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According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of
the vagueness of an expression ‘F ’ consists in its presenting borderline cases
in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F
nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic,
epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced
by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes
to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of
the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between
any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that
expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role
in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way
which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinc-
tions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability
to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected
because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it
is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach
are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitiv-
ity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt
for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical
consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In
particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of
surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to
recover a “thin” notion of a borderline case.
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Without dialogue, philosophy would be no more than a raving dream. Many
people have contributed to shaping the ideas presented in this essay. I first
want to register special debts of gratitude to five persons, thanks to whom
I can stutter some philosophy. Lucio Regaiolo was my first teacher in phi-
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is to do philosophy and what philosophy can be at its best. Sven Rosenkranz
first introduced me—among many other issues—to the problem of vagueness
during my Erasmus visit in Berlin from 2001 to 2002. Without Sven’s cru-
cial guidance on those first steps, this essay—and many other things—would
simply not exist. I’m indebted to him for this—and for much more. Crispin
Wright has been patient enough to be my supervisor for four years. Anyone
acquainted with Crispin knows what it is like to have a philosophical conver-
sation with him—an intellectual excitement whose beneficial effects linger on
for the whole day. And anyone acquainted with his ideas can tell how deeply
they have influenced these pages, and not just them. He has believed in me
and in this project: I can hardly imagine what sort of philosopher I would
have ended up being without his help and advice. Over the years, Crispin
has also been a constant example of intellectual depth, rigour, passion and
honesty. I am exceedingly proud to have him as “Doktorvater”. Patrick
Greenough has also been patient enough to be my supervisor for four years.
He’s the only person in the world capable of giving a five and a half hour
tutorial and one of the few ready to continue a philosophical discussion with
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receptiveness and support have been terrific and I have learnt from him much
of what I know about vagueness and many other philosophical topics.
I have conducted most of this research in Arche´, a research centre for
“hard-core” analytic philosophy. It’s a place where one can go on the same
day from talking about the foundations of mathematics to talking about scep-
ticism, with a little digression on the meaning of ‘I’. A philosopher’s paradise.
I have immensely benefitted from exhausting discussions on vagueness with
just about every (formal or informal) associate of the centre: Jonas A˚kerman,
JC Beall, Eline Busck, Ross Cameron, Herman Cappelen, Roy Cook, Neil
Cooper, Philip Ebert, Douglas Edwards, Kit Fine, Bob Hale, Katherine
Hawley, Richard Heck, Andri Hja´lmarsson, Ole Hjortland, Aviv Hoffmann,
Carrie Jenkins, Ira Kiourti, Michael Lynch, Roberto Loss, Federico Luzzi,
Darren McDonald, Aidan McGlynn, Paul McCallion, Paula Milne, Daniel
Nolan, Josh Parsons, Carlotta Pavese, Nikolaj Pedersen, Walter Pedriali,
Agust´ın Rayo, Stephen Read, So`nia Roca, Marcus Rossberg, Daniele Sgara-
vatti, Stewart Shapiro, Martin Smith, Andreas Stokke, Chiara Tabet, Jordi
Valor, Brian Weatherson and Robbie Williams. Special thanks go to the
members of the Arche´ Vagueness Project, which ran from 2004 to 2006 and
has been an incredible intellectual adventure. These include—in addition
to some people already mentioned—Elizabeth Barnes, Richard Dietz, Dan
Lo´pez de Sa and Sebastiano Moruzzi. Mark Sainsbury has been auditing
the project for four years, always giving very careful, detailed and construc-
tive feed-back on my work-in-progress. Graham Priest has supervised me in
the second half of 2006: I have learnt much from Graham’s extraordinary
broad-mindedness and sharp experimental spirit, which have been a great
inspiration in developing my own logical heterodoxy. Thanks are due also
to the various secretaries who have made College Street 17–9 a wonderful
working environment and have helped with lots of enigmatic administrativa:
Gill Gardner, Silvia Rescigno and especially Sharon Coull, who among other
uniquely identifying properties has also that of being the best Office Manager
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1.1 Introduction and Overview
Words like ‘bald’, ‘heap’ and ‘red’ are said to be vague, in opposition to words
like ‘prime natural number’, ‘self-identical’ and ‘triangular’, which are said
to be precise (i.e. non-vague). Vague words are said to be so because, very
roughly, their area of application is somehow blurred, not sharply delimited—
as Frege famously observed, “to represent the extensions of concepts as areas
on a plane is merely an analogy which should be employed with caution, but
which can be useful [. . . ] [a]n unsharply delimited concept would be associ-
ated with an area which, instead of having a sharp boundary everywhere, at
some places blurs into its surroundings” (Frege [1903], §56, my translation;
see Dummett [1981], pp. 33–5; van Heijenoort [1986]; Williamson [1994],
pp. 37–46 for discussions of Frege’s views on vagueness). My main questions
will be: What does this blur consist in? Why does it arise? How should we
reason in its presence?
This essay offers a new theory of vagueness. The theory needs some stage
setting before being properly introduced and this introduction is organized
accordingly. Section 2 delineates what the bearers of vagueness are with
which this essay will be concerned. Section 3 describes the main phenomena
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
of vagueness. Section 4 sketches two different approaches to theorizing about
these phenomena and introduces the theory to be developed and defended in
the rest of the essay. Section 4 outlines what this rest will amount to.
1.2 The Bearers of Vagueness
Vagueness is understood primarily to be a semantic property of linguistic
expressions (that is, a property concerning certain aspects of their mean-
ing rather than of their form), like ambiguity, abstractness, rigidity etc. (if
the language in question is context dependent, it might however be better
to attach vagueness to particular events of use of a certain linguistic ex-
pression). As in many other cases of philosophical interest, language finds
its counterpart in thought, so that it is very plausible to assume that some
concepts exhibit features analogous to those exhibited by vague words and,
again as in many other cases of philosophical interest, light on this feature
of human thought can be hoped to be shed by investigation of the public
languages which serve to express it. I will generally follow this methodolog-
ical principle, focussing mainly on the vagueness of words, but sometimes
shifting to the vagueness of concepts where it seems appropriate—my main
claims and arguments will be general enough as to apply to both language
and thought, and hopefully also to other systems of representation, like for
example pictures.
As for language, I should also stress from the start that I will make the
gross oversimplification of pretending that we speak a standard first-order
language, treating English common nouns, adjectives, verbs etc. as simple
predicates of such language. I will also consider only such predicates as
possible bearers of vagueness, leaving for another occasion the extension of
the theory to linguistic expressions belonging to other semantic categories like
singular terms, quantifiers, operators etc. (even though the logical framework
developed in chapter 4 already contains important elements for the treatment
1.3. THE PHENOMENA OF VAGUENESS 3
of the vagueness of singular terms). With so much by way of preliminaries
about the bearers of vagueness, we can turn to vagueness itself (see Rolf
[1981], pp. 150–1; Burns [1991], pp. 7–16 for more discussion on the bearers
of vagueness).
1.3 The Phenomena of Vagueness
There has been a considerable debate in the literature as to how broadly the
word ‘vagueness’ is and should be used in theorizing about language and,
relatedly, as to what the relations are between “vagueness” and other tradi-
tional semantic properties of linguistic expressions such as ambiguity, under-
specificity, context dependence etc. (see Alston [1964], p. 85; Sorensen [1989];
Sorensen [1998]; Rolf [1981], pp. 74–7; Burns [1991], pp. 16–20; Burns [1995];
Keefe and Smith [1997], pp. 5–6; Keefe [2000], pp. 10–1). This essay will fol-
low the established philosophical tradition of reserving the word ‘vagueness’
and its like for a very specific property whose phenomena we now proceed
to characterize (see Greenough [2003] for a very useful in-depth discussion
of these). A predicate will count as vague iff it exhibits all these phenom-
ena. Such a characterization is supposed to be relatively uncontroversial—the
task of a theory of vagueness will then be to explain what it is about a vague
predicate which causes these phenomena.
Sorites Susceptibility. The first and foremost phenomenon of the vague-
ness of a predicate is its seeming failure to draw a sharp boundary between its
positive and negative cases. For example, it seems preposterous to think that
there is a sharp boundary between the numbers which are small and those
which are not—that is, that there is a number i such that i is small and
i + 1 is not small (throughout, let us understand ‘small’ in such a way that
0 is indisputably small and 1,000,000 one of the first indisputably non-small
numbers).
Note that many commentators nowadays use the phrase ‘sharp boundary’
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and similar ones in a different way, such that i is a “sharp boundary” between
the small numbers and the non-small ones iff i is definitely small and i +
1 is definitely not small (see the next part on indefiniteness for more on
‘definitely’). Since the theory I will advocate in this essay has it that in this
case appearances correspond to reality and hence that ‘small’ does not in
effect draw a unit-sized boundary between its positive and negative cases, I
should wish to deviate from such contemporary usage. For the qualification
‘sharp’ and similar ones convey very well the idea that the boundary which
my theory denies to exist is unit-sized, whereas stating the theory using the
bare phrase ‘boundary’ would too easily induce the false impression that it
denies that there is any distinction at all between the small numbers and the
non-small ones. To be clear then, the first and foremost phenomenon of the
vagueness of ‘small’ is not that it is a fact that there is no number i such
that i is definitely small and i + 1 is definitely not small, but that it seems
that there is no number i such that i is small and i+ 1 is not small.
What thus seems to be the case is something which generates that par-
ticular kind of slippery-slope arguments known as ‘sorites paradoxes ’ (see
chapter 4 for a presentation and ample discussion of these), which give our
phenomenon its name and for which vagueness is usually identified as the
culprit. In my view, this is exactly as it should be, since the premises of even
the best slippery-slope arguments making use only of precise predicates like
‘ξ bricks would break a camel’s back’1 fall well short of the extreme plau-
1When I started writing this essay, I was still aiming at employing an absolutely rigorous
system of quotation. In the end, I have had to acknowledge that the complexity and
clumsiness of the notation needed to achieve the purpose would greatly override any gain
in conceptual clarity it might have served. I have thus decided to settle for a rather
promiscuous system where single quotes and display both serve in context to indicate
the appropriate quotation environment (simple quotation, quasi-quotation, autonymous
quotation etc. and combinations thereof) and where the decision as to how to interpret
the use of letters like ‘x’, ‘F ’, ‘P ’ etc. (as non-substitutional variables, or as substitutional
variables, or as schematic letters etc.) is also left to context (whereas, to avoid excessive
confusion, I stuck to maintaining a distinct notation for metalinguistic variables, using ‘ξ’,
‘Φ’, ‘ϕ’ etc.).
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sibility and peculiar immunity to demonstrable counterexamples enjoyed by
the premises of a sorites paradox.
Note also that I will assume throughout that its not being the case that
x is F and y is not F is equivalent with its being the case that, if x is
F , so is y. However, if one wishes to recognize relevantist distinctions, in
order to deal with certain recherche´ cases (see section 1.4) ‘and’ should be
understood in such contexts to denote extensional conjunction rather than
fusion (Read [1988], pp. 36–50 is probably the best philosophical discussion
of this distinction), so that the equivalence would break down (left-to-right).
Indefiniteness. The second phenomenon of the vagueness of a predicate
has just emerged and is its failure to draw a definite sharp boundary between
its positive and negative cases. For example, there is no definite sharp bound-
ary between the numbers which are small and those which are not—that is,
there is no number i such that i is definitely small and i+ 1 is definitely not
small.
Although clearly appealing to some pre-theoretical intuition, ‘definitely’
is here something of a term of art. It is best introduced ostensively by
saying that 0, 1, 2 and a few other close numbers are definitely small, that
1,000,000, 1,000,001, 1,000,002 and a few other close numbers are definitely
not small and that some numbers in the middle of the series, like 499,999,
500,000, 500,001 and a few other close numbers, are neither definitely small
nor definitely not small. It is then a major task of a theory of vagueness
using the notion of being definite to provide a theoretical explication of what
the property of being definite consists in. The contemporary literature on
vagueness does in effect provide a wide range of proposals both for an explicit
definition of ‘Definitely, ϕ’:
Semantic: Speakers’ practices determine a sufficient truth condition for
‘ϕ’, and the condition is satisfied (see e. g. Fine [1975]; McGee and
McLaughlin [1995]);
Ontic: It is a fact of the matter that ϕ (see e.g. Tye [1990]);
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Epistemic: No obstacle of a certain kind prevents knowledge that ϕ (see
e.g. Sorensen [1988], pp. 199–252; Williamson [1994]; Sorensen [2001]);
Psychological: It is correct to hold a standard (possibly partial) belief to
the effect that ϕ (see e.g. Schiffer [2003], pp. 178–237)
and for an implicit definition of it by means of a specification of the concep-
tual role of the ‘definitely’-operator (see e.g. Field [1994], pp. 409–22; Field
[2003b]).2
Note that a predicate can arguably be indefinite without thereby being
sorites susceptible. For example, a partial stipulation to the only effect that
‘small*’ is to apply positively from 0 to 499,998 and negatively from 500,001
onwards has arguably the result that the numbers from 0 to 499,998 are
definitely small*, the numbers from 500,001 onwards definitely not small*
and 499,999, 500,000 and 500,001 neither definitely small* nor definitely
not small* (see Sainsbury [1991], p. 173). Such a pattern suffices to ensure
indefiniteness, but not sorites susceptibility, since it does not seem to be the
case that, if i is small*, so is i+ 1 (in particular, it does not seem to be the
case that, if 499,998 is small*, so is 499,999).
Borderlineness. The third phenomenon of the vagueness of a predicate
is connected with indefiniteness and is its possible presentation of border-
line cases.3 For example, on each episode of consideration, some numbers
2Anticipating a little, I should note that, given the usual definition of a borderline case
as something which is neither a definitely positive case nor a definitely negative case, all
such proposals will imply that borderline cases are strong borderline cases in the sense
explained in the next part on borderlineness. Hence, for reasons I will very briefly touch
on in that part, all such proposals are unacceptable on my view. My own deflationary
story about borderline and definite cases is told in section 6.5.3.
3‘Borderline’ and its like can hardly be said to express a unique notion in ordinary
English. For example, on some uses, a 19-year-old man is a “borderline” teenager. I’m
thus going to pick up only on a fairly specific practice with the word ‘borderline’, namely
the one which associates it in a peculiar way with the other phenomena of vagueness.
Prominent in such a practice is the phenomenon to be presently introduced in the text,
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are borderline small, in the sense that not every positive or negative ‘small’-
judgement about numbers from 0 to 1,000,000 can be warranted on that
episode (this being understood as leaving it open whether each of these
judgements can be warranted on some episode of consideration or other).
This impossibility is reflected in the fact that we would prefer not to give a
positive or negative ‘small’-judgement for every number from 0 to 1,000,000
and would rather leave some cases in the middle of the series unexamined. If
forced to give such a judgement for every number in the series, we only do so
with a sense of absurdity and artificiality, as though being forced to trespass
the limits of what is warranted (see chapter 6).
This is a minimal description of borderlineness. Many commentators be-
lieve that the phenomenon allows for stronger descriptions, manifesting, on
each particular episode of consideration, a certain distinctive normative sta-
tus (either semantic, or ontic, or epistemic, or psychological, or primitive,
along the lines discussed earlier) enjoyed by some numbers in the middle of
the series quite independently of the fact that, on that episode, these num-
bers cannot be judged on pain of the sense of absurdity and artificiality just
noted. Let us refer to the possession of this alleged status as ‘strong bor-
derlineness ’. The very same notion of being definite, once provided with a
suitable theoretical explication, is then used to describe such a status, claim-
ing that some numbers in the middle of the series are neither definitely small
nor definitely not small (indeed, the property of being (strong) borderline is
usually assumed to be so defined in terms of the property of being definite
and I will normally follow suit in this respect, save for section 3.3.1).4
but arguably the practice envisages also other features not reducible to that. I rather
tentatively assume that the practice is articulated and coherent enough as to warrant the
use of the definite description ‘the pre-theoretical notion of a borderline case’ (see section
6.5.3), but not much will hinge on this assumption, so that, as far as borderlineness goes,
we can focus almost exclusively on the phenomenon about to be described.
4Greenough [2003], pp. 265–72; Cook [2005]; Zardini [2006b] contain extended analyses
of the logical relations between different versions of indefiniteness and borderlineness under
the usual definition of the property of being borderline. In this connection, I should stress
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For reasons which I cannot hope to expand on in the limited space of this
essay, I don’t think that such stronger descriptions are phenomenologically
warranted.5 To put it very briskly, it seems that nothing may be wrong with
someone who, after some reflection and in acknowledgement of the epistemic
difficulty of the situation, resolutely believes that 499,999 is small. Indeed,
it seems that nothing may be wrong with her claiming that she knows that
499,999 is small. This simple piece of data is surprisingly inconsistent with
theories which attribute strong borderlineness to 499,999 with respect to
smallness. Therefore, they should be rejected.
Ignorance. The fourth phenomenon of the vagueness of a predicate es-
calates the epistemic features of borderlineness and is our present ignorance
of a sharp boundary between its positive and negative cases (chapter 6, fn
15 critically discusses attempts at questioning this phenomenon). For ex-
ample, we are now not able to provide a warranted identification of a sharp
boundary between the small numbers and the non-small numbers on the
basis of the generally available methods used to track smallness and non-
smallness. Almost any present attempt of ours at such an identification
would be groundless—and if not rejected for this reason, any alleged such
that, on my view, while the entailment from borderlineness to indefiniteness is rather
unproblematic (but see section 3.4.2 for some possible qualms), the converse entailment
from indefiniteness to borderlineness does not hold, since it can only be established by
making use of arguments which are objectionable on the logic for vagueness that I will
develop in chapter 4.
5I owe to some of the recent writings of Crispin Wright on this issue (Wright [2001];
Wright [2003a]; Wright [2003b]; Wright [2007a]) the general idea that the traditional
philosophical picture of borderline cases as enjoying strong borderlineness is dramatically
inflated and out of touch with the data. Conversations with him over the years have been
invaluable in shaping my own views on the matter. Nevertheless, I should stress that the
radical view expressed in the text is something that Wright has never committed himself
to—indeed, while he has done much to debunk the idea that borderline cases enjoy some
kind of distinctive semantic status, in some of his writings he shows sympathy for the
idea that they still enjoy some kind of distinctive epistemic and psychological status (see
especially Wright [2001]; Wright [2007a]).
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identification would rather be taken as a demonstration that the predicate
was not, after all, vague. Note that this is not to rule out that someone else
is able to use these very same methods so as to provide such an identification
nor to rule out that there are some other methods which would enable us to
provide such an identification (see section 3.2.1 for further discussion).
The ignorance in question is thus understood to extend from lack of knowl-
edge to a more general lack of warrant, although this is not to deny that,
in an appropriately weak sense of ‘justification’ (sense in which ‘justifica-
tion’ is roughly equivalent with ‘epistemic support of some sort or other’),
one may well have a positive degree of justification in the identification of
a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases of a vague predicate.
One might for example be told by a usually reliable informant that 499,999
is the last small number. All other things being equal, one might thereby
have a positive degree of justification for believing that 499,999 is the last
small number—at least in the sense that, in so believing, one would be doing
epistemically better than believing that 499,999 is the last small number by
sheer chance (for example, by choosing at random from a list the proposi-
tion that 499,999 is the last small number). Still, one is not warranted in so
believing—given the real import of the available evidence, one is epistemi-
cally criticizable for believing that 499,999 is the last small number.6
Higher-Order Vagueness. The fifth and last phenomenon of the vagueness
of a predicate relates to all the previous ones and is the manifestation of all
6Note the contrast between the genuine phenomenon that we are ignorant of a sharp
boundary between the small numbers and the non-small numbers and the alleged phe-
nomenon that we are ignorant as to whether a borderline small number is small (or not
small). While, under some natural assumptions, ignorance with respect to each and every
borderline case would indeed entail ignorance of a sharp boundary (see section 3.2.1), the
converse entailment does not hold, since, letting i be the sharp boundary for smallness, it
may be the case that, in a certain situation, a subject s0 comes to know that i is small
and, in another situation, a subject s1 comes to know that i + 1 is not small without s0
and s1’s ever being able to pool together these pieces of knowledge in order to come to
know that i is the sharp boundary for smallness.
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the previous phenomena by the vocabulary needed to describe them. ‘Sorites
susceptible’, ‘indefinite’, ‘borderline case’ and ‘ignorant of a sharp boundary’
are all such that they seemingly fail to draw a sharp boundary between
their positive and negative cases, such that they fail to draw a definite sharp
boundary between their positive and negative cases, such that they possibly
present borderline cases and such that we are presently ignorant of a sharp
boundary between their positive and negative cases.
The literature has devoted special attention to the following borderline-
case version of this general phenomenon. The distinction between small and
non-small numbers is vague and hence there are borderline small numbers.
But the distinction between borderline small numbers and not borderline
small numbers is itself vague and hence there are borderline borderline small
numbers. But the distinction between borderline borderline small numbers
and not borderline borderline small numbers is itself vague and hence there
are borderline borderline borderline small numbers etc.7 Formal construc-
tions based on this and similar informal iterative principles have been de-
veloped and can be extended well into the transfinite (see e.g. Fine [1975],
pp. 287–98; Williamson [1999]).
At first, higher-order vagueness might look like a perplexing phenomenon,
but, rather than indicating an implicit complexity and hierarchical structure
in our understanding of what it is for a predicate to be vague, it is probably
just due to the omni-pervasiveness of vagueness in natural language (and so
in particular in words like ‘sorites susceptible’, ‘indefinite’, ‘borderline case’
and ‘ignorant of a sharp boundary’). This is not to deny, of course, that such
an omni-pervasiveness stands itself in need of an explanation (see chapter
3 for a discussion of some of the most problematic features of higher-order
vagueness).
7With respect to borderline cases, Wright [2007b] proposes a different understanding of
what higher-order vagueness should consist in. In this essay, I will stick to the traditional
understanding just sketched.
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1.4 The Theories of Vagueness
Given what the phenomena of vagueness are, I would like to contrast two
different approaches to contemporary theorizing about vagueness. On the
one hand, the dominant approach takes as basic the phenomenon of bor-
derlineness, interpreting it as strong borderlineness. Consequently, this ap-
proach sees as its main theoretical tasks the explication of the notion of
being borderline (or, equivalently, of being definite) and the explanation of
the other phenomena of vagueness (especially, sorites susceptibility, igno-
rance and higher-order vagueness) by means of the more basic phenomenon
of borderlineness.
Whatever its other merits, it is worth noting that such an approach is
in a constant danger of depriving vagueness of its status of an interesting
“natural” property of linguistic expressions, since more often than not the
explication of the notion of being borderline on offer does not discriminate
between vagueness-specific borderlineness (that is, borderlineness which is
accompanied by the other phenomena of vagueness) and a more general kind
of indeterminacy (either semantic, or ontic, or epistemic, or psychological,
or primitive) which might affect linguistic expressions (think for example of
the indeterminacy affecting the question whether a formerly two-headed man
with exactly one of his heads cut off has been beheaded).8
Vagueness is recovered by adding a (usually not very convincing) story as
8This is an instance of what Alston [1964], pp. 87–90 calls ‘combinatorial vagueness’,
distinguishing it from what he calls ‘degree vagueness’, which is vagueness in our sense.
Roughly, combinatorial vagueness arises from indeterminacy as to whether a certain pat-
tern of scoring along different dimensions relevant to the application of a predicate is
sufficient for its positive (or negative) application. Not all indeterminacy is either degree
vagueness or combinatorial vagueness: think for example of the indeterminacy affecting
the question whether an electron released at a certain time by a helium ion after being in
a superposition state is identical with the electron captured by the ion at an earlier time
(see Lowe [1994]) or, letting a and b be the two complex square roots of −1, think of the
indeterminacy affecting the question whether i = a (see Brandom [1996]).
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
to why, by some pragmatic or psychological mechanism, the relevant predi-
cates suffering from indeterminacy come to be sorites susceptible. Vagueness
turns out then to be a complex conjunctive property, one of whose conjuncts
is exemplified also by predicates like ‘beheaded’: genuinely vague predicates
like ‘bald’, ‘heap’ and ‘red’ are distinguished from it only insofar as they also
happen to satisfy a second (rather uninteresting) conjunct to the effect of
there being a pragmatic or psychological mechanism which produces sorites
susceptibility. Moreover, it also turns out that the factors usually supposed
to trigger such a mechanism (arbitrariness and unknowability of any bound-
ary that the predicate were to possess) are just as well present for predicates
like ‘ξ bricks would break a camel’s back and no one will never know that ξ
bricks would break a camel’s back’, which for all intents and purposes can
count as precise in this context (and, in particular, as not sorites susceptible),
but whose sharp boundaries are just as arbitrary and unknowable as those
that would be possessed by vague predicates.
On the other hand, the traditional approach takes as basic the phe-
nomenon of sorites susceptibility. Consequently, this approach sees as its
main theoretical tasks the explanation of this phenomenon, an account of its
relation with sorites paradoxes and the explanation of the other phenomena
of vagueness (especially, borderlineness, ignorance and higher-order vague-
ness) by means of the more basic phenomenon of sorites susceptibility. I side
squarely with the traditional approach. The kind of theory falling within it
which I should like to defend in this essay is what may aptly be called ‘a
naive theory of vagueness ’. A naive theory of vagueness holds that the key
to the nature of vagueness—to what vagueness consists in—lies in taking
sorites susceptibility at face value: very roughly, the vagueness of a pred-
icate consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between its positive
and negative cases—in what, following Wright [1975], pp. 333–4, we may call
‘its tolerance’ (sorites susceptibility can then be glossed as the appearance of
tolerance).9
9I will give some references in fn 13 as regards modern-day naive theorists. What
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Of course, this characterization needs many refinements. In its talk of
‘boundary between’, it presupposes suitable orderings of the range of signif-
icance of a predicate, which indeed do seem to be always available for vague
predicates. The characterization should also be understood as presupposing
that on at least some orderings where there is no sharp boundary there are
both positive and negative cases (so that nihilist views as espoused in Unger
[1979a]; Unger [1979b]; Unger [1979c]; Unger [1980], reference-failure views
as espoused in Wheeler [1975]; Wheeler [1979]; Braun and Sider [2007] and
incoherentist views as espoused in Dummett [1975a]; Dummett [1979] (on one
possible understanding of this author’s contention); Rolf [1981], pp. 116–49;
Rolf [1984] are ruled out from naivety) and as presupposing that such positive
and negative cases are “positive-only” and “negative-only” respectively (so
that dialetheist views as briefly mooted in Priest [2003], p. 9 and incoherentist
views as espoused in Dummett [1975a]; Dummett [1979] (on another possible
understanding of this author’s contention) are ruled out from naivety). Pos-
sibly with the exception of certain recherche´ cases to be discussed shortly,
the characterization should further be understood as presupposing the cor-
rectness of the inference from x’s being a positive (negative) case (together
with the relevant instance of tolerance) to anything very close to x in the
relevant ordering also being a positive (negative) case—that is, as presup-
posing the validity of modus ponendo ponens and of attendant arguments
like modus ponendo tollens (so that all the many different views according to
which these arguments are invalid, as espoused in Peacocke [1981]; Hyde and
other kinds of theories or positions belong to the traditional approach? Unsurprisingly,
most ancient positions do (see Masson-Oursel [1912], pp. 820–4; Moline [1969]; Barnes
[1982]; Burnyeat [1982]; Sillitti [1984]; Mignucci [1993]; Bobzien [2002] for presentation
of some of these). Many modern nihilist, reference-failure and incoherentist theories do
(the clearest cases are Dummett [1975a]; Dummett [1979]; Unger [1979a]; Unger [1979b];
Unger [1979c]; Unger [1980]; Rolf [1981], pp. 116–49; Rolf [1984]; Eklund [2001]; Eklund
[2005]). Some theories exploiting the formalism of fuzzy logic do (a clear case is Priest
[1998]). Most prominently nowadays, many contextualist views do (the clearest cases are
Raffman [1994]; Raffman [1996]; Fara [2000]).
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Sylvan [1993]; Hyde [1997]; Priest [1998]; Varzi [2000], are ruled out from
naivety). The characterization should finally be understood as presupposing
that there only need not to exist one sharp boundary between positive and
negative cases (so that ‘ξ is in her early thirties’ does count as vague, see
Weatherson [2005b], p. 2).
Even when such and similar refinements are in place, I am under no
illusion that anomalies may still arise requiring yet further qualifications.
Just to give an example, it might be the case that a certain predicate ‘F ’ is
such that, on a relevant ordering from F s to non-F s:
• It is in some sense unsettled whether a certain object x is F (where
‘unsettled’ is used of course in such a way as not to imply10 attribution
of strong borderlineness);
• It is intuitively correct to deny the conditional that, if x is F , so is
some object following x in the ordering;
• It seems that no sharp boundary is drawn by ‘F ’ before x.
‘ξ is not very late and ξ is at most 10 minutes late’ might be such a predicate
(I am extrapolating here from an example of Weatherson [2006], pp. 4–5
what seems to me really problematic for the naive theory). Intuitively, if x
is F , ‘F ’ is not vague and, if x is not F , ‘F ’ is vague, and so it is unsettled
whether ‘F ’ is vague. However, it is not the case that, if x is F , so is some
object following x in the ordering and hence we would be forced to accept
that ‘F ’ is not vague after all.
One reply would be to restrict the naive theory of vagueness to “basic
cases” of vague predicates and to explain the vagueness of other predicates
as arising in virtue of the vagueness of some basic predicates occurring in
10Following a rather established usage, I will throughout use ‘implication’ and its like
to denote the operation expressed by ‘If ϕ then ψ’, ‘entailment’ and its like to denote the
converse of logical consequence (see section 5.1).
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them (or in the meaning explanations which introduce them).11 If one is
sceptic as to whether a workable notion of a “basic vague predicate” can be
made out and wants to preserve the intuition that it is unsettled whether
‘F ’ is vague, I suggest that one should drop the fusion version of tolerance
from the naive theory (of course, if one does not recognize any admissible
sense of ‘and’ which does not collapse on extensional conjunction, the prob-
lem does not arise in the first place, since the relevant negated extensional
conjunction is unsettled). This would be of course not to deny that a naive
theorist can still hold that satisfaction of the fusion version of tolerance is
a highly reliable—though not infallible—guide to vagueness. I would offer
the same two options in the case of predicates which are intuitively vague
but whose meaning is such that at most one object belongs to their exten-
sion and so such that the fusion version of tolerance arguably fails for them
(like ‘ξ is identical to Kilimanjaro’, ‘ξ is the best football player ever’, ‘ξ is
my favourite dish’). Analogous remarks apply to sorites susceptibility as a
relatively uncontroversial necessary condition for vagueness.
It is easy to see how a naive theory of vagueness, together with the as-
sumption that its truth is available to vague-concepts users, can explain the
various phenomena of vagueness:
• A vague predicate seems to fail to draw a sharp boundary between its
positive and negative cases just because it indeed fails to do so and this
truth is available to vague-concepts users;
• Factivity of ‘definitely’ ensures that, if a vague predicate fails to draw
a sharp boundary between its positive and negative cases, it also fails
to draw a definite sharp boundary between them;
• If, for every case in a series, either a positive or a negative ‘small’-
judgement about it were warranted, given that it is usually not vague
which judgement is given about a particular case, it would follow, to-
gether with some natural assumptions about which judgements can be
11Thanks to Sebastiano Moruzzi for this suggestion.
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warranted, that, in a series starting with positive cases, there usually
is a last case which is warrantedly judged to be positive followed by a
case which is warrantedly judged to be negative. The judger’s warrant
to issue both these judgements is defeated by the availability to her, a
vague-concepts user, of the truth that there is no sharp boundary in
the series between positive and negative cases (in the case of knowl-
edge and other factive epistemic properties, an even more straightfor-
ward explanation is available, since factivity of ‘know’ ensures that, if
a vague predicate fails to draw a sharp boundary between its positive
and negative cases, no object is known to be a sharp boundary between
them);12
• The availability to a vague-concepts user of the truth that there is no
sharp boundary between positive and negative cases defeats her war-
rant for identifying any object as the sharp boundary between positive
and negative cases (again, in the case of knowledge and other factive
epistemic properties, an even more straightforward explanation is avail-
able on the lines just sketched for borderlineness);
• An account of the sources of lack of sharp boundaries (as the one offered
in chapter 2) will show them to be general enough as to predict that
expressions like ‘sorites susceptible’, ‘indefinite’, ‘borderline case’ and
‘ignorant of a sharp boundary’ are also affected by them.
This explanatory power of the naive theory of vagueness is admirable.
To my mind, together with its undeniable apparent self-evidence, it makes
it the theory which must be defeated if it is not to be accepted. In the
rest of this essay, I will be concerned part with strengthening even more the
theory’s credentials, both by offering detailed arguments for its main claim
(chapter 2) and by working out its explanation of borderlineness (chapter 6);
part with defending it in the face of the paradoxes of vagueness, by showing
12I’m skipping over important subtleties here: see chapter 6 for an elaborate and specific
development of this kind of explanation.
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how sorites paradoxes do not really tell specifically against it (chapter 3), by
providing both a suitable logic which makes the theory consistent (chapter
4) and a general philosophical commentary to the main innovative feature of
the logic (chapter 5) and by addressing a non-inferential paradox (chapter
6). Together with the apparent self-evidence and the explanatory fruitfulness
just reviewed, I will regard success in these tasks to constitute a powerful
cumulative argument in favour of the naive theory.13
13In modern times, the naive theory of vagueness has had very few defenders, probably
because of the considerable technical and conceptual difficulties involved in stabilizing it.
Ziff [1974], pp. 530–1; Ziff [1984], pp. 140–4 constitute lively, if brisk, endorsements of
the theory, echoing many pre-theoretical intuitions elicited by vagueness and the sorites
paradox. Weiss [1976] presents a carefully crafted framework aimed at accommodating the
theory: unfortunately, the framework is arguably misconceived in some of its key aspects
and, in any event, lacks the required generality, dealing as it does only with induction
versions of the sorites paradox. The same lack of generality affects the remarks in favour
of the theory in Vopeˇnka [1979], pp. 33–4, whose controversial mathematical apparatus,
while providing an explanation of the failure of induction on vague properties, does nothing
to explain what goes wrong in more elementary versions of the sorites paradox (as those
studied in chapter 4), which make use only of simple rules of inference such asmodus ponens
(classical logic goes unchallenged throughout Vopeˇnka’s monograph). Kamp [1981] is a
very rich and stimulating discussion of several importantly different context-dependent
consequence relations: the spirit of the proposal is certainly aligned with the naive theory,
accepting that there is no sharp boundary between positive and negative cases, even
though one prominent family of consequence relations in Kamp’s study fail to validate
modus ponens (and attendant arguments) and his discussion of another prominent family
is unfortunately marred by an ill-motivated constraint on their model theory. Parikh
[1983] is a most insightful discussion, to which this essay is greatly indebted: the final
pages (which should be read along with their technical companion Parikh [1971]) contain
a very brief sketch of how the naive theory should be developed and have been a source of
inspiration for my own account. Although I disagree with much of its details, Rasmussen
[1986] also develops some interesting lines in defence of the theory. Finally, Gaifman [2007]
constitutes a significant recent defence of the theory: his arguments in favour of tolerance
are however not very convincing and the consistency of the theory is achieved only at the
cost of highly counterintuitive contextual domain restrictions.
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1.5 Plan
As I have just anticipated, the plan for the rest of this essay will be as
follows. Chapter 2 provides a battery of arguments to the effect that tolerance
is indeed a necessary condition for some of our concepts to serve in the
achievement of certain important theoretical and practical purposes which
have traditionally been associated with vagueness. Chapter 3 shows how,
once higher-order vagueness is taken seriously, higher-order sorites paradoxes
fully analogous to standard sorites paradoxes can be developed by making
use of borderlineness principles instead of tolerance principles. Chapter 4
develops a family of logics which, by placing principled restrictions on the
transitivity of the consequence relation, invalidate the sorites paradox and
make the naive theory consistent. Chapter 5 discusses some of the main issues
involved in making sense of reasoning in a non-transitive logic. Chapter 6
offers a solution to another problem widely discussed in the contemporary
debate on vagueness and uses it to explain the borderlineness phenomenon
without recourse to strong borderline cases.
Before concluding this introduction, a word on at least some of the issues
that, for reasons of space, will not be discussed in this essay, but would
certainly have to be taken into account in a fuller treatment of the topic. As
I have already said, I have not developed another important part of my views
on vagueness, namely the rejection of the existence of strong borderline cases,
since, while this doctrine certainly chimes with the traditional approach and
in particular with a naive theory of vagueness, it is strictly speaking not
required by them. Nor have I addressed the many interesting issues arising at
the interface with metaphysics: in particular, I have not considered the vexed
question as to whether vagueness is a linguistic or ontic phenomenon and I
have not tackled a metaphysical problem which vagueness appears to give rise
to (the well-known problem of the many), even though (as it might transpire
from some of the remarks in chapter 2 and in section 1.4 respectively) I do
have my own views on both these issues. Nor have I been able to go into
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the complex range of issues specifically pertaining to so-called “phenomenal
sorites”, in particular into the question of the nature and properties of the
indiscriminability relation. Nor have I tried to determine what bearing the
technical and conceptual apparatus developed especially in chapters 4 and
5 respectively may have on the debate on strict finitism. Finally, save for
some cursory remarks, I have also quite generally not discussed in any decent
detail extant alternative approaches to the problems I am concerned with,
preferring to focus instead on the articulation of the positive arguments and
considerations in favour of my views.
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Chapter 2
Seconde Na¨ıvete´
2.1 Introduction and Overview
There is a very general schematic principle that an 1ary predicate ‘F ’ might
satisfy, principle which would arguably reveal to us something very inter-
esting about ‘F ’ (and about the F s themselves). If R is a particular (re-
flexive, symmetric but possibly non-transitive) relation of closeness along a
dimension of comparison relevant for being F , the schematic principle can
be expressed as follows:
(N) For every x, y such that x Rs y and y is otherwise just the way x is (at
least as far as ways relevant for being F are concerned), it is not the
case that x is F and y is not F .
For example, plausible instances of (N) are:
(Nsmall) For every numbers x, y such that [either x = y + 1 or x = y or
x = y − 1] and y is otherwise just the way x is (at least as far as ways
relevant for being small are concerned), it is not the case that x is small
and y is not small;
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(Nhigh) For every mountains x, y such that x is at most one nanometre either
higher or lower than y and y is otherwise just the way x is (at least as
far as ways relevant for being high are concerned), it is not the case
that x is high and y is not high;
(Nrich) For every persons x, y such that x has at most one penny more or
less than y and y is otherwise just the way x is (at least as far as ways
relevant for being rich are concerned), it is not the case that x is rich
and y is not rich.
Before proceeding further, three important remarks concerning (N) and
my understanding of it should be made. Firstly, the qualification ‘y is oth-
erwise just the way x is (at least as far as ways relevant for being F are con-
cerned)’ is intended to take care of the phenomenon of multi-dimensionality
so frequently occurring with vague predicates—that is, of the fact that the
correctness of the application of many a vague predicate to a particular item
depends on the item’s location on at least two distinct dimensions of com-
parison. For example, the correctness of an application of ‘bald’ to a man
depends not only on the number of hairs on his scalp, but also on their dis-
tribution, density, thickness etc. Because of multi-dimensionality, the simple
no-sharp-boundaries principle that it is not the case that [a man is bald and
a man with just one more hair on his scalp is not],1 is, strictly speaking,
false: a man with a sufficient number i of hairs, widely distributed, homoge-
neously dense and appropriately thick may well count as non-bald, whereas
a man with i − 1 hairs so poorly distributed as to cover only a square cen-
timetre of his scalp, so heterogeneously dense as to leave a hairless circle in
the middle, so thin as to be invisible will count as bald. Therefore, simple
no-sharp-boundaries principles like the one just mentioned apply straightfor-
wardly only to uni-dimensional predicates—in the case of multi-dimensional
ones, a no-sharp-boundaries principle applies on a particular dimension of
comparison only under the assumption that the values of the other dimen-
1Throughout, I will use square brackets to disambiguate scope in English.
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sions are held constant. Hence the need for the qualification ‘y is otherwise
just the way x is (at least as far as ways relevant for being F are concerned)’.
Secondly, (N) has almost universally been thought to be inconsistent with
there being both positive and negative cases of Fness which (possibly) differ
with respect to the R-relevant dimension of comparison but are otherwise
identical (at least as far as ways relevant for being F are concerned). The
inconsistency is supposed to be revealed by the kind of argument long known
as ‘sorites paradox’. I will show in chapter 4 that a satisfactory weakening
of the logic exists in which principles of the form of (N) are consistent with
the existence of the relevant positive and negative cases. In the following,
I will argue that we do use some of our predicates so as to conform to the
relevant instances of (N)—or, at any rate, that such a use is a necessary
condition for achieving some important theoretical and practical purposes.
As a consequence of the logical point just mentioned, I will neither accept
nor consider the overall objection to my arguments to the effect that they
must be wrong since our use of the predicates in question is consistent—or
since no important theoretical or practical purpose requires an inconsistent
theory—whilst (N), together with the aforementioned assumptions, would
breed inconsistency. It just needn’t be so.
Thirdly, what I propose to do in this chapter is to investigate whether
giving up (N) is a viable option in our theoretical and practical life. In this
regard, I should note that I’m actually much less interested in the categorical,
empirical and sociological claim that we in effect use some of our predicates
so as to conform to (N) than I am in the hypothetical, philosophical and
normative claim that such a use would achieve important theoretical and
practical purposes—or, at least, is a necessary condition for achieving such
purposes. I do find the arguments to follow compelling also with respect
to our actual use and will therefore argue for the stronger conclusion, but
I will ultimately rest content with simply showing that such a use is fully
intelligible, highly valuable and hardly dispensable. Once its fine architecture
and details have been brought out, I hope it will be clear that, even if it is
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not our actual use, it is something we should strive to incorporate into our
conceptual repertoire.
Clearly, principles of the form of (N) bear some interesting relation to
vagueness. Indeed, the naive theory of vagueness holds, very roughly, that
satisfaction of some such principle is what vagueness of a predicate ultimately
consists in—what the nature of vagueness is (see section 1.4). Suitably devel-
oped and refined, this is the theory I aim to defend in this essay. Admittedly,
the vindication of such a theory is no simple task (important aspects of it
have been and will be considered throughout this essay), but a crucial part
of the dialectic against its rivals consists in exposing the high costs of giving
up the connection between a predicate’s vagueness and the satisfaction of
some principle of the form of (N).
From the point of view of the naive theory of vagueness, such satisfaction
is what vagueness consists in, and so what these principles are for (the other-
wise impossible achievement of important theoretical and practical purposes
to be presently described) is what vagueness is for. In denying that such
satisfaction is what vagueness consists in—indeed, in denying that such sat-
isfaction is ever so much a necessary condition for vagueness—the rivals of the
naive theory commit themselves to denying that vagueness is conducive to
these important theoretical and practical purposes. Moreover, since it is very
plausible that vagueness would be so conducive if anything were, the rivals
commit themselves to denying that such purposes can possibly be achieved.
Therefore, the more valuable these purposes can be shown to be, the less
appealing the rivals will appear. This specific part of the dialectic is what
this chapter tries to accomplish, and, granting the success of the overarching
project, what this part would then amount to is an exhibition of the grounds
of the vagueness of a predicate—of what the sources of vagueness are. Let
me stress that, even though I will identify several such sources, the discussion
will by no means be meant to be exhaustive. Other sources of this complex
phenomenon wait to be uncovered.
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Before embarking in the details of this part of the dialectic, let me stress
that it is on my view akin to the one involving the naive theory of truth.
Even though, contrary to a highly suggestive line of thought put forward by
some prominent commentators (McGee [1991]; Tappenden [1993]; Soames
[1999]; Field [2003b]), I don’t think that the problems concerning absolute
semantic notions and those concerning vagueness have a common root, I do
think that, just as a strong case can be made that nothing falling short of the
naive theory of truth can do justice to our use of the concept of truth (and
related semantic concepts such as reference, denotation, satisfaction etc.) as
picking out a universal property of representational correctness (or, if you
prefer, as fulfilling the function of a universal device of disquotation), an at
least equally strong case can be made that nothing falling short of the naive
theory of vagueness can do justice to great a many features of our use of
vague concepts. This case will be set out in the following. Indeed, as will
be seen, in the case of vague concepts, as opposed to the case of truth (and
related semantic concepts), this strategy can be developed with respect to
significantly different and apparently independent features of our use of such
concepts, which partly explains why sometimes satisfaction of principles of
the form of (N) will only be argued to be a necessary condition for a particular
feature of use to achieve its purpose.
I also happen to think that seeing our way through the paradoxes which
seem to jeopardize these theories (respectively, the semantic paradoxes and
the sorites paradox) requires a deep rethinking of aspects naturally associated
with the notion of logical consequence (though a different aspect is concerned
in each case). As far as the naive theory of vagueness is concerned, this issue
will be taken up in chapter 5.
Given this logical heterodoxy (which will be advocated and developed
in chapters 4, 5), a last word is owed about the logic used in the infor-
mal deductive arguments throughout this essay. All these arguments are, I
hope, classically valid. They all only appeal, I hope, to what are in context
intuitively acceptable principles (there might be some exceptions involving
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e.g. use of the law of excluded middle—where this is the case, I usually try to
indicate how the argument may be modified in order to reach similar conclu-
sions). Some of them are certainly not formally valid according to any of the
logics developed in chapter 4. This presents us with a new instance of the
well-known problem of, to put it somewhat roughly, recovering in context a
logic stronger than that to which one has committed oneself to.
As will emerge in chapter 4, the only fault I find with classical logic as
far as vagueness is concerned is that, by sorites reasoning, it allows us to
use intuitively correct tolerance principles to go down the slippery slopes
associated with vague predicates. I thus regard a classically valid argument
as unacceptable (if and) only if it is soritical (the notion could be made
more precise, but I trust that we already have a workable understanding of
which arguments are soritical and will leave it at that in this essay). The
question becomes then how to justify, in the face of the proposed weakening
of the logic, the classically valid arguments which, although formally invalid
(according to the proposed weakening), are not soritical (call these ‘the good
classical arguments ’).
There are different strategies for doing this. One strategy would be to
accept extra premises which, when added to the premises of a good classical
argument, transform it into a formally valid argument. The extra premises
would be accepted on the grounds that they are true given that the original
good classical argument is not soritical. It is actually not straightforward to
implement this strategy in the case of the particular weakening of the logic
proposed in chapter 4—this would require the addition of new operators to
the language in order to express the needed extra premises, something which
I will not try to do in this essay. For this and other reasons, I regard this
strategy as at best very unnatural in the present case.
Another strategy, which in other cases would be barely distinguishable
from the first one, is to accept that classical logic is valid in the context
represented by a good classical argument, so that the argument turns out to
be after all formally valid. Classical logic would be accepted as valid in the
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context represented by a good classical argument on the grounds that the
argument is not soritical. I regard this strategy as violating the universality
implicit in the very formality of formal validity, and at best as a radically
misconceived attempt at pursuing what is indeed a different, third strategy.
I myself would prefer this third strategy, which accepts good classical
arguments as materially, even though not formally, valid (see Read [1994]
for an illuminating discussion of the distinction between formal and material
validity). A materially valid argument is, roughly, an argument which is
valid at least partly in virtue of the occurrences in it of certain non-logical2
expressions (see section 5.1). For example, the argument ‘There is nothing
in the bottle. Therefore, the bottle is empty’, even though formally invalid
(since we may assume that the most specific argument form it instantiates
is ‘There is no x such that x Rs a. Therefore, a is F ’), is intuitively valid
in virtue of the occurrences in it of the expressions ‘there is nothing’, ‘in’
and ‘empty’.3 Of course, it is a major task in the philosophy of logic to
specify the grounds for this intuitive judgement of validity, a task which I
will not attempt to undertake in this essay. Here, I will rest content with
pointing out, on behalf of the friends of material validity, that it seems very
plausible that, whatever story is ultimately told about the grounds of the
validity of ‘There is nothing in the bottle. Therefore, there is nothing in the
bottle or snow is white’ (a story which will presumably involve the logical
expression ‘or’ and talk about either some form of deducibility or about some
form of truth preservation), it will also be possible to tell an analogous story
about the grounds of material validity (that is, a story which will presumably
involve the relevant non-logical expressions and talk about either some form
2Throughout, I assume a rough-and-ready understanding of logicality. Nothing will
hinge on the fine details of this complex notion (see Go´mez-Torrente [2002a] for a recent
critical introduction to the issue).
3Note that, while the first strategy too could be applied in this case (by supplying the
extra premise ‘For every x, if there is nothing in x, then x is empty’), the second strategy
is a non-starter, since the argument form in question is not even classically valid and, to
put it somewhat roughly, no supra-classical logic is formal.
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of deducibility or about some form of truth preservation).
I take it to be a fact of life that some arguments strike us as correct not
in virtue merely of their abstract logical form, but at least partly in virtue of
their specific subject matter, which is crucially determined by the occurrences
in them of non-logical expressions. The notion of material validity enables
us then to take these appearances at face value (what the first strategy can
never do and, as argued in fn 3, the second strategy cannot always do).
It thereby entitles us to reason (i.e. draw inferences) in ways which, albeit
not sanctioned by the peculiar universality attaching to logical formality, are
intuitively correct at least partly in virtue of substantial non-logical details of
the subject matter at hand. It makes our understanding of ‘in’ and ‘empty’
a genuine source of reason no less than our understanding of ‘or’.
To come to the application of the formal/material distinction employed by
the present strategy, good classical arguments are accepted as materially valid
on the grounds that examination of the non-logical vocabulary occurring in
them reveals that they are not soritical. Anticipating a little, let us consider
as an example the following argument, given in section 2.2.3:
[S]uppose that x is not close enough [. . . ] Then, by (WO), on at
least some occasion it can be known by casual observation that
x is not close enough, and so, by (SI), on no occasion can it be
known by casual observation that y is close enough. But then,
by (WO), y is not close enough.
For present purposes, the argument can informally be regimented as ‘x is
not close enough; If x is not close enough, then on at least some occasion
it can be known by casual observation that x is not close enough; If on at
least some occasion it can be known by casual observation that x is not close
enough, then on no occasion can it be known by casual observation that y
is close enough; If on no occasion can it be known by casual observation
that y is close enough, then y is not close enough. Therefore, y is not close
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enough’, which instantiates the argument form ‘P0; If P0, then P1; If P1, then
P2; If P2, then P3. Therefore, P3’. According to all the logics developed in
chapter 4, this argument form is invalid, and so the argument itself which
instantiates it is not formally valid. Indeed, it is bound not to be so, since
the same argument form is instantiated by the argument ‘0 is small; If 0 is
small, so is 1; If 1 is small, so is 2; If 2 is small, so is 3. Therefore, 3 is small’,
which no naive theory of vagueness should be willing to recognize as valid.
Still, I accept the conclusion of the argument in section 2.2.3. Indeed,
I accept it on the grounds of the argument provided, and I do so because
I recognize that argument to be (materially) valid, even though it is not
formally so. I recognize the argument to be materially valid at least partly
because of the occurrences in it of certain non-logical expressions. In this
and other cases of interest in the present context, it is not so much that,
intuitively speaking, there is something “positive” about the occurrences of
the non-logical expressions (‘close enough’, ‘on’, ‘occasion’, ‘can’, ‘know’,
‘casual observation’) which contribute to the validity of the argument (as
was the case, on the contrary, for the previous argument involving ‘in’ and
‘empty’)—it is rather that there is nothing “negative” about them, nothing
which makes the argument soritical and hence objectionable. From the point
of view of the logics developed in chapter 4, the formal invalidity of the
argument shows that the occurrences in it of the logical expression ‘If ϕ, then
ψ’ do not suffice to ensure the nexus of consequence between the premises
and the conclusion—such is the lesson of the sorites paradox with regard
to the logical power of conditional chains. What does so suffice is rather
the combination of those occurrences with the occurrences of non-logical
expressions ruling out the soriticality of the argument.4,5
4Thanks to Stephen Read for pressing me to think hard about my employment of the
formal/material distinction in developing this strategy.
5In closing this digression, let me make clear that, despite my preference for the third
strategy just considered, I don’t take myself to have adjudicated here on this difficult issue
in the philosophy of logic. The reader who is attracted by the general outlook of this essay
is invited to reconstruct the good classical arguments contained in it according to her
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 shows what (N)
allows us to think about the world in terms of classifications of objects which
can sort them into interesting theoretical, practical and emotional kinds,
be flexible and be achievable by relying only on casually available evidence.
Section 3 shows what (N) allows us to experience of the world in terms of
seamless changes and appearances (the stark distinction between the two
sections is partly dictated by presentational needs: as will be seen, some
arguments really pertain to both sides). Section 4 draws the conclusions
which follow from the specific arguments given for what, according to the
naive theory of vagueness, the sources of vagueness are.
2.2 Thoughts Requiring the Absence of Sharp
Boundaries
2.2.1 Irrelevant Differences
In this first section, I want to expand on and generalize a suggestive line of
thought first put forward by Wright [1975] (cf Wright [1976]). In considering
the high plausibility of principles of the form of (N) for age nouns like ‘child’,
‘adolescent’, ‘adult’ etc., Wright remarked that the classifications induced by
such nouns “are of substantial social importance in terms of what we may ap-
propriately expect from, and of, persons who exemplify them” (Wright [1975],
p. 336). He then observed that, on the one hand, “[i]t would be irrational
and unfair to base substantial distinctions of right and duty on marginal – or
even non-existent – such differences” and that, on the other hand, “[o]nly if a
substantial change is involved in the transition from childhood to adolescence
can we appeal to this transition to explain substantial alterations in patterns
of behaviour” (Wright [1975], p. 337). On these grounds, he concluded that,
for such age nouns, “very small differences cannot be permitted to generate
favoured strategy.
2.2. THOUGHTS REQUIRING THE ABSENCE ETC. 31
doubt about their application without correspondingly coming to be associ-
ated with a burden of moral and explanatory distinctions which they are too
slight to convey” (Wright [1975], p. 337).
I think we can extract from this the following quite general pattern of
requirements of respectively important and unimportant differences that we
sometimes impose on being F . That is, sometimes:
(ID) We attach great importance to being F rather than falling in some
sense short of being such;6
(UD) We do not attach any great importance to minute differences with
respect to the R-relevant dimension of comparison.
Before proceeding to apply this pattern beyond age nouns, it is important
to clarify the function in this dialectical context of the phrase ‘falling in some
sense short of being F ’ and its like. In the diverse arena of contemporary
theories of vagueness, there are many different ways in which x can fall short
of being F without thereby being guaranteed to be not F . The range of the
alternative honorific candidates is wide and well-known:
• Negation of the negation of the proposition that x is F , accompanying
rejection7 or even negation of the proposition that x is F ;
• Negation of the proposition that x is unF (where ‘unF ’ is the proximate
contrary of ‘F ’), accompanying negation of the proposition that x is F ;
6Focus on the (possibly) weaker requirement that we attach great importance to being
F rather than not being such and consequent failure to pay due heed to the stronger (ID)
seem to me to flaw the considerations advanced in Sainsbury [1989], pp. 38–9; Sainsbury
[1995], p. 28.
7Throughout, rejection (along with denial, its speech-act manifestation) will be un-
derstood as a primitive attitude on a par with acceptance—in particular, it will not be
presupposed that it implies or is implied by acceptance of the corresponding negation
(see Parsons [1984]; Smiley [1996]; Tappenden [1999]; Rumfitt [2000]; Field [2003b]; Priest
[2006b], pp. 103–15 for various arguments in favour of positing this distinctive attitude).
32 CHAPTER 2. SECONDE NAI¨VETE´
• Negation of the proposition that x is either F or not F ;
• Rejection of the negation of the proposition that x is F , accompanying
rejection that x is F ;
• Rejection that x is either F or not F ;
• Negation of the proposition that it is true that x is not F , accompanying
negation of the proposition that it is true that x is F (or negation of
the proposition that ‘x is not F ’ is true, accompanying negation of the
proposition that ‘x is F ’ is true), and higher-order variations thereof;
• Negation of the proposition that it is definitely (or determinately, or
clearly etc.) the case that x is not F , accompanying negation of the
proposition that it is definitely (or determinately, or clearly etc.) the
case that x is F , and higher-order variations thereof;
• Acceptance that x is F only to some intermediary degree
and many others.
Relatedly, even better established are attempts at formulating principles
which, while weaker than those licensed by (N), still try to preserve some of
the intuitive force behind them, mostly by also allowing some strengthening
of the original supposition that x is F . Some such principles are:
• If x is definitely (or determinately, or clearly etc.) F , then y is not
definitely (or not determinately, or not clearly etc.) not F (and their
truth-theoretic analogues);
• If x is definitely (or determinately, or clearly etc.) F , then y is F (and
their truth-theoretic analogues);
• It is not both acceptable that x is F and rejectable that y is F ;
• If x is F to a certain degree, y is F at least to a not significantly smaller
degree.
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Even setting aside the question of their (doubtful) dialectical efficacy in pre-
serving the spirit of (N) (without its alleged paradoxical consequences), such
principles will be irrelevant here, our assumption being just the plain one
that x is F , and our question being what follows from that with respect to
y’s Fness.
To conclude this clarification, I will henceforth use the catch-all phrase
‘falling in some sense short of being F ’ and its like for every alternative hon-
orific candidate to being F . As a first approximation, the class of all such
alternative honorific candidates can usefully be delimited by the condition
that exemplifying the candidate is inconsistent with exemplifying Fness.8
We are now ready to expand on (ID) and (UD) following through their con-
sequences for the truth of principles of the form of (N) and also ready to
generalize their range of application to cases beyond age nouns. We will ac-
complish both tasks in one go by considering cases of predicates belonging
to the realms of theory (both scientific and ordinary), action and feeling.
Theory. Suppose that x is a dog. Suppose that y differs from x at most
for the fact that one of y’s atoms is in a location which is within a nanometre
distance from the location correlating to the location of the corresponding
atom part of x. Then it should be correct to assert that y is a dog as well—
anything falling in some sense short of this would seem to draw an arbitrary
difference between x’s and y’s animal status based on a difference, such as
the nanometrical displacement of a single atom, which we perceive to be fully
irrelevant for dogs.
The reason for the perceived irrelevance seems clear enough. Purport-
ing to pick out a biological kind, doghood, our concept of dog is supposed
to individuate an objectively distinguished feature of nature. We aim at de-
scribing important biological facts by referring to instantiation of such a kind
8Note that, if e. g. an epistemic spin in terms of clarity is given to the notion of de-
terminacy, then the relevant alternative honorific candidate is negation of the proposition
that it is clearly the case that x is not F , accompanying negation of the proposition that
it is clearly the case that x is F and acceptance that x is, after all, not F .
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by a living being rather than instantiation of anything falling in some sense
short of it.9 In its small and limited way, doghood is thus thought to “carve
nature at its joints”. But there is no relevant biological joint to be carved
in a nanometrical difference of one atom’s location: life just doesn’t go that
deep. Thus, under the supposition that x is a dog, we are forced to reject
any predication about y entailing that y falls in some sense short of being
a dog, and so we are forced to accept that y is a dog. (To counter a likely
rejoinder, note that rejection that y falls in some sense short of being a dog,
accompanying rejection that y is a dog, was itself understood to be—in a
typically reflexive way—one of the senses in which y can fall short of being
a dog.) By reductio, the truth of the relevant instance of (N) follows.
Analogously to Wright’s discussion of age nouns, the irrelevance of nano-
metrical differences can be made to emerge also from a different angle. We
may assume that, under certain circumstances, x reacted in a certain way to
the ingestion of a certain pill because x is a dog. But, certainly, it is not the
case that x reacted in that way because x’s atoms are arranged in at most
such and such distances from one another and it is not the case that the
distance of even just two of them is a nanometre greater: in such a context,
that x falls on one side rather than the other of such an exquisite distinction
has no scientific explanatory interest, as opposed to its falling on one side
rather than the other of the distinction between being a dog and falling in
some sense short of being such. This situation can be usefully contrasted
with clear cases of reduction of a higher-level property to a lower-level prop-
erty (even when the explanation in question is an explanation of action):
assuming that the fact that there was water in the glass is a good (even
though partial) explanation of the fact that Nancy reached for the glass, so
is the fact that there was H2O in the glass. Thus, by reductio, the property of
being a dog cannot be coextensive with any sharply bounded property (that
is, a property which discriminates with the highest possible degree of preci-
9Throughout, I will often make use of kind- and property-talk. This is only for ease of
exposition and should be considered as ultimately dispensable.
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sion between objects which exemplify it and object which fall in some sense
short of exemplifying it). Since it would be so coextensive if the relevant
instance of (N) were not to be accepted, the relevant instance of (N) is to be
accepted.10
In presupposing that, if (N) is not to be accepted, the distinction between
being a dog and falling in some sense short of being such must be nanomet-
rical, this argument presupposes an exhaustive bipartition on the relevant
domain between dogs and objects falling in some sense short of being such,
and such bipartition in turn presupposes the truth of the relevant instances
of the law of excluded middle. But the argument can easily be restated
without this assumption: even in a logical framework where the law of ex-
cluded middle fails (for various proposals on how to do this in the case of
vagueness, see Burgess and Humberstone [1987]; Tappenden [1993]; Soames
[1999]; Wright [2001]; Field [2003a]), it would be correct to say that there is
no explanatory interest in the fact that x falls on one side rather than the
other of a distinction which is denied to be any coarser than one determined
by a nanometrical difference of one atom’s location. (Note that, even by the
lights of the just mentioned proposals on which the law of excluded middle
fails, the universal closure of the relevant instance of (N) must be rejected,
since, together with uncontroversial assumptions, it leads to contradiction.)
The point can be made in an equally forceful and yet tellingly slightly
different way for concepts which do not purport to pick out natural kinds.
Consider the concept of baldness. It too is entrenched in a sophisticated (folk)
theory—about the physiological causes of baldness, the way bald persons
look, the social import of baldness etc. But, on the one hand, none of these
diverse aspects discriminate importantly between neighbouring numbers of
hairs on a person’s scalp: two causes such that one differs from the other
only in causing the loss of just one more hair are not importantly different,
one’s look is not importantly altered by the addition of a single hair, nor
10I owe the inspiration for this argument from explanation to a remark put to me by
Stephen Schiffer.
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is one’s social impact. On the other hand, baldness is supposed always to
affect importantly these aspects. We expect any other state of a person’s
scalp falling in some sense short of being bald to be due to substantially
different causes than those known to bring about baldness—otherwise, why
worry about also preventing causes merely similar to the latter? We expect
a bald person to look substantially different from anyone falling in some
sense short of being bald—otherwise, why be relieved about one’s look upon
being told that one still falls in some sense short of being bald? We expect a
bald person to have a substantially distinctive social impact—otherwise, why
should uncertainty about one’s baldness engender uncertainty as to how one
will be received for the first time by one’s partner’s parents? It follows from
this contrast that baldness should not be sensitive to one-hair differences or,
worse, to a nanometrical difference of one atom’s location: baldness too just
doesn’t go that deep. It too only tracks a coarse distinction, even if not
a natural one. Thus, under the supposition that x is bald and y only has
one hair more on his scalp, we are forced to reject any predication about y
entailing that y falls in some sense short of being bald, and so we are forced
to accept that y is bald. By reductio, the truth of the relevant instance of
(N) follows.
Again, this irrelevance can be made to emerge also from a different angle.
We may assume that Sally no longer goes out with x because x has become
bald. But, certainly, it is not the case that Sally now behaves the way she
does because x’s atoms are arranged in at most such and such distances from
one another and it is not the case that the distance of even just two of them
is a nanometre greater: in such a context, that x falls on one side rather
than the other of such an exquisite distinction has no ordinary explanatory
interest, as opposed to his falling on one side rather than the other of the
distinction between being bald and falling in some sense short of being such.
Thus, by reductio, the property of being bald cannot be coextensive with any
sharply bounded property. Since it would be so coextensive if the relevant
instance of (N) were not to be accepted, the relevant instance of (N) is to be
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accepted.
Action. Suppose that x is a person. Suppose that y differs from x at
most for the fact that one of y’s atoms is in a location which is within
a nanometre distance from the location correlating to the location of the
corresponding atom part of x. Then it should be correct to assert that y is a
person as well—anything falling short of this would seem to draw an invidious
difference between x’s and y’s personal status based on a difference, such as
the nanometrical displacement of a single atom, which we perceive to be fully
irrelevant for persons.
Again, the reason for the perceived irrelevance seems clear enough. Per-
sonhood is embedded in a rich web of commitments and entitlements, among
which prominent are practical ones. Importantly different actions are licensed
with respect to someone who can be said to be a person and someone who
cannot be said to be such. And we simply haven’t come up with the con-
cept of a person to find ourselves forced to discriminate in such important
ways between two fellow beings differing only in such unimportant respects.11
Thus, under the supposition that x is a person, we are forced to reject any
predication about y entailing that y falls in some sense short of being a per-
son, and so we are forced to accept that y is a person. By reductio, the truth
of the relevant instance of (N) follows.
Again, this irrelevance can be made to emerge also from a different angle.
We may assume that, under certain circumstances, I should try my best to
11Presumably, the predicate ‘treated in way w’ (as opposed to ‘to be treated in way
w’) is precise in at least the relevant respects so as to obey classical logic, and hence,
plausibly, there possibly is a finite series of the kind suggested in the text where there is a
last element treated in way w. But that just shows that we can be forced to discriminate
against our own convictions, and it is absurd to seek any safeguard against this (sadly real)
possibility in features of the use of a word (such as its vagueness). It doesn’t show that
these convictions are wrong. We can still insist that no discrimination should be made on
the basis of such an invidious difference, even though, when forced to cope with all the
elements of the series in the same situation, we are forced to operate such a discrimination.
See chapter 6 for a thorough discussion of the theoretical aspects of this phenomenon.
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save x’s life because x is a person. But, certainly, it is not the case that
I should do so because x’s atoms are arranged in at most such and such
distances from one another and it is not the case that the distance of even
just two of them is a nanometre greater: in such a context, that x falls
on one side rather than the other of such an exquisite distinction has no
practical grounding interest,12 as opposed to her falling on one side rather
than the other of the distinction between being a person and falling in some
sense short of being such. Thus, by reductio, the property of being a person
cannot be coextensive with any sharply bounded property. Since it would
be so coextensive if the relevant instance of (N) were not to be accepted, the
relevant instance of (N) is to be accepted.
Feeling. Suppose that x is a Gothic cathedral. Suppose that y differs
from x at most for the fact that one of y’s atoms is in a location which is
within a nanometre distance from the location correlating to the location of
the corresponding atom part of x. Then it should be correct to assert that
y is a Gothic cathedral as well—anything falling short of this would seem to
draw a preposterous difference between x’s and y’s artistic status based on a
difference, such as the nanometrical displacement of a single atom, which we
perceive to be fully irrelevant for Gothic cathedrals.
Again, the reason for the perceived irrelevance seems clear enough. Ar-
chitectural styles of the relevant kind are individuated according to their
embodying in a concrete form the spirit of an age. That something is a
Gothic cathedral implies that it embodies in its forms the ideas and feelings
of an age, which revive in the admiring eyes of the careful beholder, activat-
ing in her a particular emotional state. Such a state, or anything similar to
it, would be grossly inappropriate for anything falling in some sense short
of being a Gothic cathedral: only deceived or uneducated persons could feel
something even remotely similar for something which falls in some sense short
12In this and in the following example, we shift our focus from explanation through
causes to grounding through reasons, while remaining neutral on the relation between
these two types of understanding.
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of being a Gothic cathedral. But no nanometrical difference can warrant the
two vastly different emotional states required, respectively, by the contem-
plation of a Gothic cathedral and the contemplation of something which,
in effect, comes down to a failed Gothic cathedral—on the contrary, only a
smooth modulation is permitted. Thus, under the supposition that x is a
Gothic cathedral, we are forced to reject any predication about y entailing
that y falls in some sense short of being a Gothic cathedral, and so we are
forced to accept that y is a Gothic cathedral. By reductio, the truth of the
relevant instance of (N) follows.
Again, this irrelevance can be made to emerge also from a different angle.
We may assume that, under certain circumstances, I should find pleasure in
walking around inside x because x is a Gothic cathedral. But, certainly, it
is not the case that I should find pleasure in doing so because x’s atoms are
arranged in at most such and such distances from one another and it is not
the case that the distance of even just two of them is a nanometre greater:
in such a context, that x falls on one side rather than the other of such an
exquisite distinction has no emotional grounding interest, as opposed to its
falling on one side rather than the other of the distinction between being a
Gothic cathedral and falling in some sense short of being such. Thus, by
reductio, the property of being a Gothic cathedral cannot be coextensive
with any sharply bounded property. Since it would be so coextensive if the
relevant instance of (N) were not to be accepted, the relevant instance of (N)
is to be accepted.
2.2.2 Stretching the Truth
In this section, I aim at capitalizing on the phenomenon that we are some-
times willing to stretch the information that we gather about some cases to
other cases that are similar but not necessarily identical to them in the rele-
vant respects, and that we take such stretching to be indefeasible. If we are
told that Bonn is very far from Berlin and know that Cologne is very close to
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Bonn, we indefeasibly conclude that Cologne is also very far from Berlin; if
we are told that 10 kilometres is a very long distance to run, we indefeasibly
conclude that 9.999 kilometres is a very long distance to run; if we are told
that 10 hours of work per day is too much, we indefeasibly conclude that 9
hours, 59 minutes and 59 seconds of work per day is too much. Here, that the
stretching is indefeasible only means that it is bound to be true if the original
information is true, and the phenomenon is that we usually take stretching
to be indefeasible in this sense. Emphatically, the phenomenon is not that
under no circumstances may the warrant a speaker has for the stretching be
defeated by (very good) misleading evidence. For example, one can certainly
be struck by a sorites paradox for ‘very close’ in such a way as to lose one’s
warrant for inferring ‘Cologne is very far from Berlin’ from ‘Bonn is very far
from Berlin’ and ‘Cologne is very close to Bonn’, just as one can certainly be
struck by the Liar paradox in such a way as to lose one’s warrant for inferring
‘ ‘Snow is white’ is true’ from ‘Snow is white’.
Let us deepen our understanding of the phenomenon of stretching by
focussing on a particular case. Suppose that I tell you that arriving at time
t (specified on a second scale) is arriving roughly on time. Then it seems
that you can indefeasibly conclude that also arriving at t + 1 is arriving
roughly on time. More generally, given that the veridical information that
arriving at t is arriving roughly on time has been gathered, the inference to
the conclusion that also arriving at t+1 is arriving roughly on time seems to
be indefeasibly warranted. The claim is not just that, in such a situation, the
inference cannot fail to be truth preserving,13 but that, in such a situation,
the conclusion of the inference (namely, that arriving at t + 1 is arriving
13Throughout, an inference or an argument is understood to be truth preserving (in a
situation) iff, (in that situation) if all the premises are true, so is the conclusion (that is, in
terms of the truth (in that situation) of a suitable conditional). A decent underlying truth
theory is presupposed, but truth preservation will not be assumed to be either necessary
or sufficient for validity. The rather subtle distinction just drawn in the text does matter
in this context, as I hope it will become clear shortly (see section 5.3.2 for more on truth
preservation).
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roughly on time) cannot fail to be true.
Interestingly, there seems to be a restriction on the way the initial in-
formation has to be gathered. Almost any way, whether non-inferential (via
testimony, or memory, or perception, or introspection, or intuition) or in-
ferential, will license the inference, unless it turns out ultimately to rely on
an analogous inference from the information that arriving at t − 1 is arriv-
ing roughly on time. For suppose that I came to believe that arriving at t
is arriving roughly on time just because (in the rational sense of ‘because’)
someone else first veridically intuited and told me that arriving at t − 1 is
arriving roughly on time and I subsequently inferred from that that also ar-
riving at t is arriving roughly on time. In such a situation, although it seems
that my inference cannot fail to reach a true conclusion, it does not seem
that your inference is in turn guaranteed to reach a true conclusion—only
the unstretched truth is allowed to be stretched.
This restriction invites the following puzzle. In the situation envisaged,
it is true that arriving at t is arriving roughly on time (since the situation is
such that both it is true that arriving at t−1 is arriving roughly on time and
it is true that, if arriving at t− 1 is arriving roughly on time, then arriving
at t is arriving roughly on time), yet it might be untrue in it that arriving at
t+ 1 is arriving roughly on time. Under the very plausible assumption that
modus ponens is unrestrictedly valid, is it then untrue in that situation that,
if arriving at t is arriving roughly on time, then arriving at t + 1 is arriving
roughly on time, since—so we have been taught—truth in a situation must
be closed under logical consequence? That would be intolerable, as it would
fail to verify the relevant instance of (N), and so would give rise to situations
where it would not be correct to say that there is no difference between t and
t+ 1 as far as arriving roughly on time is concerned.
But it needn’t be so. As I will elaborate in section 5.4.6, truth in a situa-
tion may neutrally be thought to be determined by the logical consequences
of an initial collection of truths specifying that situation. If the operative
consequence relation is transitive, then truth in a situation is indeed closed
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under logical consequence and the relevant instance of (N) will fail to be true
in the situation envisaged (since, otherwise, by modus ponens, it would also
be true that arriving at t + 1 is arriving roughly on time). But, as we will
see in chapter 4, the weakenings of classical logic most friendly to (N) are
such that the consequence relation is not transitive. Without transitivity,
the truths that arriving at t− 1 is arriving roughly on time, that if arriving
at t− 1 is arriving roughly on time, then arriving at t is arriving roughly on
time and that, if arriving at t is arriving roughly on time, then arriving at
t + 1 is arriving roughly on time simply do not entail that arriving at t + 1
is arriving roughly on time, and so do not require its truth.
They do require it jointly with the further assumption that arriving at t
is arriving roughly on time, which is indeed true in the situation envisaged.
But, as has already been remarked, the (rejected) requirement that truth in
a situation be closed under logical consequence follows from the (accepted)
requirement that the logical consequences of an initial collection of truths
specifying a situation be themselves true in that situation only under the
(rejected) requirement that logical consequence be transitive. Of course, in
the situation envisaged, it might be the case that a conditional with a true
antecedent and an untrue consequent is true, and that there is a last time t
such that it is true that arriving at t is arriving roughly on time but untrue
that arriving at t+1 is arriving roughly on time—but that just goes with the
territory once we are working in a classical metatheory of truth in a situation,
and only shows that the connection between absolute semantic notions such
as truth and untruth and the corresponding situation-relative notions is, at
best, not immediate (again, see section 5.4.6 for elaboration of this point).
Indeed, the crucial epistemic difference drawn earlier between inferences
that rely on (N) from premises not ultimately dependent on an analogous
inference and inferences that rely on (N) from premises that are so ultimately
dependent can be seen as the flip side of the crucial semantic difference just
drawn between the stronger condition of being a logical consequence of an
initial collection of truths specifying a situation and the weaker condition
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of being a logical consequence of a collection of truths in that situation. In
section 5.4, we will explore how both these differences can be best made sense
of and grounded in a logical framework where the consequence relation is not
unrestrictedly transitive.
We still do not have quite what we want, since the relevant instance
of (N) (that, for every t, if arriving at t is arriving roughly on time, then
arriving at t + 1 is arriving roughly on time) does not immediately follow
from the fact that, for every t, if the veridical information that arriving
at t is arriving roughly on time has been gathered, then arriving at t + 1 is
arriving roughly on time.14 But suppose that arriving at t is arriving roughly
on time. Then it is certainly possible, at least in most cases, that it is said
to you (knowledgeably or not) that arriving at t is arriving roughly on time.
Indeed, most veridical pieces of information can be acquired in one way or
another (knowledgeably or not). The principle just established yields then
that it is possibly the case that arriving at t+ 1 is arriving roughly on time,
and so, since the ‘possibly’-operator can be deleted in conceptual matters
such as this, that it is the case that arriving at t + 1 is arriving roughly on
time. Thus, under the supposition that arriving at t is arriving roughly on
time, we are forced to accept that arriving at t + 1 is arriving roughly on
time. By reductio, the truth of the relevant instance of (N) follows.
Two alternative, more conservative explanations of the phenomenon of
stretching might seem tempting. Firstly, one might think that, in the rel-
evant cases, knowledge (and other epistemic properties such as warrant) is
governed by a margin-for-error principle, so that, for every t, knowledge that
arriving at t is arriving roughly on time requires truth that arriving at t+ 1
is arriving roughly on time (Williamson [1992]; Williamson [1994], pp. 216–
47; Williamson [2000b], pp. 93–134 and Mott [1998]; Williamson [2000a];
Sorensen [2007]; Williamson [2007] for a critical discussion). Given this, one
could explain the indefeasibility of the inference by observing that, if the
information that arriving at t is arriving roughly on time is knowledgeably
14Thanks to Crispin Wright for pressing this worry.
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(or warrantedly) gathered, then it must be the case that arriving at t + 1
is arriving roughly on time. However, such an explanation would seem to
be radically incomplete: as I have already suggested, the inference seems to
be no less indefeasible when the true information is gathered unknowledge-
ably (or unwarrantedly) outside of the putative margin for error—the speech
‘I don’t care whether the source really knows that arriving at t is arriving
roughly on time: as long as it is true that arriving at t is arriving roughly
on time, it is also true that arriving at t + 1 is arriving roughly on time’
is perfectly natural. What triggers the indefeasibility of the inference seems
to be the plain truth of the information rather than its knowledgeability (or
warrant).
Secondly, one might think that the phenomenon can be explained in terms
of the high, though usually < 1 epistemic probability of truth preservation
by these inferences (Sorensen [2001], pp. 57–67, who still subscribes to the
weaker claim that there can be no warrant for believing any counterexample
to a relevant instance of (N)). The phenomenon would then be revealed to
be of the same kind as the inference from someone’s having a ticket of a fair
lottery with, say, 1,000,000 participants to her losing the lottery: this infer-
ence too enjoys a very high epistemic probability of truth preservation which
plausibly makes it legitimate in thought (if not in speech). However, such a
model does not seem to fit all the aspects of the phenomenon of stretching.
In particular, the defeasibility of the (highly probably truth preserving) in-
ference from someone’s having a ticket of a fair lottery to her not winning the
lottery seems to be completely lacking in the case of stretching inferences. In
turn, this difference is reflected in the fact that the conditionalizations of the
latter inferences support the corresponding universal closure (their epistemic
probability of truth preservation is not higher than the epistemic probability
of ‘For every time t, if arriving at t is arriving roughly on time, then arriv-
ing at t + 1 is arriving roughly on time’) whereas the conditionalizations of
the former do not (their epistemic probability of truth preservation is higher
than the epistemic probability of ‘Everyone with a ticket of a fair lottery will
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lose’). The difference also reflects itself in the fact that the speech ‘Arriv-
ing at t is arriving roughly on time. Therefore, arriving at t + 1 is arriving
roughly on time’ is acceptable whereas the speech ‘Henry has a ticket of a
fair lottery. Therefore, Henry will lose the lottery’ is not.
Once the existence of stretching inferences has been established, it is in-
structive to investigate which purposes they serve. Though possibly very
similar, most things are not exactly alike in any respect. Gathering infor-
mation about a particular item, we should wish to be in a position to apply
it to every item relevantly similar to it (even if not as good as the original
item): our extrapolations about the world would be seriously hampered if
exact similarity were required, for the new things encountered are very sel-
dom exactly similar in some respect to the old ones. Hence, it seems that
there is a strong natural pressure towards adopting predicates which satisfy
the relevant instances of (N): for there certainly is a strong natural pressure
for gathering information in such a way as to make the widest possible use of
it in the presence of new, almost certainly not exactly similar cases (that is,
we want to be able to stretch the information), and the only way to achieve
this is to conceptualize the information with concepts obeying the relevant
instances of (N).15
Thus, to return to our case, there is a typical complex cluster of pieces of
information that one can gather about a certain time t: that arriving at t is
not arriving very late, that t is a right time at which to arrive, that people
would usually react in a certain way were one to arrive at t etc. We should
wish to be in a position to apply this wealth of information to every time
relevantly similar to t (even if slightly later than it), and this is only possible
if the several pieces of information are collected together into a concept (like
the concept of being a time such that arriving at it is arriving roughly on
15Of course, the width-of-use requirement has to strike a balance with a contrary, but
equally pressing, informativity requirement: while we want the information to be appliable
to enough many cases, we don’t want it to be appliable to too many of them (or, worse
still, to all of them!).
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time) which satisfies the relevant instance of (N). This is of course not to deny
that the collecting concept may not be the only one to satisfy the relevant
instance of (N)—each of the several pieces of information will have to be
expressed with concepts that also do so if stretching is to be coherent in
the first place. This further requirement is nicely predicted by our general
explanation, as it follows from the special case in which the cluster of pieces
of information we should wish to stretch is composed by a single piece.
Another at least equally important source of the need for stretching comes
most clearly into view by reflection on the point of so-called “vaguefiers” in
natural languages (see Lewis [1970]; Lakoff [1973]; Zadeh [1975]; Kamp [1975]
for discussions and theories of vaguefication). One thinks that one can make
it to the date by t, and makes consequent arrangements to get there at t. But
one soon realizes that unforeseen but likely slightly delaying circumstances
may occur, or simply that one’s belief to be able to make it by t might
be slightly overoptimistic, due to likely subtle miscalculations. A rough-and-
ready calculation shows that δ is a reasonable margin for error. The question
then arises as to why one does not rest content with the promise of meeting
between t and t+ δ, rather than vaguefying and promising to meet at about
t?
One minor reason is that any particular bounded interval would seem
completely arbitrary, triggering undesired conversational implicatures (‘Why
did he choose exactly ‘at t + δ’ rather than ‘at t + δ + 0.000001’?’ would
ask herself the heedful lover). However, use of predicates which satisfy the
relevant instances of (N) is by itself neither necessary nor sufficient to dis-
pose of the arbitrariness induced by predicates that do not do so. It is not
necessary because arbitrariness can be lost by underspecification rather than
vaguefication, by choosing an appropriately coarse-grained classification of
times (so that one can promise to arrive at 8 pm, meaning by this to ar-
rive at any second between the beginning and the end of the hour). It is
not sufficient because arbitrariness still attaches to ‘about t’ (‘Why did he
choose exactly ‘at about t’ rather than ‘at about t + 0.000001’?’ would ask
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herself the heedful lover) as long as ‘t’ designates a sufficiently specific time
(see Alston [1964], p. 85; Sorensen [1989]; Burns [1995] for discussions of the
relation between vagueness and underspecificity).
The major reason for preferring vaguefication lies elsewhere and can be
seen as follows. Two contrasting requirements on fixing a time for a date can
be identified:
(a) In fixing a time, one commits oneself to be there at that time. This
circumstance pushes towards a generously late time—one tends to make
one’s life as easy as possible.
(b) However, of course, too late a time may put into jeopardy some if not all
the purposes of the date. This other circumstance pushes towards a not
too generously late time—life is never too easy.
As a matter of empirical fact about our ordinary circumstances, δ will
therefore be bound not to take into account all the unforeseen but likely
slightly delaying circumstances which may occur, or all the likely subtle mis-
calculations that led to the choice of t in the first place. But this puts any
candidate for being δ which is good enough at steering a middle course be-
tween the two just noted contrasting requirements (a) and (b) under a terrible
pressure: for the arising of any one more of the unforeseen but likely slightly
delaying circumstances or the existence of any one more of the likely subtle
miscalculations will suffice to engender a failure to comply with one’s com-
mitment. Clearly, shift to the successor candidate will do little to alleviate
this pressure, and even that little is likely to be offset by a lower score on
the dimension of requirement (b). What is needed to remove the pressure is
of course a specification of the time which already includes a provision for
close enough times (those that would be needed should any one more of the
unforeseen but likely slightly delaying circumstances arise, or should any one
more of the likely subtle miscalculations have taken place)—what is needed
is a specification of the time with a predicate satisfying the relevant instances
of (N).
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The kind of situation envisaged can be modelled in the following way.
For simple enough cases, we can assume that the set X of all such likely-to-
happen impediments is such that all of its members enjoy more or less the
same (high) epistemic probability and are independent from one another. δ
can then be seen as allowing for a certain finite number i of such events to
happen. Since δ is a best candidate, requirement (a) entails that the epis-
temic probability that all the members x0, x1, x2 . . . xi−1 of any Y ⊆ X whose
cardinality is i unluckily happen together is not too high, while requirement
(b) jointly with empirical facts about our ordinary circumstances entails that
it will not be as low as one might ideally wish. In many cases, this will ar-
guably constrain the value of the epistemic probability of all the members
of any such Y unluckily happening together in the neighbourhood of .2 (at
least according to my personal estimate of the pros and cons!). But then
there will be a .2 probability that one can only make it just on time—a .2
probability that a situation will be realized in which the highly epistemically
probable happening of just one more impeding event will tilt the balance
from complying with one’s commitment to failing to comply with one’s com-
mitment. Even if low, a value of .2 still represents an unreasonably high risk
of being in a situation in which one is very likely to be subject to the sad
mock of failing to comply with one’s commitment because of the occurrence
of a single, minute, in itself insignificant impediment.
The shift to a predicate satisfying the relevant instance of (N) avoids this,
since the time interval selected will now be such that, if it allows for a certain
finite number i of impeding events to happen, it also allows for i + 1 such
events to happen. This does not of course guarantee that one will arrive on
time, nor that the epistemic probability of this not happening is as low as
one might ideally wish (in the model just sketched, it can e.g. be set to be
only slightly lower than .2), but it does ensure that the epistemic probability
that one will be in a situation in which one is very likely to be subject to a
sad mock is 0.
Might one not, after choosing an appropriate δ, add an additional, suit-
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ably extended buffer ε and promise to meet between t and t + δ + ε, while
still aiming at arriving between t and t+ δ? Given the suitable extension of
ε, one would thus still keep the promise even if one more impediment occurs
other than those allowed for by δ.16 This strategy only works if t + δ + ε
also satisfies requirement (b) and at the same time is such that the epistemic
probability that a maximal number of impeding events compatible with it
happen (and so the epistemic probability that one will be in a situation in
which one is very likely to be subject to the sad mock of failing to com-
ply with one’s commitment because of the occurrence of a single, minute,
in itself insignificant impediment) is not unreasonably high (i.e. significantly
lower than .2). As I have already noted, in many cases, as a matter of em-
pirical fact about our ordinary circumstances, there is no reason to believe
that these two conditions can be jointly satisfied for any choice of δ and ε.
The major reason for preferring vaguefication in this case has thus been
traced to the need of insuring oneself from failing to comply with one’s com-
mitment due to the occurrence of a single, minute, in itself insignificant im-
pediment. Such a need can be satisfied only if the commitment is expressed
using a concept which allows for the relevant stretching inferences. Having
worked out the reasons for vaguefication with respect to a very particular
example, it is easy to see how these reasons can be generalized to a wide
range of cases. For many F , two contrasting requirements on accepting that
x falls under the concept of being F can be identified:
(a′) In accepting that x falls under the concept of being F , one commits
oneself to x’s being good enough as to meet a sufficient condition for
falling under the concept of being F . This circumstance pushes towards
generously relaxed sufficient conditions for falling under the concept of
being F—one tends to make one’s life as easy as possible.
(b′) However, of course, too relaxed sufficient conditions may put into jeop-
ardy some if not all the purposes of applying the concept of being F .
16Thanks to Crispin Wright for suggesting this strategy.
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This other circumstance pushes towards not too generously relaxed suf-
ficient conditions—life is never too easy.
As a matter of empirical fact about our ordinary circumstances, any
sharply bounded property candidate for being picked out by the concept
of being F will therefore be bound not to take into account all of x’s un-
foreseen but likely deviations on any dimension of variation relevant for its
being F . But this puts any such candidate which is good enough at steering
a middle course between the two just noted contrasting requirements (a′)
and (b′) under a terrible pressure: for x’s slightest deviation on any dimen-
sion of variation relevant for its being F will suffice to engender a mistake
of some kind or other in the acceptance that x is F . Clearly, shift to a
slightly more generous sharply bounded property will do little to alleviate
this pressure, and even that little is likely to be offset by a lower score on the
dimension of requirement (b′). What is needed to remove the pressure is of
course a specification of the sufficient conditions for falling under the concept
of being F which already includes a provision for slightly weaker sufficient
conditions—what is needed is a concept satisfying the relevant instances of
(N).
I would like to close the discussion of vaguefication by proposing a new
argument for instances of (N) involving hedging vaguefiers (not all vaguefiers
have hedging effects: for example, ‘extremely’ vaguefies precise predicates
such as ‘acute’ (as applied to angles), but, clearly, ‘extremely acute’ does not
hedge ‘acute’ !). On the one hand, it seems very plausible that at least some
hedging vaguefiers have a finite least upper bound of hedging power: ‘6 feet
tall’ can be hedged by ‘roughly 6 feet tall’, but the idea that the latter can in
turn be hedged by ‘roughly roughly 6 feet tall’ looks rather dubious. We do
not seem to have a conception of a height which, whilst good enough to count
as being roughly roughly 6 feet tall, is not good enough to count as being
roughly 6 feet tall. In an intuitive sense of the word, ‘roughly 6 feet tall’
“fuzzified” the area sharply demarcated by ‘6 feet tall’: what else remains
for ‘roughly roughly 6 feet tall’ to do? We do not seem to have a conception
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of a non-trivial fuzzification of a fuzzy area. On the other hand, ‘roughly’
does seem to obliterate the existence of minute differences, so that, for every
F , if x is F and y differs only minutely from x in the relevant respects, y is
roughly F . However, the two premises:
(i) If x is roughly roughly 6 feet tall, then x is roughly 6 feet tall;
(ii) If x is roughly 6 feet tall and y is 1 inch shorter than x, then y is roughly
roughly 6 feet tall
entail the conclusion:
(iii) If x is roughly roughly 6 feet tall and y is 1 inch shorter than x, then
y is roughly roughly 6 feet tall,
which in turn entails, by reductio, the truth of the relevant instance of (N).
2.2.3 Application by Casual Observation
In this section, I will work from another remark made by Wright [1975]
(cf Wright [1976]). In considering the high plausibility of principles of the
form of (N) for a noun like ‘heap’, Wright briefly remarked that “ ‘[h]eap’
is essentially a coarse predicate, whose application is a matter of rough and
ready judgement [. . . ] [i]t would for example be absurd to force the question
of the execution of the command, ‘Pour out a heap of sand here’, to turn on a
count of the grains [. . . ] our conception of the conditions which justify calling
something a heap of sand is such that the justice of the description will be
unaffected by any change which cannot be detected by casual observation”
(Wright [1975], p. 335).
As it stands, I think that, suggestive as it may be, this remark is in
need of crucial supplementation. For what it only shows is the desirability of
predicates whose application can be decided by casual observation for some
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cases—that this property does not force satisfaction of the relevant instance
of (N) can be seen by reflecting that it is also possessed by predicates like
‘within a 1.171979 metre distance’ which uncontroversially fail to satisfy the
relevant instance of (N) (cf Sainsbury [1995], pp. 27–8; Weintraub [2004],
pp. 237–8). The question then naturally arises whether there is any reason
relating to applicability by casual observation which would lead us to use
a predicate which possibly satisfies the relevant instance of (N) (like ‘close
enough’) rather than one which does not (like ‘within a 1.171979 metre dis-
tance’) (some reasons not so relating have already been explored in sections
2.2.1, 2.2.2).
I divide the argument in favour of a positive answer to the foregoing
question in two legs. Let us call ‘an occasion’ any situation with respect to
which a predicate is applied and let us call ‘a case’ any object to which a
predicate is applied. Then, the first leg of the argument reflects on the fact
that we do demand of some predicate that, on many occasions, there be a
guarantee that it is possible to decide its application by casual observation
(under normal, non-deceptive circumstances)17 for every case (rather than
just for some cases). For example, we do assume that, on many occasions,
there is a guarantee that it is possible to decide by casual observation, for
every contextually relevant object x, whether x is close enough or not.18
Consider for instance the injunction:
(I0) Slow down just in case an animal is close enough to the racing track!
On many occasions, (I0) does not strike us as far-fetched at all (indeed, it is
very often issued!), unlike the injunction:
(I1) Slow down just in case an animal is within a 1.171979 metre distance
from the racing track!
17In the following, I will leave this qualification implicit.
18Throughout, I assume of course that there is no problem in seeing the object itself.
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Arguably, (I1) strikes us as far-fetched because being within a 1.171979 metre
distance is not the kind of fact that is guaranteed to be knowable by one’s
cognitive capacities when one is zooming on the racing track. If that is so,
then presumably (I0) does not strike us as far-fetched because the following
weak observationality principle seems to hold for ‘close enough’:
(WO) On many occasions, positive and negative cases of closeness enough
are guaranteed to be knowable by casual observation.
Note that ‘within a 1.171979 metre distance’ does not satisfy the appro-
priate analogue of (WO) because, even if in fact there are only easy positive
and negative cases of being within a 1.171979 metre distance, there is no
guarantee that this will be so—there is no guarantee that it will not be the
case that an object is, say, within a 1.171980 metre distance but not within
a 1.171979 metre distance. The existence of a guarantee for positive and
negative cases of closeness enough thus implies that there are no objects and
distances such that it is not the case that, on at least some occasion, it is
knowable whether that object at that distance is close enough (henceforth,
(WO) will be understood as carrying this implication). If there were a range
of possible such cases not so knowable (the “strong borderline cases” of close-
ness enough), (I0) should strike us just as far-fetched as (I1). But the fact is
that it doesn’t.
Isn’t it the case that we are not struck because we are in some sense
ignoring the possibility of strong borderline cases? Until clear independent
evidence has been presented for the postulation of a mechanism which should
trigger the ignoring, such a suggestion cannot be adequately discussed. But
it is hard to believe that there is some such mechanism only for the strong
borderline cases of ‘close enough’ and not for the hard cases of ‘within a
1.171979 metre distance’, as the suggestion would require if it is to be com-
patible with the asymmetry of our reactions to the two injunctions. And a
dilemma seems to be lurking for any such suggestion. A supplementation of
(I0) with the injunction of shooting only (“only”, not “if ”) at those animals
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which are within range ∆ (where ∆ happens to be included in the range
allegedly occupied by the strong borderline cases) does not seem to be vacu-
ous. If the postulated mechanism is subtle enough so as to accommodate for
this apparent non-vacuity, the supplemented injunction can be taken as the
decisive evidence for the claim that, on many occasions, positive and nega-
tive cases of closeness enough are thought to be guaranteed to be knowable
by casual observation.
Of course, this is not to deny that some cases might be harder than others
to decide—such is the case for virtually every predicate of a natural language!
What our acquiescing reaction to (I0) does show however is that, hard as they
may be, such cases are also understood to be guaranteed to be knowable by
the expert eye of a good racer. Suppose that there are lots of animals at
clearly different distances within ∆. The surprising fact is that (I0) still does
not strike us as far-fetched at all.
The second leg of the argument reflects on the very plausible claim that
the following strong indiscriminability principle holds for ‘close enough’:
(SI) For every x, y at nanometrically different distances, it is not the case
that, [on at least some occasion, we can know by casual observation
that x is close enough and, on at least some occasion, we can know by
casual observation that y is not close enough].
Putting the two legs of the argument together, we can conclude that only
predicates satisfying the relevant instances of (N) can be applied by casual
observation in the sense required by (WO). For suppose that x is not close
enough and that y is only a nanometre closer than x is. Then, by (WO),
on at least some occasion it can be known by casual observation that x
is not close enough, and so, by (SI), on no occasion can it be known by
casual observation that y is close enough. But then, by (WO), y is not close
enough. By reductio, the truth of the relevant instance of (N) follows (strictly
speaking, the argument has been given only for ‘not close enough’, but I
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argue in Zardini [2007a] that scruples about double-negation elimination are
unmotivated in these cases).
It is tempting to try to reach the same result by appealing, instead of
(SI), to the following weak indiscriminability principle for ‘close enough’:
(WI) On no occasion can we know that two objects are at nanometrically
different distances.
Emphatically, (WI) does not entail that we cannot, on different occasions,
know, of two objects x, y at nanometrically different distances, that x is
close enough and that y is not close enough, which is what is needed for the
previous argument to go through. This is so because we may well fail to be
in a position to pool together the two pieces of information that x is close
enough and that y is not close enough in order to derive, given plausible
principles connecting closeness enough and distance, a difference in distance
between x and y. For instance, our warrant for believing that x is close
enough may be defeated by reflecting on the fact that we do not believe that
y, whose distance is indiscriminable from x’s, is close enough.
Crucially, we cannot hope to rescue the previous argument by only rely-
ing on (WI) as our indiscriminability principle while appealing instead to a
stronger observationality principle, like the strong observationality principle:
(SO) On every occasion, positive and negative cases of closeness enough are
guaranteed to be knowable by casual observation.
We cannot do so because the extra strength of (SO) as opposed to (WO) is
not supported by the previous considerations concerning the asymmetry of
our reactions to (I0) and (I1)—the asymmetry has been observed to occur
only on many occasions, not necessarily on every occasion. Moreover, the
extra strength of (SO) is not only unmotivated, but is in itself questionable.
Suppose that there is a suitable series of animals approaching the racing
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track each of which is suitably close to its immediate neighbours along the
direction orthogonal to the racing track and suitably far from them along
the direction parallel to the racing track. The surprising fact is that (I0)
now does strike us as just far-fetched as (I1) (chapter 6 will try to provide an
explanation for this). The impossibility of running a (SO)/(WI) argument
instead of a (WO)/(SI) argument should not however distress us too much,
given that the uncontroversial finitude of our discriminatory powers very
plausibly sustains not just (WI), but (SI) (see Wright [1987], pp. 239–43;
Fara [2001], pp. 916–20 for some discussion on what this finitude exactly
entails).
The preceding example hints at the point of having predicates whose
application is on many occasions decidable for every case by casual observa-
tion. Most tasks involve qualified mandate for an action: the action should
be performed if (qualified “mandate”) but also only if (“qualified” mandate)
a certain condition obtains. For some such tasks, any condition would do, as
long as its obtaining is at least in principle ascertainable (in the sense that,
for every contextually relevant case x, a subject would sooner or later arrive
at the correct answer to the question whether x satisfies the condition): a
diligent subject in charge of the task can sooner or later ascertain for every
case whether it satisfies or not the condition and consequently act on the
instructions received (such is the task assigned to a god of destroying every
house with 1,975 bricks in it).
However, at least for finite beings, many tasks involve time constraints,
and for some of them these are such that the subject in charge of the task can
only afford to observe casually her environment (such is the task assigned to
a child of finding three small dogs). These latter tasks would rightly strike
us as far-fetched if formulated with predicates not satisfying an appropriate
analogue of (WO), for they then would require a subject to do something
there is no guarantee she will be able to do. Predicates satisfying the rele-
vant instances of (N) find a source of their usefulness exactly in this kind of
situation, as satisfaction of the relevant instance of (N) by a predicate is a
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consequence of the predicate’s satisfying appropriate analogues of (WO) and
(SI) (of course, appropriate analogues of (WO) and (SI) are also satisfied by
precise predicates which are true of either everything or nothing in the con-
textually relevant domain, but most qualified mandates require distinctions
which cannot be drawn by such predicates).
2.3 Experiences Requiring the Absence of
Sharp Boundaries
2.3.1 Seamless Change
In this section, I want to focus on what is probably one of the most basic ways
in which the absence of sharp boundaries presents itself to a sentient creature
capable of conceptualizing her experience.19 Some changes from red to orange
are seamless. That is, in such changes, the object’s change from being red
to being orange seems to be accomplished only throughout (what one would
intuitively consider to be) the whole temporal stretch of the change, or, at
most, only in considerably large subintervals thereof. In other words, it seems
that the change cannot be located in any considerably smaller subinterval of
the whole temporal stretch of the change (let alone at any instant included
in it). Indeed, if this were not the case, the very phrase ‘the whole temporal
stretch of the change’, meant to pick out a quite extended temporal interval,
would be a dramatic misnomer, as the real change would ultimately consist
in a sudden, instantaneous jump from red to orange, with, strictly speaking,
no real change before and after that (that is, no real change which affects
an object’s being red or orange). But, taking a cooling bar of iron to be
the object changing from red to orange and δ a sufficiently small subinterval,
19Surprisingly, the phenomenon has never been clearly isolated for analysis in its speci-
ficity. Thanks to Crispin Wright for directing my attention to it (see his Wright [2007b]
for some discussion).
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nothing less than the truth of every instance of ‘It is not the case that the
iron is red at t but not red at t + δ’ seems to be required to rule out an
unwanted sudden jump. This leads in turn to the relevant instance of (N)
(note that the change need not occur along a temporal dimension: it may for
instance occur along a spatial one, for example when the iron bar changes
seamlessly from being red at one end to being orange at the other end).
The foregoing assumes for simplicity that the iron’s change is from be-
ing red to being orange, but an analogous point can obviously be made for
any alternative candidate to being orange for being the property acquired
by the iron as soon as it loses the property of being red. Even if it is
(rather implausibly) contested that there is a first such property which is
so acquired (because the set of relevant properties is not well-ordered by the
x-is-acquired-earlier-than-y relation),20,21 the point can simply be restated
as concerning the change from possession of the property of being red to lack
of this very same property (rather than possession of any other property).
Note that rejection of the law of excluded middle would indeed allow for
rejection of every instance of ‘The iron is red at t but not red at t+ δ’. One
rejects of each member t of a collection of times that the iron is either red
at t or not red at t. Assuming very plausibly that rejection of a disjunction
is sufficient for rejection of both disjuncts, this commits one to rejecting, of
each member t of such a collection, that the iron is red at t and to rejecting,
of each member t of such a collection, that the iron is not red at t. We can
assume that these times are strictly later than the times of which one asserts
that the iron is red at them and strictly earlier than the times of which
20Throughout, I will occasionally use hyphenated open sentences to denote properties
and relations.
21Note that the point of the contention is not simply that there is no first “interesting”
property that the iron acquires. That is indeed very plausible, for, given the continuity
of the dimension along which the change occurs (a certain line through a section of the
colour spectrum), a non-well-founded chain of “interesting” properties is readily available
(consider the chain of properties denoted by ‘ξ is no less orange than τ ’, where τ denotes
a point on the dimension of the change).
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one asserts that the iron is not red at them, that the length of the stretch
constituted by these times is at least as great as any admissible appropriately
small enough δ and, ignoring higher-order vagueness, that these three kinds
of times are exhaustive on the relevant domain. Assuming very plausibly
that rejection of either conjunct is sufficient for rejection of a conjunction,
this commits one to rejecting every instance of ‘The iron is red at t but not
red at t+ δ’. Interestingly, the converse implication (from rejection of every
instance of ‘The iron is red at t but not red at t+ δ’ to rejection of the law of
excluded middle) does not hold, as is witnessed by standard supervaluationist
approaches (see e. g. Fine [1975]). Indeed, the target of the following four
points is the more general position consisting in rejection of every instance of
‘The iron is red at t but not red at t+ δ’ and non-acceptance of the relevant
instance of (N).
Arguably, rejection of every instance of ‘The iron is red at t but not red
at t + δ’ is not sufficient fully to capture the intuition of seamless change.
For the intuition in question is, to repeat, that the change is not located
in any considerably smaller subinterval of the whole temporal stretch of the
change, which requires, as it were, a “positive” lack of change at any such
subinterval: of any such subinterval, it is not just rejected that the change
occurs in it (in the same way in which it is rejected that a borderline case of
red is red, which usually goes together with the symmetric rejection that it
is not red)—it is positively asserted that it is not the case that the change
occurs in it. But such a “positive” lack of change of the iron between t and
t + δ with respect to the property of being red requires that it be not the
case that the iron is red at t but not red at t+ δ.
That simple rejection of every instance of ‘The iron is red at t but not red
at t+ δ’ is not sufficient fully to capture the intuition of seamless change can
also be seen by reflecting on the fact that it would not be sufficient to rule
out every unwanted sudden jump of some sort. For simple rejection that the
iron is red at t but not red at t+δ is consistent with acceptance that the iron
is red at t but borderline red at t+ δ, where ‘borderline’ can be understood
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in such a way as to make ‘ϕ but borderline, ϕ’ inconsistent, and hence in
such a way as to make a process in which a red object becomes borderline
red enough of a change.
Moreover, on this scheme, the quantified claim ‘For every t, it is not the
case that the iron is red at t but not red at t + δ’ is inconsistent with other
uncontroversial assumptions, and so should be rejected, which seems to leave
very little room for manoeuvre for preserving the idea that the change does
not occur instantaneously.
Finally, on any way of implementing this scheme I know of, for some
instance of ‘The iron is red at t but not red at t + δ’, rejection of it will
require rejection of its negation as well (the reason being, roughly, that at
least one of the conjunct will fail to satisfy the law of excluded middle or
will be gappy), which amounts to rejecting what seems to be a necessary
condition for the change not to occur instantaneously at t.22
The main thrust of the foregoing considerations is that we think of some
processes as crucially taking time—milk doesn’t go off in a nanosecond, Sam-
pras didn’t become a great tennis player in a nanosecond, I haven’t learnt
English in a nanosecond—and, surprisingly enough, nothing less than the
truth of the relevant instances of (N) seems to be able to entitle us to this
very natural conception. Arguably, the conception is meant to be expressed
in some uses of the phrase ‘seamless change’. It is essential to stress that not
every use of this phrase can be made sense of as simply saying that the object
in question is changing continuously along a certain dimension, exactly be-
cause some such use is meant to convey the negation of sudden jumps in the
22The reader will have realized that analogues of all these four points apply to the
analogous scheme considered in section 2.2.1, which was there criticized only using an
analogue of the second last point. I present the whole battery of points here as I think that
they are even more intuitive when applied to the phenomenon of seamless change. Indeed,
one might argue (though I won’t attempt to do this here) that this particular phenomenon
is somehow a paradigm for our general conception of tolerance, just as a venerable tradition
has it that the phenomenon of continuous change is somehow a paradigm for our general
conception of continuity.
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exemplification of a property, jumps which are not ruled out by a simple con-
tinuous change along a certain dimension. For example, an object could be
continuously increasing in temperature: this does not rule out jumps in the
exemplification of the relevant heat-related properties, such as the property
of being at most 20◦C hot. The simple continuity of the function which in
this case takes a time to the most specific heat-related property exemplified
at it does not by itself ensure any seamlessness in the sense under discussion.
The apparatus of exemplifying a property to a certain (possibly normal-
ized) degree could naturally be thought to capture this stronger sense of
‘seamless change’. Unfortunately, the implementation of the strategy faces
severe difficulties. For starters, not all the properties to which the strategy
should be applied can be associated with a suitable linear ordering. For ex-
ample, x can be very good at spatial intelligence but not at numerical one,
and y be vice versa. Intuitively, neither are x and y equally intelligent, nor is
x more intelligent than y, nor is y more intelligent than x, even though the
degrees to which they exemplify intelligence would have to be either equal
or one greater than the other.
Even for those properties which can be so associated, no satisfactory an-
swer has ever been provided to the question concerning the relation between
exemplifying a property simpliciter and exemplifying it to a certain degree.
On the one hand, to say that an object exemplifies a property p simpliciter iff
it exemplifies p at least to degree δ makes no sense of seamless change, since
the change from possession of p to lack of p will then be as instantaneous as
the change from exemplifying p to degree δ to not doing so. On the other
hand, to say that an object exemplifies a property p simpliciter iff it exem-
plifies p at least to a high degree simply shifts the problem of explaining the
seamlessness of the change from possession of p to lack of p to the problem
of explaining the seamlessness of the change from possession of the newly
introduced property of [exemplifying p at least to a high degree] to lack of
this latter property. Nothing has been gained.
Worst of all, the very same notion of exemplifying a property p to a
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certain degree has usually been explained in such a way as to be reduced to
exemplifying simpliciter the property of having a certain value along a certain
dimension associated with p. This reduction implies that the change from
exemplifying p to a certain degree to exemplifying it to a different degree,
even though continuous, is no more seamless than the change of value along
the relevant dimension. Since the latter does not by itself ensure seamlessness
(see the third last paragraph), it is hard to see how the former could do so.
Those who reject (N) may still hope to make sense of the idea that at least
the preparation for a change—if not the change itself—takes time. However,
it is rather unclear what this idea consists in and how it is supposed to relate
to the phenomenon of seamless change. Of course, from the perspective of a
rejection of (N), the preparation for a change, as a kind of process, cannot
come more seamlessly into existence than the change itself can. Still, it
seems that the preparation itself might seamlessly come into existence, and
the postulation, required by the present strategy, of another preparation for
the original preparation’s coming into existence looks dubious.
Moreover, even though, once existing, the process in which the prepara-
tion consists is allowed to stretch through time, it must be kept in mind that
the property which is eventually going to be lost in the change is still present
throughout the preparation for the change and that all the events participat-
ing in the preparation also consist in sudden jumps. Such a “preparation”
does no better in suggesting a seamless change than the uneven journey of
an old-fashioned minute hand from 1.00 pm to 1.29 pm does in suggesting a
seamless change from the minute hand’s not indicating 1.30 pm to its doing
so.
Finally, while the idea of a preparation for a change makes intuitive sense
in the case e.g. of the change consisting in the destruction of Carthage (think
of the process of destroying houses, burning ships, deporting people), such
an idea seems inapplicable to at least some other cases of seamless change.
To return to our original example, there does not seem to be any similar
preparation in the iron’s changing from red to orange—no set of events which
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jointly constitute the change even though each of them is in itself insufficient
for doing so.
The same conclusions about seamless change can be reached by approach-
ing the phenomenon from a different perspective. It is uncontroversial that
we do not perceive23 the boundaries required by what (N) negates. Of course,
it is not in general the case that one’s not perceiving that P entails one’s
perceiving that it is not the case that P . For example, being away from
home, I may not perceive that my dog is at home without thereby perceiving
that he is not. Yet, a case can be made that, in the case of our percep-
tion of the boundaries required by what (N) negates, the situation is usually
underdescribed by simply saying that we do not perceive sharp boundaries
(I thus disagree with Wright [2007c], p. 25, who thinks that this is all that
is warranted by the phenomenology). For, at least in some cases, for ev-
ery pair of neighbouring objects, we do perceive that the boundary of the
exemplification of a property does not fall between them.
For example, in a well-executed slow sfumando from forte to piano, we
can perceive, of any two neighbouring enough moments, that the boundary
between the orchestra playing forte and its not doing so does not fall between
them. That one can perceive this over and above one’s not perceiving that
the boundary falls between them seems to be what warrants a favourable
aesthetic judgement in the first place. For one would not usually think of
one’s evidence for such a judgement to be, peculiarly enough (as opposed to
many other very similar aesthetic judgements, like the judgement that the
winds are playing too loud), distinctively second-order about one’s lack of
certain perceptions, which is all the evidence that would be afforded were it
the case that a sharp boundary is only not perceived to exist rather than also
perceived not to exist. And one would not usually think that the orchestra
played simply deftly enough to make it the case that one did not perceive
a boundary where there might well have been one—rather, the aesthetic
23Here, I use ‘perceive’ and its like in a non-factive sense, understanding it as synony-
mous with lengthier constructions such as ‘it looks to one as though’.
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judgement is issued only because one would think that the orchestra played
deftly enough not to make at any time a sudden jump from its playing forte
to its not doing so.
Similar considerations can also be advanced with regard to one’s appre-
ciation of perceptually manifest features of non-aesthetic objects. For ex-
ample, upon leaving a fuzzy cloud on a flight, one can perceive, of any two
neighbouring enough spatial regions, that the boundary between the cloudy
region and the non-cloudy region does not fall between them. That one can
perceive this over and above one’s not perceiving that the boundary falls be-
tween them seems to be what warrants a judgement of fuzziness concerning
the cloud’s boundaries in the first place. For one would not usually think
of one’s evidence for such a judgement to be, peculiarly enough (as opposed
to many other very similar judgements concerning the cloud’s shape proper-
ties, like the judgement that it is big), distinctively second-order about one’s
lack of certain perceptions, which is all the evidence that would be afforded
were it the case that a sharp boundary is only not perceived to exist rather
than also perceived not to exist. And one would not usually think that the
water droplets were simply increasing smoothly enough in their density to
make it the case that one did not perceive a boundary where there might
well have been one—rather, the judgement of fuzziness is issued only because
one would think that the droplets were increasing smoothly enough in their
density not to make at any point a sudden jump from the cloudy region to
the non-cloudy region.
Of course, one can accept all these points about the correct description of
our phenomenology and still reject (N), on the grounds that our experience
systematically deceives us in this regard. On this view, our experience of
seamless change would be similar to our experience of geometrically impossi-
ble situations (as nicely exemplified e.g. in the works of Escher): even though
both real qua experiences, what they represent is something that cannot be
the case. Such a move depends on the availability of independent grounds
for thinking that what is represented is impossible (which do indeed exist in
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the case of experiences of geometrically impossible situations). I doubt such
grounds exist in the case of seamless change (see chapter 4 for discussion of
the most plausible candidate, the sorites paradox). In any event, recall that
the aim of this chapter is not so much that of establishing (N) beyond any
reasonable doubt, but to expose the unpalatable commitments incurred by
rejecting it—in this case, the unpalatable commitment to a new aspect of
systematic illusion in the way we experience the world.
2.3.2 Appearances
In this final section, I wish to trace a fairly specific and unusual argumenta-
tive path through the unwieldy jungle of questions concerning phenomenal
entities (some of the main works relevant to the issues I will touch on are
Goodman [1951]; Armstrong [1968]; Jackson and Pinkerton [1973]; Dummett
[1975a]; Wright [1975]; Wright [1987]; Peacocke [1981]; Linsky [1984]; Travis
[1985]; Hardin [1988]; Williamson [1990]; Raffman [2000]; Fara [2001]). I
would like to distinguish between the phenomenal identity of x and y with
respect to a certain quality q (the fact that x and y appear to be the same
specific way with respect to q) and the epistemic identity of x and y with
respect to q (the fact that x and y are not known not to be the same specific
way with respect to q) and only focus on the former (see Chisholm [1957] for
a canonical statement of the distinction—usually associated with an ambi-
guity in the word ‘look’—and Breckenridge [2007] for critical discussion). I
will first defend the claim that apparent (i.e. phenomenal) identity requires
identity (of appearances). I will then contend that apparent identity is pre-
served across minute enough differences of the relevant quality. I will finally
show how these two claims in turn entail the relevant instance of (N), or
something close enough.
Consider the following general abstraction principle about appearances
(see chapter 4 for a logical treatment of abstraction principles affected by
vagueness):
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(APP) For every subject s, time t, quality q and objects x, y, the appearances
of x’s and y’s q for s at t are the same iff [x and y would appear to s at
t to be the same specific way with respect to q if presented to s at t].
For example, as applied to shade appearances, (APP) yields:
(APPshade) For every subject s, time t and objects x, y, the appearances of
the shades of x and y for s at t are the same iff [x and y would appear
to s at t to be of the same shade if presented to s at t].
Before proceeding with my argument, some remarks on the formulation
of these abstraction principles are in order. Firstly, while the occurrence
of ‘same’ on the left-hand side of (APP) and (APPshade) denotes numeri-
cal identity (among certain exotic objects, appearances), the occurrence of
‘same’ on their right-hand side (in the scope of ‘appear’) denotes qualitative
identity (among common-and-garden objects, percepts). I will remain neu-
tral here as to whether qualitative identity can itself be reduced to numerical
identity (e.g. between properties). Secondly, the appearances referred to on
the left-hand side are relativized to whichever quality (shade, shape, sound
etc.) is referred to on the right-hand side. Thirdly, the counterfactuality
of the right-hand side is needed in order to be able to determine appear-
ances to s at t also for objects which are not perceived by s at t. This is
of course not to rule out that there might be some benign indeterminacy in
some instances of the relevant counterfactual conditional, which would then
entail some benign indeterminacy in the corresponding identity statements
concerning appearances. Fourthly, hereafter I will mostly leave implicit the
antecedent of the relevant counterfactual conditional (leaving only the modal
‘would’ to indicate the intended counterfactuality) and the relativization to
a subject, a time and a quality. Finally, I will assume as unproblematic the
left-to-right direction of the abstraction principles in question.
I now turn to the first step of the argument, arguing in favour of the
right-to-left direction of (APP). This direction seems essential in grounding
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the right identity conditions for appearances. For what explains the fact
that two objects would appear to be the same specific way? It cannot be
just the fact that their appearances are merely similar, because appearances
are often similar without determining that the objects they are appearances
of would appear to be the same specific way (for example, the appearance of
the shape of a collection of 5 grains is very similar to, but not identical with,
the appearance of the shape of a collection of 6 grains, but a collection of 5
grains would appear to be of a different shape than a collection of 6 grains).
Moreover, even if mere similarity in appearances between two objects could
sometimes negatively determine that it is not the case that one would appear
to be not the same specific way as the other, it is hard to see how it could
positively determine that one would appear to be the same specific way as
the other.24 It is hard to see, more generally, how any fact falling short of a
(numerical) identity could determine that an object would appear to be the
same specific way as another object.25 But, certainly, appearances are the
kind of objects related by such identities if anything is.
Indeed, not only does identity of appearances ground what would other-
wise seem to be a (theoretically highly undesirable) primitive appearing of
a (qualitative) identity, thus constituting the ultimate explanatory basis of
the explananda with respect to which appearings of (qualitative) identities
are usually appealed to—it is also required for some explanatory work which
cannot be carried out by any appearing of a (qualitative) identity. For exam-
ple, the dog may react in the same specific way upon numerically different,
24Again, elaborating on a point already made in section 2.3.1, it is not in general true
that its being the case that x would not appear to be not the same specific way as y entails
its being the case that x would appear to be the same specific way as y—for example, it is
not the case that an atom of hydrogen would appear to me now to be of a different shape
than an atom of oxygen although it is also not the case that it would appear to me now
to be of the same shape as an atom of oxygen.
25I should stress that the principle appealed to in the text, while very attractive for
appearings, is doubtlessly rather improbable for other mental states such as e.g. believings:
it is not at all hard to see how some fact falling short of an identity could determine that
an object would be believed to be the same specific way as another one.
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temporally remote but qualitatively very similar calls of his master. There
is no relevant connection between the two phenomenological states the dog
undergoes, let alone a phenomenological state in which it appears to the dog
that one object (the first call) sounds the same specific way as another (the
second call)—that is, a phenomenological state which would constitute an
appearing of a (qualitative) identity. Only the simple, unapparent identity of
the appearances of the sounds of the two calls is there to explain the identity
of the specific reactions of the dog (an analogous example can be given for
the inter-subjective rather than inter-temporal case).26 But once identity of
appearances has to be admitted in order to explain such inter-temporal and
inter-subjective cases, it would become arbitrary not to admit it in order to
explain the case where, for some s and t, two objects would appear to s at t
to be the same specific way if presented to s at t.
The next step of the argument exploits a minimal connection between
the epistemic notion of justifiedly believing and the phenomenal notion of
appearing, to reach the conclusion that, under normal circumstances, given
only minute enough differences between x and y with respect to the relevant
quality,27 an apparent (qualitative) identity between x and y must hold—
that is, for every subject s and time t constituting a normal circumstance,
if x and y differ minutely enough, x and y would appear to s at t to be
the same specific way if presented to s at t. I argue for this conclusion
by first observing that it should be uncontroversial that, under normal cir-
cumstances, minutely enough differing objects presented pairwise would be
justifiedly believed to be the same specific way, in the sense that the belief
that they are the same specific way would be positively supported by the
available phenomenal evidence. That is, it is not just that the phenomenal
evidence is merely consistent with the objects’ being the same specific way—
26Of course, in such cases the identity of the relevant appearances is not entailed by
anything like (APP), which only concerns identity of appearances to the same subject at
the same time. I believe that this shows that, important as they are, abstraction principles
like (APP) do not exhaust our understanding of appearances.
27Relativization to the relevant quality will be left implicit in the following.
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rather, the phenomenal evidence also points to the objects’ being the same
specific way (in the sense of favouring the hypothesis that the objects are
the same specific way over its negation). This should be uncontroversial once
“normal circumstances” are glossed as, roughly, those where the perceiver is
in optimal conditions for observing each pair of neighbouring objects in the
relevant series (such gloss gets around the difficulties raised by Fara [2001],
pp. 916–20).
However, if so much is granted, to reject that, under normal circum-
stances, minutely enough differing objects presented pairwise would appear
to be the same specific way would commit one to maintaining that, under
normal circumstances, there could be a case of minutely enough differing
objects presented pairwise where one is justifiedly believed, on the basis of
the phenomenal evidence, to be the same specific way as the other despite its
not appearing to be such! What could the source of this justification be, if it
is to be phenomenal but still fall short of being the appearing of a (qualita-
tive) identity? It would rather seem that nothing less than the appearing of
a (qualitative) identity could be an appearing which favours the hypothesis
that the objects are the same specific way over its negation, and thus justi-
fies the belief that they are so. Hence, the uncontroversial fact that, under
normal circumstances, if x and y differ minutely enough, the belief that x
and y are the same specific way would be justified seems to imply that, under
normal circumstances, if x and y differ minutely enough, x would appear to
be the same specific way as y.
Now, drawing the previous two threads together, suppose for concreteness
that, under normal circumstances, x and y differ minutely enough in shade.
Then, as I have contended in the second step of the argument, x would
appear to be of the same shade as y, and so, by the right-to-left direction of
(APPshade) I have defended in the first step of the argument, the appearance
of the shade of x is the same as the appearance of the shade of y. Therefore,
under normal circumstances, if x and y differ minutely enough in shade, the
appearance of the shade of x is the same as the appearance of the shade of
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y—that is, for every subject s and time t constituting a normal circumstance,
if x and y differ minutely enough, the appearance of the shade of x for s at
t is the same as the appearance of the shade of y for s at t. Moreover, given
the current understanding of ‘normal circumstances’, in this conclusion ‘x’
and ‘y’ range over all the elements of the relevant series, which could go
for example from a clear case of red to a clear case of orange (note that this
argument nowhere appeals to closure of appearing under logical consequence,
and so does not fall prey to the objections levelled by Williamson [1994],
pp. 180–4).28
Strictly speaking, this conclusion does not yet vindicate (N). It would do
so if, assuming that the appearance of the shade of x is a, we were allowed
to substitute ‘a’ for ‘the appearance of the shade of x’ at the last step.
This would yield the conclusion that, if x and y differ minutely enough in
shade and the appearance of the shade of x is a, then the appearance of
the shade of y is a, which is in effect (very plausibly) logically equivalent
with the instance of (N) obtainable by substituting ‘ξ0 and ξ1 differ minutely
enough in shade’ for ‘ξ0 Rs ξ1’ and ‘The appearance of the shade of ξ is a’
for ‘ξ is F ’. Unfortunately, the crucial substitution which is needed is an
instance of the rule of indiscernibility of identicals, which is invalid in many
logics for vagueness and so cannot neutrally be appealed to here (it is valid
though in the final logics proposed in chapter 4). Be that as it may, even if
possibly falling short of entailing the relevant instance of (N), the conclusion
is certainly in keeping with the spirit of the naive theory of vagueness, since
it does establish that appearances do not discriminate between objects which
28Since the converse of this conclusion (namely, that, under normal circumstances, if
the appearance of the shade of x is the same as the appearance of the shade of y, then x
and y differ minutely enough in shade (if they differ at all)) should be uncontroversial and
since identity is arguably transitive, this entails, under some natural assumptions, that
x-differs-minutely-enough-from-y is transitive. That seems plausible given the vagueness
of this relation (it would not of course be plausible for a relation which specifies precisely
the amount of difference tolerated). Chapter 4 will show how this much transitivity can




The foregoing arguments lend a very high plausibility to a great many in-
stances of (N). In particular, they do so by showing the high value of predi-
cates conforming to (N) in our thought about, experience of and interaction
with the world. According to the naive theory of vagueness, conformity to
(N) is, roughly, what the nature of the vagueness of a predicate is, and so,
according to the naive theory, the high value so achieved—namely, the pos-
sibility of such thoughts, experiences and interactions—is what the point of
vague predicates is. We have been exploring in some detail some of the dif-
ferent grounds of this value—these are then what, according to the naive
theory, the sources of vagueness are. These sources, we have seen, are rooted
in fundamental facts about our cognition and agency in the world. The fore-
going arguments thus lend a very high plausibility to the naive theory itself.
Not only is it the theory which is arguably explanatorily most powerful (see
chapter 1)—it is the only theory which gives depth to vagueness and does not
reduce it in the end to a rather uninteresting nuisance deriving in some way
or other from our failure to codify explicitly sharp boundaries for our pred-
icates. Indeed, since it is very plausible that vagueness would be conducive
to the high value in question if anything were, the foregoing arguments show
that rejecting the naive theory amounts to rejecting the very possibility of
the achievement of such a value. This is a very high—in my view, too high—
cost incurred by the rejection of the naive theory. The only serious defeater
for the naive theory I know of is the already mentioned sorites paradox. If
this can satisfactorily be solved, the vindication of the theory will almost be
complete. To this dialectic we turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Higher-Order Sorites Paradox
3.1 Introduction and Overview
Appealing as it may appear at a first glance, the naive theory of vagueness has
been on reflection rejected by almost every commentator on the grounds that
it is subject to standard sorites paradoxes (see chapter 4 for a presentation
and discussion of these). Opponents of the naive theory have thus sought
to find a suitably weaker claim which, while no longer subject to sorites
paradoxes, still manages to capture (a great deal of) what the naive theorist
tries to capture with her claim of tolerance. Within the dominant approach,
the natural fall-back has been a claim of borderlineness. That such a retreat
is really safe has been assumed without much argument, save for briefly
noting that there does not seem to be any easy way of generating sorites
paradoxes out of the materials afforded by borderlineness claims. The alleged
advantage of the dominant approach over the naive theory has wholly relied
on this article of faith. It is high time to shake it.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls a sur-
prising phenomenon of ignorance related to vagueness and sketches what
account is given of it by the dominant approach. Section 3 rehearses an-
other phenomenon of vagueness, higher-order vagueness, articulating and
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defending two main claims about it. Section 4 uses these claims to develop
a higher-order sorites paradox, showing that the dominant approach is after
all no less paradoxical than the naive theory. Section 5 draws the conclusions
which follow from the higher-order sorites paradox for the dialectic between
the dominant approach and the naive theory.
3.2 Ignorance
3.2.1 Ignorance and Borderlineness
Consider the series S of natural numbers from 0 to 1, 000, 000, the predicate
‘A person with ξ hairs on her scalp is bald’ (henceforth ‘Bξ’) and a conversa-
tional context (a fairly common one, I suppose) where 0 and 1, 000, 000 are,
respectively, indisputable positive and negative cases for the application of
‘B’. If there is a boundary in S between the Bs and the ¬Bs,1 where does
it lie? As noted in section 1.3, we simply seem to be unable to provide a
knowledgeable identification of such a boundary: ‘B’ is vague.
It is generally agreed that our surprising inability to provide a knowl-
edgeable identification of the boundary between the Bs and the ¬Bs is due
to the vagueness of ‘B’ (as stressed in section 1.3, this phenomenon of ig-
norance extends from lack of knowledge to a more general lack of warrant,
but, in order to avoid complexities which seem irrelevant for the purposes
of this chapter, we will focus only on this peculiar lack of knowledge and
take it as our guide to vagueness). But how exactly is the latter supposed
to explain the former? The dominant approach has it that the vagueness of
‘B’ explains our epistemic inability insofar as ‘B’ presents borderline cases2
of application in S: objects which are neither definitely B nor definitely ¬B
1To preserve clarity, in this chapter I will help myself to a moderate, hopefully self-
explanatory, regimentation of my language into Loglish.
2Henceforth, ‘borderline case’ and its like is used as a short for ‘strong borderline case’
and its like.
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(I will have something more to say on the relation between the property of
being borderline and the property of being definite in section 3.3.1). Let-
ting henceforth the quantifiers range over the elements of S and ‘D’ be a
‘definitely’-operator, the borderlineness principle:
(B) ∃x(¬DBx ∧ ¬D¬Bx)
is accepted.
Let me stress right at the outset that all the arguments to follow will be
fairly neutral with respect to the specific interpretation of the ‘definitely’-
operator (for the various options, see section 1.3), turning only on basic
common features required by its use in describing borderline cases and on a
minimal normal modal logic KT validating its factivity and closure under
logical consequence:
(F) ` Dϕ ⊃ ϕ;3
(C) If ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ` ψ, then Dϕ0,Dϕ1,Dϕ2 . . . ` Dψ.4
But, again, how exactly is (B) supposed to explain our surprising epis-
temic inability? It is—to my knowledge—universally and—to my mind—
very plausibly accepted that, if there is indeed a boundary between the Bs
and the ¬Bs, this has to lie in the borderline area of Bness, and that, if two
objects are neither DB nor D¬B, it is not known that one is B and the other
3Throughout, I will use ‘`’ to denote the contextually relevant consequence relation.
4(F) and (C) have both come into question in another area where the notion of being
definite is supposed by many to do some helpful work—namely, in the area of the semantic
paradoxes. On pain of revenge, classical theories of truth such as the one developed in
McGee [1991] must reject the definitization of (F) and non-classical theories of truth such
as the one developed in Field [2002]; Field [2003a]; Field [2003c]; Field [2007a] must reject
(C). No matter what one thinks of these moves in the context of the semantic paradoxes,
I don’t think that a similar rejection of either (F) or (C) can be motivated in the case of
vagueness.
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¬B. (A stronger, almost universally accepted ignorance principle is that its
being borderline whether something is B implies ignorance as to whether it
is B. This principle has however been forcefully rejected by some theorists of
vagueness (in addition to the works of Crispin Wright cited in section 1.3, see
Dorr [2003]; Barnett [2007a]; Barnett [2007b]). Nevertheless, these theorists
would still accept the weaker ignorance principle just mentioned.) Factivity
of knowledge reduces then to inconsistency the set consisting in these two
claims and in the further claim that it is known where the boundary between
the Bs and the ¬Bs lies. So far so good.
3.2.2 Indefiniteness and Tolerance
Now, reflect that S is such that the trichotomy principle:
(T) ∀x∀y(x < y ∨ y < x ∨ x = y)
obviously holds. Moreover, the meanings of ‘B’ and ‘D’ have been sufficiently
explicated in order to validate the monotonicity principle:
(M) ∀x((DBx′ ⊃ DBx) ∧ (D¬Bx ⊃ D¬Bx′)),
where ‘′’ is the standard successor functor, which is well-defined on S (for
simplicity’s sake, I am acquiescing in the usual, harmlessly false assumption
that baldness is just a matter of the number of hairs on one’s scalp, see
section 2.1).
Theorem 3.2.1. Together with (T) and (M), (B) entails the indefiniteness
principle:
(I) ¬∃x(DBx ∧ D¬Bx′).
Proof. Suppose for reductio that there is a definite sharp boundary between
the Bs and the ¬Bs (that is, that there is an object a such that a belongs to
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S and DBa∧D¬Ba′). Consider then an arbitrarily chosen object b belonging
to S. By (T), b is either less than a or greater than a or identical with a. If
b is smaller than a, then, by (M), b is DB, and therefore DB ∨ D¬B. If b
is greater than a, then, by (M), b is D¬B, and therefore DB ∨ D¬B. If b is
identical with a, then, by Leibniz’s Law, b is DB, and therefore DB ∨D¬B.
(Note that intersubstitutability of identicals in ‘D’-contexts may very well
result problematic, at least under certain interpretations of ‘D’. This deli-
cate issue lies however outside the scope of this essay.) Therefore, reasoning
by cases, b is DB ∨ D¬B. Therefore, by an uncontroversial De Morgan’s
Law, b is ¬(¬DB ∧ ¬D¬B). Therefore, by universal generalization, every-
thing is ¬(¬DB ∧ ¬D¬B). Therefore, by an uncontroversial ∀ξ¬ϕ⇒ ¬∃ξϕ
quantifier manipulation, nothing is ¬DB ∧¬D¬B. Therefore, by existential
instantiation, nothing is ¬DB ∧ ¬D¬B. Contradiction with (B). Therefore,
by reductio, there is no definite sharp boundary between the Bs and the ¬Bs
(cf Greenough [2003], pp. 270–1).
(I) is certainly not as straightforwardly paradoxical as the stronger, naive
tolerance principle:
(TOL) ¬∃x(Bx ∧ ¬Bx′).
On the one hand, (TOL) says that at no point in S does a single step (that
is, a step from a number to its successor) bring us from the Bs to the ¬Bs,
which—by the standard sorites paradox—seems to be inconsistent with 0’s
being B and 1, 000, 000’s being ¬B. On the other hand, (I) only says that at
no point in S does a single step bring us from the DBs to the D¬Bs, which
seems to be consistent with 0’s being B and 1, 000, 000’s being ¬B, and may
be thought adequately to describe what the apparent smoothness of S with
respect to Bness consists in. However, some very plausible claims concerning
the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness suffice to show that principles of
the form of (I) (and, therefore, principles of the form of (B)) are, in a subtler
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way, just as paradoxical as (TOL)—which, as remarked in section 1.4, was
the most obvious candidate for a characterization of the nature of vagueness
from which an explanation of our epistemic inability would nicely follow.
3.3 Higher-Order Vagueness
3.3.1 Being Definiteω
In accounting for the effects in S of the vagueness of ‘B’, the new compound
predicate ‘DB’ has been used by the dominant approach. As remarked in
section 1.3, this predicate is itself vague: ‘B’ is higher-order vague. Two
claims concerning higher-order vagueness seem to be highly plausible. Before
stating and defending them, we need however to introduce some notation. For
every natural number i, let ‘Di’ be a shorthand for the expression obtained
by concatenating the empty string with i occurrences of ‘D’. Assuming the
availability in the object language of the expressive resources afforded by
substitutional quantification, we can now introduce a ‘definitelyω’-operator
‘Dω’ by letting ‘Dωϕ’ be satisfied iff ‘ΠiDiϕ’ is.
This is a particularly neutral way of introducing transfinite levels of the
property of being definite without presupposing much with respect to the
semantics of ‘D’. On some semantics for a vague language (for example,
supervaluationism and epistemicism), ‘D’ usually receives an interpretation
in terms of possible-world semantics, being in effect treated as a necessity-
like operator. In such a semantic framework, ‘Dω’ can be interpreted as
the ancestral of ‘D’, thereby meaning that the possible-world semantics for
‘Dω’ uses as accessibility relation the ancestral (that is, the finite transitive
closure) of the accessibility relation used by the possible-world semantics for
‘D’ (Williamson [1994], p. 160). On other semantics for a vague language
(for example, many-valued), ‘D’ usually receives an interpretation in terms
of algebraic semantics, being in effect treated as a lowering operation on the
structure of values. In such a semantic framework, ‘Dω’ can be interpreted as
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the greatest lower bound of ‘D’, thereby meaning that the algebraic semantics
for ‘Dω’ assigns to it the operation that takes a value v to the greatest lower
bound of the set of values to which v is taken by the operations denoted by
finite concatenations of ‘D’ (Field [2007a], p. 34).
The first claim concerning higher-order vagueness is then that 0 (by as-
sumption, an indisputable positive case of Bness) is DωB and that 1, 000, 000
(by assumption, an indisputable negative case of Bness) is Dω¬B:
(O) DωB0 ∧ Dω¬B1, 000, 000.
The claim is validated by some of the most influential semantics for a vague
language including a ‘definitely’-operator: supervaluationist semantics as-
signing super-truth to ‘Dϕ’ if super-truth is assigned to ϕ and allowing for
‘B0’ and ‘¬B1, 000, 000’ to be super-true (see Fine [1975]), many-valued se-
mantics assigning full truth to ‘Dϕ’ if full truth is assigned to ϕ and allowing
for ‘B0’ and ‘¬B1, 000, 000’ to be fully true (see Sanford [1975])—as well as,
I suspect, being taken for granted in most of the literature (a notable excep-
tion is Williamson [1994], pp. 229, 232–3; Williamson [2002], pp. 145–6; Cian
Dorr too has work-in-progress relevant to this issue). More importantly, the
claim is very intuitive independently of the specific interpretation received
by the ‘definitely’-operator (see section 1.3), for it amounts to saying that
an indisputable positive or negative case does not exhibit vagueness at any
order. Even more importantly, the claim seems unavoidable for a vague
predicate like ‘ξ is close to 0 and [ξ is far from 1,000,000 or identical with
0]’ as applied to 0 (positively) and 1,000,000 (negatively): this is so because
it seems unavoidable that x-is-close-to-y is definitelyω reflexive, that x-is-
identical-with-y is definitelyω reflexive and vacuous5 and that x-is-far-from-y
is definitelyω irreflexive. Finally, the claim can be justified by various consid-
erations concerning the function which the ‘definitely’-operator is supposed
to serve and which allegedly constitutes our primary grasp of it.
5A relation R is vacuous on a set X iff, for every x, y ∈ X, if Rxy, then x = y.
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The issues here are surprisingly deep and difficult, deserving a far more
extended treatment than I can afford in this essay, but let me sketch just one
such consideration. Recall that, according to the dominant approach, border-
line cases are supposed to be not just a theoretical construction needed, for
every i, in the explanation of our epistemic inability concerning the boundary
between the DiBs and the ¬DiBs; rather, they are supposed to bemanifested
in our experience of being confronted with “hard cases” of DiBness—that
is, cases where, even after taking in all the relevant ‘DiB’-free information,
we competent speakers for ‘DiB’ feel unconfident both in unqualifiedly ap-
plying ‘DiB’ to the case in question and in unqualifiedly applying ‘¬DiB’
to it. Indeed, from within the dominant approach, it is arguable that, in
general, our grasp of the ‘definitely’-operator flows from our grasp of a more
basic ‘borderline’-operator, so that definite cases should be defined in terms
of borderline cases by saying that an object is definitely F iff it is F and not
borderline F (rather than, as usual, defining borderline cases in terms of def-
inite cases by saying that an object is borderline F iff it is neither definitely
F nor definitely ¬F ).
By assumption, 0 is not such a case for ‘B’. So, go along S starting from
0 and considering, case by case, the application of ‘B’. Sooner or later, you
will find yourself confronted with cases where, even after taking in all the
relevant ‘B’-free information, you competent speaker for ‘B’ feel unconfident
both in unqualifiedly applying ‘B’ to the case in question and in unqualifiedly
applying ‘¬B’ to it: these are the borderline cases of Bness—that is, cases
which are neither DB nor D¬B. By assumption, your epistemic situation
with respect to 0 was not like that : reflecting on the change occurred between
0 and the borderline cases of Bness, you infer that 0 is not a borderline case
of Bness, and therefore, by (F), that it is DB.
More explicitly: reflecting on the change occurred between 0 and the
borderline cases of Bness, you infer that 0 is not a borderline case of Bness—
that is, 0 is ¬(¬DB∧¬D¬B). But 0 is B and therefore, by (F), it is ¬D¬B.
Therefore, by adjunction and reductio, it is ¬¬DB. Therefore, by double-
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negation elimination, it is DB. Such a reasoning is of course intuitionistically
invalid at its very last step. I leave it as an exercise to the reader to adapt
the argument from here on in order to accommodate for this. However, note
that, adopting instead the less usual definition of definite cases in terms
of borderline cases suggested earlier, a legitimate worry concerning double-
negation elimination is no longer possible, since, now, for something to be
definitely F it takes no more than for it to be F and not to be a borderline
case of Fness. (In general, no legitimate worry concerning double-negation
elimination with respect to ‘F ’ is possible if ‘F ’ is known to be exclusive
and exhaustive with respect to ‘G’ over a particular range of application.
By exclusivity, if something is G, it is ¬F , wherefore, by contraposition, if
something is ¬¬F , it is ¬G. By exhaustivity, if something is ¬G, it is F .
By transitivity of the conditional, if something is ¬¬F , it is F . See Zardini
[2007a] for another application of this point in the case of vagueness.)6
You felt confident in asserting, on reflection, the difference between your
epistemic situation with respect to 0 and your epistemic situation with re-
spect to the borderline cases of Bness; since that there is such a difference is
the only substantial assumption on which the previous conclusion that 0 is
DB depends, you (should) feel confident in asserting this conclusion. Hence,
you (should) feel confident in applying ‘DB’ to 0. Indeed, it is just as clear
that there is a difference between your epistemic situation with respect to 0
and your epistemic situation with respect to the borderline cases of Bness
as is clear that 0 is B, and so your confidence in applying ‘DB’ to 0 should
equal your confidence in applying ‘B’ to it.
6The particular use of reductio on a premise got by adjunction is also relevantly invalid.
Additional, plausible assumptions concerning intensional connections between 0’s being
¬D¬B and 0’s being ¬DB would have to be made in order to turn the argument into a
relevantly valid one. Alternatively, the same strategy of adopting the less usual definition
of definite cases in terms of borderline cases would do in this case as well. I leave to the
interested reader the details of this as well as those of similar modifications that would
be needed at later stages of the argument. Thanks to Stephen Read for discussion of this
point.
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So, go along S starting again from 0 but, this time, considering, case
by case, the application of ‘DB’. Sooner or later, you will find yourself
confronted with cases where, even after taking in all the relevant ‘DB’-free
information, you competent speaker for ‘DB’ feel unconfident both in unqual-
ifiedly applying ‘DB’ to the case in question and in unqualifiedly applying
‘¬DB’ to it: these are the borderline cases of DBness—that is, cases which
are neither DDB nor D¬DB. Having followed through the previous reason-
ing, your epistemic situation with respect to 0 was not like that : reflecting
on the change occurred between 0 and the borderline cases of DBness, you
infer that 0 is not a borderline case of DBness, and therefore, by (F), that
it is DDB. (Comments analogous to those made earlier apply of course to
this inference.)
You felt confident in asserting, on reflection, the difference between your
epistemic situation with respect to 0 and your epistemic situation with re-
spect to the borderline cases of DBness; since that there is such a difference
is the only substantial assumption on which the previous conclusion that 0
is DDB depends, you (should) feel confident in asserting this conclusion.
Hence, you (should) feel confident in applying ‘DDB’ to 0. Indeed, it is just
as clear that there is a difference between your epistemic situation with re-
spect to 0 and your epistemic situation with respect to the borderline cases of
DBness as is clear that 0 is DB, and so your confidence in applying ‘DDB’
to 0 should equal your confidence in applying ‘DB’ to it. Et sic in infinitum.
This “back-and-forth” argument establishes that, for every i, one should be
confident in applying ‘DiB’ to 0—indeed, it establishes that one should be
equally confident in applying ‘DiB’ to 0 as one is confident in applying ‘B’ to
it. A parallel back-and-forth argument would of course establish the corre-
sponding claim for ‘Di¬B’ and 1,000,000. Together, these arguments commit
one to (O).
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3.3.2 Radical Higher-Order Vagueness
The second claim concerning higher-order vagueness is that, for every i, ‘DiB’
is definitelyω vague. We can establish this claim by reflecting that, for every
i, we seem to be just as much unable to provide a knowledgeable identifica-
tion of the boundary between the DiBs and the ¬DiBs as we are concerning
the boundary between the Bs and the ¬Bs (and definitelyω so), and that
there seems to be no relevant difference as regards the source of these var-
ious epistemic inabilities (and definitelyω so). In particular, for every large
i, it does not seem that the source of our epistemic inability with respect to
the boundary between the DiBs and the ¬DiBs is constituted by our com-
putational limits in understanding ‘DiB’: rather, it seems that even suitable
finite extensions of us would be in the same epistemic situation as we are
with respect to vague expressions we do understand. Since the epistemic
inability concerning the boundary between the Bs and the ¬Bs is due to
the vagueness of ‘B’ (and definitelyω so), the epistemic inability concerning
the boundary between the DiBs and the ¬DiBs is due to the vagueness of
‘DiB’ (and definitelyω so, by closure of the property of being definite—and,
therefore, of the property of being definiteω—under logical consequence). In
other words, the vagueness of ‘B’ is radical :
(R) ΠiDωV AGUE(‘DiB’).
Such a claim might however seem to be in contrast with at least one
of the considerations adduced in support of (O), namely that regarding the
possibility of predicates like ‘ξ is close to 0 and [ξ is far from 1,000,000 or
identical with 0]’ which force some cases (like 0) to be definitelyω positive
and some other cases (like 1,000,000) to be definitelyω negative. The worry is
that the straightforward argument which ensures in this and similar examples
that there are definitelyω positive and negative cases will also establish such
cases as definite sharp boundaries at some higher order or other. Thus, in
the case of ‘ξ is close to 0 and [ξ is far from 1,000,000 or identical with 0]’,
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it might be natural to think that 0 and 1,000,000 will be, for some i, the
definite sharp boundaries between the DiBs and the ¬DiBs and between the
Di¬Bs and the ¬Di¬Bs respectively (it will be even more natural to think
so for those who are attracted to the mildly nihilist view that nothing is a
definitelyω positive or negative case of a normal vague predicate).
Focus on the ignorance phenomenon allows us a conclusive dismissal of
the worry. For every i, the proponent of the worry grants that 0 is DiB.
Were vagueness to peter out at the ith order in the manner envisaged, the
proponent should be able knowledgeably to identify 0 as the sharp bound-
ary between the DiBs and the ¬DiBs. Unfortunately for her, the fact is
that she isn’t. Each claim she might make to this effect will sound wholly
preposterous—for all she knows, the sharp boundary will stabilize at 0 only
at some order higher than the ith one.7 The worry also seems to miss com-
pletely the point of vague predicates associated with extremes on a certain
dimension of comparison. At every order of the property of being definite,
such a point is exactly that of singling out for special treatment not just
the extreme, but an extended segment of the dimension (including the ex-
treme). For every i, if ‘DiB’ were to apply positively only to 0, DiBness
would completely pervert the point of Bness, which is to look at men with
very few hairs on their scalp, not just at men with no hairs on their scalp
(even though he has fewer hairs on his scalp, Yul Brynner is no more bald
than Michail Gorbacˇe¨v is).
3.4 The Paradox
3.4.1 The Basic Form of the Paradox
We are now in a position to show that, because of the phenomenon of higher-
order vagueness as described by (O) and (R), principles of the form of (I) are
7In conversation, Patrick Greenough has usefully dubbed this dimension of higher-order
vagueness ‘vertical higher-order vagueness’.
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just as paradoxical as (TOL). The paradoxicality of principles of the form of
(I) in the presence of higher-order vagueness (even without (O) and (R)) has
first been argued for by Wright [1987], pp. 262–6; Wright [1991], pp. 141–4,
150–60; Wright [1992], pp. 130–7. However, Wright’s argument needs a prima
facie implausibly strong logic for the ‘definitely’-operator and is criticized by
Edgington [1993], pp. 193–6; Heck [1993] on these grounds. The argument
to follow, on the contrary, only needs the operator to be factive and closed
under logical consequence (and hence targets also theories, such as the one
offered in Cobreros [2007], which weaken the logic of ‘definitely’ in order
to cope with the arguments just mentioned). The same paradoxicality has
more recently been argued for by Fara [2003], pp. 196–205, whose argument,
however, still needs a logic for the ‘definitely’-operator acceptable only on
some of its specific interpretations (in particular, a logic according to which
ϕ ` Dϕ is valid).
The paradoxicality of margin-for-error principles of the form of:
(ME) ¬∃x(DBx ∧ ¬Bx′)
in the presence of higher-order vagueness (as described by (O) and (R))
has been argued for by Go´mez-Torrente [1997], pp. 243–5; Go´mez-Torrente
[2002b], pp. 114–7, 119–24; Fara [2002] (to whom Williamson replies in
his Williamson [1997], pp. 261–3; Williamson [2002], pp. 144–9). However,
margin-for-error principles and their underlying epistemology are very con-
troversial; by (F), they entail but are not entailed by principles of the form
of (I), which, on the contrary, seem to be just platitudes about vagueness.
Our higher-order sorites paradox can most easily be made to emerge by
using an appropriate, hopefully self-explanatory, natural deduction system.
We begin with:
1 (1) D999,999D¬DB1, 000, 000 (O)
2 (2) D999,999¬∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) (R)
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3 (3) D¬DB1, 000, 000 A
4 (4) ¬∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) A
5 (5) DDB999, 999 A
3,5 (6) DDB999, 999 ∧ D¬DB1, 000, 000 5,3 ∧-I
3,5 (7) ∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) 6 ∃-I
3,4,5 (8) ⊥ 7,4 ¬-E
3,4 (9) ¬DDB999, 999 5,8 ¬-I
1,2 (10) D999,999¬DDB999, 999 1,2,3,4,9 D-C,
where the step from (9) to (10) employs the closure rule D-C corresponding
to (C) (note that (C) as well as (F) are crucial for (O) to entail (1)). With
a qualification I will presently address, I assume that none of the inference
rules used in the argument can plausibly be rejected. (R) justifies (2) if
it is assumed, with the dominant approach, that (second-order) vagueness
(definitely999,999) requires (second-order) borderlineness.
Next, we have:
1,2 (1′) D999,998D¬DDB999, 999 (10)
2′ (2′) D999,998¬∃x(DDDBx ∧ D¬DDBx′) (R)
3′ (3′) D¬DDB999, 999 A
4′ (4′) ¬∃x(DDDBx ∧ D¬DDBx′) A
5′ (5′) DDDB999, 998 A
3′,5′ (6′) DDDB999, 998 ∧ D¬DDB999, 999 5′,3′ ∧-I
3′,5′ (7′) ∃x(DDDBx ∧ D¬DDBx′) 6′ ∃-I
3′,4′,5′ (8′) ⊥ 7′,4′ ¬-E
3′,4′ (9′) ¬DDDB999, 998 5′,8′ ¬-I
1,2,2′ (10′) D999,998¬DDDB999, 998 1′,2′,3′,4′,9′ D-C.
(R) justifies (2′) if it is assumed, with the dominant approach, that (third-
order) vagueness (definitely999,998) requires (third-order) borderlineness. But
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999,998 structurally identical arguments eventually lead to ‘¬D1,000,001B0’,
thereby contradicting (O).8
3.4.2 Weakening the Logic?
The only problematic inference used in the argument is reductio (in the steps
from (8) to (9) and from (8′) to (9′)), which, whilst both classical and intu-
itionistically valid, is invalid in most many-valued logics which have seriously
been proposed in the vagueness debate.9 Reductio has already crucially been
used in the last step of the proof of theorem 3.2.1. There, we could have
appealed instead to weak contraposition:
(WC) If Γ, ϕ ` ψ, then Γ,¬ψ ` ¬Dϕ
(which is valid e.g. in K3 on the most obvious definition of the truth condi-
tions for ‘D’ and should be valid, I submit, on any reasonable semantics for
the operator). Letting ψ be ‘∃x(¬DBx ∧ ¬D¬Bx)’, Γ be {(T), (M)} and ϕ
8In conversation, Patrick Greenough has indicated that a structurally analogous para-
dox can be produced for inexact knowledge rather than vagueness (see section 6.4.5 for
an explanation of the distinction). For concreteness, let the numerals denote the relevant
pairwise indiscriminable trees in a series going from 25 ft tall to 15 ft tall, let ‘D’ be
interpreted as ‘An ordinary human subject can know by unaided observation that’ and let
‘Bξ’ be interpreted as ‘ξ is at least 20 ft tall’. Under this reading, (O) and the iterated
“definitizations” of the relevant (first- and higher-order) borderlineness principles are still
extremely plausible, so that a paradox structurally analogous to the higher-order sorites
paradox just presented would arise. If I were to believe in borderlineness, I would block the
higher-order sorites paradox using one of the logics to be developed in chapter 4, suitably
extended with a ‘definitely’-operator. Crucially, such a solution could not be applied to
this paradox of inexact knowledge, since, for all intents and purposes, all the expressions
occurring in it may be taken to be precise, and so no vagueness-motivated weakening of the
logic could be envisaged. It is my view that the solution to this latter paradox depends on
understanding certain crucial features of the nature of reflective knowledge and of closure
principles for knowledge. I try to make a start on these issues in Zardini [2007d].
9Thanks to Hartry Field for pressing this worry.
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be ‘∃x(DBx ∧ D¬Bx′)’, using (WC) we can obtain the weak-indefiniteness
principle:
(WI) ¬D∃x(DBx ∧ D¬Bx′).
Theorem 3.4.1. Under minimal assumptions concerning `, (WC) is equiv-
alent with weak reductio:
(WR) If Γ, ϕ ` ⊥, then Γ ` ¬Dϕ.10
Proof.
• (WR) entails (WC). Suppose that Γ, ϕ ` ψ. Then, assuming the usual
interaction between ¬ and ⊥, Γ, ϕ,¬ψ ` ⊥, and so, by (WR), Γ,¬ψ ` ¬Dϕ.
• (WC) entails (WR). Suppose that Γ, ϕ ` ⊥. Then, by (WC), Γ,¬⊥ ` ¬Dϕ,
and so, by suppression of logical truths, Γ ` ¬Dϕ.
With (WI) in place, we can run the following variation of the argument.
We begin with:
1 (1) D1,999,998DD¬DB1, 000, 000 (O)
2 (2) D1,999,998¬D∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) (R)
3 (3) DD¬DB1, 000, 000 A
4 (4) ¬D∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) A
5 (5) DDDB999, 999 A
6 (6) D¬DB1, 000, 000 A
7 (7) DDB999, 999 A
6,7 (8) DDB999, 999 ∧ D¬DB1, 000, 000 7,6 ∧-I
6,7 (9) ∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) 8 ∃-I
3,5 (10) D∃x(DDBx ∧ D¬DBx′) 3,5,6,7,9 D-C
10Thanks to Patrick Greenough for impressing upon me the importance of weak reductio.
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3,4,5 (11) ⊥ 10,4 ¬-E
3,4 (12) ¬DDDDB999, 999 5,11 W¬-I
1,2 (13) D1,999,998¬DDDDB999, 999 1,2,3,4,12 D-C,
where the step from (11) to (12) employs the weak-reductio rule W¬-I cor-
responding to (WR). (R) justifies (2) if it is assumed, with the dominant
approach, that (second-order) vagueness (definitely1,999,998) requires (second-
order) borderlineness.
Next, we have:
1′ (1′) D1,999,996DD¬D4B999, 999 (13)
2′ (2′) D1,999,996¬D∃x(DD4Bx ∧ D¬D4Bx′) (R)
3′ (3′) DD¬D4B999, 999 A
4′ (4′) ¬D∃x(DD4Bx ∧ D¬D4Bx′) A
5′ (5′) DDD4B999, 998 A
6′ (6′) D¬D4B999, 999 A
7′ (7′) DD4B999, 998 A
6′,7′ (8′) DD4B999, 998 ∧ D¬D4B999, 999 7′,6′ ∧-I
6′,7′ (9′) ∃x(DD4Bx ∧ D¬D4Bx′) 8′ ∃-I
3′,5′ (10′) D∃x(DD4Bx ∧ D¬D4Bx′) 3′,5′,6′,7′,9′ D-C
3′,4′,5′ (11′) ⊥ 10′,4′ ¬-E
3′,4′ (12′) ¬DDDD4B999, 998 5′,11′ W¬-I
1′,2′ (13′) D1,999,996¬DDDD4B999, 998 1′,2′,3′,4′,12′ D-C,
(R) justifies (2′) if it is assumed, with the dominant approach, that (fifth-
order) vagueness (definitely1,999,996) requires (fifth-order) borderlineness. But
999,998 structurally identical arguments eventually lead to ‘¬D3,000,001B0’,
thereby contradicting (O).
Might not a defender of the dominant approach weaken the modality
and only maintain the weaker claim that, if an expression is vague, it is
not definitely the case that it does not present borderline cases (instead
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of the usual, stronger claim that, if an expression is vague, it presents
borderline cases)? No. For ‘∃x(DBx ∧ D¬Bx′)’ uncontroversially entails
‘¬∃x(¬DBx ∧ ¬D¬Bx)’, and so, by (C), ‘D∃x(DBx ∧ D¬Bx′)’ entails
‘D¬∃x(¬DBx∧¬D¬Bx)’, wherefore, by (WC), ‘¬D¬∃x(¬DBx∧¬D¬Bx)’
entails ‘¬DD∃x(DBx ∧ D¬Bx′)’, which, by a slight modification of the ar-
gument just presented, can also be shown to be soritical.11
In closing, let me stress that inspection of our higher-order sorites para-
dox immediately reveals that the transfinite strength of (O) and (R) is wholly
dispensable. For once the finite length of the relevant soritical series12 has
been fixed, only weakenings of (O) and (R) where Dω is replaced by suffi-
ciently large finite concatenations of ‘D’ are needed to breed paradox. Even if
the considerations adduced in support of (O) and (R) should prove resistible,
the defender of the dominant approach is still faced with the daunting task
of showing that no suitable finite weakenings of (O) and (R) are ever avail-
able for any soritical series—that indisputable positive and negative cases
are much less definitely so than we thought them to be and that higher-order
vagueness is much less definitely radical than we thought it to be. I for one
cannot see how the defender of the dominant approach has in the present
state of information a guarantee that that task can be accomplished in its
full generality.13,14
3.5 Conclusion
Our paradox seems then to show higher-order principles of the form of (I)
(and, therefore, higher-order principles of the form of (B)), put forward by
11Thanks to Hartry Field here.
12A soritical series is any series of objects which, like S, can induce a sorites paradox.
13Thanks to Crispin Wright for emphasizing to me the dialectical importance of this
point.
14Further paradoxes of higher-order vagueness for the dominant approach are developed
in Zardini [2006a]; Zardini [2006b]. Greenough [2005]; Wright [2007b] are the best up-to-
date discussions of these issues.
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the dominant approach in order to characterize, for every i, the nature of
the vagueness of ‘DiB’, to be inconsistent with (O). The situation is thus
fully analogous to the one faced by the naive theory of vagueness, where
the original sorites paradox apparently showed (TOL), put forward by the
naive theory in order to characterize the nature of the vagueness of ‘B’, to
be inconsistent with 0’s being B and 1, 000, 000’s being ¬B. Hence, the
dominant approach loses its main advantage against the naive theory—its
alleged immunity to any form of sorites paradox. A new diagnosis of the
paradox is called for. To this we turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Tolerant Logics
4.1 Introduction and Overview
Some men are bald: a man with absolutely no hairs on his scalp is bald.
Other men are not bald: a man with a full head of hairs is not bald. It
is also very intuitive that the difference between the bald and the non-bald
is not an exquisitely fine difference: if a man is bald, so is one with just
one more hair on his scalp. In other words, it is also very intuitive that
the expression ‘bald’ is tolerant, in the sense that one-hair differences do
not make a difference to its positive or negative application (as in chapter
3, I will acquiesce in the usual, harmlessly false assumption that baldness is
just a matter of the number of hairs on one’s scalp). As we have seen in the
previous chapters, the theory based on the union of these or relevantly similar
claims may well be called ‘the naive theory of vagueness’. It is a theory of
vagueness insofar as its trio of claims can be taken to give an account of what
the vagueness of an expression consists in—very roughly, in its being tolerant
whilst having both positive and negative cases of application (see section 1.4
for a more careful formulation). It is a naive theory of vagueness insofar as
its prima facie theoretical advantages of simplicity (chapter 1), explanatory
power (chapter 1) and preservation of ordinary intuitions (chapter 2) are
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cast into grave doubt by an argument—the so-called “sorites paradox”—
purporting to show its inconsistency, in a way similar to that in which the
naive theory of sets, based on the unrestricted set-comprehension schema, is
affected by the set-theoretical paradoxes.
An informal presentation of the sorites paradox goes as follows. Consider
the premises:
(1) A man with 0 hairs is bald;
(2) A man with 1,000,000 hairs is not bald;
(3) If a man with i hairs is bald, so is a man with i+ 1 hairs.
The naive theory of vagueness is committed to all these three premises. How-
ever, from (3) we have that, if a man with 0 hairs is bald, so is a man with
1 hair, which, together with (1), yields that a man with 1 hair is bald. Yet,
from (3) we also have that, if a man with 1 hair is bald, so is a man with
2 hairs, which, together with the previous lemma that a man with 1 hair is
bald, yields that a man with 2 hairs is bald. With another 999,997 struc-
turally identical arguments, we reach the conclusion that a man with 999,999
hairs is bald. From (3) we also have that, if a man with 999,999 hairs is bald,
so is a man with 1,000,000 hairs, which, together with the previous lemma
that a man with 999,999 hairs is bald, yields that a man with 1,000,000 hairs
is bald. It would then seem that the contradictory of (2) follows simply from
(1) and (3).1
I think that all the three characteristic claims of the naive theory of
vagueness are in fact true and jointly provide a satisfactory account of what
the vagueness of an expression consists in, but I will not argue directly for
1In the simple form presented in the text, the argument has to make use of 999,999
applications of the contraction rule as well (see Copeland [1997], pp. 523–6). However,
clumsier versions of it are readily available which only employ 1,000,000 different instances
of (3) instead of (3) itself, and so do not require contraction (against what Copeland seems
to imply).
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that in this chapter. Rather, I will focus here on the problem presented by
the sorites paradox to the naive theory of vagueness, offering the basics of
a logical framework in which the theory can be true. As we will see, the
basic idea of the logical framework is not that of weakening the properties
of any particular logical constant (i. e. weakening the operational rules of
the logic). While this might be desirable in other respects, it won’t help
much in saving the naive theory of vagueness from inconsistency, since, as
we have seen, the sorites paradox need only use the rule of modus ponens
for the conditional used to formulate the tolerance principles and rejection of
this rule—in addition of course to being in itself highly implausible—would
seem to deprive those principles of their intended force (which consists in not
allowing any difference in, say, baldness between two men who only differ of 1
in the number of hairs on their scalp). The basic idea of the logical framework
is rather that of weakening the properties of the consequence relation itself
(i.e. weakening the structural rules of the logic), in particular the transitivity
property (see chapter 5 for an extended philosophical discussion of both the
viability and import of non-transitivist proposals). I will call any logic in
which the naive theory of vagueness is consistent owing to the failure of the
transitivity property ‘a tolerant logic’.
No doubt vagueness has offered other reasons, apparently independent of
the sorites paradox, to question the validity of certain classical laws and rules
concerning specific logical constants: the phenomenon of borderlineness—
especially once it is interpreted as strong borderlineness—has for instance in-
duced many a commentator to reject the law of excluded middle (see e.g. Field
[2003a]). I will thus start by describing a very minimal logical basis which,
while being non-transitive, does not prejudge any of the other many inter-
esting issues arising in the philosophy of the logic of vagueness. From such
a basis, I will then build up to my favoured specific system (mirroring, in
a non-transitive setting, classical logic), indicating along the way how other
weaker non-transitive systems (mirroring, in a non-transitive setting, some
or other non-classical logic) can be defined. An appropriate justification of
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such preference lies outside the scope of this essay: suffice it to say that I
regard classical patterns of reasoning as unchallenged by vagueness insofar
as they are compatible with a suitable weakening of the transitivity of the
consequence relation (for e. g. a defense of the law of excluded middle see
Zardini [2007a]).
The framework is thus neutral in the sense that it can fruitfully be em-
ployed also by a theorist who, while attracted to the naive theory of vague-
ness, has also reason to reject some other classical pattern of reasoning for
vague expressions. Moreover, as shown in chapter 3, most contemporary the-
ories of vagueness, requiring strong borderline cases for an expression when-
ever the expression is vague, are also subject to (higher-order) sorites para-
doxes. These paradoxes too can be blocked in a principled way by restricting
the transitivity of the consequence relation. Therefore, such theories too
should find the present framework congenial: its neutrality will allow them
to focus on (one of) the particular logic(s) which is generated by restricting
the transitivity of their originally favoured consequence relation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides and ex-
plains the general many-valued semantic framework of tolerant logics. Build-
ing on this basic framework, section 3 stepwise develops a tolerant counter-
part to classical zeroth-order logic and investigates some of its properties.
Section 4 discusses how the notion of consistency is best modelled in the
present framework and offers a proof of the consistency in a tolerant logic
of the zeroth-order fragment of the naive theory of vagueness. Section 5
extends the semantic construction to a first-order language with identity,
offering a corresponding consistency proof and individuating a specific tol-
erant logic as being on balance the best logic for a vague language. Section
6 draws the conclusions which follow for the status of the naive theory from
the non-transitivist solution to the sorites paradox and hints at some of the
outstanding technical issues.
4.2. A NEUTRAL FRAMEWORK 97
4.2 A Neutral Framework
4.2.1 Syntax
The core idea of tolerant logics—the failure of the transitivity property for the
consequence relation—already emerges at the sentential level. Furthermore,
a significant fragment of the naive theory of vagueness can be adequately
regimented in a standard sentential language. Hence, in this and the two
following sections, we will focus on the study of such a language, the vague
zeroth-order language L 0. To stress, it is not that L 0 is said to be vague
because some of its expressions are vague: being a formal language, its non-
logical atomic expressions are not interpreted, and so a fortiori not vague.
Moreover, there is no plausibility in the idea that the mathematically precise
semantics which will be provided for its logical expressions should induce any
vagueness in them. Rather, L 0 is said to be vague because the logic deter-
mined by its semantics is such that an adequate regimentation of a significant
fragment of the naive theory of vagueness is consistent in it. I should also
emphasize that the metalanguage M within which we will conduct our study
of L 0 will be assumed to be classical (in particular, assumed to be such that
its consequence relation is transitive), and that the metatheory used in M
will be the classical set theory ZFC.2
Definition 4.2.1. The set ASL 0 of the atomic symbols of L
0 is defined by
enumeration as follows:3
• The denumerable set V ARL 0 of variables
P0, P1, P2 . . . , Q0, Q1, Q2 . . . , R0, R1, R2 . . . is a subset of ASL 0 ;
2The use of a classical metalanguage in the explanation of a non-classical object lan-
guage is of course one of the cruces of any proposal of deviation from classical logic. I
cannot hope to address here the philosophical issues related to this asymmetry nor the
crucial philosophical and technical question as to whether and how much of an explanation
of a non-classical object language can be provided using a metalanguage with the same
logic.
3Throughout, formal symbols are understood autonymously to refer to themselves.
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• The 1ary sentential operator ¬ belongs to ASL 0 ;
• The 2ary sentential operators ∧, ∨ and → belong to ASL 0 ;
• ( and ) belong to ASL 0 ;
• Nothing else belongs to ASL 0 .
Note that, given the generality of the framework we will be developing, we
cannot assume the definability of any of the standard sentential operators in
terms of others. In particular, in order to let non-transitivity emerge already
at the very first stages of the construction, it will prove useful to have a
primitive conditional → bearing a privileged connection to the consequence
relation.
Definition 4.2.2. The set WFFL 0 of well-formed formulae (wffs) of L
0
(equivalently, given that L 0 is zeroth-order, the set of sentences of L 0) can
be defined by recursion in the usual way:4
• If ϕ ∈ V ARL 0 , ϕ ∈ WFFL 0 ;
• If ϕ ∈ WFFL 0 , (¬ϕ) ∈ WFFL 0 ;
• If ϕ, ψ ∈ WFFL 0 , (ϕ ∧ ψ), (ϕ ∨ ψ), (ϕ→ ψ) ∈ WFFL 0 ;
• Nothing else belongs to WFFL 0 .
Henceforth, to save on brackets, I will assume the usual scope hierarchy
among the operators (with ¬ binding more strongly than ∧ and ∨, and with
these in turn binding more strongly than→) and left associativity of the 2ary
operators (so that (ϕ0 ? ϕ1 ? ϕ2 . . . ? ϕi) reads (((. . . (ϕ0 ? ϕ1) ? ϕ2) . . . ? ϕi),
with ? being a 2ary operator). I will also drop the outermost brackets of a
self-standing wff.
4Throughout, ‘ϕ’, ‘ψ’ and ‘χ’ (possibly with numerical subscripts) are used as metalin-
guistic variables ranging over WFFL 0 .
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4.2.2 Tolerant Semantic Structures
Definition 4.2.3. We will take a sequence of wffs of L 0 to be a function
whose domain is some suitable initial segment of the ordinals and whose
range is a subset of WFFL 0 .
5 As usual:6
• Γ,∆ := Γ⋃{〈δ1, ϕ〉 : for some δ0 ∈ dom(∆), δ1 = dom(Γ) + δ0 and
ϕ = ∆(δ0)};
• Γ, ϕ := Γ, 〈ϕ〉,
where ‘:=’ is a metalinguistic symbol expressing the definition relation and
dom(R) and ran(R) are, respectively, the domain and the range of R.
Definition 4.2.4. A logic L for L 0 is any subset of {〈Γ0,Γ1〉 :
ran(Γ0), ran(Γ1) ⊆ WFFL 0}.7
As anticipated, we start our semantic construction by developing a minimal
logical basis, the basic tolerant logic T0, which already displays the core
idea of any tolerant logic—the failure of the transitivity property for the
consequence relation—but which is otherwise completely neutral with regard
to the issues concerning the philosophy of the logic of a vague language. By
adding further and further constraints on the semantics, we will then be able
to specify stronger and stronger tolerant logics. We will make use of standard
lattice-theoretical semantics, introducing the modifications appropriate for
obtaining failures of the transitivity property for the consequence relation.
Definition 4.2.5. A T0-structure S forL 0 is a 5ple 〈VS, DS,S, tolS, OS〉,
where:
5Every function is assumed to be total unless otherwise specified.
6Throughout, ‘Γ’, ‘∆’, ‘Θ’, ‘Λ’, ‘Ξ’ (possibly with numerical subscripts) are used as met-
alinguistic variables ranging over the set of sequences whose range is included in WFFL 0 .
7We will thus be working in a multiple-conclusion framework, this being required in
order to achieve the desired generality.
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• VS is a non-empty set of objects (the “values”);
• DS is a non-empty subset of VS (the “designated values”) such that:
(D0) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if v0 ∈ DS and v0 S v1, then v1 ∈ DS
(see the next item for a definition of S)
(DS is an upper set);
• S is a partial ordering (reflexive, anti-symmetric, transitive relation)
on VS such that:
(glb/lub20) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, {v0, v1} has a greatest lower bound
(glb) and a least upper bound (lub)
(S thus corresponds to a lattice);
• tolS is a “tolerance” function from VS into pow(VS) (the powerset of
VS) such that:
(tol0) For every v ∈ VS, v ∈ tolS(v);
(tol1) For every v ∈ VS, tolS(v) is an upper set.
Note in particular that tolS(v) is allowed to contain values which are
not contained in the upper set whose minimum element is v. As we
will see, this “tolerating” feature of tol is crucial in generating failures
of the transitivity property for the consequence relation;
• OS is a non-empty set of operations on VS. In particular,
{negS, implS} ⊆ OS, where:
(neg⇒0 ) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if v0 S v1, then negS(v1) S negS(v0);8
8Note that (neg⇒0 ) and (neg
⇒
1 ) can be neatly packaged into the so-called “law of in-
tuitionist contraposition” that, for every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if v0 S negS(v1), then v1 S
negS(v0).
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(neg⇒1 ) For every v ∈ VS, v S negS(negS(v));
(impl⇒0 ) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if v1 ∈ tolS(v0), then implS(v0, v1) ∈
DS;
(impl⇐0 ) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if implS(v0, v1) ∈ DS, then v1 ∈
tolS(v0).
Again, note in particular how impl relates to tol, and especially how
(impl⇐0 ) allows implS(v0, v1) to belong to DS even if v1 does not belong
to the upper set whose minimum element is v0. Henceforth, we will
focus on the case where {negS, implS} = OS, but it is clear how,
given the rich structure generated by VS, DS, S and tolS, many
other interesting operations may be defined and added to OS (and be
expressed by corresponding operators in some extension of L 0).9 In
order to exploit the full power of (neg⇒0 ), we place another constraint
on tolS:
(tol2) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if v1 ∈ tolS(v0), then negS(v0) ∈
tolS(negS(v1)).
A T0-structure can then be used to interpret L 0 once it is equipped with an
interpretation function for WFFL 0 and once suitable recursive clauses for
the sentential operators are given.
9In particular, given the characteristic “lowering” behaviour of the conjunction opera-
tion (to be specified shortly), it may prove useful to define an equivalence operation equivS
such that:
(equiv⇒0 ) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if v1 ∈ tolS(v0) and v0 ∈ tolS(v1), then equivS(v0, v1) ∈
DS;
(equiv⇐0 ) For every v0, v1 ∈ VS, if equivS(v0, v1) ∈ DS, then v1 ∈ tolS(v0) and v0 ∈
tolS(v1),
and extend L 0 with a new primitive, biconditional-like, 2ary operator ↔ expressing
equivS. Save for a brief remark later (fn 18) substantiating this point, in this essay I
will not pursue further the investigation of the logic of such ↔.
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Definition 4.2.6. A T0-model M for L 0 based on a T0-structure S is a
6ple 〈VM, DM,M, tolM, OM, intM〉, where VM, DM, M, tolM and OM are
identical to VS, DS, S, tolS and OS respectively, and intM : V ARL 0 7→ VM
is an interpretation function for V ARL 0 .
Definition 4.2.7. intM is extended to a full valuation function valM :
WFFL 0 7→ VM by the following recursion:
(valV ARL0 ) If ϕ ∈ V ARL 0 , valM(ϕ) = intM(ϕ);
(val¬) valM(¬ϕ) = negM(valM(ϕ));
(val∧) valM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = glbM({valM(ϕ), valM(ψ)});
(val∨) valM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = lubM({valM(ϕ), valM(ψ)});
(val→) valM(ϕ→ ψ) = implM(valM(ϕ), valM(ψ)).
Determining which value v ∈ VM a wff has in M, valM a fortiori determines
whether v ∈ DM or not—in other words, valM determines whether the value
of a wff is designated or not. Now, in standard many-valued semantics, the
role played by designated values can be (informally) explained as follows. It
is assumed that the actual semantics of an interpreted language J whose
logical properties one is interested in studying exhibits at least the general
features of the semantics used in the mathematical study of a formal language
K into whichJ can be adequately regimented. For example,J might be a
fragment of English expressing first-order Peano-Dedekind arithmetic andK
be a standard formal first-order language (with identity and functors): then
just as, in every model of K , every sentence (closed wff) of K is assigned
either 1 or 0 as value (but not both),10 so it is assumed that every sentence
of J is either true or false (but not both). If the formal semantics of K
10Of course, even if usual, the particular choice of 1 and 0 to model truth and falsity
is completely conventional—any two other objects recognized by the background mathe-
matical theory will do.
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is many-valued, there will typically be, included in the set of all the values
a sentence can be assigned in a model, a set of designated values. What do
such values correspond to in the semantics of J ?
The usual answer in philosophy of logic to this question is, roughly, that
they correspond to the “good” values a sentence can have—that is, those
which make a sentence good enough to be asserted, good enough to be
believed, good enough to be acted upon etc. (see Priest [2001], p. 216).11
At least in this respect, then, what designated values correspond to plays
the same role in a many-valued framework as truth plays in a two-valued
framework, for, in a two-valued framework, it is truth that which warrants
assertion, belief and action.
This is the place to enter a crucial clarification concerning the present
use of a many-valued semantics.12 Such a semantics is here used with the
main purpose of inducing a certain (family of) logic(s). The different values
are supposed to model the different levels of goodness a sentence can have
in terms of its assertability, believability, enactability etc., where the notion
of a level of goodness can be reduced for simple predications to the position
of the relevant object in the ordering generated by the contextually relevant
dimension of comparison. The values assigned to compound sentences by the
semantics are supposed to model the way in which we understand the level of
goodness of a compound sentence to be determined by the level of goodness
of its components. Emphatically, the different intermediate levels of goodness
are not different ways in which a sentence can be neither true nor false (and
so neither do the extreme levels of goodness—if they exist—coincide with
truth and falsity), nor do levels of goodness represent an ordering of truth
among sentences (on this very last point I thus diverge from the interpreta-
11“Semantically” good enough. For it may well be that other non-semantic features
(e.g. epistemic ones) contribute to the determination of a sentence’s assertability, believ-
ability, enactability etc. A similar qualification concerning truth should be understood
below as implicit.
12Thanks to Graham Priest for urging consideration of this issue.
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tion of the lattice-theoretical many-valued framework offered by Weatherson
[2005a]). The truth about truth is that a sentence ‘P ’ is true iff P , and
false otherwise—and this is manifestly too simple a notion to use if one is
trying to develop a non-classical logic in a classical metatheory. It is levels
of goodness, understood in the minimalist way just explained, which allow
us to draw the fine-grained distinctions required by non-classical reasoning
(I thus agree with Michael Dummett’s strictures against those who “reduce
the semantic notion of logical consequence to a purely algebraic tool” (Dum-
mett [1975b], p. 293), but disagree with him when he claims that “[o]n the
assumption that all our sentences possess determinate truth-values, there is
simply nothing that one can think of that a truth-table would leave unex-
plained concerning the meaning of the sentential operator for which it was
correct” (Dummett [1975b], p. 294)).
Let me note that understanding logical operations as operating on the
fine structure of levels of goodness rather than simply on truth and falsity
does not mean of course that they are not significantly constrained by truth
and falsity—indeed, they should be such that the logic they generate is not
too strong as to rule out intuitively possible assignments of truth and falsity
and not too weak as to allow intuitively impossible assignments of truth and
falsity. Let me also note that an additional layer of complexity is induced
by the fact that talk of ‘good values’ should presumably be vague, so that
our use of a classical metalanguage risks to misrepresent what good values
are. This problem connects with some of the issues mentioned in fn 2—here
I will only add that the risk is at least partially averted by the quantification
over models in the definition of the consequence relation and by the rejection
that one of the classically described models is the intended model of a vague
language. Let me finally stress that I am painfully aware that a much more
detailed discussion of these issues would be needed in order to make my
claims persuasive, but that I hope that what I have just said gives enough
indication as to how to understand the framework to be developed.
In a two-valued framework, truth also plays a crucial role in the definition
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of the consequence relation: the informal characterization of consequence
as necessary truth preservation from the premises to the conclusions gets
formally translated as preservation of 1 from the premises to the conclusions
in every model. In a many-valued framework, it is then very natural to
define consequence as preservation of designated value from the premises to
the conclusions (in the sense that, if every premise has a designated value in
a model M, then some conclusion also has a designated value in M). It is
thus guaranteed that, when one argues validly from good premises, one will
reach some good conclusion.
This is the point of entry of the crucial modification I would like to
propose in order to generate failures of the transitivity property for the con-
sequence relation. Consider again the tolerance function tol:13 informally, it
implements the idea that, if v0 counts as very good a value for a sentence
to have, any v1 ∈ tol(v0) will also count as good enough a value for a sen-
tence to have (to be asserted, believed, acted upon etc.). Of course, since
we are working in a classical (and thus transitive) metalanguage, we cannot
require that, if v0 counts as good enough a value for a sentence to have, any
v1 ∈ tol(v0) will likewise count as good enough a value for a sentence to have,
since such a principle would breed paradox (given the fact that it need not
be the case that, for every v0, v1, v2 ∈ V , if v2 ∈ tol(v1) and v1 ∈ tol(v0),
then v2 ∈ tol(v0)).14 Still, it might reasonably be argued that our inferential
practices with a vague language lend support to the idea that all consequence
in a vague language guarantees is that, when one argues validly from very
good premises, one will reach some good enough conclusion. I will not at-
tempt here to establish this claim in its generality—rather, I will briefly try
to support its plausibility by illustrating how it is supposed to work in a
particular case.
13Henceforth, I will drop subscripts for models and structures if no ambiguity threatens.
14Letting tol∗ = {〈X,Y 〉 : X ⊆ V and, for every v0, v0 ∈ Y iff, for some v1 ∈ X,
v0 ∈ tol(v1)}, the point in the text can be put by saying that tol∗ is non-idempotent, in
the sense that it need not be the case that, for every X ⊆ V , tol∗(tol∗(X)) = tol∗(X).
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(4) A man with i hairs is bald
might have a very good value, because it has been accepted on the basis of
perception, or intuition, or testimony etc.
(5) If a man with i hairs is bald, then a man with i+ 1 is bald
might also have a very good value, because it belongs to the naive theory of
vagueness. Given this, it is reasonable to expect that:
(6) A man with i+ 1 hairs is bald,
which presumably follows from (5) and (4), will have a good enough value,
and thus that it will also be assertable, believable, enactable etc. However,
it is not equally reasonable to expect that, because:
(7) If a man with i+ 1 hairs is bald, then a man with i+ 2 is bald
has also a very good value (since it too belongs to the naive theory of vague-
ness),
(8) A man with i+ 2 hairs is bald,
which presumably follows from (7) and (6), will also have a good enough
value: for (6) only has a good enough value, and it is not equally reasonable
to expect that a sentence having a merely good enough value can always be
fed as a premise into an inferential process to yield a conclusion with a good
enough value (as it is the case, on the contrary, when every premise has not
just a good enough value, but a very good value).
It seems to me that the description of the case I have given agrees with
those which would be given by many speakers if subjected to this short stretch
of a soritical series. Typically, they would accept (4), (5) and (7) (and (6))
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without feeling thereby compelled to accept (8), even though they would
accept the validity of both modus-ponens arguments (note that, typically,
they would not feel compelled to accept (8) even if there were no evidence
that it is false). Typically, they would justify this complex pattern of accep-
tance by claiming that, even though in itself valid, the argument in question
(i.e. modus ponens) should not be “pushed too far”. In order to explain these
reactions, it is plausible to conjecture that the underlying implicit concep-
tion of validity is such that it is only thought to guarantee that very good
premises yield a good enough conclusion, so that it need not be thought to
guarantee that a double application of modus ponens starting from very good
premises will ultimately issue in a good enough conclusion (as the case just
described makes clear). On this conception—which is the key to the failure
of transitivity—validity is not a matter of preservation of anything (neither
of being very good from the premises to the conclusions nor of being good
enough from the premises to the conclusions), but a matter of connection be-
tween the premises’ being very good and the conclusions’ being good enough
(see section 5.3.2 for more on this point).
4.2.3 Basic Tolerant Logic
Now, our semantic structures give us all the resources to capture the distinc-
tion between very good values and good enough values and to deploy it in
order to define a consequence relation whose hallmark is the guarantee that
very good premises lead to good enough conclusions.
Definition 4.2.8. The set of “tolerated values” TS of a structureS is defined
as follows:
(T ) TS :=
⋃
d∈DS tol(d)
We can then let the set of designated values DS represent the very good
values of S, and let the set of tolerated values TS represent the good enough
values of S.
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Theorem 4.2.1. T is an upper set.
Proof. Suppose that v0 ∈ T and v0  v1. Then, for some d ∈ D, v0 ∈ tol(d),
and so is such that, for every v2, if v0  v2, v2 ∈ tol(d) as well. Therefore,
since v0  v1, v1 ∈ tol(d) as well, and so v1 ∈ T as well.
Definition 4.2.9. The consequence relation on pairs of sequences of wffs
∈ WFFL 0 constituting the basic tolerant logicT0 (|=T0) is defined as follows:
(|=T0) A sequence of wffs ∆ is a |=T0-consequence of a sequence of wffs
Γ (Γ |=T0 ∆) iff, for every T0-model M, if, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ),
valM(ϕ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆), valM(ψ) ∈ TM.
It’s easy to check that T0 exhibits some basic structural properties (note that
full associativity is already guaranteed by our choice of sequences as terms
of the consequence relation):
Theorem 4.2.2. T0 exhibits the following structural properties:15
(Cl) If Γ0 ` ∆, then, for every Γ1 such that fld(Γ0) = fld(Γ1), Γ1 ` ∆;
(Cr) If Γ ` ∆0, then, for every ∆1 such that fld(∆0) = fld(∆1), Γ ` ∆1;
(Wl) If Γ, ϕ, ϕ ` ∆, then Γ, ϕ ` ∆;
(Wr) If Γ ` ∆, ϕ, ϕ, then Γ ` ∆, ϕ;
(Kl) If Γ ` ∆, then Γ, ϕ ` ∆;
(Kr) If Γ ` ∆, then Γ ` ∆, ϕ;
(I) If Γ is non-empty,16 Γ ` Γ.
15We state structural properties in a general fashion, using a variable ‘`’ taking as values
specific consequence relations (such as |=T0). fld(R) is the field of R.
16Note that, given our official stipulations about sequences (definition 4.2.3), the empty
sequence just is the empty set ∅.
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Proof.
• (Cl), (Cr): Immediate from the field invariance of the sequences.
• (Wl), (Wr): Immediate from the fact that {ψ : ψ ∈ ran(Γ, ϕ, ϕ)} =
{ψ : ψ ∈ ran(Γ, ϕ)}.
• (Kl): Immediate from the fact that {ψ : ψ ∈ ran(Γ)} ⊆ {ψ : ψ ∈
ran(Γ, ϕ)}.
• (Kr): Immediate from the fact that {ψ : ψ ∈ ran(∆)} ⊆ {ψ : ψ ∈
ran(∆, ϕ)}.
• (I): If Γ is non-empty and, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), val(ϕ) ∈ D, then,
for some ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), val(ϕ) ∈ D, and so a fortiori val(ϕ) ∈ T (if Γ is
empty, then, even though, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), val(ϕ) ∈ D, there is
no ϕ ∈ ran(Γ) such that val(ϕ) ∈ T ).
The failure of a particular structural property such as transitivity can thus
be achieved in full autonomy from the other usual structural properties.17 It
is too seldom noticed that transitivity itself comes in two flavours, left and
right. Left transitivity concerns, roughly, the legitimacy of chaining a class
of inferences together with another inference once some of the conclusions of
the class are jointly sufficient to constitute a component of the premises (left
part) of the latter inference:
(Tl) If, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ ` ∆, ϕ and Λ,Θ ` Ξ, then Λ,Γ ` ∆,Ξ.
17In the few previous attempts to develop a non-transitive consequence relation, this has
not always been so. For example, in the non-transitive system mooted in Smiley [1959],
pp. 238–43, (Wl) fails.
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Right transitivity concerns, roughly, the legitimacy of chaining an inference
together with a class of inferences once some of the premises of the class
are jointly sufficient to constitute a component of the conclusions (right
part) of the former inference, and is obtained by dualizing consequence with
entailment in (Tl):
(Tr) If Ξ ` Λ,Θ and, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ ` Γ, then ∆,Ξ ` Λ,Γ.
Given (Wl) and (Wr), (Tl) implies the cumulative left-transitivity prop-
erty :
(CTl) If, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ ` ∆, ϕ and Γ,Θ ` ∆, then Γ ` ∆,
and, given (Kl) and (Kr), it is implied by it. Analogously, given (Wl) and
(Wr), (Tr) implies the cumulative right-transitivity property :
(CTr) If ∆ ` Γ,Θ and, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ ` Γ, then ∆ ` Γ,
and, given (Kl) and (Kr), it is implied by it.
Definition 4.2.10.
• A sequence of argument forms 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .Fα〉 has the left-transitivity
property in a logic ` iff, if, [for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ ` ∆, ϕ and the
forms of these arguments are F0, F1, F2 . . . (where each Fβ is such that
β < α and, for every γ < α, Fγ is a Fβ)] and [Λ,Θ ` Ξ and the form of
this argument is Fα], then Λ,Γ ` ∆,Ξ.
• An argument form F has the reflexive left-transitivity property in a logic
` iff every sequence whose domain has a maximum element and whose
range is {F} has the left-transitivity property in `.
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• A sequence of argument forms 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .〉 has the full 0-left-
transitivity property in a logic ` iff, for every argument form Fα,
〈F0,F1,F2 . . .Fα〉 has the left-transitivity property in `. An argument
form Fα has the full 1-left-transitivity property in a logic ` iff, for every
sequence of argument forms 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .〉, 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .Fα〉 has the
left-transitivity property in `.
• An argument form F has the full left-transitivity property in a logic `
iff it has the full 1-left-transitivity property in ` and every sequence
whose range is {F} has the full 0-left-transitivity property in `.
Definition 4.2.11.
• A sequence of argument forms 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .〉 has the right-transitivity
property in a logic ` iff, if [Ξ ` Λ,Θ and the form of this argument
is F0] and, [for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ ` Γ and the forms of these
arguments are F1, F2, F3 . . .], then ∆,Ξ ` Λ,Γ.
• An argument form F has the reflexive right-transitivity property in a
logic ` iff every sequence whose range is {F} has the right-transitivity
property in `.
• An argument form F0 has the full 0-right-transitivity property in
a logic ` iff, for every sequence of argument forms 〈F1,F2,F3 . . .〉,
〈F0,F1,F2 . . .〉 has the right-transitivity property in `. A sequence
of argument forms 〈F1,F2,F3 . . .〉 has the full 1-right-transitivity prop-
erty in a logic ` iff, for every argument form F0, 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .〉 has the
right-transitivity property in `.
• An argument form F has the full right-transitivity property in a logic `
iff it has the full 0-right-transitivity property in ` and every sequence
whose range is {F} has the full 1-right-transitivity property in `.
Definition 4.2.12. For every tolerant logic T∗, an argument form with
premises Γ and conclusions ∆ is strict in T∗ iff, for every T∗-model M,
for some ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), for some ψ ∈ ran(∆), valM(ϕ) M valM(ψ).
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Theorem 4.2.3. For every tolerant logic T∗, if F is strict in T∗, F has the
full left- and right-transitivity properties.
Proof. Suppose that F is strict in T∗ and that it has premises of the form G
and conclusions of the form D.
• Every sequence whose range is {F} has the full 0-left-transitivity prop-
erty. Suppose that, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ ` ∆, ϕ and Λ,Θ ` Ξ, and
that the form of the premises of the former arguments is G and the
form of their conclusions is D. Since F is strict, ∆, ϕ is non-empty for
each such ϕ. Thus, given a T∗-modelM, one of the two cases holds for
each such ϕ:
(i) For some ψ ∈ ran(Γ), for some χ ∈ ran(∆), valM(ψ) M valM(χ);
(ii) For some ψ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ψ) M valM(ϕ).
If case (i) holds for some such ϕ, then it is clear that, if, for every ψ ∈
ran(Λ,Γ), valM(ψ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆,Ξ), valM(ψ) ∈ TM
(since DM ⊆ TM and TM is an upper set). If case (ii) holds for every
such ϕ, then, if, for every ψ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ψ) ∈ DM, for every such
ϕ, valM(ϕ) ∈ DM as well (since DM is an upper set). Therefore, if,
for every ψ ∈ ran(Λ,Γ), valM(ψ) ∈ DM, then, for every ψ ∈ ran(Λ,Θ),
valM(ψ) ∈ DM, and so, since Λ,Θ ` Ξ, for some ψ ∈ ran(Ξ), valM(ψ) ∈
TM. Therefore, generalizing, Λ,Γ ` ∆,Ξ.
• F has the full 1-left-transitivity property. Suppose that, for every ϕ ∈
ran(Θ), Γ ` ∆, ϕ and Λ,Θ ` Ξ, and that the form of the premises of
the latter argument is G and the form of its conclusions is D. Since F
is strict, Ξ is non-empty. Thus, given a T∗-model M, one of the two
cases holds:
(i) For some ψ ∈ ran(Λ), for some χ ∈ ran(Ξ), valM(ψ) M valM(χ);
(ii) For some ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), for some ψ ∈ ran(Ξ), valM(ϕ) M valM(ψ).
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If case (i) holds, then it is clear that, if, for every ψ ∈ ran(Λ,Γ),
valM(ψ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆,Ξ), valM(ψ) ∈ TM (since
DM ⊆ TM and TM is an upper set). If case (ii) holds, then, since
for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ ` ∆, ϕ, then, for every such ϕ, if, for every
ψ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ψ) ∈ DM, one of the two cases holds:
(a) valM(ϕ) ∈ TM;
(b) For some ψ ∈ ran(∆), valM(ψ) ∈ TM.
If case (a) holds for every such ϕ, then, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), valM(ϕ) ∈
TM, and so, since case (ii) holds, for some ψ ∈ ran(Ξ), valM(ψ) ∈ TM
(since TM is an upper set). If case (b) holds for some such ϕ, we
trivially have that, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆), valM(ψ) ∈ TM. Therefore,
generalizing twice, Λ,Γ ` ∆,Ξ.
• F has the full 0-right-transitivity property. Suppose that Ξ ` Λ,Θ and,
for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ ` Γ, and that the form of the premises of
the former argument is G and the form of its conclusions is D. Since
F is strict, Λ,Θ is non-empty. Thus, given a T∗-model M, one of the
two cases holds:
(i) For some ψ ∈ ran(Ξ), for some χ ∈ ran(Λ), valM(ψ) M valM(χ);
(ii) For some ψ ∈ ran(Ξ), for some ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), valM(ψ) M valM(ϕ).
If case (i) holds, then it is clear that, if, for every ψ ∈ ran(∆,Ξ),
valM(ψ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(Λ,Γ), valM(ψ) ∈ TM (since
DM ⊆ TM and TM is an upper set). If case (ii) holds, then, if, for
every ψ ∈ ran(Ξ), valM(ψ) ∈ DM, for some ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), valM(ϕ) ∈ DM
as well (since DM is an upper set). Since ∆, ϕ ` Γ, if, for every ψ ∈
ran(∆), valM(ψ) ∈ DM as well, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ψ) ∈
TM. Therefore, ∆,Ξ ` Λ,Γ.
• Every sequence whose range is {F} has the full 1-right-transitivity prop-
erty. Suppose that Ξ ` Λ,Θ and, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ ` Γ, and
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that the form of the premises of the latter arguments is G and the form
of their conclusions is D. Since F is strict, Γ is non-empty for each such
ϕ. Thus, given a T∗-modelM, one of the two cases holds for each such
ϕ:
(i) For some ψ ∈ ran(∆), for some χ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ψ) M valM(χ);
(ii) For some ψ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ϕ) M valM(ψ).
If case (i) holds for some such ϕ, then it is clear that, if, for every ψ ∈
ran(∆,Ξ), valM(ψ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(Λ,Γ), valM(ψ) ∈
TM (since DM ⊆ TM and TM is an upper set). If case (ii) holds for
every such ϕ, since Ξ ` Λ,Θ, it follows that if, for every ψ ∈ ran(Ξ),
valM(ψ) ∈ DM, one of the two cases holds:
(a) For some ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), valM(ϕ) ∈ TM;
(b) For some ψ ∈ ran(Λ), valM(ψ) ∈ TM.
If case (a) holds, then, since case (ii) holds, for some ψ ∈ ran(Γ),
valM(ψ) ∈ TM (since TM is an upper set). If case (b) holds, we trivially
have that, for some ψ ∈ ran(Λ), valM(ψ) ∈ TM. Therefore, generalizing
twice, ∆,Ξ ` Λ,Γ.
Given that |=T0 satisfies all the other structural properties needed in order
for (CTl) and (CTr) to entail (Tl) and (Tr) respectively, the counterexamples
we will provide to (Tl) and (Tr) will be counterexamples to (CTl) and (CTr)
as well. A first kind of counterexample to (Tl) and (Tr) will emerge by
studying further properties of T0 relating to specific operators.
Some elementary rules and laws for the sentential operators are already
valid in T0. For →, we have from (impl⇐0 ):
Theorem 4.2.4. The rule of modus ponens:
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(MP→) ϕ→ ψ, ϕ |=T0 ψ
is valid.
Proof. Suppose that val(ϕ → ψ), val(ϕ) ∈ D. Then, by (impl⇐0 ), val(ψ) ∈
tol(val(ϕ)), and so, since val(ϕ) ∈ D, val(ψ) ∈ T .
Crucially, (impl⇐0 ), validating (MP→), already suffices to trigger failures of
the transitivity properties for T0:
Theorem 4.2.5. |=T0 satisfies neither (Tl) nor (Tr).
Proof.
• (Tl): Given (MP→), P0 → Q0, P0 |=T0 Q0 and Q0 → R0, Q0 |=T0 R0.
Setting Γ = P0 → Q0, P0, ∆ = ∅, Θ = Q0, Λ = Q0 → R0 and
Ξ = R0, (T
l) yields that Q0 → R0, P0 → Q0, P0 |=T0 R0, which is false,
since there are T0-models where val(P0) ∈ D, val(Q0) ∈ tol(val(P0))
(and so val(P0 → Q0) ∈ D) but /∈ D, val(R0) ∈ tol(val(Q0)) (and so
val(Q0 → R0) ∈ D) but /∈ T .
• (Tr): Again, given (MP→), P0 → Q0, P0 |=T0 Q0 and Q0 → R0, Q0 |=T0
R0. Setting Ξ = P0 → Q0, P0, Λ = ∅, Θ = Q0, ∆ = Q0 → R0 and
Γ = R0, (T
r) yields that Q0 → R0, P0 → Q0, P0 |=T0 R0, which is false
as explained above.
That such a failure emerges with → should not be surprising, given the
privileged connection of → with the consequence relation |=T0 (connection
determined by the role played by tol in the specification of both (impl⇐0 ) and
(|=T0)).
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Turning to the interaction of this operator with ¬, we note that, thanks to
(impl⇒0 ), (impl
⇐
0 ) and (tol2), the novelty of the framework does not interfere
with the validity of the intuitionistically acceptable rule of contraposition:
Theorem 4.2.6. The rule of contraposition:
(CONTR) ϕ→ ψ |=T0 ¬ψ → ¬ϕ
is valid.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ → ψ ∈ D. Then, by (impl⇐0 ), val(ψ) ∈ tol(val(ϕ)).
Therefore, by (tol2), neg(val(ϕ)) ∈ tol(neg(val(ψ))), and so, by (impl⇒0 ),
val(¬ψ → ¬ϕ) ∈ D.18
For ∧ and ∨, we have from (D0):
Theorem 4.2.7. The rules of simplification and addition:
(SIMP0) ϕ ∧ ψ |=T0 ϕ;
(SIMP1) ϕ ∧ ψ |=T0 ψ;
(ADD0) ϕ |=T0 ϕ ∨ ψ;
(ADD1) ψ |=T0 ϕ ∨ ψ
are valid and strict.
18Related to a comment made earlier (fn 9), we can now appreciate why an equivalence
operator↔ defined in terms of equiv would not be equivalent to the conjunction of condi-
tionals (ϕ→ ψ)∧(ψ → ϕ). Consider a modelM such that valM(ϕ) = v0, valM(ψ) = v1 and
v0 ∈ tolM(v1) and v1 ∈ tolM(v0). Then, by (equiv⇒0 ), valM(ϕ ↔ ψ) = equivM(v0, v1) =
v2 ∈ DM. Moreover, by (impl⇒0 ), valM(ϕ → ψ) = implM(v0, v1) = v3 ∈ DM and
valM(ψ → ϕ) = implM(v1, v0) = v4 ∈ DM. However, there is no guarantee that
valM((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)) = glb({v3, v4}) = v5 ∈ DM, let alone that v5 = v2.
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Proof. Immediate from (D0).
Interestingly, we do have from (D0) the following restricted transitivity
properties for T0:
Theorem 4.2.8. The properties of conjunction in the premises and disjunc-
tion in the conclusions:
(CP0) If Γ, ϕ |=T0 ∆, then Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ |=T0 ∆;
(CP1) If Γ, ψ |=T0 ∆ then Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ |=T0 ∆
(DC0) If Γ |=T0 ∆, ϕ then Γ |=T0 ∆, ϕ ∨ ψ
(DC1) If Γ |=T0 ∆, ψ then Γ |=T0 ∆, ϕ ∨ ψ
hold.
Proof.
• (CP0): Immediate from (SIMP0)’s strictness.
• (CP1): Immediate from (SIMP1)’s strictness.
• (DC0): Immediate from (ADD0)’s strictness.
• (DC1): Immediate from (ADD1)’s strictness.
Turning to the interaction of these operators with ¬, we note that, thanks
to (neg⇒0 ) and (neg
⇒
1 ), the novelty of the general framework does not interfere
with the validity of the intuitionistically acceptable De Morgan rules:
Theorem 4.2.9. The De Morgan rules:
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(DM0) ϕ ∨ ψ |=T0 ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ);
(DM1) ϕ ∧ ψ |=T0 ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ);
(DM2) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) |=T0 ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ
are valid and strict.
Proof.
• (DM0): By (val∧), val(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) = glb({val(¬ϕ), val(¬ψ)}), and so,
by (neg⇒0 ), val(¬¬ϕ)  val(¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) and val(¬¬ψ)  val(¬(¬ϕ ∧
¬ψ)), wherefore, by (neg⇒1 ), val(ϕ)  val(¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) and val(ψ) 
val(¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)). But, by (val∨), val(ϕ ∨ ψ) = lub({val(ϕ), val(ψ)}),
and so val(ϕ ∨ ψ)  val(¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)).
• (DM1): By (val∧), val(ϕ ∧ ψ) = glb({val(ϕ), val(ψ)}), and so, by
(neg⇒0 ), val(¬ϕ)  val(¬(ϕ∧ψ)) and val(¬ψ)  val(¬(ϕ∧ψ)). But, by
(val∨), val(¬ϕ∨¬ψ) = lub({val(¬ϕ), val(¬ψ)}), and so val(¬ϕ∨¬ψ) 
val(¬(ϕ∧ψ)). By (neg⇒0 ), val(¬¬(ϕ∧ψ))  val(¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ)), and so,
by (neg⇒1 ), val(ϕ ∧ ψ)  val(¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)).
• (DM2): By (val∨), val(ϕ ∨ ψ) = lub({val(ϕ), val(ψ)}), and so, by
(neg⇒0 ), val(¬(ϕ∨ψ))  val(¬ϕ) and val(¬(ϕ∨ψ))  val(¬ψ). But, by
(val∧), val(¬ϕ∧¬ψ) = glb({val(¬ϕ), val(¬ψ)}), and so val(¬(ϕ∨ψ)) 
val(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
Finally, for ¬ itself, we have from (neg⇒1 ):
Theorem 4.2.10. The rule of double-negation introduction:
(DNI) ϕ |=T0 ¬¬ϕ
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is valid and strict.
Proof. Immediate from (neg⇒1 ).
Given the strictness in T0 of (SIMP0), (SIMP1), (ADD0), (ADD1),
(DM0), (DM1), (DM2) and (DNI), the result of substituting → for |=T0 in
them is a logical truth of T0.
We end here our brief survey of the properties of the basic tolerant logic
T0. Even though, as has been seen, T0 already enshrines the core idea of
tolerant logics, it is manifestly too weak a logic for a vague language, failing to
satisfy many properties which any such logic may be reasonably expected to
have. Hence, in the following we proceed to strengthen the logic in the usual
fashion, by adding further and further constraints on its defining structures,
while preserving its tolerance.
4.3 Classical Tolerant Logic
4.3.1 Towards the Classical Tolerant Logic CT0
As far as vagueness is concerned, my favoured approach, for reasons con-
cerning the philosophy of the logic of a vague language I cannot develop
here, is, to speak somewhat loosely, to validate the full fragment of classi-
cal logic consistent with the naive theory of vagueness. To achieve that, we
place further constraints on T0-structures, thereby characterizing the class
of CT0-structures (and, consequently, of CT0-models), CT0 being the “clas-
sical” tolerant logic generated by these structures. The investigation of the
tolerant logics intermediate between T0 and CT0 will have to wait for an-
other occasion, but our stepwise way of proceeding will be sufficient to give
a flavour of the variety of options available in this area.
We start by imposing the following constraints on D and T :
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(D21) If v0, v1 ∈ D, then glb({v0, v1}) ∈ T
(D is a tolerance filter—informally (and plausibly), if two vague pieces of
information are very good, their conjunction is still at least good enough);
(D22) For every v0, v1 ∈ V , if lub({v0, v1}) ∈ D, then either v0 ∈ T or v1 ∈ T
(D is tolerantly prime—informally (and plausibly), the disjunction of two
vague pieces of information can be very good only if at least one of them is
at least good enough) and:
(D⇒3 ) For every v, if v ∈ D, then neg(v) ∈ V \ T ;
(D⇐3 ) For every v, if neg(v) ∈ V \ T , then v ∈ D
(D is a tolerance ultrafilter—informally (and plausibly), a vague piece of
information is very good iff its negation is not even good enough).19
We then require distributivity of finite glbs over finite lubs :20
(glb/lub21) For every v0, v1, v2 ∈ V , glb({v0, lub({v1, v2})}) =
lub({glb({v0, v1}), glb({v0, v2})})
—informally (and plausibly), the conjunction of a vague piece of information
x with the disjunction of two vague pieces of information y and z is exactly as
good as the disjunction of the conjunction of x with y and of the conjunction
of x with z.
We finally add the following constraints on neg:
19Note that, together with (neg⇒1 ), (D
⇒
3 ) and (D
⇐
3 ) jointly entail that, for every v ∈ V ,
v ∈ T \D iff neg(v) ∈ T \D—informally (and plausibly), a vague piece of information is
good enough but not very good iff its negation is good enough but not very good.
20Equivalent with distributivity of finite lubs over finite glbs:
(lub/glb21) For every v0, v1, v2 ∈ V , lub({v0, glb({v1, v2})}) =
glb({lub({v0, v1}), lub({v0, v2})}).
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(neg⇐0 ) For every v0, v1 ∈ V , if neg(v1)  neg(v0), then v0  v1;
(neg⇐1 ) For every v ∈ V , neg(neg(v))  v
(of course, each will do given both (neg⇒0 ) and (neg
⇒
1 ))—informally (and
plausibly), a vague piece of information is at least as good as the negation of
its negation.
Definition 4.3.1. With all these further constraints in place on CT0-
structures, the consequence relation on pairs of sequences of wffs ∈ WWFL 0
constituting the classical tolerant logic CT0 (|=CT0) can finally be defined
as follows:
(|=CT0) A sequence of wffs ∆ is a consequence of a sequence of wffs Γ iff, for
every CT0-modelM, if, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), valM(ϕ) ∈ DM, then, for
some ψ ∈ ran(∆), valM(ψ) ∈ TM.
4.3.2 The Strength of CT0
We can then reap the harvest of the new semantics. We will do so by going
through the newly introduced constraints focussing on their logical import.
From (D21) and (D
2
2) we have:
Theorem 4.3.1. The rules of adjunction and disjunction:
(ADJ) ϕ, ψ |=CT0 ϕ ∧ ψ;
(DISJ) ϕ ∨ ψ |=CT0 ϕ, ψ
are valid.
Proof.
• (ADJ): Immediate from (D21).
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• (DISJ): Immediate from (D22).
(ADJ) and (DISJ) suffice to trigger new interesting failures of (Tl) and (Tr)
for CT0:
Theorem 4.3.2. (ADJ) and (DISJ) suffice to trigger →-free failures of (Tl)
and (Tr) for CT0.
Proof.
• (Tl): Given (ADJ), P0, Q0 |=CT0 P0 ∧ Q0 and R0, P0 ∧ Q0 |=CT0 R0 ∧
P0 ∧ Q0. Setting Γ = P0, Q0, ∆ = ∅, Θ = P0 ∧ Q0, Λ = R0 and
Ξ = R0∧P0∧Q0, (Tl) yields that R0, P0, Q0 |=CT0 R0∧P0∧Q0, which is
false, since there are CT0-models where val(P0), val(Q0), val(R0) ∈ D,
but val(P0 ∧Q0) ∈ T \D and val(R0 ∧ P0 ∧Q0) ∈ V \ T .
• (Tr): Given (DISJ), P0 ∨Q0 ∨R0 |=CT0 P0 ∨Q0, R0 and P0 ∨Q0 |=CT0
P0, Q0, R0. Moreover, R0 |=CT0 P0, Q0, R0. Setting Ξ = P0 ∨ Q0 ∨ R0,
Λ = ∅, Θ = P0 ∨ Q0, R0, ∆ = ∅ and Γ = P0, Q0, R0, (Tr) yields that
P0 ∨ Q0 ∨ R0 |=CT0 P0, Q0, R0, which is false, since there are CT0-
models where val(P0 ∨ Q0 ∨ R0) ∈ D and val(P0 ∨ Q0) ∈ T \ D, but
val(P0), val(Q0), val(R0) ∈ V \ T .
By themselves, of course, (ADJ) and (DISJ) rule out, respectively, subval-
uational and supervaluational approaches. In a transitive framework, these
can be abstractly characterized as follows. A specification of a class of admis-
sible models is assumed (usually, for applications to the problem of vagueness,
these are just classical models). It is then said that a sequence of wffs ∆ is
a subvaluational (supervaluational) consequence of a sequence of wffs Γ iff,
for every subclass S of admissible models, if, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), for some
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(every) M ∈ S, ϕ has a designated value in M, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆),
for some (every)M ∈ S, ψ has a designated value inM. Given this abstract
characterization, the generalization to a non-transitive tolerant framework
is straightforward. Given a tolerant consequence relation T∗, we can de-
fine subvaluational and supervaluational versions of T∗ by subvaluating and
supervaluating on subclasses of T∗-models as follows:
(|=sbT∗) A sequence of wffs ∆ is a |=sbT∗-consequence of a sequence of wffs Γ iff,
for every subclass S of T∗-models, if, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), for some
M ∈ S, valM(ϕ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆), for some M ∈ S,
valM(ψ) ∈ TM;
(|=spT∗) A sequence of wffs ∆ is a |=spT∗-consequence of a sequence of wffs Γ iff,
for every subclass S of T∗-models, if, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), for every
M ∈ S, valM(ϕ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆), for every M ∈ S,
valM(ψ) ∈ TM.
However, in this essay we will not investigate further subvaluational and
supervaluational tolerant logics, returning instead to studying the properties
of CT0.
Defining a material-implication operator as usual:
Definition 4.3.2. ϕ ⊃ ψ := ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,21
from (D22), (D
⇒
3 ) and (D
⇐
3 ) we have:
Theorem 4.3.3. The rule of modus ponens and the deduction theorem:
(MP⊃) ϕ ⊃ ψ, ϕ |=CT0 ψ;
(DT⊃) If Γ, ϕ |=CT0 ψ, then Γ |=CT0 ϕ ⊃ ψ.
are valid.
21The previous conventions about →’s binding force apply to ⊃ as well.
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Proof.
• (MP⊃): Suppose that val(ϕ ⊃ ψ), val(ϕ) ∈ D. Then, by (D22), either
val(neg(ϕ)) ∈ T or val(ψ) ∈ T . But val(ϕ) ∈ D, and so, by (D⇒3 ),
val(neg(ϕ)) /∈ T . Therefore, val(ψ) ∈ T .
• (DT⊃): Suppose that Γ, ϕ |=CT0 ψ. Either val(ϕ) ∈ D or not. In the
first case, since Γ, ϕ |=CT0 ψ, if, for every χ ∈ ran(Γ), val(χ) ∈ D,
val(ψ) ∈ T , and so lub({val(neg(ϕ)), val(ψ)}) ∈ T . In the sec-
ond case, by (neg⇒1 ), (D
⇒
3 ) and (D
⇐
3 ), val(neg(ϕ)) ∈ T , and so
lub({val(neg(ϕ)), val(ψ)}) ∈ T .
From (D⇒3 ) and (D
⇐
3 ) we also have:
Theorem 4.3.4. The properties of negation in the premises and negation
in the conclusions:
(NP) If Γ |=CT0 ∆, ϕ, then Γ,¬ϕ |=CT0 ∆;
(NC) If Γ, ϕ |=CT0 ∆, then Γ |=CT0 ∆,¬ϕ
hold.
Proof.
• (NP): Suppose that Γ |=CT0 ∆, ϕ. Either val(ϕ) ∈ T or not. In the
first case, by (neg⇒1 ) and (D
⇒
3 ), val(neg(ϕ)) /∈ D, and so it is vacuously
true that, if, for every ψ ∈ ran(Γ,¬ϕ), val(ψ) ∈ D, then, for some
ψ ∈ ran(∆), val(ψ) ∈ T . In the second case, since Γ |=CT0 ∆, ϕ, it
is true that, if, for every ψ ∈ ran(Γ,¬ϕ), val(ψ) ∈ D, then, for some
ψ ∈ ran(∆), val(ψ) ∈ T .
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• (NC): Suppose that Γ, ϕ |=CT0 ∆. Either val(ϕ) ∈ D or not. In the
first case, since Γ, ϕ |=CT0 ∆, it is true that, if, for every ψ ∈ ran(Γ),
val(ψ) ∈ D, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆,¬ϕ), val(ψ) ∈ T . In the second
case, by (D⇐3 ), val(neg(ϕ)) ∈ T , and so it is true that, if, for every
ψ ∈ ran(Γ), val(ψ) ∈ D, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆,¬ϕ), val(ψ) ∈ T .
Theorem 4.3.5. The law of excluded middle and the attendant property of
exhaustion for the consequence relation:
(LEM) ∅ |=CT0 ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ;
(EXH) ∅ |=CT0 ϕ,¬ϕ
are valid.
Proof.
• (LEM): Either val(ϕ) ∈ D or not. In the first case,
lub({val(ϕ), val(¬ϕ)}) ∈ D, and so a fortiori lub({val(ϕ), val(¬ϕ)}) ∈
T . In the second case, by (neg⇒1 ), (D
⇒
3 ) and (D
⇐
3 ), val(¬ϕ) ∈ T , and
so lub({val(ϕ), val(¬ϕ)}) ∈ T .
• (EXH): Immediate from the proof of (LEM).
Theorem 4.3.6. The law of non-contradiction and the attendant property
of explosion for the consequence relation:
(LNC) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ |=CT0 ∅;
(EXP) If ϕ,¬ϕ |=CT0 ∅
126 CHAPTER 4. TOLERANT LOGICS
are valid.
Proof.
• (LNC): Suppose for reductio that val(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ D. Then val(ϕ) ∈ D
and val(¬ϕ) ∈ D. But, if val(ϕ) ∈ D, by (D⇒3 ), val(¬ϕ) /∈ D.
• (EXP): Immediate from the proof of (LNC).22
From (glb/lub21) we have:
Theorem 4.3.7. The distributivity rules:
(DISTR∧/∨) ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) |=CT0 (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ);
(DISTR∨/∧) ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ χ) |=CT0 (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ)
are valid and strict.
Proof.
• (DISTR∧/∨): Immediate from (glb/lub21).
• (DISTR∨/∧): Immediate from (lub/glb21).
From either (neg⇐0 ) or (neg
⇐
1 ) we have:
Theorem 4.3.8. The rule of double-negation elimination:
22Note that (LEM) and (EXH) ((LNC) and (EXP)) would come apart in the superval-




) which uses CT0-models as
the class of admissible models.
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(DNE) ¬¬ϕ |=CT0 ϕ
is valid and strict.
Proof. Immediate from either (neg⇐0 ) or (neg
⇐
1 ).
Theorem 4.3.9. The De Morgan rule:
(DM3) ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) |=CT0 ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ
is valid and strict.
Proof. By (val∨), val(¬ϕ∨¬ψ) = lub({val(¬ϕ), val(¬ψ)}), and so, by (neg⇒0 ),
val(¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ))  val(¬¬ϕ) and val(¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ))  val(¬¬ψ). By either
(neg⇐0 ) or (neg
⇐
1 ), val(¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ))  val(ϕ) and val(¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ))  val(ψ).
But, by (val∧), val(ϕ∧ψ) = glb({val(ϕ), val(ψ)}), and so val(¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ)) 
val(ϕ∧ψ). By (neg⇒0 ), val(¬(ϕ∧ψ))  val(¬¬(¬ϕ∨¬ψ)), and so, by either
(neg⇐0 ) or (neg
⇐
1 ), val(¬(ϕ ∧ ψ))  val(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ).
Possibly with exception of (NC), (LEM) and (EXH) (whose defence I
cannot undertake here), I submit that all the various rules and laws we have
been reviewing can very plausibly be taken to represent correct patterns of
reasoning with a vague language: competent speakers do usually abide by—
and hold others responsible to—them. It is thus crucial to see how, in CT0,
the desired restrictions on (Tl) and (Tr) can be achieved while preserving
the full validity of these other rules and laws.
4.3.3 The Weakness of CT0
I hope that the foregoing is sufficient to show how rich a fragment of clas-
sical logic is preserved by CT0. What is not preserved are exactly those
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rules and laws of the operators which encode the transitivity of the classical
consequence relation (that some such rules and laws exist is evident from
the eliminability of the cut rule in a standard sequent calculus for classical
logic). These can be made to emerge already in the extensional fragment
CT09 of CT
0 (that is, the restriction of CT0 to the extensional language
L 09 such that WFFL 09 = WFFL 0 \ {ϕ :→ occurs in ϕ}). We have already
seen (theorem 4.3.2) that CT09 fails to satisfy (T
l). Correspondingly:
Theorem 4.3.10. The property of material implication in the premises:
(IP⊃) If Γ |=CT09 ∆, ϕ and Θ, ψ |=CT09 Λ, then Θ,Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ |=CT09 Λ,∆
fails.
Proof. We consider the CT09-model M0, where:
• VM0 = {〈x, y〉 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 4, 0 ≤ y ≤ 4};
• DM0 = {〈x, y〉 : x+ y ≥ 6};
• M0 = {〈pi0, pi1〉 : 0co(pi0) ≤ 0co(pi1) and 1co(pi0) ≤ 1co(pi1)} (where
ico(pi) is the ith coordinate of the ordered pair pi);
• tolM0 = {〈pi0,Π〉 : Π = {pi1 : [0co(pi1) ≥ 0co(pi0) − 3 and 1co(pi1) ≥
1co(pi0)] or [0co(pi1) ≥ 0co(pi0) and 1co(pi1) ≥ 1co(pi0)− 3]}};
• OM0 = {negM0} (where negM0 = {〈pi0, pi1〉 : [ico(pi1) = 0 iff ico(pi0) = 4]
and [ico(pi1) = 1 iff ico(pi0) = 3] and [ico(pi1) = 2 iff ico(pi0) = 2] and
[ico(pi1) = 3 iff ico(pi0) = 1]});
• intM0(P0) = 〈2, 4〉, intM0(Q0) = 〈0, 4〉 and intM0(R0) = 〈0, 2〉.
Setting Γ = P0, ∆ = ∅, ϕ = P0, Θ = Q0 ⊃ R0, ψ = Q0 and Λ = R0, it’s
easy to check that the consequent of (IP⊃) is falsified by M0 even though
its antecedent holds. M0 may be depicted by the following Hasse diagram
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(where double circular nodes indicate the members of DM0 , simple circular
nodes the members of TM0 , square nodes the members of VM0 \ TM0 and
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However, we do have the following restricted transitivity property:
Theorem 4.3.11. (IP⊃) holds if the form F0 of Γ |=CT09 ∆, ϕ is such that
〈F0〉 has the full 0-left-transitivity property and the form F1 of Θ, ψ |=CT09 Λ
is such that F1 has the full 1-left-transitivity property.
Proof. Since (MP⊃) is valid and 〈F0〉 has the full 0-left-transitivity property,
by (Tl) it follows that ϕ ⊃ ψ,Γ |=CT09 ∆, ψ. Since F1 has the full 1-left-
transitivity property, by (Tl), (Cl) and (Cr) it follows that Θ,Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ |=CT09
Λ,∆.
We have also seen (theorem 4.3.2) that CT09 fails to satisfy (T
r). Corre-
spondingly:
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Theorem 4.3.12. The property of disjunction in the premises:
(DP) If Γ, ϕ |=CT09 ∆ and Θ, ψ |=CT09 Λ, then Θ,Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ |=CT09 Λ,∆
fails.
Proof. WithM0 as in the proof of theorem 4.3.10, setting Γ = P0, ϕ = ¬P0,
∆ = R0, Θ = Q0 ⊃ R0, ψ = Q0 and Λ = R0, it’s easy to check that the
consequent of (DP) fails in M0 even though its antecedent holds.
However, we do have the following restricted transitivity property:
Theorem 4.3.13. (DP) holds if the forms F0, F1 of Γ, ϕ |=CT09 ∆ and
Θ, ψ |=CT09 Λ are such that 〈F0,F1〉 has the full 1-right-transitivity property.
Proof. Since, clearly, full 1-right transitivity is left and right monotonic and
commutative, the forms F2, F3 of Θ,Γ, ϕ |=CT09 Λ,∆ and Θ,Γ, ψ |=CT09
Λ,∆ are also such that 〈F2,F3〉 has the full 1-right-transitivity property.
Since (DISJ) is valid, by (Kl), (Kr), (Cl), (Cr) and (Tr) it follows that
Θ,Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ |=CT09 Λ,∆.
A striking feature of CT09 (and consequently of CT
0) is the failure of
two traditionally very distinctive restricted transitivity properties:
Theorem 4.3.14. The properties of suppression of logical truths:23
(LTTl) If, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∅ ` ∆, ϕ and Λ,Θ ` Ξ, then Λ ` ∆,Ξ;
(LTTr) If ∅ ` Λ,Θ and, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ ` Γ, then ∆ ` Λ,Γ
fail.
23A logical truth is simply a logical consequence of the empty sequence.
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Proof.
• (LTTl): We consider the CT09-model M1, which is just as M0 as in
proof of theorem 4.3.10, with the exception that, for every v ∈ TM1 \
DM1 , negM1(v) = v and possibly with the exception that intM1(Q1) =
〈4, 0〉. Setting ∆ = ∅, Θ = Q0∨¬Q0, Q1∨¬Q1, Λ = ∅ and Ξ = (Q0∨
¬Q0)∧(Q1∨¬Q1), (LTTl) yields that ∅ |=CT0 (Q0∨¬Q0)∧(Q1∨¬Q1),
which is false, since valM1((Q0 ∨ ¬Q0) ∧ (Q1 ∨ ¬Q1)) = 〈0, 0〉 /∈ T .
• (LTTr): With M1 as above, setting Λ = ∅, Θ = Q0 ∨ ¬Q0, ∆ =
Q1∨¬Q1 and Γ = (Q0∨¬Q0)∧(Q1∨¬Q1), (LTTr) yields that ∅ |=CT0
(Q0 ∨ ¬Q0) ∧ (Q1 ∨ ¬Q1), which is false as explained above.
I conjecture that the failure of (LTTl) and (LTTr) is essentially due to validity
of (LEM) (and (EXH)), and so that they hold in weaker tolerant logics.
Instead of trying here to establish this claim, I would like to show that, far
from indicating a deficiency of the framework developed up to this point,
this failure is unavoidable in any tolerant logic with certain properties (the
following theorem has been inspired by a remark in Field [2007b], p. 2).
Theorem 4.3.15. For every tolerant logic T∗, if T∗ validates (LEM),
(DISTR∧/∨) (in such a way that (DISTR∧/∨) has the full 1-left-transitivity
property and 〈(DISTR∧/∨), (DISTR∧/∨)〉 has the full 1-right-transitivity prop-
erty) and (LTTl) (or (LTTr)), T∗ entails the negation of the conjunction of
the characteristic claims of the naive theory of vagueness (1), (2) and (3).
Proof. From (LEM), we have that either a man with 0 hairs is bald or a man
with 0 hairs is not bald and that either a man with 1 hair is bald or a man
with 1 hair is not bald, and so, by (LTTl) (or (LTTr)), [either a man with
0 hairs is bald or a man with 0 hairs is not bald] and [either a man with 1
hair is bald or a man with 1 hair is not bald]. By the full 1-left-transitivity
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property of (DISTR∧/∨), this yields that either [[either a man with 0 hairs
is bald or a man with 0 hairs is not bald] and a man with 1 hair is bald] or
[[either a man with 0 hairs is bald or a man with 0 hairs is not bald] and a
man with 1 hair is bald].
Moreover, by the full 1-right-transitivity property of 〈(DISTR∧/∨),
(DISTR∧/∨)〉, theorem 4.3.13 yields that 〈‘Either [a man with 0 hairs is
bald and a man with 1 hair is bald] or [a man with 0 hairs is not bald and
a man with 1 hair is bald]’, ‘Either [a man with 0 hairs is bald and a man
with 1 hair is bald] or [a man with 0 hairs is not bald and a man with 1 hair
is bald]’〉 follows from ‘Either [[either a man with 0 hairs is bald or a man
with 0 hairs is not bald] and a man with 1 hair is bald] or [[either a man with
0 hairs is bald or a man with 0 hairs is not bald] and a man with 1 hair is
bald]’, and so, by the full 1-right-transitivity property of 〈(ADD0), (ADD1)〉
and (Wr), ‘Either [either [a man with 0 hairs is bald and a man with 1 hair
is bald] or [a man with 0 hairs is not bald and a man with 1 hair is bald]] or
[either [a man with 0 hairs is bald and a man with 1 hair is bald] or [a man
with 0 hairs is not bald and a man with 1 hair is bald]]’ follows from ‘Either
[[either a man with 0 hairs is bald or a man with 0 hairs is not bald] and a
man with 1 hair is bald] or [[either a man with 0 hairs is bald or a man with
0 hairs is not bald] and a man with 1 hair is bald]’. Therefore, by (LTTl) (or
(LTTr)), ‘Either [either [a man with 0 hairs is bald and a man with 1 hair
is bald] or [a man with 0 hairs is not bald and a man with 1 hair is bald]] or
[either [a man with 0 hairs is bald and a man with 1 hair is bald] or [a man
with 0 hairs is not bald and a man with 1 hair is bald]]’ is itself a logical
truth.
With another 999,999 structurally identical arguments, we reach a (horri-
fyingly long!) conclusion in disjunctive normal form each of whose disjuncts
is of the form ‘A man with 0 hairs is/is not bald and a man with 1 hair is/is
not bald and a man with 2 hairs is/is not bald. . . and a man with 1,000,000
hairs is/is not bald’. Examples of such disjuncts are: ‘A man with 0 hairs
is bald and a man with 1 hair is bald and a man with 2 hairs is bald. . . and
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a man with 1,000,000 hairs is bald’, ‘A man with 0 hairs is bald and a man
with 1 hair is bald and a man with 2 hairs is bald. . . and a man with 500,000
hairs is bald and a man with 500,001 hairs is not bald. . . and a man with
1,000,000 hairs is bald’, ‘A man with 0 hairs is bald and a man with 1 hair is
bald and a man with 2 hairs is bald. . . and a man with 500,000 hairs is bald
and a man with 500,001 hairs is not bald and a man with 500,002 hairs is
bald . . . and a man with 1,000,000 hairs is bald’ etc.
Each disjunct represents in effect a complete decision (either in the pos-
itive or in the negative), for every i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], of the question
whether a man with i hairs is bald (we will thus henceforth call any such
disjunction ‘a completeness disjunction’). Some disjuncts violate (i.e. entail
the negation of) the monotonicity principle which—under our current sim-
plifying assumptions—holds for ‘A man with ξ hairs is bald’; all of them
violate (3), the tolerance principle for ‘A man with ξ hairs is bald’ to which
the naive theory of vagueness is committed,24 save for the “trivialist” ‘A man
with 0 hairs is bald and a man with 1 hair is bald and a man with 2 hairs
24Might one not want to reject the implicit reasoning here, and contend that, just as
the “intolerant” conclusion that, for some number i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 999, 999], it is both the
case that a man with i hairs is bald and that a man with i + 1 hairs is not bald (or vice
versa) should not follow from the fact that, for every number i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], it
is either the case that a man with i hairs is bald or it is the case that a man with i hairs
is not bald, the equally intolerant conclusion that, for some numeral ι [ι : ι = ‘0’ or ι = ‘1’
or ι = ‘2’. . . or ι = ‘999,999’], it is both the case that ‘A man with ι hairs is bald’ occurs
in a disjunct and it is the case that ‘A man with ι + 1 hairs is not bald’ occurs in the
disjunct (or vice versa) should not follow from the fact that, for every numeral ι [ι : ι =
‘0’ or ι = ‘1’ or ι = ‘2’. . . or ι = ‘1,000,000’], it is either the case that ‘A man with ι hairs
is bald’ occurs in a disjunct or it is the case that ‘A man with ι hairs is not bald’ occurs
in the disjunct? It is true that the pattern of reasoning presupposed here had better be
(and is) generally invalid in a tolerant logic, and it is true that we cannot feasibly secure a
guarantee for all such conclusions by directly inspecting each disjunct in question to find
out which particular pairs of conjuncts breach tolerance. However, given the classicality
of our metalanguage, ‘ξ0 occurs in ξ1’ must be assumed to behave classically (and hence,
from the point of view of the naive theory, to be precise). The instances of the pattern of
reasoning presupposed here are thus unexceptionable.
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is bald. . . and a man with 1,000,000 hairs is bald’ and the “nihilist” ‘A man
with 0 hairs is not bald and a man with 1 hair is not bald and a man with 2
hairs is not bald. . . and a man with 1,000,000 hairs is not bald’, which violate
(2) and (1) respectively.
It is actually easy to see that, employing as they do only (SIMP0) and
(SIMP1), the violations in questions are not only such that every disjunct
entails the negation of one or another characteristic claim of the naive the-
ory (and so, by more (SIMP0), (SIMP1) and (neg
⇒
0 ), the negation of the
conjunction of these claims), but also such that the sequence of the rele-
vant arguments has the 1-right-transitivity property. By theorem 4.3.13, the
completeness disjunction itself entails the negation of the conjunction of the
characteristic claims of the naive theory.
Notice that the antecedent of theorem 4.3.15 is satisfied by CT09 (and,
consequently, by CT0), since (DISTR∧/∨) is validated in CT09 by (glb/lub
2
1),
which makes 〈(DISTR∧/∨)〉 strict. Now, consider that there would seem to
be no reason why acceptance of a tolerant logic T∗ should preclude one
from also accepting the following constraint of non-acceptance of entailers of
contradictories :
(NEC) If Γ `T∗ ‘It is not the case that ϕ’, one ought not to accept ϕ and
accept all the coordinates of Γ.25
However, given (NEC), a theorist who would like to accept the conjunction
of all the three characteristic claims of the naive theory ought not to accept
the completeness disjunction. Since this is however entailed, together with
25Throughout, I will remain deliberately neutral between wide-scope and narrow-scope
readings of a rational requirement flowing from logical consequence (see Broome [1999] on
the importance of this distinction). The arguments go through on either disambiguation
(see section 5.4.3 for more on the normativity of logical consequence in a non-transitive
framework).
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the other rules, by (LTTl) (or (LTTr)), we can conclude that such principles
are not to be had.
4.4 The Consistency of the Naive Theory of
Vagueness
4.4.1 Consistency in a Tolerant Framework
Building on what seems to be a plausible model of our use of a vague lan-
guage, we constructed the basic tolerant logic T0. We then proceeded to
develop stronger and stronger systems in order to capture more and more of
what seem to be correct patterns of reasoning with a vague language, while
at the same time taking care of preserving the hallmark of the weakness of a
tolerant logic—namely, the non-transitivity of the consequence relation. The
result has been the logic CT0. It is now time to show that CT0 is in effect
suitable to fulfil the theoretical task for which it has been developed: that
of making the naive theory of vagueness consistent once it is assumed as the
background logic of the theory.
The informal presentation of the naive theory of vagueness left it rather
unspecific what it exactly amounts to. Choosing a particular example, we
can be more precise. Keeping in mind the expressive limitations of L 0, I
propose to consider as a simple paradigmatic example of a zeroth-order naive
theory of vagueness the theory N 0 based on the following axioms (where Pi
translates into L 0 the English ‘i is a small natural number’ and this is used









t0 ) P0 ⊃ P1;
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(N0
t1 ) P1 ⊃ P2.
N 0 is palpably a zeroth-order naive theory of vagueness inasmuch as it con-
tains all the three characteristic claims of such a theory (see section 4.1):
the existence of positive cases, the existence of negative cases and the non-
existence of a sharp boundary between them.
Given the non-standard properties of |=CT0 and the existence of two non-
coincident kinds of “good” values in the underlying semantics (the members
of D and the members of T ), it is not immediate how the intuitive notion
of consistency might best be captured in the present framework. Indeed, it
is easily seen that the framework allows for a multiplicity of different, non-
equivalent definitions of the consistency of a sequence. Such definitions will
differ in their strength and there is every reason to think that different def-
initions will prove useful for different theoretical purposes. In this essay, I
propose however to focus for simplicity’s sake only on one such definition
which appears to be very natural and deeply embedded in our inferential
practices. Consider that, given a consequence relation L, the following con-
straint linking consequence with acceptance and rejection should hold:
(AR) If Γ `L ∆, then one ought not to accept all the coordinates of Γ and
reject all the coordinates of ∆.26
If ∆ is empty, (AR) comes down to the condition that one ought not to
accept all the coordinates of Γ, which in turn seems to capture well at least
one construal of the intuitive notion of consistency. On such a reading, a
sequence Γ is inconsistent in a logic L iff Γ `L ∅. Notice that a parallel
26Whenever rejecting ϕ implies accepting ‘It is not the case that ϕ’ and ϕ entails ‘It
is not the case that it is not the case that ϕ’, the relevant instance of (NEC) implies
the corresponding (single-conclusion) instance of (AR). Conversely, whenever accepting ϕ
implies rejecting ‘It is not the case that ϕ’, the relevant (single-conclusion) instance of
(AR) implies the corresponding instance of (NEC) (again, see section 5.4.3 for more on
the normativity of logical consequence in a non-transitive framework).
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argument can be run for the notion of validity : if Γ is empty, (AR) comes
down to the condition that one ought not to reject all the coordinates of ∆,
which in turn seems to capture well at least one construal of the intuitive
notion of validity. On such a reading, a sequence ∆ is valid in a logic L iff
∅ `L ∆.
Applying these definitions to CT0 (and, more generally, to any logic
definable in our framework), we obtain that (|=CT0) reduces the consistency
of Γ to every coordinate of Γ being in DM for some CT
0-model M, and
that it reduces the validity of ∆ to some coordinate of ∆ being in TM for
every CT0-model M. Given the properties of |=CT0 , the theory based on Γ
(that is, the set of (single-conclusion) logical consequences of Γ)27 will then
be guaranteed to have all of its members in TM.
Note in particular that, given (|=CT0), premises (and conclusions) are
not really “put together” when evaluating whether consequence holds or
not: what is relevant in such evaluation is only whether, for every premise,
the value of the premise belongs to D rather than whether the value re-
sulting from conjunctively “putting together” the premises (the glb of the
set of values of the premises) itself belongs to D (analogously, what is rel-
evant in such evaluation is only whether, for some conclusion, the value of
the conclusion belongs to T rather than whether the value resulting from
disjunctively “putting together” the conclusions (the lub of the set of values
of the conclusions) itself belongs to T ). This independence seems desirable,
as the requirement that the values of the premises (or of the conclusions)
27A more general notion of theory exploiting the multiple-conclusion setting would have
the theory of Γ be the set of sequences which are consequences of Γ. I skip over such
niceties here. Notice also that, in a non-transitive framework, we cannot sensibly employ
the usual, stronger definition of the theory of Γ, which identifies it with the closure of Γ
under logical consequence (that is, the smallest set of sentences T such that:
(i) For every ϕ, if Γ ` ϕ, then ϕ ∈ T ;
(ii) For every ϕ and Θ (such that ran(Θ) = T ), if Θ ` ϕ, then ϕ ∈ T ).
I discuss the philosophical and technical implications of this circumstance in section 5.4.6.
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undergo any logical operation (such as glb or lub) before being evaluated
for consequence would seem to build already into the very definition of the
consequence relation a form of transitivity contrary to the spirit of tolerant
logics. Therefore, as regards consistency in particular, (|=CT0) only requires
there to be a CT0-model M where the value of every premise belongs to
DM—it does not require there to be a CT
0-modelM where the value of the
conjunction of every premise itself belongs to DM (which, given the char-
acteristic “lowering” behaviour that the conjunction operation has in CT0,
would amount to a more exacting requirement).28 It thus only remains to
show that there is indeed such a model.
4.4.2 A Model of Tolerance
For simplicity’s sake, we focus on the consistency result for CT09. The
extension to full CT0 is straightforward.
Theorem 4.4.1. The axiomatic base of N 0 〈(N0p), (N0n), (N0t0 ), (N0t1 )〉 is
consistent in CT09.
Proof. We consider the CT09-model C
0 where:
• VC0 = {〈x, y〉 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 2, 0 ≤ y ≤ 2};
• DC0 = {〈x, y〉 : x+ y ≥ 3};
• C0 = {〈pi0, pi1〉 : 0co(pi0) ≤ 0co(pi1) and 1co(pi0) ≤ 1co(pi1)};
• tolC0 = {〈pi0,Π〉 : Π = {pi1 : [0co(pi1) ≥ 0co(pi0) − 1 and 1co(pi1) ≥
1co(pi0)] or [0co(pi1) ≥ 0co(pi0) and 1co(pi1) ≥ 1co(pi0)− 1]}};
• OC0 = {negC0}, where negC0 = {〈pi0, pi1〉 : [ico(pi1) = 0 iff ico(pi0) = 2]
and [ico(pi1) = 1 iff ico(pi0) = 1]};
28This is not to say of course that such consequence relations lack theoretical interest.
Their study must however wait for another occasion.
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• intC0(P0) = 〈1, 2〉, intC0(P1) = 〈0, 2〉 and intC0(P2) = 〈0, 1〉.
It’s easy to check that C0 is indeed a CT09-model for the axiomatic base of
N 0. C0 may be depicted by the following Hasse diagram (notational conven-

















































































4.5.1 Vagueness and First-Order Expressive Power
In developing a revisionary logic for vagueness, matters can hardly be left
at the sentential level. This is generally so—no matter what the particular
logic developed is—because some problematic claims expressible in a vague
language, such as the claim that there is a sharp boundary between the
bald and the non-bald, can only be adequately regimented in a first-order
language, and because the notion of identity itself is apparently subject to
sorites paradoxes which only employ plausible principles pertaining to the
identity predicate, so that a specific treatment of the predicate would appear
to be called for. This need is of course at its most acute if the general thrust
of the logical revision consists in declaring sorites paradoxes invalid rather
than unsound, for then fault must be found not simply in the alleged truth
of at least some members of a set of plausible identity claims, but rather in
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the alleged validity of at least some members of the set of the classical rules
of inference governing the identity predicate.
An informal presentation of the sorites paradox for identity goes as follows
(see Priest [1991]; Priest [1998]). Let us use the functor ‘the baldness status
of a man with ξ hairs’ in order to categorize numbers of hairs of hairy and
less hairy men in a soritical series according to the men’s baldness, just as the
functor ‘the colour of ξ’ can be used to categorize red and less red patches in
a soritical series according to the patches’ colour. Let us also assume for the
time being that the categorization is so coarse-grained as to encompass only
two categories: the baldness status of baldness, enjoyed by all and only those
numbers such that a man with one of those numbers of hairs is bald, and the
baldness status of non-baldness, enjoyed by all and only those numbers such
that a man with one of those numbers of hairs is not bald.
Consider then the premises:
(9) The baldness status of a man with 0 hairs is not the same as the baldness
status of a man with 1,000,000 hairs;
(10) The baldness status of a man with i hairs is the same as the baldness
status of a man with i+ 1 hairs.
The naive theory of vagueness is committed to both these premises. To see
in particular that it is committed to (10), consider that, given the current
coarse-grained understanding of the categorization induced by ‘the baldness
status of a man with ξ hairs’, the following abstraction principle strikes us
as a conceptual truth:
(ABS−) The baldness status of a man with i hairs is the same as the baldness
status of a man with j hairs iff, [a man with i hairs is bald iff a man
with j hairs is bald].
But, given (ABS−), the falsity of (10) would require that a man with i hairs
be bald while a man with i + 1 hairs be not bald—that is, it would require
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the falsity of (3), to which we have already seen that the naive theory is
committed.
However, from (10) we have that the baldness status of a man with 0
hairs is the same as the baldness status of a man with 1 hair. From (10)
we also have that the baldness status of a man with 1 hair is the same as
the baldness status of a man with 2 hairs, which, together with the previous
lemma that the baldness status of a man with 0 hairs is the same as the
baldness status of a man with 1 hair, yields that the baldness status of a
man with 0 hairs is the same as the baldness status of a man with 2 hairs.
The rule appealed to here is the rule of indiscernibility of identicals, which
allows one to infer Φ(τ1) (in our case, ‘The baldness status of a man with 0
hairs is the same as the baldness status of a man with 2 hairs’) from Φ(τ0)
(in our case, ‘The baldness status of a man with 1 hair is the same as the
baldness status of a man with 2 hairs’) and ‘τ0 is the same as τ1’ (in our
case, ‘The baldness status of a man with 0 hairs is the same as the baldness
status of a man with 1 hair’). With another 999,997 structurally identical
arguments, we reach the conclusion that the baldness status of a man with 0
hairs is the same as the baldness status of a man with 999, 999 hairs. From
(10) we also have that the baldness status of a man with 999, 999 hairs is the
same as the baldness status of a man with 1, 000, 000 hairs, which, together
with the previous lemma that the baldness status of a man with 0 hairs is
the same as the baldness status of a man with 999, 999 hairs, yields that the
baldness status of a man with 0 hairs is the same as the baldness status of a
man with 1, 000, 000 hairs. It would then seem that the contradictory of (9)
follows simply from (10).
At the expenses of some continuity with the foregoing and some not
wholly uncontroversial metaphysical assumption, the same point could
have been made even without appeal to abstracts introduced by some-
thing like (ABS−): we could have considered my continuous transformation
into a skyscraper, taking a very long finite sequence of subsequent times
t0, t1, t2 . . . tk and calling ‘Eliai’ the thing (substance) present at ti. Then,
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for every i, j [i, j : 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k, j = i + 1], the naive theory is commit-
ted to ‘Eliai is the same as Eliaj’, just as it is committed to the relevant
substances’ not ceasing to exist because of nanometrical differences in one
atom’s location. But then a structurally identical reasoning could be used
to establish the absurd ‘Elia0 is the same as Eliak’. However, consideration
of (ABS−) does allow us to introduce the further problem of what appear to
be sound abstraction principles which abstract on a non-transitive relation,
and of what import the truth of these principles would have on the classical
properties of identity (in particular, on its transitivity).
There are also reasons specific to the particular logical systems developed
so far which make their extensions to first-order languages non-trivial. For
the logical behaviour of the two traditional first-order quantifiers, universal
and particular, can very roughly be characterized as “conjunctive” and “dis-
junctive” respectively, and we have already had occasion to appreciate the
distinctive strength of the conjunction and disjunction operations in tolerant
logics, in particular as opposed to the structural operation of “putting to-
gether” premises or conclusions expressed by ‘,’ (section 4.4.1). This implies
that the simple consistency proof given in theorem 4.4.1 cannot be assumed
to go through in all its main aspects also for a suitable first-order formulation
of the naive theory of vagueness (having as unique sentence which expresses
the non-existence of a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases a
sentence saying that there is no sharp boundary between positive and nega-
tive cases). For that would amount to the consistency of the conjunction of
the tolerance conditionals occurring in the axiomatic base of N 0—that is to
val((N0
t0 ) ∧ (N0t1 )) belonging to DC0—and it is easy to see that this is not
the case.
4.5.2 Syntax
We extend the zeroth-order language L 0 to the first-order language L 1.
In view of the theoretical problems highlighted in section 4.5.1, we proceed
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immediately to the study of a first-order language with a designated identity
predicate and functors.
Definition 4.5.1. The set ASL 1 of the atomic symbols of L
1 is defined by
enumeration as in definition 4.2.1 with the deletion of the first clause and
the addition of the following clauses:
• The denumerable set CONSTL 1 of individual constants
a0, a1, a2 . . . , b0, b1, b2 . . . , c0, c1, c2 . . . is a subset of ASL 1 ;
• The denumerable set V ARL 1 of individual variables
x0, x1, x2 . . . , y0, y1, y2 . . . , z0, z1, z2 . . . is a subset of ASL 1 ;
• For every i, the denumerable set FUNCT iL 1 of iary func-






















• For every i, the denumerable set PREDiL 1 of iary predicate con-






















• The first-order quantifiers ∀ and ∃ (universal and particular respec-
tively) belong to ASL 1 ;
• , belongs to ASL 1 .
Note that, given the generality of the framework we will be developing, we
cannot assume the definability of either quantifier in terms of the other. We
pick a designated 1ary functor in FUNCT 1L 1 (say, f
1
100) to serve as succes-
sor functor, and denote it with ‘′’ (in right-superscript notation). We pick
another designated 1ary functor in FUNCT 1L 1 (say, f
1
101) to serve as ab-
straction functor, and denote it with ‘@’. We finally pick a designated 2ary
predicate constant in PRED2L 1 (say, P
2
100) to serve as identity predicate, and
denote it with ‘m’ (in infix notation).
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Definition 4.5.2. The set TERML 1 of terms of L
1 can be defined by
recursion in the usual way:29
• If τ ∈ CONSTL 1 , V ARL 1 , then τ ∈ TERML 1 ;
• For every i, if τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1 ∈ TERML 1 and ρi ∈ FUNCT iL 1 ,
ρi(τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1) ∈ TERML 1 .
Definition 4.5.3. The setWFFL 1 of wffs ofL
1 can be defined by recursion
as in definition 4.2.2 with the deletion of the first clause and the addition of
the following clauses:30
• For every i, if τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1 ∈ TERML 1 and Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 ,
Φi(τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1) ∈ WFFL 1 .
• If ϕ ∈ WFFL 1 , ξ ∈ V ARL 1 and neither ∀ξ nor ∃ξ occur in ϕ, then
(∀ξ(ϕ)), (∃ξ(ϕ)) ∈ WFFL 1 .
• Nothing else belongs to WFFL 1 .
Henceforth, to save on brackets, in addition to the previous conventions I
will assume that quantifiers bind as strong as ¬ and that right associativity
holds for 1ary operators (including quantifiers) (so that (?0 ?1 ?2 . . . ?i ϕ)
reads (?0(?1(?2 . . . ?i (ϕ) . . .))), with each ?j being a 1ary operator). I will
also drop the brackets of functional and predicative application, the commas
of argument composition and the arity-indicating superscripts.
The set SENTL 1 of sentences of L
1 can then be defined as usual:
Definition 4.5.4. SENTL 1 := WFFL 1 \ {ϕ : for some ξ, ξ occurs free in
ϕ}.
29Throughout, ‘τ ’, ‘σ’ and ‘υ’ (possibly with numerical subscripts) are used as metalin-
guistic variables ranging over TERML 1 ; ‘ρ’ (possibly with numerical subscripts and su-
perscripts (to indicate arity)) is used as a metalinguistic variable ranging over FUNCTL 1 .
30Throughout, ‘Φ’ (possibly with numerical subscripts and superscripts (to indicate
arity)) is used as metalinguistic variables ranging over PREDL 1 ; ‘ξ’ (possibly with nu-
merical subscripts) is used as a metalinguistic variable ranging over V ARL 1 .
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4.5.3 Tolerant First-Order Semantic Structures
Definitions 4.2.3, 4.2.4 receive the natural modifications. The basic tolerant
semantic structures are now defined as follows.
Definition 4.5.5. A T1-structure S for L 1 is a 6ple 〈US, VS, DS,S,
tolS, OS〉, where VS, DS,S, tolS are as in definition 4.2.5 and:
• US is a non-empty set of objects (the “universe of discourse”);
• S is as in definition 4.2.5 with (glb/lub20) replaced by the stronger
condition:
(glb/lubi0) For every X ⊆ VS, X has a glb and a lub
(S thus corresponds to a complete lattice—this is required in order
to guarantee the semantic interpretation of quantified wffs when US is
infinite);
• OS is as in definition 4.2.5 with the addition that idS ∈ OS, where
idS : US × US 7→ VS and:
(id0) For every u0, u1 ∈ US, idS(u0, u1) = idS(u1, u0).
—informally (and plausibly), the identification of x with y is exactly
as good as the identification of y with x. This is arguably a necessary
condition on the behaviour of a vague-identity operation such as id—we
will add further conditions on it in due course.
A T1-structure can then be used to interpret L 1 relative to an assignment
of values to variables, once it is equipped with an interpretation function for
CONSTL 1 , FUNCTL 1 and PREDL 1 and once suitable recursive clauses
are given.
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Definition 4.5.6. A T1-model M for L 1 based on a T1-structure S is
a 7ple 〈UM, VM, DM,M, tolM, OM, intM〉, where UM, VM, DM, M, tolM
and OM are identical to US, VS, DS, S, tolS and OS respectively, and




M × UM) ∪⋃
i∈ω(U
i
M×VM) is an interpretation function for CONSTL 1 , FUNCTL 1 and
PREDL 1 , assigning members of UM to members of CONSTL 1 , members of
U iM × UM to members of FUNCT iL 1 and members of U iM × VM to members
of PREDiL 1 .
Definition 4.5.7. An assignment is a function ass : V ARL 1 7→ UM.
Definition 4.5.8. ass0 ≈ξ0 ass1 := for every ξ1 6= ξ0, 〈ξ1, u〉 ∈ ass0 iff
〈ξ1, u〉 ∈ ass1
Definition 4.5.9. Relative to an assignment ass, intM is extended to a full
valuation function valM : WFFL 1 7→ VM by the two following recursions:
(valCONSTL1 ) If τ ∈ CONSTL 1 , valM,ass(τ) = intM(τ);
(valV ARL1 ) If τ ∈ V ARL 1 , valM,ass(τ) = ass(τ);
(valFUNCTL1 ) If ρ ∈ FUNCTL 1 , valM,ass(ρ) = intM(ρ);
(valTERML1 ) For every i, if τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1 ∈ TERML 1
and ρi ∈ FUNCT iL 1 , valM,ass(ρi(τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1)) =
valM,ass(ρ
i)(valM,ass(τ0), valM,ass(τ1), valM,ass(τ2) . . . valM,ass(τi−1));
(valPREDL1 ) If Φ ∈ PREDL 1 , valM,ass(Φ) = intM(Φ);
(valTERMPREDL1 ) For every i, if τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1 ∈ TERML 1
and Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , valM,ass(Φi(τ0, τ1, τ2 . . . τi−1)) =
valM,ass(Φ
i)(valM,ass(τ0), valM,ass(τ1), valM,ass(τ2) . . . valM,ass(τi−1));
(val¬) valM,ass(¬ϕ) = negM(valM,ass(ϕ));
(val∧) valM,ass(ϕ ∧ ψ) = glbM({valM,ass(ϕ), valM,ass(ψ)});
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(val∨) valM,ass(ϕ ∨ ψ) = lubM({valM,ass(ϕ), valM,ass(ψ)});
(val→) valM,ass(ϕ→ ψ) = implM(valM,ass(ϕ), valM,ass(ψ));
(val∀) valM,ass0(∀ξϕ) = glbM({valM,ass1(ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1});
(val∃) valM,ass0(∃ξϕ) = lubM({valM,ass1(ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1});
(valm) valM,ass(τ m σ) = idM(valM,ass(τ), valM,ass(σ)).
4.5.4 First-Order Basic Tolerant Logic
Definition 4.5.10. The consequence relation on pairs of sequences of wffs
∈ WFFL 1 constituting the first-order basic tolerant logicT1 (|=T1) is defined
as follows:
(|=T1) A sequence of wffs ∆ is a |=T1-consequence of a sequence of wffs Γ
(Γ |=T1 ∆) iff, for every T1-model M, for every assignment ass, if,
for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), valM,ass(ϕ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆),
valM,ass(ψ) ∈ TM.
It’s easy to check that whatever laws, rules and structural properties
hold for T0 hold for T1 as well. Moreover, for ∀ and ∃, we have from (D0)
(letting ‘ϕ[τ/σ]’ and its like denote the result of substituting τ for every
free occurrence of σ in ϕ, with the usual restriction that τ be free for σ in
ϕ henceforth being implicitly understood to be in place in order to avoid
clashes of bound variables):
Theorem 4.5.1. The rules of universal instantiation and particular gener-
alization:
(UI) ∀ξϕ |=T1 ϕ[τ/ξ]
(PG) ϕ |=T1 ∃ξϕ[ξ/τ ]
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are valid and strict.
Proof. Immediate from (D0).
Interestingly, we do have from (D0) the following restricted transitivity prop-
erties for T1:
Theorem 4.5.2. The properties of universal quantifier in the premises and
particular quantifier in the conclusions:
(UP) If Γ, ϕ |=T1 ∆, then Γ,∀ξϕ[ξ/τ ] |=T1 ∆;
(PC) If Γ |=T1 ∆, ϕ then Γ |=T1 ∆,∃ξϕ[ξ/τ ]
hold.
Proof.
• (UP): Immediate from (UI)’s strictness.
• (PC): Immediate from (PG)’s strictness.
Turning to the interaction of the quantifiers with ¬, we note that, thanks
to (neg⇒0 ) and (neg
⇒
1 ), the novelty of the general framework does not inter-
fere with the validity of the intuitionistically acceptable quantificational De
Morgan rules:
Theorem 4.5.3. The quantificational De Morgan rules:
(QDM0) ∃ξϕ |=T1 ¬∀ξ¬ϕ;
(QDM1) ∀ξϕ |=T1 ¬∃ξ¬ϕ;
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(QDM2) ¬∃ξϕ |=T1 ∀ξ¬ϕ
are valid and strict.
Proof.
• (QDM0): By (val∀), valM,ass0(∀ξ¬ϕ) = glb({valM,ass1(¬ϕ) :
ass0 ≈ξ ass1}), and so, for every such ass1, it follows by (neg⇒0 )
that valM,ass1(¬¬ϕ)  valM,ass0(¬∀ξ¬ϕ), wherefore, by (neg⇒1 ),
valM,ass1(ϕ)  valM,ass0(¬∀ξ¬ϕ)—that is, valM,ass0(¬∀ξ¬ϕ) is an up-
per bound for {valM,ass1(ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}. But, by (val∃),
valM,ass0(∃ξϕ) = lub({valM,ass1(ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}), and so
valM,ass0(∃ξϕ)  valM,ass0(¬∀ξ¬ϕ).
• (QDM1): By (val∀), valM,ass0(∀ξϕ) = glb({valM,ass1(ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}),
and so, for every such ass1, it follows by (neg
⇒
0 ) that valM,ass1(¬ϕ) 
valM,ass0(¬∀ξϕ)—that is, valM,ass0(¬∀ξϕ) is an upper bound for
{valM,ass1(¬ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}. But, by (val∃), valM,ass0(∃ξ¬ϕ) =
lub({valM,ass1(¬ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}), and so valM,ass0(∃ξ¬ϕ) 
valM,ass0(¬∀ξϕ). By (neg⇒0 ), valM,ass0(¬¬∀ξϕ)  valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬ϕ), and
so, by (neg⇒1 ), valM,ass0(∀ξϕ)  valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬ϕ).
• (QDM2): By (val∃), valM,ass0(∃ξϕ) = lub({valM,ass1(ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ
ass1}), and so, for every such ass1, it follows by (neg⇒0 ) that
valM,ass0(¬∃ξϕ)  valM,ass1(¬ϕ)—that is, valM,ass0(¬∃ξϕ) is a lower
bound for {valM,ass1(¬ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}. But, by (val∀),
valM,ass0(∀ξ¬ϕ) = glb({valM,ass1(¬ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}), and so
valM,ass0(¬∃ξϕ)  valM,ass0(∀ξ¬ϕ).
Finally, for m, we have from (id0):
Theorem 4.5.4. The rule of symmetry:
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(Sm) τ m σ |=T1 σ m τ
is valid and strict.
Proof. Immediate from (id0).
Given the strictness in T1 of (UI), (PG), (QDM0), (QDM1), (QDM2) and
(Sm), the result of substituting → for |=T1 in them is a logical truth of T1.
We end here our brief survey of the properties of the first-order basic
tolerant logic T1. As in the case of T0, T1 is manifestly too weak a logic
for a vague language, failing to satisfy many properties which any such logic
may be reasonably expected to have. Hence, in the following we proceed
to strengthen the logic in the usual fashion, by adding further and further
constraints on its defining structures.
4.5.5 First-Order Classical Tolerant Logic
(val∀) and (val∃) clearly follow the venerable tradition of interpreting univer-
sal quantification as an extension of the conjunction operation and particular
quantification as an extension of the disjunction operation. The further con-
straints to be added for characterizing CT1-structures (and, consequently,
CT1-models), which define the first-order counterpart CT1 of zeroth-order
CT0, can thus be expected to mirror and extend those adopted for CT0.
Again, the investigation of the quantified tolerant logics intermediate be-
tween T1 and CT1 will have to wait for another occasion, but our stepwise
way of proceeding will be sufficient to give a flavour of the variety of options
available in this area.
We impose the following constraints on D and T :
(Di1) If X ⊆ D, then glb(X) ∈ T
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(D is a tolerance superfilter—informally (and plausibly), if some vague pieces
of information are very good, their conjunction is still at least good enough)
and:
(Di2) For every X ⊆ V , if lub(X) ∈ D, then, for some v ∈ X, v ∈ T
(D is tolerantly superprime—informally (and plausibly), the disjunction of
some vague pieces of information can be very good only if at least one of them







and so that these independent constraints of CT0-models can be dispensed






0 ) and (neg
⇐
1 ) go over
as constraints on CT1-models.
In order to get the desired benefits from (Di1) and (D
i
2), we must also
require that:31
(U) For every CT1-model M, for every u ∈ UM, for some δ ∈ CONSTL 1 ,
intM(δ) = u.
Of course, if we want to allow for CT1-models of arbitrary (set) size, the
previous definitions concerning CONSTL 1 , TERML 1 and WFFL 1 must be
modified and reformulated in an adequate theory of classes. I leave such
niceties to the interested reader.
We finally add the following constraints on id:
(id⇒1 ) For every u0, u1 ∈ U , if u0 = u1, then id(u0, u1) ∈ D
—informally (and plausibly), if x and y are completely identical, then the
identification of x with y is very good—and:
(id⇒2 ) For every u0, u1, u2 ∈ U , if id(u0, u1) ∈ D and id(u1, u2) ∈ D , then
id(u0, u2) ∈ T
31Throughout, ‘δ’ (possibly with numerical subscripts) is used as a metalinguistic vari-
able ranging over CONSTL 1 .
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—informally (and plausibly), if both the identification of x with y and the
identification of y with z are very good, then the identification of x with z is
at least good enough.
Definition 4.5.11. With all these further constraints in place on CT1-
structures, the consequence relation on pairs of sequences of wffs ∈ WWFL
constituting the first-order classical tolerant logic CT1 (|=CT1) can finally
be defined as follows:
(|=CT1) A sequence of wffs ∆ is a consequence of a sequence of wffs Γ iff, for
every CT1-modelM, for every assignment ass, if, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Γ),
valM,ass(ϕ) ∈ DM, then, for some ψ ∈ ran(∆), valM,ass(ψ) ∈ TM.
We can then reap the harvest of the new semantics. We will do so by




2) and (U) we have:
Theorem 4.5.5. The infinitary rules of universal generalization and par-
ticular instantiation:
(UG) ϕ[δ0/ξ], ϕ[δ1/ξ], ϕ[δ2/ξ] . . . |=CT0 ∀ξϕ;
(PI) ∃ξϕ |=CT0 ϕ[δ0/ξ], ϕ[δ1/ξ], ϕ[δ2/ξ] . . .
(where ‘δ0, δ1, δ2 . . .’ is a complete “enumeration” of CONSTL 1—guaranteed
to exist in ZFC—and ξ does not occur bound in ϕ) are valid.
Proof.
• (UG): Immediate from (Di1) and (U).
• (PI): Immediate from (Di2) and (U).
4.5. GOING FIRST-ORDER 153
From either (neg⇐0 ) or (neg
⇐
1 ) we have:
Theorem 4.5.6. The quantificational De Morgan rule:
(QDM3) ¬∀ξϕ |=CT1 ∃ξ¬ϕ
is valid and strict.
Proof. By (val∃), valM,ass0(∃ξ¬ϕ) = lub({valM,ass1(¬ϕ) : ass0 ≈ξ ass1}),
and so, for every such ass1, it follows by (neg
⇒
0 ) that valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬ϕ) 
valM,ass1(¬¬ϕ). By either (neg⇐0 ) or (neg⇐1 ), valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬ϕ) 
valM,ass1(ϕ)—that is, valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬ϕ) is a lower bound for {valM,ass1(ϕ) :
ass0 ≈ξ ass1}. But, by (val∀), valM,ass0(∀ξϕ) = glb({valM,ass1(ϕ) :
ass0 ≈ξ ass1}), and so valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬ϕ)  valM,ass0(∀ξϕ). By (neg⇒0 ),
valM,ass0(¬∀ξϕ)  valM,ass0(¬¬∃ξ¬ϕ), and so, by either (neg⇐0 ) or (neg⇐1 ),
valM,ass0(¬∀ξϕ)  valM,ass0(∃ξ¬ϕ).
Finally, from (id⇒1 ) and (id
⇒
2 ) we have:
Theorem 4.5.7. The reflexivity and transitivity rules:
(Rm) |=CT1 τ m τ ;
(Tm) τ m σ, σ m υ |=CT1 τ m υ
are valid.
Proof.
• (Rm): Immediate from (id⇒1 ).
• (Tm): Immediate from (id⇒2 ).
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4.5.6 Naive Abstraction
Let us use again the functor ‘the baldness status of a man with ξ hairs’ in
order to categorize numbers of hairs of hairy and less hairy men in a soritical
series according to the men’s baldness. Let us also assume this time that
the categorization is so fine-grained as to encompass many categories: the
baldness status of 0-baldness (enjoyed by all and only those numbers such
that a man with one of those numbers of hairs has roughly the same number
of hairs as a man with 0 hairs), the baldness status of 1-baldness (enjoyed by
all and only those numbers such that a man with one of those numbers of hairs
has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with 1 hair), the baldness
status of 2-baldness (enjoyed by all and only those numbers such that a man
with one of those numbers of hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as
a man with 2 hairs). . . the baldness status of 1,000,000-baldness (enjoyed by
all and only those numbers such that a man with one of those numbers of
hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with 1,000,000 hairs).
Note that we are still in the dark about the identities of the objects (baldness
status) just listed, and so, while the list is certainly complete, it may well be
redundant.
We assume that the relation a-man-with-x-hairs-has-roughly-the-same-
number-of-hairs-as-a-man-with-y-hairs is an equivalence relation (reflexive,
symmetric and transitive):
(REFLhairs) A man with x hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a
man with x hairs;
(SYMhairs) If a man with x hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a
man y hairs, then a man with y hairs has roughly the same number of
hairs as a man with x hairs;
(TRANShairs) If both a man with x hairs has roughly the same number of
hairs as a man with y hairs and a man with y hairs has roughly the
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same number of hairs as a man with z hairs, then a man with x hairs
has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with z hairs.
It is crucial to note that ‘A man with ξ0 hairs has roughly the same
number of hairs as a man with ξ1 hairs’ is vague, and so a tolerant logic must
be used when reasoning with it. Note that, under some plausible additional
assumptions, (TRANShairs) amounts in effect to a tolerance principle for ‘A
man with ξ0 hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with ξ1
hairs’. For we can also assume the two following necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of the predicate:
(NEChairs) A man with x hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a
man with y hairs only if the absolute value of the difference of x with
y is ≤ 10;
(SUFFhairs) A man with x hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a
man with y hairs if the absolute value of the difference of x with y is
≤ 1.
Consider then the premises:
(11) A man with 0 hairs does not have roughly the same number of hairs as
a man with with 1,000,000 hairs;
(12) A man with i hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with
i+ 1 hairs.
(11) and (12) are validated by (NEChairs) and (SUFFhairs) respectively.
However, from (12) we have that a man with 0 hairs has roughly the same
number of hairs as a man with 1 hair. From (12) we also have that a man
with 1 hair has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with 2 hairs,
which, together with (TRANShairs) and the previous lemma that a man with
0 hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with 1 hair, yields
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that a man with 0 hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with
2 hairs. With another 999,997 structurally identical arguments, we reach the
conclusion that a man with 0 hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as
a man with 999, 999 hairs. From (12) we also have that a man with 999, 999
hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with 1, 000, 000 hairs,
which, together with the previous lemma that a man with 0 hairs has roughly
the same number of hairs as a man with 999, 999 hairs, yields that a man with
0 hairs has roughly the same number of hairs as a man with 1, 000, 000 hairs.
It would then seem that the contradictory of (11) follows simply from (12)
and (TRANShairs). Fortunately, it doesn’t, as the reasoning just rehearsed
implicitly appeals to (Tl). Within a tolerant framework, our (very plausible)
assumptions about ‘A man with ξ0 hairs has roughly the same number of
hairs as a man with ξ1 hairs’ are consistent.
The lesson is that, within a tolerant framework, the transitivity of a
relation must be sharply distinguished from its chain transitivity (to the
best of my knowledge, Parikh [1983], p. 247 has been the first to draw this
very important distinction). In the classical first-order theory of relations,
the transitivity of R:
(TRANSR) For every x, y, z, if both x Rs y and y Rs z, then x Rs z.
implies its finite chain transitivity:32
(CTRANSR
f
) For every x0, x1, x2. . .xi, if x0 Rs x1 and x1 Rs x2 and x2 Rs
x3. . . and xi−1 Rs xi, then x0 Rs xi.
This is not so if the background logic is weakened so as to exhibit suitable
failures of transitivity, as is the case in every tolerant logic.
32An infinitary version of chain transitivity would be:
(CTRANSR
i
) For every X, x, y, if X is well-ordered by R, x is the minimum element of
X under R and y is the lub of X under R, then x Rs y.
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We do get a hint about the identities of baldness status by considering
that, given the current fine-grained understanding of the categorization in-
duced by ‘the baldness status of ξ’, the following abstraction principle strikes
us as a conceptual truth:
(ABS) The baldness status of a man with i hairs is the same as the baldness
status of a man with j hairs iff, [a man with i hairs has roughly the
same number of hairs as a man with j hairs].
The relation mentioned on the right-hand side is an equivalence relation,
and so (ABS) at least avoids the immediate incoherence of abstracting on
a relation which is not an equivalence relation. Note however that such an
incoherence threatens only on the controversial assumption that identity is
itself an equivalence relation—in particular, that it is transitive. Such an
assumption holds in any tolerant logic—such as CT1—accepting (id⇒2 ) (and
so validating (Tm)), but fails for weaker tolerant logics. We will stick to it
given its attractiveness, and show how a first-order naive theory incorporating
(ABS) is consistent in CT1 (see Shapiro [2006], pp. 165–89 for a stimulating
discussion of naive abstraction principles in a transitive framework).
4.5.7 The Consistency and Strength of the First-Order
Naive Theory of Vagueness
Benefitting from the expressive resources of L 1, I propose to consider as a
simple paradigmatic example of a first-order naive theory of vagueness the
theory N 1 based on the following axioms (where P0τ translates into L 1 the
English ‘A man with τ hairs is bald’, ai translates into L 1 the English ‘i’,
τ ′ translates into L 1 the English ‘the successor of τ ’, @τ translates into L 1
the English ‘the baldness status of a man with τ hairs’ and R0τσ translates
into L 1 the English ‘A man with τ hairs has roughly the same number of
hairs as a man with σ hairs’):









) ∀x0(P0x0 ⊃ P0x′0);
(N1
an
) ¬@a0 m @a1,000,000;
(N1
at
) ∀x0(@x0 m @x′0);
(N1
a⇒
) ∀x0∀x1(@x0 m @x1 ⊃ R0x0x1);
(N1
a⇐
) ∀x0∀x1(R0x0x1 ⊃ @x0 m @x1).
N 1 is palpably a first-order naive theory of vagueness inasmuch as it contains
all the six characteristic claims of such a theory (sections 4.1, 4.5.1): the ex-
istence of positive cases, the existence of negative cases, the non-existence
of a sharp boundary between them, the non-identity of the categories of
the extreme cases, the identity of the categories of adjacent cases and the
necessity and sufficiency of the holding of a non-chain-transitive relation be-
tween categorized cases for the identity of the categories they fall under.
For simplicity’s sake, we focus again on the consistency result for CT19
(that is, the restriction of CT1 to the extensional language L 19 such that
WFFL 19 = WFFL 1 \ {ϕ :→ occurs in ϕ}). The extension to full CT1 is
straightforward.







)〉 is consistent in CT19.
Proof. We consider the CT19-model C
1
0 where:
• UC10 = {ai : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000} ∪ {bi : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000};
• VC10 = pow({0, 1, 2}) ∪ {X : X ∈ pow({0, 1, 2, 3, 4}) and 0 ∈ X and
card(X) ≥ 3 and, if card(X) = 3, then 1 /∈ X};
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• DC10 = {{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, {0, 1, 2}};
• C10 = {〈X, Y 〉 : X ⊆ Y } \ {〈{0}, {0, 1}〉, 〈{2}, {1, 2}〉};
• tolC10 = {〈X, Y 〉 : either Y = {Z : card(Z) ≥ card(X) − 1} or [X =
{0, 1, 2} and Y = {Z : card(Z) ≥ 2} ∪ {{0}, {2}}]};
• OC10 = {negC10 , idC10}, where negC10 = {〈X, Y 〉, 〈Y,X〉 : either [card(X) =
5 and card(Y ) = 0] or [card(X) = 3 and card(Y ) = 1 and [either
0 ∈ X,Y or 1 ∈ X, Y or 2 ∈ X, Y ]] or card(X) = card(Y ) = 2} and
idC10 is such that, if idC10(u0, u1) ∈ DC10 , then:
(i) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
or 1 /∈ valC10,ass(Φi)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk),
then valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) [j, k : k − j = i];
(ii) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2},
then either valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {0, 1} [j, k : k − j = i];
(iii) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1},
then either valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {1} [j, k : k − j = i];
(iv) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {1, 2},
then either valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2} [j, k : k − j = i];
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(v) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {1}, then
either valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC10,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {1, 2} [j, k : k − j = i].
Moreover, idC10 is such that:
(i′) idC10(u0, u1) = {0, 1, 2} iff, either u0 = u1 or, for some i, j [i : 0 ≤
i, j ≤ 1, 000, 000], u0 = bi, u1 = bj and |i− j| ≤ 1;
(ii′) idC10(u0, u1) = {0, 1} iff, for some i, j [i : 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 1, 000, 000],
u0 = bi, u1 = bj and |i− j| = 2;
(iii′) Otherwise, idC10(u0, u1) = {1}.
It’s easy to check that these additional conditions on idC10 are consistent
with conditions (i)-(v).
• intC10 is such that:
(i) If, for some i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], δ = ai or δ = bi, then
intC10(δ) = δ;
(ii) intC10(@) = {〈〈u0〉, u1〉 : for some i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], either
[u0 = ai and u1 = bi] or [u0 = bi and u1 = ai]};
(iii) intC10(
′) = {〈〈u0〉, u1〉 : for some i [i : 0 ≤ i < 1, 000, 000], either
[u0 = ai and u1 = ai+1] or [u0 = a1,000,000 and u1 = a1,000,000] or
[u0 = bi and u1 = bi+1] or [u0 = b1,000,000 and u1 = b1,000,000]};
(iv) intC10(P0) = {〈〈u〉, v〉 : either, [for some i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 499, 997],
u = ai and v = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}] or [u = a499,998 and v = {0, 1, 2}]
or [u = a499,999 and v = {0, 2, 3}] or [u = a500,000 and v = {0, 1}]
or [u = a500,001 and v = {0}] or [u = a500,002 and v = {1}] or
[for some i [i : 500, 003 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], u = ai and v = ∅];
otherwise, v = ∅};
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(v) intC10(R0) = {〈〈u0, u1〉, v〉 : for some i, j [i, j : 0 ≤ i, j ≤
1, 000, 000], u0 = ai and u1 = aj and [either [|i − j| ≤ 1 and
v = {0, 1, 2}] or [|i − j| = 2 and v = {0, 1}] or [|i − j| ≥ 2 and
v = {1}]]; otherwise, v = {1}}.
It’s easy to check that these additional conditions on P0 and R0 are
consistent with conditions (i)-(v) on idC10 .
It’s easy to check that C10 is indeed a CT
1
9-model for the axiomatic base of
N 1. C10 may be depicted by the following Hasse diagram (notational conven-






































































































































































Indeed, not only does a model such as C10 provide a proof of the consistency
of the axiomatic base ofN 1 inCT19, but it also validates the other traditional
fundamental rule governing identity which had so far escaped our semantic
machinery: the rule of indiscernibility of identicals.
Definition 4.5.12. A CT1-model M is quasi-C10-equivalent iff there exists
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an isomorphism between the structure ofM and the structure of C10 possibly
with the exception of conditions (i′)-(iii′) on idC10 .
Theorem 4.5.9. The rule of indiscernibility of identicals:
(II) τ m σ, ϕ |=CT1 ϕ[τ/σ]
is valid in every quasi-C10-equivalent CT
1-model.
Proof. An easy, even though tedious, induction on the complexity of wffs for
conditions (i)-(v) on id.
(II) is licensed by the conditions (i)-(v) on id, which in effect amount to
requiring, informally (and plausibly), that, if both the identification of x
with y and the information that y is F are very good, then the information
that x is F is at least good enough.33 Given (II)’s eminent plausibility, I
propose that we single out for special attention the strengthening CIIT1 of
CT1 characterized by quasi-C10-equivalent CT
1-models.







), it also validates the strictness of the argument
from @τ0 m @τ1 to R0τ0τ1 and vice versa. This can easily be seen as requiring
that [the relation denoted by R0 is transitive iff the relation denoted by m
is transitive], and in C10 they are in effect both transitive (even though, of
course, not chain-transitive).
Furthermore, C10 is such that, unlike many other CT
1-models, for every
X ⊆ DC10 , glb(X) ∈ DC10 . This implies that every quasi-C10-equivalent CT1-
model of Γ = 〈ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi〉 is also a model of ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 . . . ∧ ϕi, so
that the consistency in CIIT1 of the (finite) axiomatic base of a theory T
implies the consistency in CIIT1 of the conjunction of the axioms of T (and
the consistency in CIIT1 of the axiomatic base 〈ϕ[τ0/ξ], ϕ[τ1/ξ], ϕ[τ2/ξ] . . .〉
33Of course, (Tm) is just a special case of (II), with ϕ = σ m υ.
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(where ξ does not occur bound in ϕ) of a theory T implies the consistency in
CIIT1 of ∀ξϕ). Dually, C10 is such that, unlike many other CT1-models, for
every X ⊆ VC10 \ TC10 , lub(X) ∈ VC10 \ TC10 . This implies that every quasi-C10-
equivalent CT1-model which does not tolerate Γ = 〈ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi〉 (i.e. is
such as not to assign a tolerated value to any of ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi) does not
tolerate ϕ0∨ϕ1∨ϕ2 . . .∨ϕi either, so that the non-toleration in CIIT1 of the
(finite) axiomatic base of a theory T implies the non-toleration in CIIT1 of
the disjunction of the axioms of T (and the non-toleration in CIIT1 of the
axiomatic base 〈ϕ[τ0/ξ], ϕ[τ1/ξ], ϕ[τ2/ξ] . . .〉 (where ξ does not occur bound
in ϕ) of a theory T implies the non-toleration in CIIT1 of ∃ξϕ).
Finally, we can state and prove for CIIT1 a fairly general kind of theorem
concerning tolerant logics which reveals the peculiar incompleteness of the
naive theory of vagueness that they fit so well as to make it consistent. This
feature is closely related to that discussed in connection with theorem 4.3.15
(and, in what follows, with theorem 4.5.11). We will study in depth in chapter
6 the philosophical grounds and consequences of such incompleteness—here,
we limit ourselves to some of its logical manifestations.
Definition 4.5.13. A logic L has the Lindenbaum property iff, for every Γ,
if Γ 0L ∅, then, for some ∆ such that, for every ϕ, if ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), then
ϕ ∈ ran(∆), and, for every ϕ, either ϕ or ¬ϕ ∈ ran(∆), ∆ 0L ∅.
Theorem 4.5.10. CIIT1 does not have the Lindenbaum property.
Proof. Consider Γ = 〈(N1p), (N1n), (N1t), (N1an ), (N1at ), (N1a⇒), (N1a⇐)〉. As
proved in theorem 4.5.8, Γ 0CIIT1 ∅. However, for no ∆ such that, for every
ϕ, if ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), then ϕ ∈ ran(∆), and, for every i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000],
either Pai or ¬Pai ∈ ran(∆), ∆ 0CIIT1 ∅. For, since (N1p), (N1n) ∈ ran(Γ),
it would follow by familiar reasoning (in the classical metalanguage) that,
for some i, Pai ∈ ran(∆) and ¬Pai+1 ∈ ran(∆). But, since (N1t) ∈ ran(Γ),
this would be impossible, as ϕ, ψ,¬∃ξ(ϕ ∧ ψ) `CIIT1 ∅ ((ADJ) has the full
0-left-transitivity property in CIIT1).
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4.5.8 The Price of Tolerance
A less desirable feature of C10 is that valC10,ass0(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ)) =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} ∈ DC10 , since valC10,ass1(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ) = {2} if ass1(ξ) = a499,999,
valC10,ass2(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ) = {1} if ass2(ξ) = a499,998, valC10,ass3(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ) =
{0} if ass3(ξ) = a500,001, and lub({valC10,ass1(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ), valC10,ass2(P0ξ ∧
¬P0ξ), valC10,ass3(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ)}) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} ∈ DC10 . It is of the utmost
importance to see why this unwelcome result is not simply an accidental fea-
ture of C10, but is in a sense unavoidable under the current constraints on
CT1-models for reasons similar to those exposed in theorem 4.3.15.
Theorem 4.5.11. No CT1-model is a model both of the conjunction of the
coordinates of the axiomatic base of N 1 and of ¬∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ).
Proof. Suppose that, for some CT1-model M and assignment ass0,
valM,ass0(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ)) ∈ VM \ TM. Then, for every ass1 ≈ξ ass0,
valM,ass1(P0ξ ∧¬P0ξ) M valM,ass0(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧¬P0ξ)), and so, by the strictness
of (DNE), valM,ass1(¬P0ξ ∧ ¬¬P0ξ) M valM,ass0(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ)). Hence,
by the strictness of (DM2), valM,ass1(¬(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ)) M valM,ass0(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧
¬P0ξ)), and so lubM({valM,ass1(¬(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ)) : ass1 ≈ξ ass0}) =
valM,ass0(∃ξ¬(P0ξ ∨¬P0ξ)) M valM,ass0(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧¬P0ξ)) ∈ VM \ TM. There-
fore, by (D⇐3 ), valM,ass0(¬∃ξ¬(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ)) ∈ DM, and so, by the strictness
of (QDM2), valM,ass0(∀ξ¬¬(P0ξ∨¬P0ξ)) ∈ DM. Then, for every ass1 ≈ξ ass0,
valM,ass1(¬¬(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ)) ∈ DM. Hence, by the strictness of (DNE),
valM,ass1(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ) ∈ DM and, since glb({valM,ass1(¬¬(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ)) :
ass1 ≈ξ ass0}) = valM,ass0(∀ξ¬¬(P0ξ ∨ ¬P0ξ)) ∈ DM, glb({valM,ass1(P0ξ ∨
¬P0ξ) : ass1 ≈ξ ass0}) ∈ DM as well.
Given the strictness of (DISTR∧/∨), a reasoning similar to that exploited
in theorem 4.3.15 will now ensure that the corresponding completeness dis-
junction ϕ is such that valM,ass0(ϕ) ∈ DM. By (SIMP0), (SIMP1) and (PG)
each disjunct entails the negation of one or another coordinate of the ax-
iomatic base of N 1 (and so, by more (SIMP0), (SIMP1) and (neg⇒0 ), the
4.5. GOING FIRST-ORDER 165
negation of the conjunction ψ of these coordinates). Since the sequence of
these arguments has the full 1-right-transitivity property, it follows, by the-
orem 4.3.13, that ϕ itself entails ¬ψ, and so that ¬ψ ∈ TM. But then, by
(D⇒3 ), ψ cannot belong to DM, and so M is not after all a model of ψ.
The upshot is that every CT1-model M and assignment ass such that
valM,ass(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ)) ∈ VM \ TM do not model ψ (i.e. valM,ass(ψ) /∈ DM);
contraposing, everyCT1-modelM and assignment ass which do model ψ will
also tolerate ∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ) (i.e. valM,ass(∃ξ(P0ξ ∧ ¬P0ξ)) ∈ TM). In other
words, in CT1, the conjunction of the coordinates of the axiomatic base of
N 1 entails ∃ξ(P0ξ∧¬P0ξ)—the joint existence of positive and negative cases
and the non-existence of a sharp boundary between them entails the existence
of cases which are both positive and negative. Given (NEC), a theorist who
would like to accept ψ ought not to accept that there are no cases which
are both positive and negative. Indeed, given (NDD) (see section 5.4.3),
a theorist who would like to accept ψ for non-soritical reasons (see again
section 5.4.3) ought to accept that there are cases which are both positive
and negative.
It is crucial to see that this concession is not as catastrophic as it might
seem at first glance. For no δ do we have the entailment from the conjunction
of the coordinates of the axiomatic base of N 1 to P0δ ∧ ¬P0δ, since, even
though, in every CT1-modelM of interest, for some δ, P0δ∧¬P0δ ∈ TM, it is
not the case that, for some δ, in everyCT1-modelM of interest, P0δ∧¬P0δ ∈
TM. What the conjunction of the coordinates of the axiomatic base of N 1
logically requires is not the contradictoriness of any particular object, but the
contradictoriness of some object or other. One can accept that some object
or other is contradictory without accepting of any particular object that it is
contradictory; in fact, one can accept that while rejecting of each particular
object that it is contradictory and indeed accepting of each particular object
that it is not contradictory—or, at least, given (PI), one can do so without
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violating (AR) if one is accepting that some object or other is contradictory
for soritical reasons (see section 5.4.3).
Say that a semantics is “non-value-functional” iff the value of some com-
pound expressions is not a function of the values of the component expressions
(or instances), and say that a semantics is “non-truth-functional” iff it fails
to satisfy some entailments between the truth (falsity) of a compound ex-
pression and the truth or falsity of the component expressions (or instances).
Our semantics are all value-functional and, whenever (SIMP0), (SIMP1),
(ADD0), (ADD1), (ADJ), (DISJ), (NP), (NC), (UI), (PG), (UG) and (PI)
are present, they are truth-functional as well. We can then recast the gist
of the foregoing considerations on the existence of a contradictory object by
saying that non-transitivity allows to simulate non-truth-functional effects in
a truth-functional framework. Such a non-truth-functional effect can then
be plausibly regarded as expressing the contradictoriness of a soritical series
in its totality rather than the contradictoriness of any particular object, and
the resistance against the former is arguably much weaker than the resistance
against the latter.
Despite these suggestive remarks, theorem 4.5.11 certainly encourages
the exploration of various strategies for weakening some of our semantic con-
straints. The heavy use of (DNE) made in the proof may for instance invite
for an intuitionist rejection of (neg⇐1 ). Even though they are undoubtedly
worth investigating further, I think that this and other strategies focussing
on the behaviour of negation and on its interaction with conjunction and dis-
junction fail to deal with the root of the problem we are confronting. For this
root arguably lies in the crucial iterated use of distribution in the proof of
theorem 4.5.11, parallelling that made in the proof of theorem 4.3.15. There,
we managed to avoid paradox by rejecting (LTTl) and (LTTr), but the fore-
going result shows that such a rejection does not really go to the heart of
the problem. In a nutshell, this consists in the fact that the strictness of
(DISTR∧/∨) allows us to transform without loss of goodness the conjunction
of a certain decision (in the positive or in the negative), for every object x in
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some subseries S0 of a soritical series, of the question whether x is P0 with
the decision (in the positive or in the negative), for another object y, of the
question whether y is P0 into a certain decision (in the positive or in the
negative), for every object z in the subseries S1 extending S0 by y, of the
question whether z is P0. The preservation of goodness allows this process to
be iterated indefinitely, so that, in the end, a certain decision (in the positive
or in the negative) is reached, for every object x in the soritical series in
its totality, of the question whether x is P0, thereby contravening what is
arguably an essential feature of soritical series—the peculiar unsurveyability
which pertains to them in spite of their finitude (section 6.5.3 will develop
this theme).
Distribution appears even more problematic once we consider that the
only intuitive argument in its favour unavoidably appeals, among other
things, to (DP). The argument is well-known from discussions of quantum
logics and runs as follows (in the specific version justifying (DISTR∧/∨)). As-
sume ϕ, ψ. By (ADJ), ϕ∧ψ, and so, by (ADD0) and (Tl), (ϕ∧ψ)∨ (ϕ∧ χ)
(the application of (Tl) is justified since (ADD0) has the full 1-left-transitivity
property). Assume ϕ, χ. By (ADJ), ϕ ∧ χ, and so, by (ADD1) and (Tl),
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ) (the application of (Tl) is justified since (ADD1) has the
full 1-left-transitivity property). Therefore, by (DP), (Cl), (Wl) and (Wr),
ϕ, ψ∨χ entails (ϕ∧ψ)∨(ϕ∧χ), and so, by (Cl), (CP0) and (CP1), ϕ∧(ψ∨χ)
entails (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ). The argument crucially uses (DP), which fails in
every tolerant logic (note that theorem 4.3.13 does not apply in this case,
since the sequences of the relevant argument forms do not have the full 1-
right-transitivity property).
I thus conclude that we have good reasons to reject the semantic under-
pinning of the strictness of (DISTR∧/∨) and (DISTR∨/∧)—that is, (glb/lub
2
1)
(and (lub/glb21)). Not only does this rejection free us of unwelcome logical
strength, but it also comes at no additional cost, as the distributivity of our
semantic structures is quite independent from their other features, so that all
the other properties of tolerant logics we have been studying are preserved
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even if distributivity is lost, as inspection of the various proofs readily reveals.
Let us then consider the class of NDCT1-structures (and, consequently,
of NDCT1-models) which satisfy all the constraints on CT1-models save
for possibly (glb/lub21) (and (lub/glb
2
1)), NDCT
1 being the non-distributive
“classical” tolerant logic generated by these structures. It must be shown
that there is indeed a suitable NDCT1-model of the axiomatic base of N 1
and that such a model does not also tolerate any wff to the effect that some
object or other is contradictory. For simplicity’s sake, we focus again on the
consistency result for NDCT19 (that is, the restriction of NDCT
1 to the
extensional languageL 19). The extension to fullNDCT
1 is straightforward.
Theorem 4.5.12. There is a NDCT19-model M of the axiomatic base of
N 1 such that, for no wff ϕ of the form ∃ξ0∃ξ1∃ξ2 . . . ∃ξi(((. . . (ψ0 ∧ ¬ψ0) ∨
(ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ1) ∨ (ψ2 ∧ ¬ψ2) . . . (ψi ∧ ¬ψi)) (where each ψj may have the same
form as ϕ) and assignment ass, valM,ass(ϕ) ∈ TM.
Proof. We consider the NDCT19-model C
1
1 where:
• UC11 = {ai : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000} ∪ {bi : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000};
• VC11 = pow({0, 1})∪{X : X ∈ pow({0, 1, 2, 3}) and {0, 1} ⊆ X}∪ {X :
X ∈ pow({0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) and {0, 1, 2, 3} ⊆ X} ∪ {{0, 4}, {1, 5}};
• DC11 = {X : X ∈ pow({0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) and {0, 1, 2, 3} ⊆ X};
• C11 = {〈X, Y 〉 : X ⊆ Y };
• tolC11 = {〈X, Y 〉 : either Y = {Z : card(Z) ≥ card(X) − 1} or [X =
{0, 1, 2, 3} and Y = {Z : card(Z) ≥ 3} ∪ {{0, 4}, {1, 5}}]};
• OC11 = {negC11 , idC11}, where negC11 = {〈X, Y 〉, 〈Y,X〉 : either [card(X) =
6 and card(Y ) = 0] or [X = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and Y = {1}] or [X =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 5} and Y = {0}] or [X = {0, 1, 2, 3} and Y = {0, 1}] or none
of the foregoing conditions is met and X 6= Y and card(X) = card(Y )}
and idC11 is such that, if idC11(u0, u1) ∈ DC11 , then:
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(i) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
[card(valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk)) ≥ 5 or
≤ 2] and valC11,ass(Φi)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) 6=
{0, 1}, then valC11,ass(Φi)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) [j, k : k − j = i];
(ii) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2, 3},
then either valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2} [j, k : k − j = i];
(iii) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2},
then either valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {0, 1} [j, k : k − j = i];
(iv) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 3},
then either valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 2, 3} [j, k :
k − j = i];
(v) For every Φi ∈ PREDiL 1 , if
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) = {0, 1},
then either valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) =
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u0 . . . uk) or
valC11,ass(Φ
i)(uj, uj+1, uj+2 . . . u1 . . . uk) = {0, 1, 3} [j, k : k − j = i].
Moreover, idC11 is such that:
(i′) idC11(u0, u1) = {0, 1, 2, 3} iff, either u0 = u1 or, for some i, j [i :
0 ≤ i, j ≤ 1, 000, 000], u0 = bi, u1 = bj and |i− j| ≤ 1;
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(ii′) idC11(u0, u1) = {0, 1, 2} iff, for some i, j [i : 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 1, 000, 000],
u0 = bi, u1 = bj and |i− j| = 2;
(iii′) Otherwise, idC10(u0, u1) = {0, 1}.
It’s easy to check that these additional conditions on idC11 are consistent
with conditions (i)-(v).
• intC11 is such that:
(i) If, for some i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], δ = ai or δ = bi, then
intC11(δ) = δ;
(ii) intC11(@) = {〈〈u0〉, u1〉 : for some i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, 000, 000], either
[u0 = ai and u1 = bi] or [u0 = bi and u1 = ai]};
(iii) intC11(
′) = {〈〈u0〉, u1〉 : for some i [i : 0 ≤ i < 1, 000, 000], either
[u0 = ai and u1 = ai+1] or [u0 = a1,000,000 and u1 = a1,000,000] or
[u0 = bi and u1 = bi+1] or [u0 = b1,000,000 and u1 = b1,000,000]};
(iv) intC11(P0) = {〈〈u〉, v〉 : either, [for some i [i : 0 ≤ i ≤ 499, 998], u =
ai and v = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}] or [u = a499,999 and v = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}]
or [u = a500,000 and v = {0, 4}] or [u = a500,001 and v = {0}] or
[u = a500,002 and v = ∅]; otherwise, v = ∅};
(v) intC11(R0) = {〈〈u0, u1〉, v〉 : for some i, j [i, j : 0 ≤ i, j ≤
1, 000, 000], u0 = ai and u1 = aj and [either [|i − j| ≤ 1 and
v = {0, 1, 2, 3}] or [|i− j| = 2 and v = {0, 1, 2}] or [|i− j| ≥ 2 and
v = {0, 1}]]; otherwise, v = {1}}.
It’s easy to check that these additional conditions on P0 and R0 are
consistent with conditions (i)-(v) on idC11 .
It’s easy to check that C11 is indeed a NDCT
1
9-model for the axiomatic base
of N 1 and is such that, for no wff ϕ of the form ∃ξ0∃ξ1∃ξ2 . . . ∃ξi(((. . . (ψ0 ∧
¬ψ0) ∨ (ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ1) ∨ (ψ2 ∧ ¬ψ2) . . . (ψi ∧ ¬ψi)) (where each ψj may have the
same form as ϕ) and assignment ass, valC11,ass(ϕ) ∈ TC11 (an easy induction on
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the complexity of wffs building on the observation that, for every v ∈ VC11 ,
glbC11({v, negC11(v)}) C11 {0, 1} ∈ VC11 \ TC11). C11 may be depicted by the






















































































































































































d c c b





































































Analogously to C10, not only does a model such as C
1
1 provide a proof of
the consistency of the axiomatic base of N 1 inNDCT19, but it also validates
the other traditional fundamental rule governing identity, (II).
Definition 4.5.14. A NDCT1-modelM is quasi-C11-equivalent iff there ex-
ists an isomorphism between the structure of M and the structure of C11
possibly with the exception of conditions (i′)-(iii′) on idC11 .
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Theorem 4.5.13. (II) is valid in every quasi-C11-equivalent NDCT
1-model.
Proof. An easy, even though tedious, induction on the complexity of wffs for
conditions (i)-(v) on id.
Again, note that (II) is licensed by the conditions (i)-(v) on id, which in effect
amount to requiring, informally (and plausibly), that, if both the identifica-
tion of x with y and the information that y is F are very good, then the infor-
mation that x is F is at least good enough. Given (II)’s eminent plausibility, I
propose that we single out for special attention the strengthening NDCIIT1
of NDCT1 characterized by quasi-C11-equivalent NDCT
1-models.
As with C10, other features of C
1
1 are also worth remarking upon. Not
only does C11 validate (N
1a⇒) and (N1
a⇐
), it also validates the strictness of
the argument from @τ0 m @τ1 to R0τ0τ1 and vice versa. This can easily be
seen as requiring that [the relation denoted by R0 is transitive iff the relation
denoted by m is transitive], and in C11 they are in effect both transitive (even
though, of course, not chain-transitive).
Furthermore, C11 is such that, unlike many other NDCT
1-models, for
every X ⊆ DC11 , glb(X) ∈ DC11 . This implies that every quasi-C11-equivalent
NDCT1-model of Γ = 〈ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi〉 is also a model of ϕ0∧ϕ1∧ϕ2 . . .∧ϕi,
so that the consistency in NDCIIT1 of the (finite) axiomatic base of a
theory T implies the consistency in NDCIIT1 of the conjunction of the
axioms of T (and the consistency in NDCIIT1 of the axiomatic base
〈ϕ[τ0/ξ], ϕ[τ1/ξ], ϕ[τ2/ξ] . . .〉 (where ξ does not occur bound in ϕ) of a theory
T implies the consistency in NDCIIT1 of ∀ξϕ). Dually, C11 is such that, un-
like many otherNDCT1-models, for every X ⊆ VC11 \TC11 , lub(X) ∈ VC11 \TC11 .
This implies that every quasi-C11-equivalent NDCT
1-model which does not
tolerate Γ = 〈ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi〉 does not tolerate ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 . . . ∨ ϕi either,
so that the non-toleration in NDCIIT1 of the (finite) axiomatic base of a
theory T implies the non-toleration in NDCIIT1 of the disjunction of the
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axioms of T (and the non-toleration in NDCIIT1 of the axiomatic base
〈ϕ[τ0/ξ], ϕ[τ1/ξ], ϕ[τ2/ξ] . . .〉 (where ξ does not occur bound in ϕ) of a theory
T implies the non-toleration in NDCIIT1 of ∃ξϕ).
Finally, despite the failure of distributivity in NDCIIT1, we still have
the peculiar incompleteness phenomenon remarked upon in section 4.5.7:
Theorem 4.5.14. NDCIIT1 does not have the Lindenbaum property.
Proof. Consider Γ = 〈(N1p), (N1n), (N1t), (N1an ), (N1at ), (N1a⇒), (N1a⇐)〉.
As proved in theorem 4.5.12, Γ 0NDCIIT1 ∅. However, for no ∆ such that,
for every ϕ, if ϕ ∈ ran(Γ), then ϕ ∈ ran(∆), and, for every i [i : 0 ≤





) ∈ ran(Γ), it would follow by familiar reasoning (in the classical
metalanguage) that, for some i, Pai ∈ ran(∆) and ¬Pai+1 ∈ ran(∆). But,
since (N1
t
) ∈ ran(Γ), this would be impossible, as ϕ, ψ,¬∃ξ(ϕ∧ψ) `NDCIIT1
∅ ((ADJ) has the full 0-left-transitivity property in NDCIIT1).
4.6 Conclusion
We have thus seen how a fairly natural weakening of the logic, targeting
one of the structural properties of the consequence relation rather than any
property pertaining to a specific logical constant, is sufficient to stabilize the
first-order fragment of the naive theory of vagueness. I think that this result
is crucial in reinstating the naive theory as one of the main competitors in
the vagueness debate. Distinctively technical issues—such as the extension
of tolerant logics to higher orders, the development of adequate deductive
systems for the logics and the possibility of an alternative possible-world
semantics for them—will have to be investigated elsewhere. In the next
chapter, we rather turn to some distinctively philosophical issues arising from
the non-transitivist solution to the sorites paradox presented here.
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Chapter 5
Following-from and Transitivity
5.1 Introduction and Overview
I start with some rather dogmatic statements, simply in order to fix a specific
enough framework against which to investigate the topic of this chapter. The
reader who does not share some or all of the doctrines thereby expressed is
invited to modify the rest of the discussion in this chapter in accordance to
her favourite views on logical consequence.
Sometimes, some things logically follow from some things. The former
are a logical consequence of the latter and, conversely, the latter logically
entail the former. Something logically following “from nothing” is a logical
truth.1 There are presumably other ways of following-from (conceptually,
metaphysically, nomologically etc.). Even within the logical way of following-
from, this can be determined by different features of the sentences in question.
Assuming a semantic individuation of sentences (two sentences are the same
only if they mean exactly the same things), the relevant features can be:
• The semantic value of some expressions or others (together with syn-
tactic structure and the identities of all occurring expressions), as in
1For readability’s sake, I will henceforth mostly drop the qualification ‘logical’.
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‘John is unmarried’ ’s following from ‘John is a bachelor’;
• The semantic value of some expressions belonging to a privileged class
of “logical constants” (again together with syntactic structure and the
identities of all occurring expressions), as in ‘Snow is white’ ’s following
from ‘Snow is white and grass is green’;
• The semantic structure of the sentences, determined by the semantic
categories of the expressions occurring in them and their mode of com-
position (together with the identities of all occurring expressions), as
in ‘New York is a city’ ’s following from ‘New York is a great city’ (see
Evans [1978] and Sainsbury [2001], pp. 359–64 for some discussion);
• The sheer identities of the sentences, as in ‘Snow is white’ ’s following
from ‘Snow is white’ (see Varzi [2002], pp. 213–4; Moruzzi and Zardini
[2007], pp. 180–2 for critical discussion).
The last three cases are usually considered to be cases of “formal con-
sequence”. In the following, we focus attention on them, even though, as
should have been clear already from some remarks in section 2.1, on my view
the interesting divide between logical following-from and the rest does not
coincide with the divide between formal logical following-from and the rest,
the latter simply arising from a division of the theoretically basic notion of
logical following-from into subnotions which are individuated by the specific
features of the sentences which, in each particular case, make it so that the
relation of following-from obtains (see Garc´ıa-Carpintero [1993] for a similar
view). Unfortunately, I won’t have anything more to say here about either
the basic notion of logical following-from or the derivative notion of formal
logical following-from (see Moruzzi and Zardini [2007], pp. 161–74 for a crit-
ical survey of the main approaches to the analysis of logical following-from
and formal logical following-from).
The things related by consequence are sentences. No interesting notion
of a proposition as a genuinely non-linguistic entity has been made out which
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would sustain the fine-grainedness of individuation required by consequence.
‘Barbarelli is Giorgione’ expresses the same proposition as ‘Barbarelli is Bar-
barelli’ on many accounts of propositions, but only the latter is a logical
truth. ‘The US is the United States’ expresses the same proposition as ‘The
US is the US’ on any account of propositions worthy of consideration, but
only the latter is a (formal) logical truth. Utterances are also ill-suited to
play the relevant role in consequence, as utterances of presumed logical truths
such as ‘Here is here’ can be uttered falsely (if two different places are indi-
cated in association with the two different occurrences of ‘here’). Moreover,
sentences are nowadays the objects invariably considered by the science of
consequence, logic (see Moruzzi and Zardini [2007], pp. 179–80 for further
discussion).
In consequence, sentences are often “put together” (what this amounts
to in the case of tolerant logics has been seen in section 4.4.1). Their mode
of being “put together” is signalled in English by ‘and’ in the locution ‘ ‘Q0’
and ‘Q1’ and ‘Q2’. . . follow from ‘P0’ and ‘P1’ and ‘P2’. . . ’ and cannot be
assumed to be less structured than the mode of being put together enjoyed by
the coordinates of a sequence. This is so because many logics give divergent
answers to the questions:
(i) whether ψ follows from ϕ;
(ii) whether ψ follows from ϕ and ϕ.
But ϕ and ϕ form the same plurality, set, compound, aggregate, fusion etc. as
ϕ. Some logics even discriminate between:
(i′) χ’s following from ϕ and ψ;
(ii′) χ’s following from ψ and ϕ.
But ϕ and ψ form the same multi-set as ψ and ϕ (see Restall [2000] and
Paoli [2002] for useful overviews of such logics). We will thus stick to the
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practice of chapter 4 of representing with sequences such a fine-grained mode
of “putting together” sentences.
In such a framework, consequence plays such a central role that all other
traditional logical properties can be defined in terms of it. To give some
examples, Γ is consistent iff ∅ does not follow from it; Γ is exhaustive iff
it follows from ∅; Γ and ∆ are contrary iff ∅ follows from Γ,∆; Γ and ∆
are subcontrary iff Γ,∆ follows from ∅. Γ and ∆ are compatible iff they
are not contrary; Γ and ∆ are contradictory iff they are both contrary and
subcontrary.
An argument is a structure representing some or no sentences (the conclu-
sions of the argument) as following from some or no sentences (the premises
of the argument). In English, an argument is usually expressed with a dis-
course of the form ‘P0; (and) P1; (and) P2. . . Therefore, Q0; (or) Q1; (or)
Q2. . . ’. An argument is valid iff the conclusions in effect follow from the
premises; sound iff it is valid and all of its premises are true. An inference
is an act of drawing conclusions from premises (I should stress for further
reference that I am not equating inferring with drawing conclusions in accor-
dance to a certain collection of syntactic rules). A deduction is an abstract
codification of a derivation of conclusions from premises conforming to a cer-
tain collection of syntactic rules (deductive rules). A proof is a deduction
from 0 premises.
What does it mean to draw (accept, reject, doubt etc.) conclusions when
they are not exactly one conclusion, but many or none (as it might be the case
in our general multiple-conclusion framework)? As a first approximation, we
can say that, while premises have to be treated (accepted, rejected, doubted
etc.) “conjunctively”, conclusions have to be treated (accepted, rejected,
doubted etc.) “disjunctively”. Focussing on acceptance, it is important to
note that accepting “disjunctively” a sequence should not be interpreted as
accepting every (or even some) coordinate of the sequence. For example,
in most multiple-conclusion logics, 〈‘There are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’,
‘It is not the case that there are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’〉 follows from
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‘Either there are 1,963 houses in St Andrews or it is not the case that there
are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’, and in most of these logics one may well
rationally accept the latter while having no idea of how many houses there
are in St Andrews. If one is in such a situation, it would of course be wrong
not only to conclude that one is committed to accepting both ‘There are
1,963 houses in St Andrews’ and ‘It is not the case that there are 1,963
houses in St Andrews’, but also to conclude that either one is committed
to accepting ‘There are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’ or one is committed to
accepting ‘It is not the case that there are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’. One
is only committed as it were “disjunctively” to accepting ‘There are 1,963
houses in St Andrews’ and ‘It is not the case that there are 1,963 houses in
St Andrews’, which can very roughly be characterized as a commitment to
accepting that either ‘There are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’ is true or ‘It is
not the case that there are 1,963 houses in St Andrews’ is true.2
A major part of the philosophical investigation of the notion of conse-
quence consists in an attempt at elucidating its nature—what consequence
consists in. Yet, consequence is also a relation, and as such one can sensibly
ask what its formal properties are.3 Arguably, Tarski’s most notorious con-
tribution to the philosophical investigation of the notion of consequence is
constituted by his theory of what consequence consists in: truth preservation
in every model (see Tarski [1936]). An at least equally important contribution
to such investigation is however represented by his earlier studies concerning
an abstract theory of consequence relations, aimed at determining the for-
2In this connection, I should also note that accepting (rejecting, doubting etc.) a
sequence can only be equated with accepting (rejecting, doubting etc.) all (or some) of
the sentences in its range if the underlying logic exhibits (Cl), (Cr), (Wl) and (Wr) (as
all tolerant logics do).
3Compare with resemblance: a major task for resemblance theories is to determine
what resemblance between two individuals consists in (sharing of universals, matching in
tropes, primitive similarity etc.); yet, the study of the formal properties of resemblance
(seriality, reflexivity, symmetry etc.) can fruitfully be pursued even in the absence of an
answer to the question about its ultimate nature.
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mal behaviour of any such relation. In his Tarski [1930], he mentions four
properties a consequence relation worthy of this name must have: reflexivity,
monotonicity, transitivity and (less centrally) compactness.4 I think all of
these properties are at least questionable (see Moruzzi and Zardini [2007],
pp. 180–7). But here I want to focus on transitivity, trying to make sense
of a position according to which consequence is not transitive (see chapter 4
for a precise statement of the main transitivity properties). I will not argue
for any such position (I did so in chapter 4), but will simply try to make it
adequately intelligible and assess what impact its correctness would have on
our understanding of consequence.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. To fix ideas, section 2
puts on the table a range of philosophically interesting non-transitive con-
sequence relations, introducing briefly their rationale. Section 3 discusses
and disposes of two very influential objections of principle to the use of non-
transitive consequence relations. Section 4 delves into some fine details of
the logical and normative structures generated by non-transitivity. Section 5
draws the conclusions which follow from these investigations for our general
understanding of the relation between logical consequence and rationality
and for the non-transitivist solution to the sorites paradox.
5.2 Non-Transitive Consequence Relations
5.2.1 Relevance
In order to study in details the impacts of non-transitivity on our understand-
ing of consequence, it will be helpful to have in mind concrete examples of
consequence relations lacking the transitivity property—the specific reasons
4Important as they may be, it is worth stressing that they would still grossly underde-
termine the identification of the nature of consequence, even if the field of the relation is
kept fixed. Consider e.g. that the relation which holds between Γ and ∆ iff Γ entails ∆
and is non-empty will satisfy all the properties mentioned in the text if consequence does.
5.2. NON-TRANSITIVE CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS 181
underlying their rejection of transitivity will help us to form and test an
understanding of general features of consequence which opens daylight for
the idea of its failing to be transitive.5 Of course, again, the aim here is not
to argue for the adoption of any such logic, but only to shed light on their
rational motivation. Let me also anticipate that the rest of our discussion
will actually almost exclusively centre on left transitivity, as this is the target
of all extant non-transitive logics.
Consider the two following arguments:
CONTRADICTION Intuitively, ‘Graham Priest is dead wrong’ does
not follow from ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence is true and the
Strengthened-Liar sentence is not true’. Graham Priest’s error should
not be entailed by the correctness of one of his most famous doctrines.
Yet:
(i) Both ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence is true’ and ‘The
Strengthened-Liar sentence is not true’ do seem to follow from
it (by simplification);
(ii) ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence is true or Graham Priest is
wrong’ does seem to follow from ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence
is true’ (by addition);
(iii) ‘Graham Priest is dead wrong’ does seem to follow from ‘The
Strengthened-Liar sentence is true or Graham Priest is wrong’
and ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence is not true’ (by disjunctive
syllogism).
Two applications of (Tl) (see section 4.2.3) would then yield that ‘Gra-
ham Priest is dead wrong’ does after all follow from ‘The Strengthened-
Liar sentence is true and the Strengthened-Liar sentence is not true’.
5The reader should keep in mind that, throughout, what is meant by ‘failure of tran-
sitivity’ and the like is simply failure of unrestricted transitivity and the like. The most
interesting non-transitive logics retain transitivity for many argument forms (see section
4.2.3 for a precise formulation of what this amounts to).
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LOGICAL TRUTH Intuitively, ‘Timothy is a male and Timothy is a sib-
ling iff it is not the case that [Timothy is not a male or Timothy is not
a sibling]’ does not follow from ‘Timothy is a brother iff [Timothy is a
male and Timothy is a sibling]’. No De Morgan Law should be entailed
by an analysis of ‘brother’. Yet:
(i′) ‘Timothy is a brother iff it is not the case that [Timothy is not
a male or Timothy is not a sibling]’ does seem to follow from
‘Timothy is a brother iff [Timothy is a male and Timothy is a
sibling]’ and ‘Timothy is a male and Timothy is a sibling iff it
is not the case that [Timothy is not a male or Timothy is not
a sibling]’ (by transitivity of the conditional), and so from the
former only (by suppression of logical truths);
(ii′) ‘Timothy is a brother iff [Timothy is a male and Timothy is a
sibling]’ does seem to follow from itself (by reflexivity). Given this
and (i′), it also does seem that ‘Timothy is a brother iff [Timothy is
a male and Timothy is a sibling]’ entails both ‘Timothy is a brother
iff [Timothy is a male and Timothy is a sibling]’ and ‘Timothy is
a brother iff it is not the case that [Timothy is not a male or
Timothy is not a sibling]’ (by contraction);
(iii′) Moreover, it does seem that the latter two jointly entail ‘Timothy
is a male and Timothy is a sibling iff it is not the case that [Tim-
othy is not a male or Timothy is not a sibling]’ (by transitivity of
the conditional).
One application of (Tl) would then yield that ‘Timothy is a male and
Timothy is a sibling iff it is not the case that [Timothy is not a male
or Timothy is not a sibling]’ does after all follow from ‘Timothy is a
brother iff [Timothy is a male and Timothy is a sibling]’.
Some (Bolzano [1837] (according to George [1983]; George [1986]) and
then Lewy [1958], pp. 123–32; Geach [1958]; Smiley [1959], pp. 238–43; Wal-
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ton [1979]; Epstein [1979]; Tennant [1987], pp. 185–200, 253–65)6 have taken
taken these intuitive judgements at face value and concluded that (Tl) does
not unrestrictedly hold (see Lewy [1976], pp. 126–31; Routley et al. [1982],
pp. 74–8 for critical discussion of this approach). One possible way of elabo-
rating the rationale for these judgements would be as follows (see von Wright
[1957], pp. 175, 177). (Non-0-premise, non-0-conclusion) consequence is a re-
lation holding in virtue of some meaning connection between premises and
conclusions—its holding can never be determined merely by the independent
logical status of some premises or conclusions. Thus, (non-0-premise, non-
0-conclusion) consequence should never discriminate between logical truths
and logical contingencies.
This intuitive constraint can then be made precise as the requirement
that an argument is valid iff it can be obtained by substitution of sentences
for atomic sentences from a valid argument none of whose premises or con-
clusions are logical truths or falsehoods (see Smiley [1959], p. 240). The
constraint yields the desired results: it can easily be checked that, subject to
a certain qualification concerning LOGICAL TRUTH, each subargument
of the previous arguments satisfies the requirement, even though the overall
arguments do not.
In particular, as for CONTRADICTION, notice that the two subar-
guments in (i) are valid, as they can be obtained from the valid argument
‘Snow is white and grass is green. Therefore, snow is white (grass is green)’
by substitution of ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence is true’ for ‘Snow is white’
and of ‘The Strengthened-Liar sentence is not true’ for ‘Grass is green’; the
other subarguments satisfy the requirement already in their present form. As
for LOGICAL TRUTH, notice that the subargument in (iii′) is valid, as
it can be obtained from the valid argument ‘Snow is white iff grass is green;
snow is white iff water is blue. Therefore, grass is green iff water is blue’
6Sylvan [2000], pp. 47–9, 98–9 intriguingly mentions some possible medieval and early-
modern sources, but, to the best of my knowledge, a satisfactory investigation into the
pre-modern history of this logical tradition has yet to be undertaken.
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by substitution of ‘Timothy is a brother’ for ‘Snow is white’, of ‘Timothy
is a male and Timothy is a sibling’ for ‘Grass is green’ and of ‘It is not the
case that [Timothy is not a male or Timothy is not a sibling]’ for ‘Water
is blue’; the other subarguments considered as a whole single subargument
satisfy the requirement already in their present form. Given what counts
as meaning connection in this framework, addition of (Tl) would lead to a
gross overgeneration of meaning connections between sentences—the genuine
intensional dependencies between the premises and conclusions of each subar-
gument would overgenerate into the bogus intensional dependencies between
the premises and conclusions of the overall arguments.
It is often claimed that the imposition of this and similar additional con-
straints on the consequence relation amounts to changing the subject matter
of logic, and does not really engage with the (self-proclaimed) traditional view
according to which “truth preservation” is what consequence is all about.
Note that such a claim cannot be addressed in the particular case of CON-
TRADICTION by holding that some contradictions (sentences of the form
‘P and it is not the case that P ’) may be true whilst not everything is true,
so that the argument would fail to be truth preserving in the straightforward
sense of having true premises and false conclusions—for the truth of only
some contradictions would presumably invalidate subargument (iii) (qua not
truth preserving in the straightforward sense) and therefore prevent a possi-
ble failure of transitivity (see Priest [2006a], pp. 110–22).
The claim is however highly dubious on other grounds. For it is plausible
to assume that there is a notion of conditionality (expressible in the language
by →) such that, if ∆, ψ follows from Γ, ϕ, then ∆, ϕ → ψ follows from Γ.
At least on some readings, ‘If ϕ, then ψ’ does presumably express such a
notion in English. But, on such a reading, ‘If the Strengthened-Liar sentence
is true and the Strengthened-Liar sentence is not true, then Graham Priest
is dead wrong’ seems to be false (indeed false-only) if anything is. Under
the present assumption, it would, however, be a logical truth if CONTRA-
DICTION were valid. Even though, we may assume, truth preserving in
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the straightforward sense of not having true premises and false conclusions,
such an argument would thus not be truth preserving in the only slightly less
straightforward sense of being such that its validity would imply the valid-
ity of arguments which are not truth preserving in the straightforward sense.
Under the present assumption about the behaviour of the conditional, there is
thus a perfectly good sense in which, for someone attracted by the approach
just sketched, licensing the validity of CONTRADICTION, transitivity
would lead indeed to failures of truth preservation—what consequence is
supposed to be all about (see section 5.3.2 for more on transitivity and truth
preservation and Read [1981]; Read [2003] for a different reply on the issue
of relevance and truth preservation).
5.2.2 Tolerance
This is of course familiar ground by now, but let us rehearse the gist of the
non-transitivist solution to the sorites paradox from a perspective which will
facilitate further philosophical reflection on it. Consider the premises:
(1) A man with 0 hairs is bald;
(2) A man with 1,000,000 hairs is not bald;
(3) If a man with i hairs is bald, so is a man with i+ 1 hairs.
All these premises are intuitively true, and, presumably a fortiori, consistent.
However, from (3) we have that, if a man with 0 hairs is bald, so is a man
with 1 hair, which, together with (1), yields that a man with 1 hair is bald.
Yet, from (3) we also have that, if a man with 1 hair is bald, so is a man
with 2 hairs, which, together with the previous lemma that a man with 1
hair is bald, yields that a man with 2 hairs is bald. With another 999,997
structurally identical arguments, we reach the conclusion that a man with
999,999 hairs is bald. From (3) we also have that, if a man with 999,999
hairs is bald, so is a man with 1,000,000 hairs, which, together with the
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previous lemma that a man with 999,999 hairs is bald, yields that a man
with 1,000,000 hairs is bald. 999,999 applications of (Tl) would then yield
that the contradictory of (2) follows simply from (1) and (3).
In chapter 4 we have taken these intuitive judgements at face value and
concluded that (Tl) does not unrestrictedly hold (Weir [1998], pp. 792–4;
Be´ziau [2006] also briefly entertain this possibility). One possible way of
elaborating the rationale for these judgements would be as follows. A major
point of a vague predicate is to draw a difference in application between some
cases which are far apart enough on a dimension of comparison relevant for
the application of the predicate. The predicate should discriminate between
some such cases. Hence, (1) and (2) must be enforced. Still, another ma-
jor point of a vague predicate is not to draw any difference in application
(from a true application to anything falling short of that) between any two
cases which are close enough on a dimension of comparison relevant for the
application of the predicate. The predicate should not discriminate between
any two such cases. Hence, (3) must be enforced. Moreover, instances of (3)
should allow modus ponens : what substance is there to the idea that there
is no sharp boundary between i and i + 1 in matters of baldness if, given
the premise that a man with i hairs is bald, I cannot detach and infer that
a man with i+1 hairs is bald? Given what counts as indiscriminability con-
nection in this framework and given the fact that the topology and metric
of the dimension allow for chains of close enough items whose extreme are
far apart, addition of (Tl) would lead to a gross overgeneration of indiscrim-
inability connections between sentences—the correct mandate of not drawing
any unit-sized difference would overgenerate into the incorrect mandate of
not drawing any 1,000,000-sized difference.
5.2.3 Probabilistic Reasoning
Finally, I would also like to put on the table a case of a non-deductive,
defeasible consequence relation—that is, roughly, a relation which is supposed
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to hold between premises and conclusions iff the truth of some of the latter
is reasonable in the lights of the (partial) state of information represented
by the former, even if not guaranteed by their truth (as is supposed to be
the case for a deductive consequence relation). For example, the inference
of ‘Al is a native speaker of Italian’ from ‘Al was born in Little Italy’ is
eminently reasonable, as well as the inference of ‘Al was born in Italy’ from
‘Al is a native speaker of Italian’. However, the inference of ‘Al was born in
Italy’ from ‘Al was born in Little Italy’ is eminently unreasonable. Under
this intuitive understanding of defeasible consequence:
(1′) ‘Al is a native speaker of Italian’ is a consequence of ‘Al was born in
Little Italy’;
(2′) ‘Al was born in Italy’ is a consequence of ‘Al is a native speaker of
Italian’;
(3′) ‘Al was born in Italy’ is not a consequence of ‘Al was born in Little
Italy’,
whereas, given (1′) and (2′), (Tl) would rule out (3′).
One possible way of elaborating the rationale for these judgements would
be as follows. Whereas on all probability distributions reasonable in the light
of how things actually are the conditional probabilities of ‘Al is a native
speaker of Italian’ and ‘Al was born in Italy’ on ‘Al was born in Little Italy’
and ‘Al is a native speaker of Italian’ respectively are both very high, the
conditional probability of ‘Al was born in Italy’ on ‘Al was born in Little
Italy’ is very low (if not = 0!).
The idea can be made more precise in different specific ways. Here is
a fairly general recipe. Let a model M of a language L be a probability
distribution on the sentences of L . Let the conditional probability functions
be totally defined—assume to that effect a suitable probability calculus (for
well-known examples, see Popper [1959]; Re´nyi [1970]). The probability dis-
tribution corresponding to M will thus be in effect determined by the set of
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conditional probability functions—the unconditional probability in M of ϕ
being the conditional probability in M of ϕ on ψ, for some logical truth ψ
(assuming a suitable logic in the characterization of the probability calculus).
Define then ∆ to be a δ-consequence of Γ inM iff the conditional probability
in M of the disjunction of all the coordinates of ∆ on the conjunction of all
the coordinates of Γ is ≥ δ. Finally, define ∆ to be a δ-consequence of Γ iff,
for every modelM, ∆ is a δ-consequence of Γ inM. Assuming that the logic
featuring in the characterization of the probability calculus is classical, it’s
easy to check that, as defined, for every δ > 0, δ-consequence is just classical
consequence (for δ = 0, δ-consequence is trivial). The desired supra-classical
strength comes of course by restricting the range of admissible models to a
set of (contextually determined) “reasonable” probability distributions.
No doubt this recipe still leaves a lot of leeway in the choice of the proba-
bility calculus and of the appropriate restrictions on models, and some of its
parameters (such as the logic featuring in the characterization of the calculus)
could interestingly be modified. However, it seems plausible that, whichever
specific implementation is eventually chosen, the consequence relations so
obtained will have a decent claim to codify at least in part the (contextu-
ally determined) canon of non-deductive, defeasible reasoning. If so, such
a canon will not satisfy (Tl): given what counts as evidential connection in
this framework, addition of (Tl) would lead to a gross overgeneration of ev-
idential connections between sentences—the reasonable rules of thumb that
people born in Little Italy (typically) speak Italian and that Italian speakers
were (typically) born in Italy would overgenerate into the unreasonable rule
of thumb that people born in Little Italy were (typically) born in Italy.
It might legitimately be wondered what the point is of introducing a de-
feasible consequence relation in the course of an attempt at understanding
the idea that deductive consequence is non-transitive. Yet, it will turn out
that one of the gateways to this understanding is constituted by an appre-
ciation of the normative import of consequence on rational attitudes. The
non-transitivist can be made sense of as interpreting such import in a par-
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ticular way. However, that import is not of course a privilege of deductive
consequence, and so study of defeasible consequence relations with certain
properties (such as the failure of transitivity) may well shed light on some
features of deductive consequence relations with the same properties.7
5.3 Two Objections to the Very Idea of Non-
Transitive Consequence
5.3.1 Consequence and Inference
I can see (and have encountered, in print and conversation) two main ob-
jections concerning the very idea of non-transitive consequence, objections
which, if correct, would seem to doom from the start any interesting use of a
non-transitive consequence relation. Their rebuttal will help to dispel some
misunderstandings of what non-transitivity of consequence amounts to. A
more positive characterization will be offered in the next section.
There should be an uncontroversial sense in which logic is oftentimes
substantially informative. There should be an uncontroversial sense in which
reasoning oftentimes leads to the discovery of new truths. For example, there
should be an uncontroversial sense in which the derivation from a standard
arithmetical axiom system that there are infinitely many prime numbers is
rightly regarded as a substantial discovery about natural numbers, accom-
plished by purely logical means (under the assumption of the truth of the
axioms), no matter what one’s views are about the ultimate aptness of logi-
7Indeed, there seem to be some deep connections between probabilistic reasoning and
at least some kinds of non-transitive deductive consequence relations. For example, the
main logics of chapter 4 fail to satisfy some principles (such as (IP⊃), (DP), the 1-left-
transitivity property for (ADJ) etc.) which are also invalid from a probabilistic point
of view, even though they are valid on many non-probabilistic codifications of defeasible
consequence, such as mainstream non-monotonic logics (see Makinson [2005] for a useful
overview of these).
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cal vocabulary to represent features of the world. However, as Quine among
others has stressed (see e.g. Quine [1986], pp. 80–94), the elementary steps
of logic are, in a sense, obvious.8 In what sense can then logic still be sub-
stantially informative?
Well, as the traditional thought about this puzzle has always been at
pains to stress, a series of completely obvious elementary steps may well
lead to a completely unobvious conclusion. The relation x-is-an-obvious-
consequence-of-y is non-transitive. However, it is important to note that
this by itself does not yet explain away the puzzle: a series of one-foot steps
may well lead to cover a considerable distance, but no one has ever supposed
this to show that one can take a much longer step than the length of one’s
legs would give reason to suppose. x-is-obviously-reachable-in-one-step-from-
y is indeed non-transitive, but so is x-is-reachable-in-one-step-from-y. The
crucial, implicit, auxiliary assumption must be that consequence, as opposed
to obvious consequence, is indeed transitive, so that the path to the unobvious
conclusion can be obliterated and this be seen already to follow from the
initial assumptions. As Timothy Smiley so nicely put it, “the whole point of
logic as an instrument, and the way in which it brings us new knowledge, lies
in the contrast between the transitivity of ‘entails’ and the non-transitivity
of ‘obviously entails’ ” (Smiley [1959], p. 242). Thus, there seems to be little
space for consequence not to be transitive, if logic is to preserve its function
as a means of discovering new truths.
I accept that logic is to preserve such a function, but, as it stands, I contest
the very coherence of the previous argument. Suppose that ψ obviously
follows from ϕ and that χ obviously follows from ψ but not so obviously from
8Quine uses ‘obvious’ in such a way that an apparently deviant logician would be best
translated non-homophonically (see also Quine [1960], pp. 57–61). I find very dubious that
even the elementary steps of logic are “obvious” in this sense and don’t mean anything
that strong—only that once one has adopted a reasonable logic, its elementary steps look
most straightforward and least informative, unlike the step from a standard arithmetical
axiom system to Euclid’s theorem. Thanks to Graham Priest and Stewart Shapiro for
stimulating discussions of Quine’s views on these matters.
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ϕ. If consequence is indeed transitive, then, at least as far as consequence is
concerned, the step from ϕ to χ is no more mediated than those from ϕ to ψ
and from ψ to χ: χ just follows from ϕ as it follows from ψ (and as ψ follows
from ϕ). If the step from ϕ to χ is indeed unobvious, then it is just not true,
in a transitivist framework, that every “elementary” logical step is obvious.
Thus, the solution offered to the puzzle (transitivity) simply denies one of
the elements from which the puzzle arose. Of course, the step from ϕ to χ is
“elementary” in the sense that, at least as far as consequence is concerned,
it is no more mediated than those from ϕ to ψ and from ψ to χ. Indeed, in
this sense, every valid step is an “elementary” step. The real trouble is then
that the transitivity solution simply obliterates the structure presupposed
by the puzzle, namely the distinction between elementary logical steps and
non-elementary ones.
This suggests that the elementary/non-elementary distinction has been
mislocated by the argument. It is not a distinction to be drawn at the level of
consequence—rather, it is a distinction to be drawn at the level of inference.
For present purposes, the notion of an elementary inference can be left at an
intuitive level: it is understood in such a way that the inference of ϕ from ‘ϕ
and ψ’ is elementary, whereas that of ‘[ϕ or χ] and [ψ or υ]’ from ‘ϕ and ψ’
is not. This is just as good, since the puzzle was an epistemic one and the
drawing of an inference is one of the canonical ways in which the validity of
an argument can be recognized by a subject. The transitivist herself has thus
to acknowledge that the puzzle should properly be stated as the puzzle of how
any inference can be substantially informative given that every elementary
inference is least informative. Her own solution to the puzzle may then be
revised as follows. x-is-elementarily-inferrable-from-y is non-transitive, yet it
entails x-is-inferrable-from-y. Furthermore, the soundness of the inferences
(with respect to consequence) makes it the case that x-is-inferrable-from-y
entails x-is-a-consequence-of-y. The transitivity of the latter in turn ensures
that the final conclusion can be inferred from the initial premises, even if
such an inference is non-elementary (and non-obvious).
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The revised argument is coherent and might seem to offer a satisfactory
explanation of the revised puzzle from a transitivist perspective. However,
if x-is-inferrable-from-y is itself transitive, the appeal to the transitivity of
consequence is now exposed as a superfluous detour. For a simpler argument
can run as follows. x-is-elementarily-inferrable-from-y is non-transitive, yet
it entails x-is-inferrable-from-y. The transitivity of the latter in turn ensures
that the final conclusion can be inferred from the initial premises, even if
such an inference is non-elementary (and non-obvious).
Now, as has been so far explicated, x-is-inferrable-from-y is very general
and need not be transitive from a non-transitivist point of view. Yet, any
theoretical employment of logic by a being whose cognitive architecture re-
sembles that of humans is likely to require a systematization of the inferences
whose validity can be recognized without further analysis into a small set of
syntactic rules which are at least sound (and possibly complete) with respect
to consequence. It is simply a fact that such a systematization provides
the most effective method a human (and anyone with a similar cognitive
architecture) can employ in order to explore what follows from what (just
as something like the standard rules for addition, subtraction, multiplication
and division together with something like decimal notation provides the most
effective method a human (and anyone with a similar cognitive architecture)
can employ in order to explore what gives what).
To stress, I don’t think that there is an immediate connection between
inference and syntactic rules: I think that it’s clear on reflection that one
can recognize the validity of an inference (and so endorse it) simply in virtue
of one’s appreciation of the logical concepts involved in it, even if one is
not in possession of a set of syntactic rules which would allow the relevant
derivation. Yet, as I have just noted, given the way human cognition works,
there is every theoretical reason for transitivists and non-transitivists alike
to accept a systematization of our pre-theoretical judgements of validity in
terms of syntactic rules. And while there is no conceptual bar to the de-
ductive system thus generated being itself non-transitive, it is of course a
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desirable epistemic feature also from the non-transitivist perspective that
the deductive system used in the study of a non-transitive consequence rela-
tion be itself transitive (in the sense that any application of a rule preserves
the property of being a correct deduction). This feature is desirable be-
cause non-transitive consequence can be just as non-obvious as transitive
consequence, whence the need arises for deductive techniques offering the
epistemic gain flowing from the asymmetry between the non-transitivity of
x-is-obviously-deducible-from-y and the transitivity of x-is-deducible-from-y
(for an example of non-transitive logics with transitive sound and complete
deductive systems see Zardini [2007b]). No further asymmetry between the
non-transitivity of x-is-an-obvious-consequence-of-y and the alleged transi-
tivity of x-is-a-consequence-of-y is required.
5.3.2 Consequence and Truth Preservation
We have already encountered in section 5.2.1 the (rather vague) claim that
consequence is all about truth preservation, in the sense that whether the
consequence relation holds between certain premises and conclusions is wholly
determined by whether the conclusions preserve the truth of the premises. On
the basis of an intuitive understanding of such notion of truth preservation,
the following objection can be mounted.
The non-transitivist, we may assume, claims that, for some ϕ, ψ and χ,
ψ follows from ϕ and χ from ψ, but χ does not follow from ϕ. So, since
consequence requires truth preservation, the non-transitivist should concede
that ψ preserves the truth of ϕ and that χ preserves the truth of ψ. Yet,
on the face of it, truth preservation is a transitive relation: if ψ preserves
the truth of ϕ and χ preserves the truth of ψ, then it would seem that χ
also preserves the truth of ϕ. For suppose that ψ preserves the truth of ϕ
and that χ preserves the truth of ψ, and suppose that ϕ is true. Then, since
ψ preserves the truth of ϕ, ψ should be true as well. But χ preserves the
truth of ψ, and so, since ψ is true, χ should be true as well. Thus, under
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the supposition that ϕ is true (and that ψ preserves the truth of ϕ and that
χ preserves the truth of ψ), we can infer that χ is true. Discharging that
supposition, we can then infer (still under the suppositions that ψ preserves
the truth of ϕ and that χ preserves the truth of ψ) that, if ϕ is true, so is
χ, which might seem sufficient for χ’s preserving ϕ’s truth. The objection
is completed by noting that truth preservation suffices for consequence, so
that, since χ preserves the truth of ϕ, χ follows from ϕ, contrary to what the
non-transitivist claims.
A proper assessment of the objection requires an adequate explication
of the underlying notion of truth preservation. Picking up some threads of
section 2.2.2, I know of no better way of spelling out this notion than in terms
of a conditional statement: certain conclusions preserve the truth of certain
premises iff, if every premise is true, then some conclusion is true (where,
for the purposes of the discussion to follow, we can afford to remain rather
neutral as to the exact behaviour of the conditional). Of course, so stated in
terms of an unadorned indicative conditional, truth preservation alone does
not suffice for consequence. Moreover, as I argue in Zardini [2007c], it is
very doubtful that any sufficient non-circular strengthening of the intensional
force of the conditional is available, and the very idea of the sufficiency of
truth preservation risks making unintelligible some first-order debates about
valid reasoning. Unfortunately, I have no space to rehearse those arguments
here, and so I will simply have to assume their conclusion that there is no
interesting sense of ‘truth preservation’ in which truth preservation suffices
for consequence. Given this, I will also officially adopt the above explication
of the notion (save for briefly considering a possible alternative at the end of
this section).
It must be stressed that, if truth preservation does not suffice for con-
sequence, the simple argument against the non-transitivist presented at the
outset of this section results unsound. In particular, the argument breaks
down at the step ‘since χ preserves the truth of ϕ, χ follows from ϕ’, which
assumes truth preservation to suffice for consequence. Yet, a more sophis-
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ticated version of the argument could still be made to run against some
applications that the non-transitivist envisions for her logics (for example, to
the sorites paradox). Let us say that:
• An application of non-transitivity which only requires a verdict of in-
validity concerning a transitivistically valid target argument is weak ;
• An application which in addition requires the rejection of a commitment
to accepting the conclusions of a transitivistically valid target argument
all of whose premises are accepted9 is intermediate;
• An application which in addition requires the falsity of all the conclu-
sions of a transitivistically valid target argument all of whose premises
are true is strong.
Focus then on strong applications of non-transitivity. For some of these, the
non-transitivist wishes to maintain that ϕ is true but χ false, even though ψ
follows from ϕ and χ from ψ.10 However, the transitivity of truth preserva-
tion and its necessity for consequence seem to be sufficient to establish that, if
9For simplicity’s sake, I will henceforth take sentences as the objects of acceptance and
rejection. The whole discussion may be recast, more clumsily, in terms of acceptance of
propositions.
10In fact, at least one of the most prominent such applications, i.e. the one to the sorites
paradox, presents some recalcitrance against being fit into this mould. For that is an
application with multiple-premise arguments, so that transitivity of truth preservation is
not applicable to such chains of arguments in the direct way exploited by the revised
argument in the text. One way to recover such an application would be to modify the
relevant arguments, so as to bring all the premises ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi used at some point
or other in the chain up front, collect them together in a single, long “conjunction” and
carry them over from conclusion to conclusion adding to the relevant conclusion ψ the
“conjuncts” ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi (scare quotes being used here since, for example in tolerant
logics, standard conjunction has not the right properties to do the job and a new operation
would have to be introduced instead). An alternative way of recovering the application
would be to use a stepwise application of the alleged transitivity of truth preservation
on the original arguments. Given the relevant chain of arguments a0, a1, a2 . . . aj , with a
first multiple-premise argument ai after a0, transitivity of truth preservation can be used
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ϕ is true, so is χ—a conditional which sits badly with the other commitments
(truth of ϕ, falsity of χ) the non-transitivist would wish to undertake (exactly
how badly it sits will depend of course on the details of the logic—for exam-
ple, these claims are jointly inconsistent in all the various classical tolerant
logics of chapter 4). Unfortunately, the series of considerations concerning
context dependence, the semantic paradoxes and higher-order indeterminacy
developed in Zardini [2007c] would appear to show that even the necessity
of truth preservation for consequence cannot be sustained in full generality.
Before seeing how the argument from truth preservation may still be
made to run in the presence of these limitations, I would like to undertake a
brief digression on truth preservation which I hope will prove instructive for
understanding some features of non-transitive logics. For it may be replied
to the foregoing that consequence is trivially guaranteed to preserve at least
some kind of truth, even if not truth simpliciter. For consequence is often
defined as preservation, for every model M, of truth in M. Consequence
would then be trivially guaranteed to preserve truth in a model. In a sense,
already the identification of consequence with the preservation of something
or other (in some structure or other) just begs the question against the non-
transitivist, as there are no compelling intuitive or theoretical grounds for
such an identification and one can define well-behaved consequence relations
without appealing to anything recognizable as preservation of something or
other (in a some structure or other).11
to yield the truth of at least one (possibly all) of the relevant premises of ai. Having so
secured the truth of those premises, the truth of any other premise (possibly none) of ai
is conceded by the non-transitivist (for example, in the case of the sorites paradox, this
would be the truth of the relevant instance of (3)). The procedure can be applied again
until the truth of the conclusion of aj is reached.
11Even granting an identification of consequence with truth preservation in some struc-
ture or other, it is well-known that the standard set-theoretic notion of model, which
replaces the generic notion of structure, has serious drawbacks in the analysis of the con-
sequence relation of expressively rich languages. I won’t go here into this further aspect
of the complex relation between consequence and preservation of truth in a structure (see
McGee [1992] for a good introduction to some of these issues).
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Tolerant logics are an example of such a consequence relation developed in
a non-transitive framework; an example driven by a completely different kind
of consideration (not affecting transitivity) can be found in Martin and Meyer
[1982]. The general structural point in these logics is that the collection of
designated values relevant for the premises is not identical with the collection
of designated values relevant for the conclusions: in the tolerant logics of
chapter 4 the former is in effect a proper subcollection of the latter, whereas
the logic S of Martin and Meyer [1982] can be seen as a form of the dual
position, in which the former is a proper supercollection of the latter (thereby
leading to the failure not of transitivity, but of another property considered
by Tarski [1930] essential for a consequence relation—namely, reflexivity).12
Let me be clear. It is not the case that a representation in terms of non-
identity of the two collections suffices to ensure the non-transitivity of a logic
(see Smith [2004] for an example of a transitive logic generated by such a
representation). Nor is it the case that a representation in terms of non-
identity of the two collections is essential for every non-transitive logic (see
Smiley [1959] for an example of a non-transitive logic where no such natural
representation seems to be forthcoming). Yet such a representation, where
available, is a fruitful point of entry to at least one of the key thoughts
behind the logic and as such has been (in section 4.2.2) and will be deployed
(in section 5.4.4) in this essay. The representation also connects up neatly
with usual representations of transitive logics (preservation of designated
value in some structure or other), showing how non-transitivity arises from a
very natural and straightforward generalization of the usual model-theoretic
representation of a (transitive) consequence relation.
Coming back to our main line of thought and in spite of the qualms
that the foregoing considerations should warrant against any straightforward
appeal to truth preservation, I am willing to concede that, in the cases under
discussion, consequence does indeed require truth preservation. However, I
12Thanks to Bob Meyer for a very helpful discussion of S and to Graham Priest for
pointing out to me the duality connection.
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reject that the non-transitivist is thereby committed to χ’s being true if ϕ
is. For this conclusion (and so the transitivity of truth preservation) follows
from the premises that ψ preserves the truth of ϕ and that χ preserves the
truth of ψ only under the assumption that the consequence relation of the
metalanguage (the language in which we talk about the truth of ϕ, ψ and
χ) is transitive (as against the non-transitivity of the consequence relation of
the object language in which we talk about whatever ϕ, ψ and χ talk about).
More explicitly: under the current interpretation of truth preservation, the
validity of the argument to the conclusion that χ is true if ϕ is (and so to the
transitivity of truth preservation) boils down to the validity of the argument
form ‘If P0, then P1; if P1, then P2. Therefore, if P0, then P2’, which should
however be invalid in a non-transitive logic (it is for example invalid in all
tolerant logics of chapter 4).
Moreover, no deviance from classical logic worthy of this name should
grant the assumption that the consequence relation of the metalanguageM
talking about the truth and falsity of the sentences of the object language
O over which a deviation from classical logic is envisaged should itself be
classical. For, given any decent theory of truth, this will be sufficient to rein-
troduce classical logic in O itself. Consider for example a deviant intuitionist
logician. Were she to accept ‘Either ‘ϕ’ is true or ‘ϕ’ is not true’ in M (for
ϕ belonging to O), the most natural theory of truth (namely one such that
ϕ’s being not true implies that ϕ is false and so that ‘It is not the case that
ϕ’ is true) would commit her to ‘Either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’.
The point need not exploit the full equivalence between ϕ and ‘ ‘ϕ’ is true’
which is induced by the enquotation/disquotation schema:
(ED) P iff ‘P ’ is F
(here and in what follows, make a proviso for the semantic paradoxes if you
like). We can produce similar results only e.g. with the right-to-left direction
of (ED). If a metalinguistic necessity predicate were to behave classically,
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the intuitionist would have to accept in M ‘Either ‘ϕ’ is necessary or ‘ϕ’ is
not necessary’ (for ϕ belonging to O). Given that ‘ ‘ϕ’ is not necessary’ is
classically equivalent with ‘ ‘It is not the case that ϕ’ is possible’, she would
have to accept ‘Either ‘ϕ’ is necessary or ‘It is not the case that ϕ’ is possible’,
whence, by substituting ‘Either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’ for ‘ϕ’, she
would have to accept ‘Either ‘Either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’ is necessary
or ‘It is not the case that either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’ is possible’,
which entails in (any suitable modal extension of) intuitionist logic ‘ ‘Either
ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’ is necessary’. By right-to-left (ED), she would
have to accept ‘Either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’.13 Indeed, up to the
very last step, the previous argument would go through also for necessity-like
metalinguistic predicates14 which fail to satisfy either direction of (ED), such
as ‘justified’. Thus, if a metalinguistic justification predicate were to behave
classically, the intuitionist would have to accept inM ‘ ‘Either ϕ or it is not
the case that ϕ’ is justified’ (for ϕ belonging to O).
More generally, the point will hold for any two languages L0 and L1
as soon as some of the notions expressible in L1 are best thought of as
exhibiting the same problematic properties which motivate a revision of the
13This argument should make clear what I mean when I say that a metalinguistic pred-
icate Φ “behaves classically”. What I mean is that every instance of an argument form
valid in classical first-order logic in which Φ occurs essentially is valid (treating quotation
names as constants) and, in addition, that Φ has a dual Ψ satisfying the schema ‘ ‘P ’ is
not Φ iff ‘It is not the case that P ’ is Ψ’. In particular, note that since ‘a is F ’ is not
an argument form valid in classical first-order logic, we cannot straightforwardly assume
‘ ‘Either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’ is necessary’ (maybe on the grounds that ‘Either ϕ
or it is not the case that ϕ’ is classically valid), whose most fine-grained form is precisely
‘a is F ’. Only the object-language logic—which in our example is intuitionist—is allowed,
as it were, to “look inside” quotation names, whence it is crucial that, in our argument,
‘ ‘It is not the case that either ϕ or it is not the case that ϕ’ is not possible’ is valid in
(any suitable modal extension of) intuitionist logic.
14A metalinguistic predicate Φ is necessity-like iff ‘ ‘ϕ’ is Φ’ and ‘ ‘ψ’ is Φ’ entail ‘ ‘ϕ
and ψ’ is Φ’ and ϕ entails ‘ ‘ϕ’ is Φ’ if ϕ is the trivial truth (that is, the truth entailed by
anything).
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logic for L0 (maybe exactly because of some systematic connection that
these notions bear to notions expressible in L0, as is the case for the notion
of truth when L1 is the metalanguage of L0 and truth is governed by (ED)).
This more general point fatally affects also a revision of the argument from
truth preservation which replaces the notion of truth preservation with that
(logically identical) of closure of knowledge (or of other epistemic properties)
under logical consequence.15
It is worth seeing in closing how the argument from truth preservation
fares if the current (and standard) explication of the notion of truth preserva-
tion in terms of the notion of conditionality is rejected in favour of a primitive
relation of truth preservation. While under the former explication there was a
logical guarantee that the relation is transitive (at least assuming a transitive
logic!), now that guarantee is lost and the alleged transitivity must be postu-
lated as a specific law governing the relation. Clearly, there is no need on the
non-transitivist’s part to accept this postulation. What is important to note
now is that even the acceptance of a transitivity postulate for the relation
would not by itself wreck havoc for a strong application of non-transitivity
like the one to the sorites paradox, for what is really at issue there is not
so much simple transitivity, but the stronger assumption that a finite chain
of elements connected by a relation R is such that its first element bears R
to its last element. This is in effect the finite chain-transitivity assumption
(CTRANSR
f
), which, in a non-transitive logic, is usually stronger than the
transitivity assumption (TRANSR) (see section 4.5.6). Even though there is
little need for the non-transitivist to pursue this latter strategy in the case of
a primitive truth-preservation relation, I think there is good reason for her
to embrace it in other cases where independent grounds support the transi-
tivity of a particular relation, as in the case of the identity relation (see again
section 4.5.6).
15Thanks to Stephen Schiffer for interesting discussions on this kind of argument.
5.4. THE NON-TRANSITIVIST’S PICTURE 201
5.4 The Non-Transitivist’s Picture
5.4.1 Non-Logical/Logical Dualism and Non-
Transitivism
We have only started to scratch the surface of the philosophical underpin-
nings of a non-transitive logic. The rebuttal of the two previous objections
has helped to dispel some misunderstandings of what non-transitivity of con-
sequence amounts to, but not much has yet been offered in the way of a
positive characterization of a conception of consequence as non-transitive.
I think more progress on this issue can be made by asking the question
as to why consequence is usually assumed to be transitive. Consider the
following natural picture (where, for simplicity’s sake, we take sets to be
the terms of the consequence relation and restrict our attention to single-
conclusion arguments). The laws of logic can be seen as an operation16 which,
applied to a set of facts X, yields another such set Y (possibly identical with
X). They apply with necessity to X, yielding Y , but they also apply with
16 The study of consequence as an operation rather than relation goes back at least
as far as Tarski [1930] (see Wo´jcicki [1988] for a recent comprehensive study within this
approach). Under the simplifying assumptions made at the start of this section, the
properties of reflexivity, monotonicity and transitivity of a consequence relation correspond
to the following properties of a consequence operation cons from sets of sentences to sets
of sentences:
(i) X ⊆ cons(X) (increment);
(ii) If X ⊆ Y , cons(X) ⊆ cons(Y ) (monotonicity);
(iii) cons(cons(X) ∪ Y ) ⊆ cons(X ∪ Y ) (union-adjoint subidempotency).
An operation satisfying conditions (i)–(iii) is a Tarski closure operation. A generalization
of closure operations for modelling multiple-conclusion consequence relations are Scott
closure operations (see Scott [1974]). Further generalizations dealing with collections more
fine-grained than sets are possible (see Avron [1991] for a start). Closure operations have
first been identified by Kuratowski [1922].
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necessity to Y , yielding another set Z (possibly identical with Y ). It may
therefore seem to follow from this natural picture that X is already sufficient
to yield with logical necessity Z—i.e. that the laws of logic applied to X
already yield Z. This would mean that the result (Z) of the operation of the
laws of logic on the result (Y ) of the operation of the laws of logic on X is
included in the result (Y ) of the operation of the laws of logic on X—the
operation would be subidempotent,17 thus validating a form of transitivity
for the corresponding relation of consequence. However, as in the case of
the objection from truth preservation, the conclusion that X yields with
logical necessity Z (that is, that, if all the members of X hold, so do all
the members of Z), in its characteristic obliteration of the logical role played
by the intermediary conclusion (that is, that all the members of Y hold),
implicitly relies on transitivity. Given that facts-talk is no less non-neutral
than truth-talk, the non-transitivist should not be seen as committed to the
denial of the natural picture.
This point is crucial. It is very tempting to try to make sense of the non-
transitivist’s position, especially in its intermediate and strong applications,18
as relying on a distinction between two different kinds of facts, the non-logical
and the logical. Non-logical facts are those provided, as it were, by the world
itself, such as the fact that snow is white; the fact that, if snow is white,
it reflects light; the fact that every piece of snow is white. Logical facts
are those that hold in virtue of the application of the laws of logic to the
non-logical facts, such as the fact that either snow is white or grass is blue
(holding in virtue of the application of the laws of logic to the fact that snow
17An operation op is subidempotent on a set X and ordering ≤ iff, for every x ∈ X,
op(op(x)) ≤ op(x). Under the simplifying assumptions made at the start of this section, in
our case ≤ is simply subset inclusion. It’s easy to check that, with conditions (i) and (ii) of
fn 16 in place, subidempotency on subset inclusion implies union-adjoint subidempotency.
18Henceforth, I will mainly talk about non-transitive logics tailored to intermediate
and strong applications of non-transitivity, as these are arguably the philosophically most
interesting cases to be made sense of. This qualification must be understood as implicit
in the following.
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is white); the fact that snow is white and grass is green (holding in virtue
of the application of the laws of logic to the fact that snow is white and the
fact that grass is green); the fact that something is white (holding in virtue
of the application of the laws of logic to the fact that snow is white). Of
course, much more would have to be said about how to draw exactly the
non-logical/logical distinction, but I take it that we have an intuitive grasp
of it (as witnessed by our intuitive judgements in the foregoing cases) which
will be sufficient for present purposes.
The non-transitivist would then be seen as rejecting that the applica-
tion of the laws of logic to the logical facts always results in non-vacuous
effects. By the application of the laws of logic “having non-vacuous effects”
I mean that they manage to force the fact described by the conclusion to
hold whenever every fact described by the premises holds (where, as in the
case of truth preservation, this is to be spelled out in terms of a conditional
statement). Whenever at least one of the facts of the set to which an ap-
plication of the laws of logic is envisaged is logical, it would then be open
to the non-transitivist to deny non-vacuous effects to the application of the
laws of logic to that set. To stress, according to such non-logical/logical du-
alism, having non-vacuous effects of application does not coincide with being
valid: an argument form may be universally valid but, when applied to a set
of facts which correspond to its premises and some of whose members are
logical, fail to force the fact corresponding to its conclusion to hold. Thus,
on this dualist view, the validity of an argument is one thing and a different,
stronger thing is the argument’s being able to force the fact described by its
conclusion to hold whenever every fact described by its premises holds.
There might be an important distinction between accepting an inference
and accepting the corresponding conditional, in the sense that one can accept
the former while rejecting the latter (see e.g. Field [2006]; Zardini [2007c]).
As should be clear, I am understanding the dualist as someone who, in our
original case, not only rejects the conditional that, if all the members of Y
hold, so do all the members of Z, but also refuses to infer the conclusion
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that all the members of Z hold from the premise that all the members of
Y hold. As opposed to her rejection of the conditional, her rejection of the
inference is what she shares with a non-dualist non-transitivist. Still, I want
to understand her rejection of the inference as grounded in her rejection of the
conditional. Her rejection of the conditional must then be understood in a
suitably strong sense, as implying some kind of possibility of the antecedent’s
holding and the consequent’s failing.
Under a certain extremely plausible assumption, this dualist position does
in effect require restrictions on the transitivity of consequence, at least if fail-
ure to yield non-vacuous effects is to be allowed when an argument is applied
to a set of logically contingent facts. For, whenever a restriction on the non-
vacuous effects of the application of the laws of logic to some non-empty
set of logically contingent facts described by the premises ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕi
is envisaged (so that the inference to the conclusion ψ, which follows from
them, is rejected), the jth premise must itself be in the transitive closure of
the consequence relation to some non-empty set Γj whose members describe
non-logical facts. This is so because, even if not every logically contingent
fact is non-logical (consider for example the fact that something is white), it
is extremely plausible to assume that every logically contingent fact is ulti-
mately grounded in a non-logical fact in such a way as to follow from it (here
I won’t try though to justify this assumption). If transitivity were then to
hold unrestrictedly, ψ would already follow from Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ Γ2 . . . ∪ Γi. Since
however the members of this set all describe non-logical facts, there would
be no dualist bar to the application of the laws of logic having non-vacuous
effects, and so the fact described by ψ would be forced to hold as well.
Interesting as such a dualist position may be, it is crucial to see that a non-
transitivist is not committed to it—indeed, that versions of non-transitivism
are committed to the negation of its tenet that, to take a single-premise case,
χ might follow from ψ even if it is not the case that, if the fact described
by ψ holds, so does the fact described by χ (this might be so when the fact
described by ψ in turn only holds because ψ follows from another sentence ϕ
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describing a non-logical fact that holds). For a non-transitivist may well hold,
against the dualist, that the laws of logic apply with non-vacuous effects to
whichever facts turn out to hold: such a non-transitivist would accept that,
if the fact described by ψ holds, no matter on what grounds, so does the fact
described by χ.
Switching from facts-talk to truth-talk, in the situation envisaged the du-
alist denies that, even though χ follows from ψ, it must be the case that, if
ψ is true, so is χ. The non-dualist non-transitivist, on the contrary, accepts
that. This should however not obscure a deeper point of agreement between
the two positions. For reflect that, in a non-transitive framework, the dual-
ist can be seen as doing one thing by means of a quite different one. That
is, to come back to the last example, she can be seen as rejecting a com-
mitment to a consequence (χ) of what she is logically committed to (ψ) by
maintaining that it is not the case that, if ψ is true, so is χ (she is logically
committed to ψ because it follows from ϕ, to which she is committed on
non-logical grounds). Even if a non-transitivist can disagree with the latter,
she cannot but agree with the former, since the rejection of being commit-
ted to a consequence of what she is logically committed to is arguably the
crux of her disagreement with the transitivist, the place at which their differ-
ent metalinguistic judgements about validity are finally reflected in a clash
of object-linguistic attitudes (in this case, the transitivist’s acceptance of χ
against the non-transitivist’s non-acceptance of χ). A non-transitivist need
not disagree with the transitivist as to whether, if ψ is true, so is χ, but she
has to disagree with the transitivist’s willingness to undertake a commitment
to χ’s being true on the sole basis of her logical commitment to ψ’s being
true.
It should by now be clear that—in opposition to the dualist—a non-
dualist non-transitivist can legitimately insist on not explaining her position
in terms of some deviant conception of the relation between the truth of ψ
and the truth of χ (such that it is not the case that, if ψ is true, so is χ),
just as someone who rejects the law of excluded middle need not explain
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her position in terms of a deviant (e. g. gappist) conception of the relation
between the truth of a sentence and the truth of its negation (e.g. such that
it might be the case that neither a sentence nor its negation are true), or just
as someone who rejects disjunctive syllogism need not explain her position
in terms of a deviant (e. g. dialetheist) conception of the relation between
the truth of a sentence and the truth of its negation (e.g. such that it might
be the case that both a sentence and its negation are true). As in all those
other cases, the heart of the logical revisionism being proposed is a certain
conception of what counts as a correct pattern of reasoning rather than a
certain deviant conception of what truth is. The thought that truth, its
properties and laws is what consequence is all about (see e.g. Frege [1893],
pp. XV–XVI) only risks making unintelligible the point of these proposals.
5.4.2 Logical Nihilism and Non-Transitivism
Still, regarded now as a proposal as to what counts as a correct pattern of rea-
soning, non-transitivism may look perilously close to a logical nihilism which
rejects the universal validity of all the argument forms that are the last coor-
dinate of a sequence lacking the left-transitivity property (of course, even in a
non-transitive logic not every argument form is usually such). For take with-
out loss of generality single-conclusion arguments a0, a1, a2 . . . ai such that
a0, a1, a2 . . . ai−1 are of forms F0, F1, F2. . .Fi−1 and ai of form Fi, and such
that the relevant instance of (Tl) fails for them. Then 〈F0,F1,F2 . . .Fi〉 lacks
the left-transitivity property. Consider then a non-transitivist who accepts
on non-logical grounds all the premises Γ of a0, a1, a2 . . . ai−1 and accepts (on
non-logical or logical grounds) the premises Λ of ai which are not conclusions
of any of a0, a1, a2 . . . ai−1. Such a non-transitivist would then have to accept
all the premises Λ,Θ of ai. Yet, given the foregoing explanation of what the
non-transitivist regards as a correct pattern of reasoning, she need not re-
gard herself as committed to the conclusions Ξ of ai. How could she then still
maintain that ai is valid, given that she accepts all its premises but refuses
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to infer its conclusions? Is her refusal to infer the conclusions not an im-
plicit admission that she does not regard ai as valid (and thus that she does
not regard Fi, which is instantiated by ai, as a universally valid argument
form)? Note how these questions are particularly pressing for a non-dualist
non-transitivist, since she cannot help herself to the dualist doctrine that it
is not the case that, if every premise of ai is true, so is some conclusion of ai,
doctrine which would certainly go some way towards explaining the refusal
to infer the conclusions of ai.
Before addressing these urgent questions, note that nihilism, as against
dualism, is not a possible option for a non-transitivist, at least in the following
sense. It might well be that all of the nihilist, the dualist and the non-dualist
non-transitivist accept all the premises Γ of a classically valid argument a of
form F while refusing to infer its conclusions ∆. The dualist might do this
because, even though she recognizes a as valid, she regards some coordinate
of Γ as describing a logical fact, and so she rejects that, if every coordinate of
Γ is true, so is some coordinate of ∆ (and refuses to infer ∆ from Γ). The non-
dualist non-transitivist might do this because, even though she recognizes a as
valid and accepts that, if every coordinate of Γ is true, so is some coordinate
of ∆, she still refuses to infer ∆ from Γ (on grounds which we will explore
shortly). The nihilist, however, refuses to infer ∆ on the very simple grounds
that she does not regard F as a universally valid argument form and that,
in particular, she regards its instance a as invalid. She thus cannot regard
a as involved in a possible failure of the transitivity of consequence, as the
dualist and the non-dualist non-transitivist do. Nihilism is an alternative to
non-transitivism, not one of its species.
To come back to the question as to how a (non-dualist) non-transitivist
can recognize as valid an argument whose premises she accepts and whose
conclusions she does not accept, we must observe that the connection, pre-
supposed by this question, between recognizing an argument as valid and
inferring the conclusions if one also accepts its premises is much less straight-
forward than it might seem at first glance. One can recognize an argument
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as valid and accept its premises while still not inferring its conclusions be-
cause one is somehow prevented by external circumstances from doing so
(by a threat, a psychological breakdown, a sudden death etc.). Or because
one fails to recognize, maybe on account of their syntactic complexity, that
the premises (conclusions) are indeed premises (conclusions) of an argument
one recognizes as valid. Or because one has a general policy of not infer-
ring conclusions, maybe for the reason that one has been told by one’s guru
that every inference is sacrilegious. Or maybe because one simply cannot be
required to infer all the conclusions of all the arguments one recognizes as
valid and whose premises one accepts—this is certainly not a requirement
on resource-bounded rationality, and, unless each and every single truth is
an aim of belief, it is not clear why it should even be a requirement on
resource-unbounded rationality.
The previous counterexamples may seem to trade on “deviant” cases.
Still, unless a plausible independent characterization of “deviancy” is pro-
vided (a highly non-trivial task), the objection against the non-transitivist
would seem to lose much of its force—why should non-transitivism be itself
classified as one of the “deviant” cases (which we know from the forego-
ing counterexamples generally to exist)? Be that as it may, stronger, only
slightly more controversial counterexamples can be given where there is ac-
tually epistemic force against the inference’s being drawn:
VANN Vann may be told by a source he is justified to trust that, if Vann’s
initial is ‘V’, then Vann is a horribly bad modus-ponens inferrer (which
does not imply that Vann is horribly bad at recognizing the validity
of modus-ponens arguments). Vann may also know that his initial
is ‘V’. In these conditions, there would plausibly be epistemic force
against Vann’s inferring the conclusion that he is a horribly bad modus-
ponens inferrer, even though Vann may recognize the validity of the
relevant instance of modus ponens—plausibly, it would be unwarranted
to believe that one is a horribly bad modus-ponens inferrer exactly via
5.4. THE NON-TRANSITIVIST’S PICTURE 209
a modus-ponens inference.19
DAVID Sincere and modest David might believe of each of the 1,000 sub-
stantial statements of his new history book that that statement is
true—if sincere David didn’t really believe a statement to be true, why
would he have put it in the book in the first place? Together with
the certainly true assumption that those are all the statements in his
book, it follows that all the statements in David’s book are true. David
recognizes the argument as valid, yet there is epistemic force against
modest David’s inferring the conclusion that all the statements in his
book are true.20
19Note in passing that this counterexample can easily be turned into a counterexample
against the prima facie very plausible closure principle that “knowing p1, . . . , pn, compe-
tently deducing q, and thereby coming to believe q is in general a way of coming to know
q” (Williamson [2000b], p. 117; cf Hawthorne [2004], p. 33). Thanks to Daniele Sgaravatti,
Martin Smith and Crispin Wright for discussion of this and similar examples.
20This counterexample is of course a version of the preface paradox (see Makinson
[1965] and Christensen [2004] for a recent congenial discussion). The counterexample is
even more telling given the relationships between probabilistic reasoning and some kinds of
non-transitive deductive consequence relations remarked upon in fn 7. As Crispin Wright
has emphasized to me in conversation, there is an important asymmetry between the
counterexample, which crucially relies on the fact that there is epistemic force against
accepting the conjunction of all the premises, and some application of non-transitivity,
where one would wish not just to accept all the premises, but also their conjunction (more
or less equivalently, one would wish not only to accept of every premise that it is true, but
also to accept that every premise is true). (Indeed, this is why in sections 4.5.7, 4.5.8 I
went to some length to show that CIIT1 and NDCIIT1 have the nice feature that the
consistency in them of the (finite) axiomatic base of a theory T implies the consistency in
them of the conjunction of the axioms of T .) The point of the counterexample is however
only to show that there can be epistemic force against an inference’s being drawn even if
the argument is recognized as valid and all its premises are accepted. The source of this
epistemic force inDAVID is such that it only applies to multi-premise arguments, whereas
the source of the force in some application of non-transitivity will evidently not carry this
restriction (Harman [1986], pp. 11–20 is the locus classicus for the problematization of the
connection between validity and inference).
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These counterexamples are certainly sufficient to open up conceptual
space for a genuinely non-transitivist (rather than logical nihilist) position.
Still, more needs to be said by way of a positive explanation of the refusal
to draw an inference when an argument is recognized as valid and all its
premises are accepted (at least, more needs to be said if one wants to avoid
giving the explanation that the dualist gives). Moreover, a doubt now arises
as to the very point of non-transitivism: if a story needs to be told any-
way in order to vindicate the rationality of accepting all the premises of an
argument recognized as valid while refusing to infer its conclusions, could
such a story not be applied in a transitive framework, recognizing, say, that,
since, [for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ entails ∆, ϕ and Λ,Θ entails Ξ], Λ,Γ does
entail ∆,Ξ, and accepting Λ,Γ, while refusing to infer ∆,Ξ? Such a doubt
would certainly be pressing at least for intermediate and strong applications
of non-transitivity.
The situation which seems to be emerging is this. The non-transitivist
needs to differentiate between the acceptance-related normative property of
being N0 (which triggers the normative force of consequence once all the
premises of an argument recognized as valid are N0) and the acceptance-
related normative property of being N1 (which consequence so generates
with respect to the conclusions of the argument), in such a way that be-
ing N1 need not in turn imply being N0 (and so in such a way that the
acceptance-related normative property of being N0 need not be closed under
logical consequence). Such a distinction between acceptance-related norma-
tive properties would allow the non-transitivist to insist that, in the cases
where she accepts all the premises of an argument recognized as valid while
refusing to infer its conclusions, this is so because the premises are only N1
and not N0. It would also allow her to reply to the awkward question of
the last paragraph by saying that, since Λ,Γ are N0, if consequence were
transitive, ∆,Ξ would have to be N1 and so she would after all be com-
mitted to accepting it (since x-is-N1 would arguably have to be at least so
strong as to imply one-is-committed-to-accepting-x). To the identification of
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the acceptance-related normative properties of being N0 and of being N1 we
must now turn.
5.4.3 The Normativity of Consequence
Let us go back without loss of generality to the situation where the non-
transitivist accepts ϕ for non-deductive reasons,21 accepts both that ψ follows
from ϕ and that χ follows from ψ but does not accept that χ follows from ϕ.
I say that, in such a situation, her non-transitivism is sufficient to save her
from a commitment to accepting χ. The simple logical point that, in a non-
transitive logic, it need not follow that, if ϕ is true, so is χ, has already been
expounded in the rebuttal of the objection from truth preservation. It is now
time to see how the non-transitivist can escape in general a commitment to
accepting χ, whether via the previous conditional or any other route. To
see this consider that, quite plausibly, one has deductive reasons22 to accept
no more than the consequences of what one has non-deductive reasons to
accept,23 and our non-transitivist only has non-deductive reasons to accept
ϕ. Since ψ is indeed a consequence of ϕ, and since she has non-deductive
reasons to accept ϕ, she has indeed deductive reasons to accept ψ, and so she
is indeed committed to accepting ψ.24 However, χ need not be a consequence
21Henceforth, by ‘having non-deductive reasons to accept ϕ’ and its like I really just
mean ‘having reason to accept or accepting ϕ not because conclusion of a deductively
valid argument all of whose premises one has reason to accept or accepts’—acceptance for
non-deductive “reasons” need not be objectively well-grounded at all.
22Henceforth, by ‘having deductive reasons to accept ϕ’ and its like I really just mean
‘having reason to accept ϕ because conclusion of a deductively valid argument all of whose
premises one has non-deductive reasons to accept’ (see fn 21).
23Note that this principle can quite generally be held to exhaust the normative force
of consequence (at least as far as the aspects we are concerned with here go), no matter
whether the underlying consequence relation is transitive or non-transitive (see below in
the text).
24This last step should make clear that, to simplify the discussion, I am assuming that
the relevant (non-deductive or deductive) reasons to accept a certain sentence are always
so strong as to imply a commitment to accepting that sentence.
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of ϕ (at least, if consequence is non-transitive!), and so she needs not be
committed to χ simply because she has non-deductive reasons to accept ϕ
(even though she is committed to ψ and has non-deductive reasons to accept
that, if ψ is true, so is χ!).
Drawing on the foregoing implicit distinction between having non-
deductive reasons to accept and having deductive reasons to accept, I sug-
gest that we identify the acceptance-related normative properties of x-is-
N0 and x-is-N1 with one-has-non-deductive-reasons-to-accept-x and one-has-
deductive-reasons-to-accept-x respectively. I take it that this distinction has
some very intuitive appeal and import in our evaluation of reasons: we would
ordinarily distinguish between one’s reasons to accept a certain sentence be-
ing so strong as to permit (or even mandate) acceptance of whatever follows
from that sentence and one’s reasons to accept a certain sentence being simply
strong enough as to permit (or even mandate) acceptance of that sentence.
In the former case, one’s reasons allow (or even mandate) one to take the
sentence as a starting point for further reasoning, whereas in the latter case
they only allow (or even mandate) one to take the sentence as a terminal
point of acceptance (see Smith [2004], pp. 196–9 for a defence of this dis-
tinction within a transitive framework). In the lights of the remarks already
made in fn 7 and in connection to DAVID, it should go without saying
that the distinction also makes perfectly good probabilistic sense.25 Neither
acceptance-related normative property implies actual acceptance, whilst be-
ing actually accepted implies both being N0 (see fn 21) and being N1 (from
fn 21, (NDD) (see below) and reflexivity of consequence—indeed, by reflex-
ivity of consequence and (NDD), being N0 itself implies being N1). This is so
because both acceptance-related normative properties pertain to what ought
to be the case rather than to what is the case.
25Indeed, in the case of the strong application of non-transitivity to the sorites paradox,
I actually think that the fact that, in a sense to be made more precise, vague belief exhibits
probabilistic structure is the grain of truth in the thought (for which see Field [2000]; Field
[2003b]; Schiffer [2003], pp. 178–237; Wright [2007a]) that vague belief is essentially a kind
of partial belief.
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In such a distinction between acceptance-related normative properties, we
see how a trace of non-logical/logical dualism does necessarily remain in the
non-dualist non-transitivist’s position: only, the distinction is not between
two different kinds of facts, but between two different kinds of reasons for
the acceptance of a sentence—either non-deductive or deductive. In view of
this distinction, the non-dualist non-transitivist can be seen not as endorsing
the rather exotic restriction to non-logical facts of the non-vacuous effects of
the application of the laws of logic, but as adhering unswervingly both to the
verdicts of validity and invalidity issued by her non-transitive logic and to
the general principle introduced two paragraphs back that the commitments
generated by the laws of logic on a certain position (a collection—set, multi-
set, sequence etc.—of sentences accepted for non-deductive reasons) coincide
with the logical consequences of that position. That is, if one has non-
deductive reasons to accept a certain collection of sentences, one is indeed
committed by logic and those very same reasons to accepting each and every
consequence of them, but also committed only to that (at least by logic
and those very same reasons), so that, if logic is non-transitive, one is not
committed by logic and those very same reasons to accepting a consequence
of a consequence of one’s position which is not already a consequence of
one’s position (such, as it were, “consequences at one remove” of course do
not exist if logic is transitive, but they do if it isn’t).
It is crucial to see that, as I have already indicated in fn 23, this ba-
sic principle governing consequence can be accepted by non-transitivists and
transitivists alike as exhausting its normative force (at least as far as the as-
pects we are concerned with here go), and can be fleshed out as the following
principle of connection between having non-deductive reasons to accept and
having deductive reasons to accept :
(NDD) Consequence only maps non-deductive reasons to accept a collection
of sentences (the premises) onto deductive reasons to accept a collection
of sentences (the conclusions).
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Note that, pending any further specification of the properties of the con-
sequence relation, (NDD) does not imply that consequence in turn maps
deductive reasons to accept a collection of sentences onto deductive reasons
to accept a collection of sentences. In other words, pending any further
specification of the properties of the consequence relation, while (NDD) does
imply that the normative force of consequence applies to premises accepted
for non-deductive reasons, producing deductive reasons to accept (and hence
commitments to accepting) the conclusions, it does not imply that such a
force applies to premises one has simply deductive reasons to accept. In-
deed, the non-transitivist can be seen as exploiting exactly the fact that,
by itself, (NDD) does not imply the stronger principle of preservation of
deductive reasons to accept :
(DD) Consequence maps deductive reasons to accept a collection of sentences
(the premises) onto deductive reasons to accept a collection of sentences
(the conclusions).
In particular, the non-transitivist can be seen as accepting (NDD) while
rejecting (DD): on her view, one need not be committed to accepting conse-
quences of commitments generated by logic.26
Let me stress that the restriction operated by (NDD) (as against (DD))
of the normative force of consequence to premises accepted for non-deductive
reasons will actually be far less draconian than it might at first appear to be
for many interesting non-transitive consequence relations. Firstly, many such
relations do enjoy unqualified transitivity properties (as defined in section
4.2.3) for a large number of argument forms. Restricted to such argument
26(NDD) and (DD) are closure principles, in the sense that they say what one has
reasons to do (accept or reject certain collections of sentences) given that one has reasons
to do something (accept or reject certain collections of sentences). By contrast, (AR) in
section 4.4.1 is a coherence principle, in the sense that it says what one has reasons not
to do (accept or reject certain collections of sentences) given that one has reasons to do
something (accept or reject certain collections of sentences).
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forms, (NDD) will imply (DD). Secondly, even if an argument form does not
enjoy an unqualified transitivity property, for many interesting intermedi-
ate and strong applications of non-transitivity the counterexamples will be
circumscribable to a very specific class. Restricted to arguments outside of
this class, (NDD) will still imply (DD) (where consequence will be material
rather than formal). For example, in the case of the strong application of
non-transitivity to the sorites paradox pursued in chapter 4, (NDD) will still
imply (DD) restricted to the good classical arguments (see section 2.1). As I
have already indicated, these can be roughly identified with those arguments
which do not fallaciously exploit tolerance principles to go down the slippery
slopes associated with vague predicates. Thus, in the case of the strong ap-
plication of non-transitivity to the sorites paradox, the acceptance-related
normative property triggering the normative force of consequence can be
taken to be the weaker one-has-non-soritical-reasons-to-accept-x rather than
the stronger one-has-non-deductive-reasons-to-accept-x.
It seems to me that, in her joint acceptance of (NDD) and rejection of
(DD), the non-transitivist is occupying a reasonable position, given that the
following theorem holds for every reflexive consequence relation:
Theorem 5.4.1. (NDD) implies (DD) iff the consequence relation is tran-
sitive.
Proof.
• Left-to-right. We prove the contrapositive and focus without loss of
generality on failure of left transitivity. Take a reflexive non-transitive
consequence relation L such that, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ `L ∆, ϕ and
Λ,Θ `L Ξ, but Λ,Γ 0L ∆,Ξ, and consider an intermediate application
of L by a subject s having non-deductive reasons only to accept Γ and
Λ.27 s’s intermediate application of L is such that s does not accept
27Throughout this proof, in order to avoid excessive verbal clutter, I will sometimes let
context disambiguate whether a sequence is accepted “conjunctively” (in the fashion of
premises) or “disjunctively” (in the fashion of conclusions).
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∆,Ξ, even though she does accept, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ. In
such a situation, (NDD) only requires from s that she accept, for every
ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ (since, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), Γ `L ∆, ϕ)—it does not
require from s that she accept ∆,Ξ (since Λ,Γ 0L ∆,Ξ). Therefore, s
satisfies (NDD). However, in such a situation, (DD) does require from
s that she accept ∆,Ξ. For, having non-deductive reasons to accept Γ,
by (DD) s has deductive reasons to accept (and hence is committed to
accepting), for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ), ∆, ϕ (since, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ),
Γ `L ∆, ϕ). By the additional principle of semicolon-agglomeration of
commitments to accepting “disjunctively”:
(SACD) If, for some function seq from sentences to sequences, for every
ψ ∈ ran(Π) (with Π = χ0, χ1, χ2 . . .), one is committed to accept-
ing “disjunctively” seq(ψ), ψ, then one is committed to accepting
“disjunctively” seq(χ0), seq(χ1), seq(χ2) . . . ,Π
;
(where ‘;’, unlike ‘,’, denotes a right-conjunctive structural punctuation
mark28 and Π† the result of substituting † throughout as the structural
punctuation mark of Π), s is committed to accepting “disjunctively”
∆,∆,∆ . . . ,Θ;. Hence, by (Wr), s is committed to accepting “disjunc-
tively” ∆,Θ;.29 Since s is also committed to accepting “conjunctively”
Λ (having non-deductive reasons to accept “conjunctively” Λ), by the
28A structural punctuation mark † is right-conjunctive iff [Γ ` ∆ † ϕ iff [Γ ` ∆ and
Γ ` ϕ]]. Needless to say, the usefulness of a right-conjunctive structural punctuation mark
derives from its ability to allow us to mimic conjunctive operations over sentences of a
language which may well lack a conjunctive operator.
29The use of (Wr), a particular rule of contraction, is required in the proof only because,
truth be told, our very official statements of left- and right-transitivity (Tl) and (Tr) are
not as pure as one might wish but still encapsulate a mild form of contraction in their
failure of letting (Γ and) ∆ vary depending on the value of ‘ϕ’. In view of the complexities
that general precise statements of left- and right-transitivity free of any form of contraction
would involve, I have however settled for sparing these to the reader as quite inessential
to almost every point made in this essay and for only mentioning them on this occasion
just to say that (Wr) would not be needed were they assumed in lieu of (Tl) and (Tr).
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additional principle of monotonicity of commitment to accepting “dis-
junctively” over implication of commitment to accepting :
(MCDIC) If commitment to accepting (“conjunctively”) Π0,Π1 implies
commitment to accepting (“disjunctively”) Σ0, then commitment
to accepting “conjunctively” Π0 implies that commitment to ac-
cepting “disjunctively” Σ1,Π
;
1 implies commitment to accepting
“disjunctively” Σ1,Σ0,
we have that s is committed to accepting “disjunctively” ∆,Ξ (since the
fact that Λ,Θ `L ∆,Ξ together with the reflexivity of L, (NDD) and
(DD) allows us to detach the main consequent of the relevant instance
of (MCDIC)). Therefore, s does not satisfy (DD). Hence, (NDD) does
not imply (DD), otherwise s could only satisfy the former by satisfying
the latter.
• Right-to-left. By cases. Take a reflexive non-transitive consequence
relation L and suppose that, for every ϕ ∈ ran(Θ0), a subject s has
deductive reasons to accept ϕ. This can be so:
(i) Either because s has non-deductive reasons to accept ϕ (so that,
by reflexivity of L and (NDD), s has deductive reasons to accept
ϕ);
(ii) Or because Γ `L ϕ, where Γ 6= ∅ and s has non-deductive reasons
to accept Γ (so that, by (NDD), s has deductive reasons to accept
ϕ);
(iii) Or because ∅ `L ϕ (so that, by (NDD), s has deductive reasons
to accept ϕ).
These are all the possible cases assuming, very plausibly, that it is
not possible that, if ∅ 0L ϕ, [Γ is such that, for all (some) of its
coordinates ϕ0, s has only deductive reasons to accept ϕ0, namely that
ϕ0 follows from premises Γ0, and that Γ0 is in turn such that, for all
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(some) of its coordinates ϕ1, s has only deductive reasons to accept
ϕ1, namely that ϕ1 follows from premises Γ1, and that Γ1 is in turn
such that, for all (some) of its coordinates ϕ2, s has only deductive
reasons to accept ϕ2, namely that ϕ2 follows from premises Γ2. . . ]:
in other words, the relation x-but-not-y-is-a-coordinate-of-a-sequence-
which-gives-s-deductive-reasons-for-y must be well-founded on the field
of logically contingent sentences. This yields that, if ∅ 0L ϕ, each
deductive reason s has to accept ϕ must ultimately be traceable back
in a finite number of steps to an original sequence of premises Γi every
coordinate of which s has non-deductive reasons to accept. Hence,
given (Tl), we have that Γi `L ϕ. Letting Γ = Γi, this finite-chain case
is finally reduced to case (ii).
Now, suppose also that Θ0 `L Ξ. Let Θ1 be the sequence obtained from
Θ0 by replacing each coordinate falling under case (ii) but not under
case (iii) with one of its associated Γ 6= ∅ s has non-deductive reasons
to accept and by deleting each coordinate falling under case (iii). Then,
s has non-deductive reasons to accept all the coordinates of Θ1 and, by
(Tl), Θ1 `L Ξ just as well. Hence, (NDD) gives s deductive reasons to
accept Ξ.
Indeed, given that (DD) straightforwardly implies (NDD) no matter
whether the consequence relation is transitive or not as long as it is re-
flexive (since non-deductive reasons to accept imply then deductive reasons
to accept), theorem 5.4.1 can be strengthened to the effect that [(NDD) is
equivalent with (DD) iff the consequence relation is transitive]. In view of
this, it seems to me that the non-transitivist can reasonably insist that the
pure principle, free of any assumption concerning formal properties of conse-
quence, which represents its normativity (normativity which is the same for
non-transitivists and transitivists alike) is (NDD) rather than (DD), (DD)
being associated with such normativity only because equivalent with (NDD)
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under the (rejected) assumption of transitivity.30 Hence, even though a non-
transitive logic is naturally hospitable to a certain “softening” of the nor-
mative force of consequence, this does not mean that no important require-
ment is placed by non-transitive consequence on rational beings. Indeed, as
theorem 5.4.1 shows, the requirement placed by non-transitive consequence,
(NDD), is just what becomes of the traditional requirement (DD) once the
assumption of the transitivity of the consequence relation is dropped.
Before proceeding further, an absolutely essential feature of this dialectic
must be made clear. (DD) is in effect a principle of closure of having deduc-
tive reasons to accept under logical consequence. Why then cannot one apply
in this case a strategy analogous to the one we used in order to uphold in a
non-transitive framework the necessity of truth preservation for consequence,
which is in effect a principle of closure of truth under logical consequence? In
the case of truth and of the other properties we considered in section 5.3.2,
it was observed that there seem to be bridge principles linking the languages
talking about these properties and the original language L0 claimed to be
non-classical, principles which force the logic of the former languages to be
30I should stress that, while it is clear that intermediate and strong applications of non-
transitivity require rejection of (DD), it is much less clear that there is any interesting
application of non-transitivity which does accept (DD). For a simple case study, consider a
non-transitivist who assumes a sequence 〈F0,F0,F1〉 to lack the left-transitivity property
only if there can be no objectively well-grounded commitment to accept all the premises
of an argument whose form is F0 (being e.g. motivated to do so by the desire of blocking
CONTRADICTION via a non-transitivist strategy). (DD) (together with reflexivity
of consequence and (NDD)) would still force on her the claim that, if one is committed
to ‘ϕ and it is not the case that ϕ’, one is also committed to ψ, which seems to sit very
uncomfortably with her claim that ψ does not follow from ‘ϕ and it is not the case that ϕ’.
Note though that something akin to (DD) could actually be rescued from this perspec-
tive by replacing ‘deductive reasons’ with ‘objectively well-grounded deductive reasons’
in it: since, from this perspective, the only cases where a sequence 〈F0,F0,F1〉 lacks the
left-transitivity property are those where there can be no objectively well-grounded com-
mitment to accept all the premises of an argument whose form is F0, (DD) would be
trivially satisfied in such cases (and satisfied in all other cases of consequence).
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itself non-classical. No such principle seems to govern properties like one-
has-deductive-reasons-to-accept-x and, more generally, there does not seem
to be any reason why the language L1 talking about this property should
exhibit the same problematic features which motivated a deviance from clas-
sical logic for L0. Even for an intuitionist, for example, the language talking
about which sentences of a standard quantified arithmetical language the
members of a finite community of mathematicians have deductive reasons to
accept may well be classical.
Moreover, even if the logic of L1 were non-transitive, (DD) would still
be unacceptable for most non-transitivists. Suppose that a subject s has
non-deductive reasons to accept ϕ, and that ψ follows from ϕ and χ from ψ.
Suppose also that the sequence featuring as coordinates the forms of these
two arguments (from ϕ to ψ and from ψ to χ) lacks the left-transitivity
property, so that, qua non-transitivists, we would wish to avoid imputing
to s any commitment to accepting χ, despite her having (non-deductive)
reasons to accept ϕ. Now, by (NDD), we can infer that s has deductive
reasons to accept (and hence is committed to accepting) ψ. But reflect that
the satisfaction of s’s commitment to accepting ψ requires s to treat ψ in
a certain way (at the least, very roughly, to assent to ψ if queried under
normal circumstances). Crucially, such a way is also sufficient to establish
s’s commitment to ψ independently from s’s having non-deductive reasons
to accept ϕ together with (NDD). This means that there will typically be
not only deductive reasons to believe that s is committed to accepting ψ
(namely, those provided by s’s having non-deductive reasons to accept ϕ
together with (NDD)), but also non-deductive reasons to believe so (namely,
those provided by the observation of s’s behaviour). More precisely, there will
be such reasons whenever s in fact satisfies her commitment to accepting ψ.
Having non-deductive reasons both to accept that s is committed to accepting
(and hence, possibly by reflexivity of consequence and (NDD), has deductive
reasons to accept) ψ and to accept (DD), we would thus be committed to
believing that s has deductive reasons to accept (and hence is committed to
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accepting) χ! (Of course, the argument propagates forward to any conclusion
connected with χ through a chain of valid arguments.)
Actually, a very general lesson can be extracted from the main turn of the
previous argument. Say that a proposition is non-deductively inaccessible for
a subject s at time t iff its truth does not imply the availability for s at t of
any non-deductive reason to believe it. What the previous argument shows is
that even an intermediate application of non-transitivity with respect to two
arguments a0 and a1 made by a subject s at time t requires the propositions
expressed by the conclusions of a0 to be non-deductively inaccessible for s at
t. This squares nicely with the joint acceptance of (NDD) and rejection of
(DD) typical of intermediate applications of non-transitivity: for what these
imply is that whether or not the normative force of consequence applies to a
subject’s acceptance of a sentence should depend on the sentence’s pedigree
(non-deductive or deductive) in the subject’s epistemic history, whereas lack
of non-deductive inaccessibility precisely obliterates any distinction which
might be drawn at that level.
5.4.4 The Asymmetry between Premises and Conclu-
sions
Exploiting the distinction just unearthed, the left-hand and right-hand sides
of a sequent can then be interpreted in a non-transitive framework as express-
ing a connection between what we have non-deductive reasons to accept and
what we have deductive reasons to accept (which does not of course rule
out that, independently, we also have non-deductive reasons to accept it:
reasons-based acceptance can be overdetermined). This distinction has sub-
stance for transitivists and non-transitivists alike: there is a perfectly good
sense in which I have non-deductive reasons to accept that snow is white
but have simply deductive reasons to accept that either snow is white or
grass is blue. It should thus actually be common ground that consequence
can indeed fail to preserve non-deductive reasons to accept, and that it only
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guarantees that, if one has non-deductive reasons to accept all the premises,
one has deductive reasons to accept the conclusions.
Within this common ground, the debate on transitivity can then be un-
derstood as follows. The non-transitivist can be seen as thinking that con-
sequence can fail to preserve deductive reasons to accept. She can thus be
seen as focussing on the common-ground property of consequence of guar-
anteeing deductive reasons to accept given non-deductive reasons to accept,
whilst the transitivist can be seen as focussing on the further (alleged) prop-
erty of consequence of simply preserving deductive reasons to accept. The
non-transitivist thinks that consequence guarantees a connection between
the two different acceptance-related normative properties of being N0 and
of being N1, whilst the transitivist thinks that it also preserves the single
acceptance-related normative property of being N1.
As a result of this, the non-transitivist’s position can be summarized by
the slogan that it takes more than being on the right-hand side of a valid
sequent whose left-hand side coordinates are all accepted to figure as (one of
the coordinates of) the left-hand side of a valid sequent whose other left-hand
side coordinates are all accepted in such a way as to commit one to the latter
sequent’s conclusions. Sentences accepted qua conclusions of valid arguments
all of whose premises are accepted may just not have the right pedigree to
enter in turn as premises into further valid arguments possessing normative
force: this peculiar relevance of the premises’ pedigree to the normative force
of a valid argument is where deductive non-transitive reasoning comes closest
to inductive probabilistic reasoning. I suggest that this epistemic asymmetry
between premises and conclusions standing in the consequence relation is the
core of the non-transitivist’s position.
It is worth noting that, parallel to the epistemic distinction between hav-
ing non-deductive reasons to accept and having deductive reasons to accept,
a similar distinction can be drawn at the metaphysical level between truth
simply in virtue of how the world is and truth in virtue of how the world
is and the laws of logic. The left-hand and right-hand sides of a sequent
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can then equally legitimately be interpreted in a non-transitive framework
as expressing a connection between what is true simply in virtue of how the
world is and what is true in virtue of how the world is and the laws of logic
(which does not of course rule out that, independently, it is also true simply
in virtue of how the world is: truth can be overdetermined). This distinction
too has substance for dualists and non-dualists alike: there is a perfectly
good sense in which it is true simply in virtue of how the world is that snow
is white, but it is true in virtue of how the world is and the laws of logic
that either snow is white or grass is blue. It should thus actually be common
ground that consequence can indeed fail to preserve truth simply in virtue
of how the world is, and that it only guarantees that, if all the premises are
true simply in virtue of how the world is, some conclusion is true in virtue
of how the world is and the laws of logic.
The dualist can then be seen as thinking that consequence can also fail
to preserve truth in virtue of how the world is and the laws of logic. She can
thus be seen as focussing on the common-ground property of consequence of
guaranteeing truth in virtue of how the world is and the laws of logic given
truth simply in virtue of how the world is, whilst the non-dualist (either
transitivist or non-transitivist) can be seen as focussing on the further (al-
leged) property of consequence of simply preserving truth in virtue of how
the world is and the laws of logic. The dualist thinks that consequence guar-
antees a connection between two different metaphysical properties, whilst the
non-dualist thinks that it also preserves a single metaphysical property.
5.4.5 The Locality of Non-Transitive Consequence
In the peculiar joint acceptance of (NDD) and rejection of (DD) we see in
which sense the requirement placed by a non-transitive logic might typically
be “local”, extending only so far as the consequences of sentences accepted for
non-deductive reasons go rather than stretching to cover every consequence of
any sentences one is committed to accepting for whichever reasons. Indeed, to
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pursue this suggestive spatial metaphor31 even beyond the normative aspects
of consequence, the non-transitivist’s picture of the logical space is the rather
unusual one which sees the space of consequences of a given point (that is,
of a given collection of sentences) as being bounded by a horizon: there are
bounds to what is logically necessary in relation to a given point which are not
generally such in relation to themselves and to some other points included in
the same original horizon, so that a movement inside the horizon can result in
a movement of the horizon itself. Needless to say, this picture goes precisely
against the more traditional picture of the logical space (inspiring the view
of consequence as a closure operation introduced in fn 16) which sees the
space of consequences of a given point as being bounded by a frame: there
are bounds to what is logically necessary in relation to a given point which
stretch so far as to be such also in relation to themselves and to all other
points included in the same original frame, so that no movement inside the
frame can result in a movement of the frame itself.
The picture that has emerged is then as follows. From the non-
transitivist’s perspective, at least as espoused in intermediate and strong
applications of non-transitivity, the effects of consequence are peculiarly lo-
cal: consequence manages to constrain the truth value of sentences only, as it
were, at one remove. Again, to stress, this need not be because consequence
in turn fails to impose a truth-preservation constraint on the sentences whose
truth values have been so constrained (unless one is a dualist)—rather, it is
because the application of such a constraint somehow fails to generate anal-
ogous effects. Rather than being manifested in the rejection of a law (i.e. a
proposition) of truth preservation under logical consequence (unless one is a
dualist), endorsement of the idea that consequence fails to constrain further
truth values is thus manifested in the non-transitivist’s pattern of attitudes
of acceptance and non-acceptance (i.e. in her conforming or not to certain
rules of acceptance and non-acceptance).32
31Suggested to me in conversation by Crispin Wright.
32Compare with the idea that consequence manages to guarantee the connection be-
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The general condition which is thought by non-transitivists to trigger
such a situation of merely local effects of consequence can very abstractly be
thought of as one where transitivity would create spurious connections. To go
back to the examples of applications of non-transitivity of section 5.2, in the
case of relevance, transitivity would create a spurious meaning connection
between sentences which have none (even though they are the opposite ex-
tremes of a chain of genuinely connected sentences); in the case of tolerance,
transitivity would create a spurious indiscriminability connection between
sentences which have none (even though they are the opposite extremes of
a chain of genuinely connected sentences); in the case of probabilistic rea-
soning, transitivity would create a spurious evidential connection between
sentences which have none (even though they are the opposite extremes of a
chain of genuinely connected sentences). In all these cases, transitivity would
obliterate a non-trivial distance structure which non-transitivists think is in-
duced by consequence (possibly together with a theory) on a set of sentences,
inflating local connections between these into global ones.
5.4.6 Non-Transitivist Theories, Situations and
Worlds
It is in view of this asymmetry that, in a non-transitive framework and under
a certain assumption to be introduced shortly, two different readings of the-
oretical notions defined using the notion of closure under logical consequence
must be sharply distinguished as being non-equivalent (in this section, for
simplicity’s sake, we assume monotonicity and return to taking sets to be the
terms of the consequence relation and to restricting our attention to single-
conclusion arguments). Notions so defined can be seen as having at their
tween being the case and being determinately the case. Rather than being manifested in
the acceptance of a law stating that, for every P , if P , then determinately P (which would
spell disaster in its contrapositive form), that idea is manifested in one’s pattern of atti-
tudes of acceptance and non-acceptance, e.g. in her conforming to the rule of [accepting
‘Determinately, ϕ’ whenever one accepts ϕ].
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core the notion of a theory, defined as being any set of sentences closed un-
der logical consequence. The rationale for the theoretical interest of a notion
which, in virtue of the closure clause, outruns that of a mere set of sentences
should be evident in view of the normativity of consequence. One has non-
deductive reasons to accept a set of sentences X. By (NDD), one has thereby
deductive reasons to accept (and hence is committed to accepting) not only
X, but also the set of all the consequences of X. The objects of commitment
are thus always closed under logical consequence in the specified sense. But
theories are traditionally thought precisely to be the objects of commitment:
theories are what people are traditionally thought to hold, defend, attack,
revise, try to confirm etc.
Under the simplifying assumptions made at the start of this section, we
can identify positions (introduced in section 5.4.3) with arbitrary sets of sen-
tences; the theory of a position is then the closure under logical consequence
of that position (let us denote by ‘thrL’ the function from positions to the-
ories under the consequence relation L). A theory T is prime iff, whenever
‘ϕ or ψ’ belongs to T , either ϕ or ψ belongs to T : primeness is the prop-
erty of a theory to provide a witness for each of its assertions. A theory T
is maximal iff, for every ϕ, either ϕ or ‘It is not the case that ϕ’ belongs
to T : maximality is the property of a theory to settle every question. A
prime theory represents a situation, a maximal theory a world ; ϕ is true* in
a situation (true* in a world) iff ϕ belongs to the theory representing that
situation (world). Call the logic under which a theory is closed ‘target logic’,
the logic of the language talking about theories ‘background logic’.
What do non-transitivist theories, situations and worlds look like? There
is no reason to think that the language talking about the logical consequences
of sets of sentences of a language L should exhibit the same problematic
features which motivate a deviance from classical logic for L . It behoves us
then to consider the case where the background logic is classical. Under this
assumption, two readings of the phrase ‘The theory of a position is the closure
under logical consequence of that position’ must be sharply distinguished as
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being non-equivalent:
(i) The theory of a position P is the set of the logical consequences of P .
(ii) The theory of a position P is the smallest set T such that:
(a) T contains all the logical consequences of P ;
(b) If ϕ is a consequence of T , ϕ ∈ T .33
Under the assumption of transitivity of the background logic, the notion de-
livered by reading (ii) is clearly too strong even for intermediate applications
of non-transitivity, since it will force the theory of a position—that to which
one is committed—to contain sets of sentences which are not logical conse-
quences of the position (this inadequacy of reading (ii) should come as no
surprise given that it in effect amounts to an obliteration of the asymmetry
between premises and conclusions which we have seen in section 5.4.4 to be
crucial to intermediate and strong applications of non-transitivity).
Again, as in the case of (NDD) and (DD), it seems to me that, in her
use of reading (i) rather than reading (ii), the non-transitivist is occupying a
reasonable position, given that the following theorem holds for every reflexive
consequence relation (see fn 34):
Theorem 5.4.2. Reading (i) implies reading (ii) iff the consequence relation
is transitive.
Proof.
• Left-to-right. We prove the contrapositive and focus without loss of
generality on failure of left transitivity. Take a reflexive non-transitive
consequence relation L such that, for every ϕ ∈ Y , X `L ϕ and Z ∪
Y `L ψ, but Z ∪X 0L ψ, and consider a position P = Z ∪X. Reading
33That is, the glb under ⊆ of the class of sets satisfying (a) and (b); that is, the set T0
such that ϕ ∈ T0 iff, for every T1 satisfying (a) and (b), ϕ ∈ T1.
228 CHAPTER 5. FOLLOWING-FROM AND TRANSITIVITY
(i) dictates that ψ /∈ thrL(P ) (since Z ∪X 0L ψ), whereas reading (ii)
dictates that ψ ∈ thrL(P ) (since it dictates that Y ⊆ thrL(P ), and
Z ∪ Y `L ψ).34
• Right-to-left. Take a transitive consequence relation L. Let thr(i)L
and thr(ii)L be the functions corresponding respectively to readings
(i) and (ii), and consider an arbitrary position P . Suppose that ϕ ∈
thr(ii)L(P ). We aim to prove that P `L ϕ. We do so by first defining
by transfinite recursion the following hierarchy of positions:
(i′) P0 = {ϕ : P `L ϕ};
(ii′) Pα+1 = Pα ∪ {ϕ : Pα `L ϕ};
(iii′) Pλ =
⋃
({Pα : α < λ}).
Note that, since the language is finitary, by the well-ordering of the
ordinals there will be a (not very big) first ordinal κ at which the
process stabilizes and no new sentences are admitted as consequences—
that is, for every α > κ, Pα = Pκ. Consider then the set Pκ+1. Pκ+1
satisfies (a), since P0 ⊆ Pκ+1. Pκ+1 also satisfies (b), since Pκ+2 = Pκ+1.
Moreover, Pκ+1 is the smallest set to do so. For suppose that ϕ ∈ Pκ+1
and T satisfies (a) and (b). We prove by transfinite induction that, for
every α ≤ κ+ 1, Pα ⊆ T :
(i′′) Since, by (a), {ϕ : P `L ϕ} ⊆ T , P0 ⊆ T ;
(ii′′) If Pα ⊆ T , since, by (b), {ϕ : Pα `L ϕ} ⊆ T as well, Pα+1 ⊆ T ;
(iii′′) If, for every α < λ, Pα ⊆ T , then
⋃
({Pα : α < λ}) ⊆ T as well.
Thus, since ϕ ∈ Pκ+1, ϕ ∈ T . Being Pκ+1 the smallest set to satisfy
(a) and (b), it follows that Pκ+1 = thr(ii)L(P ). We can now prove by
transfinite induction that, given the transitivity of L, if ϕ ∈ thr(ii)L(P )
34The assumption of reflexivity of L is needed in order to ensure that Z ⊆ thrL(P ) as
well as Z ⊆ P .
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(ϕ ∈ Pκ+1), then P `L ϕ. We do so by proving by transfinite induction
the more general result that, for every α ≤ κ + 1, if ϕ ∈ Pα, then
P `L ϕ:
(i′′′) If ϕ ∈ P0, then P `L ϕ;
(ii′′′) If ϕ ∈ Pα+1, then ϕ ∈ Pα ∪ {ϕ : Pα `L ϕ}, and so:
(a′) Either ϕ ∈ Pα, in which case, by the induction hypothesis,
P `L ϕ;
(b′) Or ϕ ∈ {ϕ : Pα `L ϕ}, in which case, since, by the induction
hypothesis, for every ψ ∈ Pα, P `L ψ, by (Tl) P `L ϕ as well;
(iii′′′) If ϕ ∈ Pλ, then, for some α < λ, ϕ ∈ Pα, and so, by the induction
hypothesis, P `L ϕ.
The proof is completed by observing that, since P `L ϕ, ϕ ∈ thr(i)L(P )
as well.
Indeed, given that reading (ii) straightforwardly implies reading (i) no
matter whether the consequence relation is transitive or not (since, given
(a), it is trivial that [ϕ ∈ thr(i)L(P ) only if ϕ ∈ thr(ii)L(P )]), theorem 5.4.2
can be strengthened to the effect that [reading (i) is equivalent with reading
(ii) iff the consequence relation is transitive]. In view of this, it seems to
me that the non-transitivist can reasonably insist that the pure notion, free
of any assumption concerning formal properties of consequence, which plays
the complex role usually assigned to the notion of a theory (role which is
the same for non-transitivists and transitivists alike) is the one expressed
by reading (i) rather than the one expressed by reading (ii), the latter being
associated with such role only because reading (ii) is equivalent with (i) under
the (rejected) assumption of transitivity
Once reading (i) is distinguished as the appropriate notion to use when
the target logic is non-transitive, the theory of theories can proceed very
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much as before (see e. g. Barwise and Perry [1983], pp. 49–116). For our
purposes, we only need to note the following concerning situations. A prime
theory N with a non-transitive target logic L representing a certain situation
may be such that ψ ∈ N , ψ → χ ∈ N but χ /∈ N (such will be the case
consider for example in tolerant logics). The situation thus represented would
be one where a conditional and its antecedent are true*, but the consequence
is not. At a glance, this may of course look like an unwelcome consequence,
since L may actually be such that the rule of modus ponens holds in full
generality (as it does in tolerant logics). Even worse, if the law of excluded
middle also holds unrestrictedly in L (as it does in classical tolerant logics),
given N ’s primeness we would have that ‘It is not the case that χ’ ∈ N !
However, it should by now be clear that, analogously to the cases discussed in
section 5.3.2, these consequences are due to the choice of adopting a transitive
background logic in the theory of theories. This choice imposes that the link
between the technical notion of truth* in a situation (and of truth* in a
world) and the informal and philosophical notion of truth in a situation (and
of truth in a world) be at best very complex and mediated.
Again, the point can be illustrated with reference to more well-known
deviations from classical logic. Consider a classical theory C of a prime
intuitionist theory I formulated in language I . C entails that the situation
i represented by I is actually such that, for every ϕ ∈ I , either ϕ is true*
in i or ϕ is not true* in i (even though, of course, being the target logic
intuitionist, it need not be the case that, for every ϕ ∈ I , either ϕ ∈ I
or ‘It is not the case that ϕ’ ∈ I). Such a conclusion would be repugnant
given what would seem to be the most natural theory of truth in a situation
available to an intuitionist (namely one such that ϕ’s being not true in a
situation implies that ϕ is false in that situation and so that ‘It is not the
case that ϕ’ is true in that situation).
If a non-transitive logic is adopted as background logic, however, things
change drastically and reading (ii) becomes again a viable option for inter-
mediate and strong applications of non-transitivity. Indeed, the following
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theorem concerning preservation of truth* in a situation becomes available,
at least for those applications of non-transitivity which (like the strong ap-
plication of tolerant logics to the sorites paradox) do not require failures of
transitivity for standard definitional reasoning:
Theorem 5.4.3. If the background logic L0 is non-transitive, reading (ii)
allows for the construction of a theory T with a non-transitive target logic
L1 representing a situation s such that, if X `L1 ϕ, then truth* in s is
preserved from X to ϕ.
Proof. Given that we are only concerned with applications of non-transitivity
which do not require failures of transitivity for standard definitional reason-
ing, it suffices to observe that the following argument only requires transi-
tivity in that area. Suppose that X `L1 ϕ and that every member of X is
true* in s. Then, by definition of truth* in s, it follows that X ⊆ T . From
this, X `L1 ϕ and reading (ii), it follows that ϕ ∈ T , which in turn entails,
by definition of truth* in s, that ϕ is true in s as well.
On the other hand, going back to the theory N discussed two paragraphs
back, reading (ii) no longer has the unwelcome consequence of declaring that
χ ∈ N . For, in a non-transitive background logic, that χ ∈ N does not
follow from set theory, reading (ii), ϕ’s belonging to N , ϕ → ψ’s belonging
to N and ψ → χ’s belonging to N .
5.5 Conclusion
Appealing as it is, the non-transitivist solution to the sorites paradox requires
an extended philosophical discussion of what sense there is to be made of a
rational being who reasons using a non-transitive logic. This chapter has no
doubt been only a first stab at meeting that pressing request in its general-
ity. We have seen how this task involves dealing with some of the hardest
232 CHAPTER 5. FOLLOWING-FROM AND TRANSITIVITY
problems at the interface between the philosophy of logic and the theory
of rationality: the connection between structural rules and the very nature
of the premises and conclusions of an argument (and of their acceptance or
rejection); the relation between deductive and non-deductive consequence
relations; the relation between consequence and inference; the relation be-
tween consequence, preservation of truth and preservation of other epistemic
properties; the normativity of consequence; the relation between premises
and conclusion of a valid argument; the nature of the object of logical com-
mitment; the problem of theorizing about how all this behaves in a certain
logic by using a different one etc. From a wider perspective, I hope that the
foregoing investigations about how non-transitivity impinges on these and
other issues have helped to see them in a new, more general light, and that
the conceptualizations made and the distinctions drawn will prove fruitful
also in the examination of the philosophical foundations of other logics. As
far as the more specific purposes of this essay are concerned, I take these
investigations, applying as they do in particular to tolerant consequence re-
lations, to provide a solid philosophical basis to the non-transitivist solution
to the sorites paradox, solution which is in my view the best one available to
the naive theory of vagueness defended in this essay. Within the restricted
focus of this essay, it remains to be seen whether and how this machinery can
be brought to bear on a non-inferential counterpart of the sorites paradox.
In the next chapter, I will offer a mainly negative answer to this question,
answer which will ultimately allow us to explain nicely within the naive the-
ory the phenomenon of vagueness which has so far stayed impenetrable to
it—borderlineness.
Chapter 6
Forced March in the Penumbra
6.1 Introduction and Overview
Oftentimes, a ‘Yes’/‘No’-answer to a ‘Yes’/‘No’-question is not warrantedly
available from one’s current epistemic state. Both by replying ‘Yes’ and by
replying ‘No’ one would be returning a verdict which would not be warranted
by the lights of one’s overall epistemic situation. Such would be a ‘Yes’/‘No’-
answer, I take it, to the question as to whether the number of electrons in
the universe is odd. If one were to reply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to such a question, one
would be judging1 something for which no epistemic (ie, very broadly, truth
conducive) support is available—since, epistemically, a serious judgement
(as opposed to a conjecture, or supposition, or phantasy etc.) does require
some positive epistemic support or other, one would thus be doing something
unwarranted and be consequently criticizable.
To be sure, the criticism would still be (at least immediately) purely intel-
1Throughout, I will use ‘judge’ and its like more or less interchangeably with ‘believe’
and its like, with a preference for the former when emphasizing the “act” aspect of the
relevant mental event (for example, when talking about the mental events in some sense
expressed by speech acts such as answers) and a preference for the latter when emphasizing
the “state” aspect of the relevant mental event.
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lectual—it would only (at least immediately) concern how well one is doing
in one’s role as inquirer (searcher of truth), not how well one is doing in
one’s overall personal life. Even with respect to one’s intellectual life, the
criticism would only be straightforwardly licensed by the consideration of the
judgement as candidate for being part of the final good one should strive for
in one’s intellectual life—the judgement could still constitute a precious in-
strumental good to that very same end (consider a situation where an answer
is elicited on pains of a sudden and certain death). An overall intellectual
criticism, let alone an all-things-considered criticism, would thus surely need
to take into account further aspects of the inquirer’s total situation before
being issued properly. Yet, the restricted intellectual criticism would remain
in any case, and, other things being equal, could not but extend to an over-
all intellectual and indeed all-things-considered criticism. In the following,
the use of normative and evaluative vocabulary is to be understood in the
restricted intellectual sense.
Fortunately, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ are not the only two answers available to
a ‘Yes’/‘No’-question. The simple case just considered indicates the avail-
ability of a fall-back answer, which does not take a stand on the first-order
question as to whether P , but simply reflects the inquirer’s inability to re-
turn a warranted first-order verdict either way: ‘I can’t say’, interpreted
as implying that the inquirer neither is warranted in judging that P nor is
warranted in judging that it is not the case that P . In many cases, such
a fall-back seems to be readily available, allowing the inquirer to preserve
her intellectual integrity : ‘Did Socrates sneeze on his 28th birthday?’, ‘Is the
continuum hypothesis true?’, ‘Is abortion permissible?’—‘I can’t say’. It is
then natural to conjecture that the fall-back is always so available, and thus
that life is relatively easy even for a non-omniscient subject (a searcher of
truth, an inquirer). Granted, her view may be widely covered by the veil of
ignorance—still, even in these unfortunate circumstances, if she is reflective
enough, she can live up to any challenge posed by a ‘Yes’/‘No’-question by
returning a warranted verdict relevant to the dialectical situation in which
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the question is asked: ‘I can’t say’.2 Not even the most cunning dialectical
opponent could rob her of her intellectual integrity. Or could he?
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 undertakes a
couple of qualifications and refinements necessary before our leading question
can be properly examined. Drawing on results from two quite different areas,
section 3 shows how no simple-minded version of the preservation of one’s
intellectual integrity can be upheld and develops an elaborate version thereof.
Taking inspiration from a case widely discussed in the contemporary debate
on vagueness, section 4 introduces a major difficulty for the elaborate version
and argues that no happy-face solution to it succeeds. Section 5 proposes
an unhappy-face solution to the difficulty, tests its fruitfulness by applying
it to another area and uses the materials introduced by it to reconstruct,
within the traditional approach and more specifically within the rejection
of the existence of strong borderline cases, a notion of a borderline case
which accounts for the phenomenon of borderlineness. Section 6 draws the
conclusions which follow from the overall dialectic for the connection between
tolerance and borderlineness from the standpoint of the theory of vagueness
defended in this essay.
2Something along these lines (with focus on knowledge) is arguably presupposed for
example in the medieval practice of obligatio (see Dutilh-Novaes [2007], pp. 145–214),
where, roughly, starting from an initial proposition accepted for the sake of argument, one
is confronted sequentially with a series of propositions, each of which one has either to
accept or to reject or to doubt (if one has not to distinguish senses because of the presence
of an ambiguity) while preserving consistency. If a proposition is logically independent
from one’s previous commitments, one is supposed to [accept it iff one knows it to be true]
and [reject it iff one knows it to be false]. In such a case, one is presumably supposed to
be knowledgeable about one’s ignorance if one decides to doubt the proposition. If so, it
is in effect presupposed that, for every proposition P , one either knows that P or knows
that it is not the case that P or knows that one does not know whether P . Thanks to
Stephen Read for introducing me to the intriguing world of obligationes.
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6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 A Simple-Minded Conjecture and Innocent
Questions
Of course, ‘warrant’ and ‘ ‘I can’t say’ ’ are not much more than place-holders
in the foregoing considerations. Letting ‘E’ stand schematically for any sig-
nificant epistemic property, the general form of the previous unqualified and
simple-minded version of the conjecture is:
(US) For every ‘Yes’/‘No’-question Q, if neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’ would be an
E answer to Q for subject s at time t, then ‘Neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’
would be an E answer to Q for me now’ would be an E answer to Q
for s at t.
Let me stress from the very beginning that conditions like (US) (and its suc-
cessors to come) will always be meant only as a first approximate attempt
at stating a non-trivial sufficient condition for the preservation of one’s in-
tellectual integrity in the face of dialectical or theoretical challenges.3 The
concept of intellectual integrity is (unsurprisingly!) very complex, and the
simple letter of the conditions to be considered may well fall short of cap-
turing a real sufficient condition, allowing for deviant satisfaction. This is
why in the following I will often take care of enriching the condition under
discussion according to the specific demands which seem to be placed by
the concept of intellectual integrity in a particular dialectical or theoretical
context. It will also be one of the main points of my positive proposal that
3I am using ‘dialectical’ to refer to the task of defending a view against other views,
‘theoretical’ to refer to the task of determining which view is true (see Pryor [2004] for a
recent interesting case-study investigation of this distinction). In this sense, there plausibly
are dialectical norms which are not theoretical norms and vice versa. As indicated in the
text, I will be interested in the issue of the preservation of one’s intellectual integrity in both
dialectical and theoretical contexts, offering arguments which, given their insensitivity to
this distinction, concern both.
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nothing like these conditions is a necessary condition for the preservation of
one’s intellectual integrity in the face of dialectical or theoretical challenges.
Another crucial qualification, already implicit in the foregoing, must be
entered right at the outset. This concerns epistemic properties—such as
knowledge, reliability, externalist conceptions of warrant and justification
etc.—whose exemplification plausibly depends on conditions that are not
always subjectively detectable at least in their failure to hold. For any such
property of being E, of course, there is no hope for (US) to be true, as one
can easily imagine a situation where a subjectively undetectable condition
fails to hold and not only do the inquirer’s answers not exemplify Eness with
respect to the relevant proposition that P and its negation, but the inquirer
also mistakenly believes that P (mistakenly believes that it is not the case
that P ), and so returns a ‘Yes’ (‘No’) verdict which is not E. Given the
potential negative subjective undetectability of some necessary condition for
Eness’s exemplification, one might simply be tricked into such a situation.
Eness might for example be the property of being reliable with respect to
the proposition that the Tower of Pisa is straight, and one might be fed
(by perception, memory or testimony) false information—which seems by all
appearances to come from a reliable source—to the effect that the Tower of
Pisa is straight. One’s ‘Yes’-answer would then not be reliable.
However, such a possibility—even though sadly real—does little to en-
danger the ideal of intellectual integrity governing inquiry: false information
need not always carry its name on its sleeves, and, at least in some cases, one
might not be epistemically criticizable for taking it at face value. Indeed, as
should already be clear, falsity is not necessary for triggering answers lacking
Eness on the model of the above example: all that is needed is a piece of
information (truthful or otherwise) which might be taken by the inquirer to
support an E answer when in fact it does not (call any such piece of in-
formation ‘faulty ’). Eness might for example be the property of knowing
with respect to the proposition that the Tower of Pisa is crooked, and one
might be fed (by perception, memory or testimony) faulty (though truthful)
238 CHAPTER 6. FORCED MARCH IN THE PENUMBRA
information—which seems by all appearances to come from a knowledgeable
source—to the effect that the Tower of Pisa is crooked. One’s ‘Yes’-answer
would then not be knowledgeable.
We can conclude that the threat to an inquirer’s intellectual integrity
seems only to come from questions targeting propositions on which no faulty
information bears which may be possessed by the inquirer (call any such ques-
tion ‘innocent ’). Nothing as strong as (the false) (US) is needed to protect an
inquirer’s intellectual integrity from innocent questions—the simple-minded
conjecture can accordingly be qualified to:
(QS) For every innocent ‘Yes’/‘No’-question Q, if neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’
would be an E answer to Q for subject s at time t, then ‘Neither
‘Yes’ nor ‘No’ would be an E answer to Q for me now’ would be an E
answer to Q for s at t.
We can also hereafter stick to the use of ‘warrant’ and its like to stand
schematically for a wide range of significant epistemic properties, since, as
will be seen, the arguments to be considered are quite insensitive in this re-
spect. Indeed, they are at their strongest with broadly internalist properties,
which are the most plausible candidates for spelling out the requirement of
intellectual integrity which would be met were the corresponding instance of
(QS) true. In all cases, we will focus for simplicity’s sake on the “proposi-
tional” rather than the “doxastic” version of the relevant epistemic property
(see Firth [1978], p. 218 for the introduction of the distinction with respect
to warrant properly called and for an influential explication of it).
6.2.2 Saying ‘No’
Before starting our critical discussion, another crucial clarification needs to
be made. In a certain respect, the most natural setting for our problem—the
dialogical setting of questions and answers—brings in unnecessary complex-
ities. Presumably, answering ‘Yes’ to a question as to whether P in some
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sense expresses a judgement to the effect that P . However, it is rather doubt-
ful that an analogous situation holds for a ‘No’-answer—that is, it is rather
doubtful that answering ‘No’ to a question as to whether P in some sense
always expresses a judgement to the effect that it is not the case that P .
A ‘No’-answer would rather seem to express a rejection of the proposition
that P (see chapter 2, fn 7). The failure of the implication from a rejection
to the corresponding negative judgement is exemplified for discourses and
questions which are thought to reflect some kind of defectiveness, such as, on
some theories of vagueness and truth (see e.g. Field [2003a]; Field [2003b]),
questions asking whether a borderline red is red or whether the Liar sen-
tence is true4—for a less controversial example of such defectiveness, think
of a question asking whether it is the case that abracadabra. (Dialetheism,
as defended in Priest [2006a]; Priest [2006b], offers a counterexample to the
converse implication.)
Transposed into a reflective, non-dialogical setting, our problem would
concern the warrantability of the attitudes a thinker may eventually adopt
towards the proposition that P once she has become aware of the issue as to
whether P and has reflected on it. In such a setting, a ‘No’-answer to the
question as to whether P would have to be variously represented as either
an attitude of acceptance that it is not the case that P or as an attitude of
rejection of the proposition that P . In the following, I propose however to
stick to the vividness of the dialogical setting and to impose the following
conventions: a ‘No’-answer to a question as to whether P will be interpreted
restrictedly (as expressing a negative judgement that it is not the case that
P ), while an ‘I can’t say’-answer, unless otherwise specified, will be used as an
umbrella answer for expressing either a judgement to the effect that there is
no warrant for judging whether P or a rejection of the proposition that P . An
‘I can’t say’-answer expressing a warranted rejection of a certain proposition
4These theories’ treatment of higher-order borderline cases and of the semantic para-
doxes also belie the reduction of rejection that P to negative judgement that it is not true
that P (that ‘P ’ is not true).
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will also be understood among the legitimate satisfiers of (QS) (and, in the
following, of (E)) and, for simplicity’s sake, we will take a rejection of the
proposition that P to be warranted just in case the corresponding judgement
that the proposition that P should be rejected is warranted.
6.3 Can’t Say ‘Can’t Say’
6.3.1 Failure of Negative Transparency
Natural as it may be, (QS) comes immediately under pressure from at least
two different areas. In both cases, I will first present the argument as it arises
in relation to knowledge, since such a presentation is by far more familiar
and natural. I will then point out the modifications needed, if any, to adapt
the argument to the more general notion of warrant we are using.
The first area of pressure is constituted by the structural features illus-
trated by some of the counterexamples against the characteristic S5 axiom
for knowledge (if one does not know that P , then one knows that one does
not know that P ). One’s evidence might not suffice to know that P , and
still be quite close to be so sufficient, so close that one does not have enough
second-order evidence to know that the first-order evidence is so insufficient.
In this case, just as a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’-answer, an ‘I can’t say’-answer to the
question as to whether P would not be knowledgeable. The situation can be
illustrated by the following example:
JACOB Jacob is about to conduct an experiment but, given the poor status
of his knowledge of chemistry, is agnostic about its real bearing on the
question as to whether there is calcium in a sample of water, whereas
a positive result would actually come very close to settle the question
in the positive, with only a further minor check due for knowledge
to be delivered. Jacob is also agnostic as to whether he believes—on
the basis of this or other experiments—that there is calcium in the
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sample.5 If the experiment were then conducted yielding a positive
result, Jacob would still not know that there is calcium in the sample,
but he would also not know that he does not know, given his lack of
evidence concerning the real bearing of the experiment.
Suppose then that, after the experiment has been carried out with a
positive result, Jacob is asked whether there is calcium in the water sample.
As JACOB has been described, neither a ‘Yes’- nor a ‘No’-answer would be
knowledgeable, but neither would be in this case an ‘I can’t say’-answer (of
course, it would not be so even if interpreted as expressing rejection of the
proposition that there is calcium in the sample). An analogous point can be
made by substituting throughout the notion of being warranted for that of
knowing.6
6.3.2 Epistemic Paradox
Pressure against (QS) also comes from the area of the paradoxes of self-
reference, in particular from the epistemic paradoxes. Consider a modified
version of the Knower paradox (re-discovered in modern times by Kaplan
and Montague [1960]), with a sentence κ provably equivalent with ‘κ is not
known by Thomas’7 (where ‘know’ and its like are short for ‘know at some
5Assuming that (Jacob knows that) knowledge requires belief, this twist is needed in
order to foreclose Jacob the easy route to knowledge of his ignorance which goes through
knowledge of his lack of belief. The twist is not needed if the notion of being in a position
to know is used instead of the notion of knowing, nor is it needed if the operative notion
is that of being (propositionally) warranted.
6Many counterexamples against the characteristic S5 axiom for an epistemic opera-
tor crucially rely on the possession of faulty information on the part of the subject (see
e.g. Williamson [2000b], p. 23). JACOB shows that such reliance is dispensable.
7To keep things simple, in making this point I use ‘know’ and its like as predicates
of sentences (and subjects). This is of course in contrast with much traditional philo-
sophical thinking on this subject and, more generally, on the attitudes, which construes
propositional-attitude verbs either as predicates of non-linguistic propositions (and sub-
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time or other’, with suitable modifications under embeddings), and suppose
that Thomas is asked whether κ is known by Thomas.
(i) Suppose that Thomas is knowledgeable in saying ‘Yes’. Then he knows
that κ is known by Thomas. By factivity of the outermost (sentential-
operator) occurrence of ‘know’, κ is known by Thomas. Since by con-
struction κ entails ‘κ is not known by Thomas’, it follows that, by
factivity of knowledge (in the form ‘If ‘P ’ is known by ξ, then P ’), κ is
not known by Thomas. Contradiction (by structural contraction).
(ii) Suppose that Thomas is knowledgeable in saying ‘No’. Then he knows
that κ is not known by Thomas. Switching from the sentential-operator
reading to the sentence-predicate reading, ‘κ is not known by Thomas’
is known by Thomas. Since by construction ‘κ is not known by Thomas’
entails κ, it follows that, by closure of knowledge under logical conse-
quence (in the form ‘If ‘P0’, ‘P1’, ‘P2’. . . are all known by ξ, and they
entail ‘Q’, then ‘Q’ is known by ξ’),8 κ is known by Thomas. Contra-
diction (by structural contraction).
(iii) Suppose that Thomas is knowledgeable in saying ‘I can’t say’. Then
he knows that he does not know that κ is not known by Thomas.
Since by construction ‘κ is not known by Thomas’ is equivalent with
jects) or as term-indexed sentential operators (“connecticates”, as Prior [1971], p. 135
felicitously put it). I trust that this circumstance will not affect the substance of the
point I’m about to make, since the very same point could have been made just as well,
even though more clumsily, with a knowledge sentential operator together with the use
of a truth predicate, or of propositional quantification, or of non-standard quotation and
abbreviation. An analogous comment applies to the use of ‘warrant’ and its like below.
8Many authors reject this principle and accept only the weaker principle of closure of
knowledge under known logical consequence. If only this weaker principle is accepted, the
example must be enriched, here and elsewhere, with the further assumption that Thomas
knows that the entailments in question holds. Thanks to Stephen Read for pointing out
the need for this qualification, which will be left implicit for similar cases in the rest of
this chapter.
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κ, it follows that, by closure of knowledge under logical consequence
(sentence-predicate form), Thomas’s not knowing ‘κ is not known by
Thomas’ is equivalent with Thomas’s not knowing κ. Switching again
from the sentential-operator reading to the sentence-predicate reading
and using closure of knowledge under logical consequence (sentential-
operator form), Thomas knows that κ is not known by Thomas. The
argument to contradiction can then proceed as in (ii).
Again, neither a ‘Yes’- nor a ‘No’-answer would be knowledgeable, but
neither would be in this case an ‘I can’t say’-answer. Moreover, since the
argument in (iii) only exploits at the relevant places the formal property of
closure under logical consequence of ‘is known by Thomas’, and since this
property is plausibly exhibited also by ‘should not be rejected by Thomas’
(where ‘reject’ and its like are short for ‘reject at some time or other’, with
suitable modifications under embeddings), the argument in (iii) can still con-
clude to Thomas’s knowing that κ should be rejected by Thomas in case
Thomas’s answer ‘I can’t say’ expresses rejection (rather than ignorance)
of the proposition that κ is not known by Thomas. From there we cannot
of course argue as before (connecting immediately to (ii)), but we appeal
instead to the following constraint linking rejection and ignorance:
(RI) If ϕ should be rejected by a subject s, ϕ is not known by s
and argue as follows:
(iii′) Suppose that Thomas is knowledgeable in saying ‘I can’t say’. Then
he knows that ‘κ is not known by Thomas’ should be rejected by
him. Since by construction ‘κ is not known by Thomas’ is equiva-
lent with κ, it follows that, by closure of ‘should not be rejected by
Thomas’ under logical consequence, ‘κ is not known by Thomas’ ’s
having to be rejected by Thomas is equivalent with κ’s having to be re-
jected by Thomas. By closure of knowledge under logical consequence
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(sentential-operator form), Thomas knows that κ should be rejected
by Thomas. By Thomas’s knowledge of (RI) and closure of knowledge
under logical consequence (sentential-operator form), Thomas knows
that κ is not known by Thomas. The argument to contradiction can
then proceed as in (ii).
An analogous point can be made by substituting throughout the notion
of being warranted for Thomas for that of being known by Thomas and
undertaking the appropriate adjustments (where ‘warrant’ and its like are
short for ‘warrant at some time or other’, with suitable modifications under
embeddings). In particular, in (i) we can no longer appeal to factivity. We
thus assume the additional principles of harmony of warrant :
(HW) If ϕ is warranted for a subject s, ‘ ‘ϕ’ is not warranted for s’ is not
warranted for s
(in effect, a factivity principle for warrant restricted to ‘ ‘ϕ’ is not warranted
for s’-initial sentences) and of unwarrantability of absurdity :
(UA) If ϕ is absurd, ϕ is not warranted for any subject.
We also make use in all three cases of mild closure-under-logical-
consequence principles for warrant. We consider the sentence z which is
provably equivalent with ‘z is not warranted for Thomas’, and ask Thomas
whether z is warranted for him. (i) now goes into:
(i′′) Suppose that Thomas is warranted in saying ‘Yes’. Then he is war-
ranted in judging that z is warranted for Thomas. Since, by con-
struction z entails ‘z is not warranted for Thomas’, ‘z is warranted
for Thomas’ entails, by closure of warrant under logical consequence
(sentence-predicate form), ‘ ‘z is not warranted for Thomas’ is war-
ranted for Thomas’. By (HW), these are jointly absurd, and so, switch-
ing from the sentential-operator reading to the sentence-predicate
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reading, it follows that, by closure of warrant under logical consequence
(sentence-predicate form), an absurdity is warranted for Thomas. Con-
tradiction with (UA).
(ii), (iii) and (iii′) receive their natural modifications by substituting ‘warrant’
and its like for ‘know’ and its like. In the modification of (iii′), an analogue
of (RI) for ‘warrant’ must be used.
While refuting (QS), these kinds of examples also show the way to a
more acceptable version of a conjecture whose truth would guarantee the
preservation of an inquirer’s intellectual integrity. For reflect that, as far as
they have been described, both kinds of examples are compatible with an ‘I
don’t know that I know’-answer’s being knowledgeable. Of course, this is not
the end of the story as both kind of examples can be developed (or others be
produced) where not even such an answer would be knowledgeable, but the
spirit of the conjecture, allowing the inquirer to climb up as far as needed
the hierarchy of the relevant epistemic property, should be clear enough.
A satisfactory precise formulation of the conjecture would certainly re-
quire considerable subtleties. For example, we don’t want the requirement
of intellectual integrity to be so low that it can be met, with respect to the
question as to whether P , by the answer ‘I don’t know that [I know that P
and I know that it is not the case that P ]’. Such an answer would seem to
change the subject (from whether P to logic) rather than to address the orig-
inal question whether P and the challenge posed by it. Intellectual integrity
is no less jeopardized by a willful change of subject than by an unwarranted
answer—by so changing the subject, one would simply be cheating. A classi-
fication of states occurring in the hierarchy of warrant states into admissible
and inadmissible ones would thus seem to be necessary for a satisfactory for-
mulation of the conjecture. The task of stating such a classification appears
to be highly non-trivial. Fortunately, the problem I wish to discuss in the rest
of this chapter is wholly insensitive to this and other fine-tuning details, and
we can rest content with the following (rather promissory) elaborate version
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of the conjecture:
(E) For every innocent ‘Yes’/‘No’-question Q, for some Φ that stands for an
admissible state occurring in the hierarchy of warrant states, if neither
‘Yes’ nor ‘No’ would be a warranted answer to Q for subject s at time
t, then ‘Neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’ would be a Φ answer to Q for me now’
would be a warranted answer to Q for s at t
(note the order of the quantifiers here, which allows the value of ‘Φ’ to be a
function of the value of ‘Q’).
To see why (E) may be thought at least to stand a chance to deal ad-
equately and exhaustively with the problems just highlighted for (QS), it
is useful to think about the structurally similar situation arising within the
dominant approach to vagueness. Within this approach, for some object be-
tween the definite cases of Fness and the definite cases of non-Fness, (first-
order) vagueness determines that neither an ‘F ’-predication nor a ‘non-F ’-
predication should be accepted as definitely correct. The introduction of a
new category, borderline Fness, allows one to decide (i.e. definitely catego-
rize) some new cases which were not decidable by simply using the categories
of Fness and non-Fness. Still, higher-order vagueness determines that not
every case can be so decided. The introduction of a new category, border-
line borderline Fness, allows one to decide some new cases which were not
decidable by simply using the categories of Fness, non-Fness and borderline
Fness. And so on, in such a way that one might reasonably conjecture that
every case will become eventually decidable at some stage or other of the
hierarchy, given the richer categorical discriminations afforded by each new
stage. A structurally similar conjecture seems to be equally reasonable in
our situation, and such a conjecture is just what (E) in effect amounts to.9
However, reasonable as (E) may seem, we now turn to a case which puts
considerable pressure even on it.
9Thanks to Crispin Wright for intense questioning which led to this comparison.
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6.4 The Forced March
6.4.1 Setting
Consider a series of 1,000 pairwise indiscriminable colour patches, going from
clear red to clear orange. The patches are pairwise indiscriminable in the
sense that, given any pair of adjacent patches, no normal human subject
could detect, by unaided vision, any difference in colour between the two
patches when considering them in isolation from all other patches (either
sequentially or at the same time). Consider a normal human subject, Vicky,
who, under the best visual conditions, is forced to give her best judgement
sequentially on all the patches, starting from patch #1. Vicky may know
about all this situation, and so know that at least some of the indiscriminable
patches x and y could differ from one another at least in the sense of there
being another patch z in the series such that z is discriminable from x but
not from y (although the existence of such a patch is not guaranteed in the
series). Still, Vicky cannot detect, by unaided vision, any difference in colour
between any two adjacent patches when considering them in isolation from
all other patches. The question that she will be asked at each step is ‘Is this
patch red?’. Vicky’s aim is to give a warranted answer at each step of the
forced march.10
To this effect, she has available a wide range of answers, not necessarily
restricted to those allowed by (E): ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘I can’t say’, ‘It’s borderline’,
‘Yes and no’ etc.11 However, for the same reason as (E) requires a distinction
between admissible and inadmissible warrant states, we need to impose some
10The problem of vagueness actually entered in Western philosophy in something like
this forced-march setting (see the references in chapter 1, fn 9 for a presentation and
discussion of the sources). As far as I know, the forced march with its specific problems
has been introduced in the contemporary debate on vagueness by Sainsbury [1992] (see
Williamson [1994], pp. 8–27; Raffman [1994]; Raffman [1996]; Horgan [1994]; Tye [1994],
pp. 204–6; Soames [1999], pp. 203–27; Fara [2000]; Priest [2003]; Shapiro [2003]; Shapiro
[2006], pp. 1–44; Wright [2007c] for a representative range of approaches to the issue).
11Note that it is no real limitation to our inquiry into the possibility and limits of intel-
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minimal constraints on the answers available to Vicky, otherwise she would
be able to go through the forced march simply by answering e.g. ‘I’m hungry’
at each step. Clearly, such a willful change of subject would be just as bad as
an unwarranted answer as far as Vicky’s intellectual integrity is concerned—
by so changing the subject, Vicky would simply be cheating. To state the
constraints, we need a notion of an ordering of the propositions available to
Vicky as answers according to what intuitively is their informational strength.
Such an ordering will properly include the ordering of logical strength and
will be such that propositions entailing that the patch in question is red
(not red) are stronger than any other proposition save for those entailing
that the patch in question is not red (red). Fortunately, we can remain
rather vague on the rest, leaving it at the intuitive notion of the strength of
information carried by an answer (such that, for example, ‘It’s borderline’
carries a stronger information than ‘It seems borderline’, even though they
are logically independent), as nothing in our discussion will depend on the
further fine details of the ordering. I will use ‘strong*’ and its like to denote
it.
As I have already hinted at, it will be instructive to allow Vicky a wider
range of answers than that determined by (E), while placing some additional
constraints in order to capture what would suffice for the preservation of
Vicky’s intellectual integrity in relation to the peculiarities of the setting of
the forced march. I thus propose that we should require from forced-marched
Vicky satisfaction of the following complex condition:
(HAPPY) Vicky gives a warranted answer for each question, and does so by:
(CLEAR) Having ‘Yes’ as the strongest* answer available to her for
lectual integrity that we are not explicitly considering the possibility of answers expressing
attitudes which differ in degree or in kind from flat-out judgement (such as, say, interme-
diate degrees of confidence and puzzlement respectively). As will be seen, all the decisive
points in our dialectic can be more clumsily recast in such a way as to encompass this
wider range of possible answers (one of whose limit cases is deliberate silence). Thanks to
Crispin Wright for directing my attention to these possible alternative modes of answering.
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patch #1, and ‘No’ as the strongest* answer available to her for
patch #1, 000;
(MAX) Giving always an answer which is maximally strong* among
the answers warrantedly available to her;
(KEEP) Giving the same answer as long as her state warrants such an
answer and this is compatible with satisfaction of (MAX);
(COH) Not forming any unwarranted belief in the process as a conse-
quence12 of her answers (even if the belief were itself not expressed
by any of her answers).
On the one hand, (CLEAR) is uncontroversial13 and (COH) is also hardly
resistable: the integrity of an inquirer is arguably jeopardized as soon as she
is forced to form an unwarranted belief in her attempt to give an answer,
whether or not this belief is itself expressed by some of her answers ((COH)
will play a crucial role in the dialectic of sections 6.4.3, 6.4.4, 6.5.1). On the
other hand, (MAX) and (KEEP), despite their initial plausibility, may turn
out to be too demanding—I will assume them for the time being, coming back
in section 6.4.4 to the question of their correctness and of the consequences of
their rejection. Also, clearly the spirit (if not the letter, depending on how the
admissible/inadmissible distinction is finally spelled out) of (E) stands or falls
with (HAPPY) (or possibly with one of its weaker versions without (MAX)
or (KEEP) or either, depending again on how the admissible/inadmissible
distinction is finally spelled out). We can thus hereafter focus on (HAPPY)
and its weaker versions: in arguing that they do fall, we will have argued
against (E) as well.
12In the rational, rather than merely causal sense of ‘consequence’. Thanks to Crispin
Wright for pointing out the need for this qualification.
13Granted, it does ignore the possibility of Vicky’s having an answer e.g. for patch #1
which is logically stronger (and so stronger*) than ‘Yes’ (like ‘I know that patch #1 is
red’), but this is just for ease of exposition—the arguments to follow can be more clumsily
recast doing away with this simplification.
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6.4.2 Sequentially Inconsistent Judgements
By (CLEAR) and (MAX), Vicky must then answer ‘Yes’ for patch #1. Pre-
sumably, she will return the same (we may assume equally warranted) ver-
dict for patches #2, #3, #4 and quite a few others immediately following
these, all at least very similar in colour to a clearly red patch. However,
by (CLEAR), Vicky will not be warranted in returning the same verdict for
patch #1, 000. If she wants to achieve her aim, she must then return a dif-
ferent verdict at least for patch #1, 000. By classical logic, there will be a
first patch for which Vicky returns a verdict different from ‘Yes’. Indeed,
since, by (CLEAR), she will not be warranted in returning for patch #1, 000
any verdict which entails that patch #1,000 is red (as ‘I know that patch
#1,000 is red’ would be), she must return at least for patch #1, 000 a verdict
which does not entail that the patch in question is red, and so, by classi-
cal logic, there will be a first patch for which Vicky returns such a verdict
(hereafter, ‘different verdict’ and its like will usually be understood in this
stronger sense).
Presumably, she will return the same (we may assume equally warranted)
verdict she gave for patch #1, 000 also for patches #999, #998, #997 and
quite a few others immediately preceding these, all at least very similar in
colour to a clearly orange patch. So let us suppose without loss of generality
that the first patch for which Vicky returns a verdict different from ‘Yes’ is
patch #401 (and let us suppose that what would intuitively be described as
‘the borderline cases of redness’ in effect start in the neighbourhood of patch
#401, and end in the neighbourhood of patch #600). Thus, Vicky answered
‘Yes’ for patch #400 and something different for patch #401. The answer
for patch #401 need not be ‘No’: Vicky might answer ‘There’s no fact of the
matter’, or ‘I don’t know’, or ‘I don’t feel fully confident in saying ‘Yes’ ’ or
in a myriad other ways.
For a start, let us however investigate what would happen if Vicky were
to answer ‘No’ for patch #401. Then Vicky would in effect be judging patch
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#400 to be red and be judging patch #401 not to be red (note the wide scope
of ‘and’ here). But, for patches #400 and #401 as for any other two adjacent
patches, Vicky cannot detect any difference in colour between them when
considered in isolation from all other patches, and, more generally, cannot
appeal (using perception or any other source of warrant) to any difference
which she is warranted in taking to indicate a difference in redness.14 Hence,
Vicky is certainly not warranted in judging that [patch #400 is red and patch
#401 is not red] (note the narrow scope of ‘and’ here).15 Yet, Vicky could
14It is possible that there is a patch in the series that she could discriminate from
patch #400 but not from patch #401, but why should she take this to indicate that
patch #400 is red while patch #401 is not? (See Russell [1927], pp. 280–1; Russell
[1950], pp. 104–5; Goodman [1951], pp. 196–200; Burns [1986]; Burns [1991], pp. 124–
38 for relevant applications of this indirect-discrimination method and Dummett [1975a],
pp. 321–3; Wright [1975], pp. 351–60; Williamson [1990], pp. 82–7 for criticisms thereof.)
15Sainsbury [1990], pp. 259–60; Sainsbury [1992], pp. 181–3 puts forth the example of
an artist’s materials supplier who, having to arrange her red and yellow paints on just
two shelves (marked ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ respectively), places as the least red paint on the
‘red’-marked shelf a paint x which is pairwise indiscriminable from the reddest paint y
placed on the ‘yellow’-marked shelf (similar examples are given in Fara [2000], pp. 58–9).
It is claimed that the supplier is warranted in doing so. I agree that, given her situation
and purposes, the supplier is warranted in placing x on the ‘red’-marked shelf and y on the
‘yellow’-marked shelf, but reject as gratuitous the implication that she is also warranted
in judging x to be red and y to be yellow. This is not to deny of course that ‘red’
and ‘yellow’ are in general context-dependent predicates or that, against their communal
meaning, they might end up being used in the supplier’s shop in such a way that ‘x is red’
and ‘y is yellow’ are warranted for the supplier and her employees (just as an eccentric
English mathematician might use in her own idiolect ‘prime number’ in such a way that
‘4 is a prime number’ is warranted for her). I thus regard the point correctly made by the
example as rather irrelevant to Vicky’s situation.
Sainsbury [1992], pp. 181–3 puts also forth a more interesting example of a subject who
is forced to judge a whole series of patches not sequentially, but in a random order, ending
up with returning opposite verdicts for two adjacent pairwise indiscriminable patches.
Unfortunately, an analogous example can be produced by using a precise predicate like ‘at
least 20 ft tall’, where however the claim that the subject is warranted in returning opposite
verdicts for, say, two adjacent pairwise indiscriminable trees is clearly preposterous. In
view of this, I must confess that, without further supplementation, I don’t find any force in
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still be warranted both in judging patch #400 to be red and in judging patch
#401 not to be red if in this case warrant failed to collect over conjunction.
A suitably weak notion of warrant (as is most appropriate for our discus-
sion) might very well entail failures of collection over conjunction, for, on a
suitably weak construal, one is certainly warranted in believing, of each of
the 1,000 possessors of a ticket of a fair lottery, that she won’t win the lottery
(assuming, of course, no collateral information), even though one is equally
certainly not warranted in believing that none of them will win the lottery.16
the suggestion that, in Sainsbury’s example, the subject is warranted in returning opposite
verdicts for two adjacent pairwise indiscriminable patches. I’m indebted to Paula Milne
and Mark Sainsbury for discussions of these and similar cases.
16Actually, assuming conjunction to be a fixed-arity 2ary operation, I don’t accept the
implicit reasoning here. For I take it to be very plausible that ‘warranted’ is vague in
this context, in the sense that it is intuitively true that, if one is warranted in believing
that [[[. . . [x0 won’t win the lottery and x1 won’t win the lottery] and x2 won’t win the
lottery] and x3 won’t win the lottery] and x4 won’t win the lottery]. . . and xi won’t win
the lottery, one is also warranted in believing that [[[[. . . [x0 won’t win the lottery and x1
won’t win the lottery] and x2 won’t win the lottery] and x3 won’t win the lottery] and
x4 won’t win the lottery]. . . and xi won’t win the lottery] and xi+1 won’t win the lottery
(with x0, x1, x2. . .xi+1 possessors of a ticket). This is just a tolerance principle as to of
how many possessors one is warranted in believing that they won’t win the lottery: one
is certainly warranted in believing of one possessor that she won’t win the lottery, one is
certainly not warranted in believing of all the 1,000 possessors that they won’t win the
lottery, but of at most exactly how many possessors is one warranted in believing that
they won’t win the lottery?
Applying the naive theory of vagueness, the answer is that there is no such number,
the tolerance principle being true. Since, in this case, a counterexample to collection
will be something of the form ‘One is warranted in believing that [[[. . . [x0 won’t win the
lottery and x1 won’t win the lottery] and x2 won’t win the lottery] and x3 won’t win the
lottery] and x4 won’t win the lottery]. . . and xi won’t win the lottery, and one is warranted
in believing that xi+1 won’t win the lottery, but one is not warranted in believing that
[[[[. . . [x0 won’t win the lottery and x1 won’t win the lottery] and x2 won’t win the lottery]
and x3 won’t win the lottery] and x4 won’t win the lottery]. . . and xi won’t win the lottery]
and xi+1 won’t win the lottery’, the truth of any such counterexample would entail the
falsity of the tolerance principle. Hence, the naive theory entails that, in this case at
least, there is no such counterexample, and so that, in this case at least, collection is
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But how could collection fail in this case? In the lottery case, what we may
call the “epistemic uncertainty” of each conjunct (i.e. 1 minus its epistemic
probability, see Edgington [1992], p. 193) is amplified in the conjunction, so
as to reach at some point or other of the “conjoining” process a degree high
enough as to undermine any warrant in the resulting conjunction; in the
forced-march case, whatever epistemic uncertainty is present in each of the
two discriminating judgements is amplified only once. Is Vicky’s warrant for
each of the two discriminating judgements only ever so thin as to get lost at
the very first stage of the conjoining process? This is implausible. For the
series of patches might also change uniformly from big to small, and Vicky
judge patch #401 not to be big: there is a strong intuition that, if she is
warranted in judging patch #400 to be red and warranted in judging patch
#401 not to be big, she is also warranted in judging that [patch #400 is red
and patch #401 is not big].17 This shows that failure of collection, if such
there is, cannot be attributed to the weakness of one’s warrant, in significant
disanalogy to the lottery case.
It might be replied that the source of the failure of collection over con-
junction is rather the fact that ‘Patch #401 is not red’ is strongly (negatively)
probabilistically dependent on ‘Patch #400 is red’. Note that the appeal to
strong probabilistic dependence at this stage is anyways mandated. For re-
flect that, in the lottery case, the epistemic uncertainty of each conjunction is
valid. The naive theory can agree though that the case does present a counterexample
to collection once conjunction is interpreted as a variable-arity operation (in particular,
the counterexample would target collection over the 1,000ary conjunction saying that [x0
won’t win the lottery and x1 won’t win the lottery and x2 won’t win the lottery and x3
won’t win the lottery and x4 won’t win the lottery. . . and x1,000 won’t win the lottery]).
17This much is of course perfectly compatible with the relevant epistemic probabilities
obeying the classical laws of probability, and so with Vicky’s epistemic probability for
‘Patch #400 is red and patch #401 is not big’ being the product of her epistemic proba-
bilities for ‘Patch #400 is red’ and ‘Patch #401 is not big’ (Schiffer [1998]; Schiffer [2000];
Schiffer [2003], pp. 178–237 uses related but more problematic considerations to argue for
the revision of the classical laws of probability in the presence of vagueness-related partial
beliefs).
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only ever so slightly higher than the maximum of the epistemic uncertainties
of each conjuncts, while, in the forced-march case, as has just been argued,
the epistemic uncertainty of ‘Patch #400 is red and patch #401 is not red’
is very close to 1 (assuming e.g. that there are 200 equally reasonable can-
didates for being the cut-off point for redness in the series, and assuming a
plausible principle of indifference, it will be .995), and so considerably higher
than the maximum of the epistemic uncertainties of ‘Patch #400 is red’ and
‘Patch #401 is not red’. In order for failure of collection to be sustained,
this would require, in significant disanalogy to the lottery case (where only
a very weak negative probabilistic dependence obtains), that ‘Patch #400
is red’ and ‘Patch #401 is not red’ be strongly negatively probabilistically
dependent.
I am willing to concede here that it is plausible to set the conditional
epistemic probability of ‘Patch #401 is not red’ on ‘Patch #400 is red’ sig-
nificantly lower than the epistemic probability of ‘Patch #401 is not red’. A
simple model of this situation can be given by letting there to be 200 equally
reasonable candidates for being the cut-off point for redness in the series (say,
from patch #400 to patch #599), and setting to .5 the epistemic probability
for each such patch to be red. Then, for example, the epistemic probability
of ‘Patch #401 is not red’ is .5, while, assuming the same principle of in-
difference as in the last paragraph, the conditional epistemic probability of
‘Patch #401 is not red’ on ‘Patch #400 is red’ can be as low as .01 (thus
showing the strong negative probabilistic dependence of the former on the
latter), and so the epistemic probability of ‘Patch #400 is red and patch
#401 is not red’ can fall well below .25 (namely, as low as .005).
To be sure, one could contest the low assignment of conditional epistemic
probability; one could also contest both the model’s faithfulness to Vicky’s
situation and the claim that what is modelled is a failure of warrant to collect
over conjunction. While I think that these are legitimate worries and need
be addressed, what I would like to question here is rather whether there are
cases where ϕ and ψ are such that the conditional probability of the negation
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of the latter on the former is very high, and yet one is both warranted for
ϕ and warranted for ψ without being warranted for ‘ϕ and ψ’. Consider the
following case:
JOHANN AND JOSEPH Johann is an Italian citizen grown up in South
Tyrol, always speaking German and never learning Italian. Meet-
ing Johann at the airport, Joseph can gather some evidence that Jo-
hann is Italian by noticing that he’s flying back to Venice after what
have apparently been his holidays, and also gather some evidence that
he doesn’t speak Italian by seeing him reading a German newspa-
per. Pointing at Johann, Joseph’s conditional epistemic probability for
‘That man speaks Italian’ on ‘That man is Italian’ is very high, even
though Joseph’s epistemic probabilities for both ‘That man is Italian’
and ‘That man doesn’t speak Italian’ are not too low. Presumably, the
flimsy evidence available to Joseph is not sufficient to warrant him in
believing to be in the presence of the rather bizarre case of an Italian
who doesn’t speak Italian. But is Joseph nevertheless warranted both
in believing that Johann is Italian and in believing that he doesn’t
speak Italian? It seems clear that he isn’t, even though, given Joseph’s
state of information, the two new pieces of evidence may well defeat
both his antecedent warrant for believing Johann not to be Italian and
his antecedent warrant for believing Johann to speak Italian.
Consideration of this and similar cases invites some inductive scepticism
with regard to the hypothesized configuration of epistemic probabilities and
warrant. Note also that, even if the hypothesis should prove to be correct
for some other (presumably, rather exotic) cases, it would still have to be
argued in addition that the forced-march case can be assimilated to them in
the relevant respects.
These are however relatively minor niceties. For the simple and yet damn-
ing point is that Vicky’s pair of attitudes—belief that patch #400 is red, belief
that patch #401 is not red—draws a sharp distinction between patch #400
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and patch #401 for which Vicky has no warrant: for all Vicky can tell, an
analogous pattern of attitudes placing the sharp boundary in question rather
between, say, patch #401 and patch #402 would have been just as good
(or just as bad). It is important to note that the present point requires the
legitimacy of attaching the epistemic property of warrant (or lack thereof)
to a pattern of attitudes rather than to a single attitude: I believe that we
have a clear enough intuitive grasp of this wider range of attributions and,
in the following, will continue to work under this plausible assumption and
a broader understanding of (HAPPY) which makes its satisfaction sensitive
also to these issues.
Of course, there may be cases where arguably a pattern of attitudes is not
only such that each of the attitudes is warranted but is also itself warranted,
even though the single attitude towards the conjunctive content generated by
conjoining the contents of all the attitudes (see fn 16) is still not warranted—
lottery-paradox cases are arguably such. In this respect, our case is strikingly
different, as the lack of warrant is already present with the pattern of dif-
ferential attitudes towards adjacent patches, even without considering the
further possible single attitude arising from the conjunction of the contents
of these two attitudes. Moreover, note that the lack of warrant only im-
mediately attaches to the pattern of differential attitudes towards adjacent
patches rather than to either attitude considered singularly. For, at this
point of the dialectic, we can grant not only that Vicky both may well be
warranted in judging patch #400 to be red and may well be warranted in
judging patch #401 not to be red (note here the wide scope of ‘and’ with
respect to ‘may’), but also that she may well be both warranted in judging
patch #400 to be red and warranted in judging patch #401 not to be red
(note here the narrow scope of ‘and’ with respect to ‘may’ and its wide scope
with respect to ‘warranted’)—we only have to insist that she is not warranted
in both judging patch #400 to be red and judging patch #401 not to be red
(note here the narrow scope of ‘and’ with respect to ‘warranted’).
Before bringing this particular discussion to an end, I want to mention
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briefly an alternative line of attack to the use of collection of warrant in this
dialectic. The attack takes inspiration from the contextualist idea that, when
Vicky returns a different verdict for patch #401, the extension of ‘red’ as used
by her changes in such a way that neither patch #401 nor patch #400 belong
to it, while, when Vicky returned a verdict for patch #400, both patch #400
and patch #401 belonged to it (see Raffman [1994]; Raffman [1996]; Soames
[1999], pp. 203–27; Fara [2000]; Shapiro [2003]; Shapiro [2006], pp. 1–44
for specific implementations of this idea and Robertson [2000]; Keefe [2003];
Keefe [2007]; Heck [2003], pp. 118–20; Stanley [2003] for some influential crit-
icisms). If this idea is correct, then Vicky might well be warranted in both
her judgements without being warranted in identifying any relevant sharp
boundary. Generally speaking, this attack inherits many of the flaws of con-
textualist approaches to vagueness, whose discussion lies outside the scope of
this essay. Here, I will rest content with two critical observations specifically
pertaining to our problem. Firstly, satisfaction of (HAPPY) achieved be-
cause of the psychological or pragmatic or semantic impossibility of keeping
fixed one’s words’ extensions is just another (not so subtle) version of the
strategy of changing the subject (already encountered in other versions in
sections 6.3.2, 6.4.1) and as such rather irrelevant to our guiding question
concerning the preservation of Vicky’s intellectual integrity. Secondly, no
matter what its (dubious) merits are for forced marches using vague predi-
cates, the strategy is a non-starter for forced marches using precise predicates
(as those discussed in section 6.4.5) and so is at best radically incomplete.18
The conclusion is then that, if collection of warrant holds (as seems plau-
sible in this case), since Vicky is not warranted in judging that [patch #400
is red and patch #401 is not red], it is not the case that Vicky is both
warranted in judging patch #400 to be red and warranted in judging patch
#401 not to be red (even though, for all that has been said, she might well
be warranted in exactly one of these judgements, and be warranted in the
18Thanks to Mark Sainsbury and Crispin Wright for pointing out to me the need to
mention this contextualist move.
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general judgement that there is a cut-off point for redness in the series)—if
collection of warrant does not hold, we are still stuck with the fact that it is
not the case that Vicky is warranted both in judging patch #400 to be red
and in judging patch #401 not to be red. Hence, either way, Vicky’s answer
for patch #401 must be different from ‘No’.
Let us now first consider the case where her answer is still inconsistent
with patch #401’s being red (such would plausibly be if it were e.g. ‘There’s
no fact of the matter’, ‘That’s not determinate’, ‘That’s not true’ etc.). In
that case, the previous consideration concerning Vicky’s inability to detect
any difference in colour between patches #400 and #401 when considered
in isolation from all other patches, and, more generally, Vicky’s inability
to appeal to any difference which she is warranted in taking to indicate a
difference in redness would still apply to a judgement that [patch #400 is
red and patch #401 is not determinately red] (using ‘not determinately red’
as a catch-all phrase for any of the specific answers under consideration). For,
since being red is inconsistent with not being determinately red, they mark
among things a genuine (albeit more exotic) difference in redness just as
being red and not being red do: that is, just as, in matters of redness, being
not red rules out being red, so, in matters of redness, not being determinately
red also rules out being red (even though it need not imply not being red).
And it seems that Vicky is no better off in detecting a difference of this kind
between patch #400 and patch #401 than she was in detecting a red/non-red
difference between them.
6.4.3 Sequentially Consistent Judgements
We now turn to consider the case where Vicky’s answer is consistent with
patch #401’s being red (such would plausibly be if it were e. g. ‘I don’t
know’, or ‘I don’t feel fully confident in saying ‘Yes’ ’, or ‘I don’t know that
I know’ etc.). Notice first that the specific problem which used to arise for
the previous kind of answer does not arise for this new kind of answer. For
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the problem used to arise because, in giving inconsistent answers for patch
#400 and patch #401, Vicky was committed to being warranted in drawing
a difference in redness for which she seemed to have no warrant. But, clearly,
no difference in redness between the two patches need be drawn in judging
that one is red and that the other is not known to be red: the judgement is
still compatible with both patches being just plain red.
Nevertheless, suppose that Vicky would have been warranted in judging
patch #401 to be red: then, in not answering ‘Yes’ to the question as to
whether patch #401 is red, she would be violating (KEEP) (since the judge-
ment in question is a judgement to the effect that a certain patch is red, there
is no question of (MAX) overriding (KEEP) in this case). Hence, if Vicky sat-
isfies (HAPPY), she is not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red. This
simple piece of reasoning is however available to Vicky: she is thus warranted
in believing that, if she does not answer ‘Yes’ to the question as to whether
patch #401 is red, if she satisfies (HAPPY), she is not warranted in judging
patch #401 to be red. Moreover, presumably, there should be no bar to her
being warranted in believing that she has not answered ‘Yes’ to the question
as to whether patch #401 is red.19 If we make the additional assumption
that Vicky must be warranted in believing that she satisfies (HAPPY), it
follows, by what seems to be two ungainsayable applications of closure of
warrant under logical consequence, that she is warranted in believing that
she is not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red.
Unfortunately, Vicky answers ‘Yes’ to the question as to whether patch
#400 is red. We can thus use an analogous argument to show that she is
warranted in believing that she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be
red. Since Vicky answers ‘Yes’ to the question as to whether patch #400
is red, if she satisfies (HAPPY), she is warranted in judging patch #400
to be red. This simple piece of reasoning is available to Vicky: she is thus
warranted in believing that, if she answers ‘Yes’ to the question as to whether
19Of course, even if the content of her answer is consistent with the content of the answer
‘Yes’, her action is inconsistent with the action of answering ‘Yes’.
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patch #400 is red, if she satisfies (HAPPY), she is warranted in judging
patch #400 to be red. Moreover, presumably, there should be no bar to
her being warranted in believing that she has answered ‘Yes’ to the question
as to whether patch #400 is red. Given the same additional assumption
that Vicky must be warranted in believing that she satisfies (HAPPY), it
follows, by what seems to be two ungainsayable applications of closure of
warrant under logical consequence, that she is warranted in believing that
she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red.
Therefore, even if Vicky’s answer is consistent with patch #401’s being
red, her not answering ‘Yes’ to the question as to whether patch #401 is red
still entails, together with the other assumptions made explicit in the last
two paragraphs, that [[Vicky is warranted in believing that she is warranted
in judging patch #400 to be red] and [Vicky is warranted in believing that
she is not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red]]. By collection of
warrant over conjunction, Vicky would be warranted in believing that [she
is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red and not warranted in judging
patch #401 to be red]. However, ‘Vicky is warranted in judging ξ to be
red’ seems to be no less vague than ‘ξ is red’: which is the last patch that
Vicky is warranted in judging to be red? This vagueness reflects itself in
the fact that, for patches #400 and #401 as for any other two adjacent
patches, Vicky cannot detect any difference in warranting a ‘Yes’-judgement
between them when considered in isolation from all other patches, and, more
generally, cannot appeal (using perception or any other source of warrant)
to any difference which she is warranted in taking to indicate a difference
in warranting a ‘Yes’-judgement (see fn 14). Hence, Vicky is certainly not
warranted in judging that [she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red
and not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red].
The foregoing argument makes use of the crucial additional assumption
that Vicky must be warranted in believing that she satisfies (HAPPY). This
assumption is not at all uncontroversial, as it requires a mild iteration princi-
ple for warrant: Vicky cannot just be warranted in her first-order judgements
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about the patches, but must also be warranted in her second-order beliefs
that she is so (first-order) warranted. Indeed, whatever norm N we should
like to impose on an inquiry in order to preserve an inquirer’s intellectual
integrity, N will have to entail that the inquirer gives warranted answers to
the innocent questions posed to her: an analogous assumption to the effect
that the inquirer must be warranted in believing that she satisfies N would
result in the fact that the inquirer cannot just be warranted in her first-order
judgements about whatever her inquiry is about, but must also be warranted
in her second-order beliefs that she is so (first-order) warranted. One who is
doubtful about the general truth of the characteristic S4 axiom for warrant
(if one is warranted in believing that P , then one is warranted in believing
that one is warranted in believing that P ) may well question at this point
the legitimacy of this kind of assumption.
In addressing this worry, I would like to point out first that I actually
regard the present dialectic as an exemplification of the problematicity of
attaching significant normative force to a certain epistemic property of being
E while denying the general truth of the characteristic S4 axiom for that
property. For such a combination has to envisage situations in which an
agent meets a norm for Aing20 that P in virtue of her being E with respect
to the proposition that P , but fails to be E with respect to the proposition
that [she is E with respect to the proposition that P ]. Such an agent would
thus fail to meet a norm forAing that [she is E with respect to the proposition
that P ], and, since being E is at least a necessary condition for correct Aing,
by closure of being E under logical consequence she would presumably fail
to meet a norm for Aing that she correctly As that P .
For example, knowledge might be proposed as a norm for asserting and
the general truth of the characteristic S4 axiom for knowledge be denied (as
in Williamson [2000b]). Such a combination has to envisage situations in
which an agent meets the knowledge norm for asserting that it’s cold outside
20Roughly, for every attitude of Aing, a norm for Aing is a necessary condition for an
event of Aing to be correct.
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in virtue of her knowing that it’s cold outside, but fails to know that she
knows that it’s cold outside. Such an agent would thus fail to meet a norm for
asserting that she knows that it’s cold outside, and, since knowledge is at least
a necessary condition for correct asserting, by closure of knowledge under
logical consequence she would presumably fail to meet the knowledge norm
for asserting that she is correctly asserting that it’s cold outside. Assuming
further that the agent meets whatever other necessary condition is in place
for correctly asserting that it’s cold outside, we would end up in a situation
where the norms of assertion allow an agent to assert that it’s cold outside,
but forbid her to defend herself in the face of challenges to the correctness of
her assertion. This, I submit, is not assertion as we know and love it: either
one keeps silent in the first place, or one should be allowed to go on and
defend oneself from charges of incorrectness—to have to stop midway would
not just be extremely bizarre, but would also be hardly compatible with
the preservation of one’s intellectual integrity, running against any minimal
ideals of self-awareness and coherence in inquiry.
Worries from the alleged problematicity of the characteristic S4 axiom
for warrant may also be allayed by remarking that what the additional as-
sumption in question requires is only that Vicky be warranted in believing
that she satisfies (HAPPY) as far as her first-order judgements go: it does
not launch Vicky in a dangerous climb up the hierarchy of warrant by requir-
ing that she be warranted in believing that she satisfies (HAPPY) as far as
any of her first-order or higher-order judgements go. This mild iteration of
warrant is perfectly compatible with the general falsity of the characteristic
S4 axiom for warrant (and compatible with the results of the most challeng-
ing arguments against the axiom, like that advanced in Williamson [1992];
Williamson [1996]; Williamson [2000b], pp. 93–134). Indeed, by (COH), if
Vicky cannot warrantedly believe that she satisfies (HAPPY), she is not even
allowed to believe that she satisfies (HAPPY). But how could this belief be
dispensed with? How could she try to conform to (HAPPY) without even
believing that she is so conforming?
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To clinch matters, note that there should be no objection to Vicky’s
being herself a believer in the failure of iteration, if that’s the truth on these
matters. After all, failure of iteration is now supposed to be the reason why
Vicky should not believe that she is conforming to (HAPPY). Vicky would
then have to believe that, for some of her first-order judgements to the effect
that P , she is warranted in judging that P and not warranted in believing
that she is warranted in judging that P . Note that this by itself is not at
all (Moore) paradoxical: it is just an instance of the perfectly appropriate
(for us) quantified belief that, for some P , P and one is not warranted in
believing that P (note the wide scope of ‘belief’ here).
The problem arises rather by considering that it would seem that Vicky
can also be warranted in believing what some of the witnesses of the quan-
tified belief are: she is warranted in believing that she switches after patch
#400, and it seems that she can also be warranted in believing that, if iter-
ation fails at all, it will fail for the patch after which she switches (after all,
failure of iteration at patch #400 is now supposed to be the reason why Vicky
should not believe that she is conforming to (HAPPY) for patch #400). Un-
fortunately, assuming mild closure-under-logical-consequence principles for
warrant, warrant in believing in a particular failure of iteration of warrant
is not only Moore paradoxical (having the general form that a conjunction
saying that [P and the proposition that P lacks a certain doxastic or epis-
temic property of being E] is itself E), but it also entails the non-failure of
the iteration and, assuming (HW), is indeed impossible. For a subject s’s
warrant in believing that [s is warranted in believing that P and s is not
warranted in believing that s is warranted in believing that P ] entails, by a
mild principle of closure of warrant under logical consequence, both that [s
is warranted in believing that s is warranted in believing that P ] and that
[s is warranted in believing that s is not warranted in believing that s is
warranted in believing that P ].
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6.4.4 Unwise Chrysippus
It might be proposed at this point that the trouble with the forced march
resides in (MAX)—which, despite its initial plausibility, should therefore be
rejected as too demanding. Rejecting (MAX) (but keeping (KEEP)), Vicky
could start by answering e. g. ‘It’s not definitely orange’ for patch #1 and
then switch to ‘It’s not definitely red’ at patch #401.21 Importantly, it may
seem that a rejection of (MAX) could be adopted in a principled way by
noticing that, under some natural assumptions, what (MAX) really amounts
to is the conformity condition:
(CONF) Vicky must always conform her judgements to whatever positive
warrant is available to her.
Together with the following principle linking conforming and warrant :
(CW) Conforming to its being the case that P (or, at least, conforming to
its being the case that there is warrant for one of Vicky’s judgements)
requires warrant in judging that P (warrant in judging that there is
warrant for one of Vicky’s judgements),
21Note in passing that the converse strategy of keeping (MAX) and rejecting (KEEP)
does not seem even to get off the ground. For, by (CLEAR) and (MAX), Vicky must
answer ‘Yes’ for patch #1 and ‘No’ for patch #1,000. By classical logic, there will be
a first patch #i for which Vicky returns a verdict different from ‘Yes’. However, given
the ordering of informational strength, when she stops answering ‘Yes’ for patch #i, she
can only do so by replying ‘No’. For suppose that she replies anything weaker* than
‘No’. Then, this will also be weaker* than ‘Yes’. If she satisfies (HAPPY) (in particular,
(MAX)), this can only be so if she is not warranted in judging patch#i to be red. The
main line of argument of section 6.4.3 could then be applied to obtain the conclusion that
she unwarrantedly believes that she is warranted in judging patch #i − 1 to be red and
not warranted in judging patch #i to be red. If however Vicky replies ‘No’, then the
main line of argument of section 6.4.2 could be applied to obtain the conclusion that she
unwarrantedly believes patch #i− 1 to be red and patch #i not to be red.
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(CONF) would then amount to a local imposition of the characteristic S4
axiom for warrant, which may cause the usual worries.
I hope to have made a case in section 6.4.3 that, even if this result should
obtain, such worries are likely to be misplaced. What I want to point out
here is that (CW) seems to presuppose an excessively intellectualist inter-
pretation of what conforming to warrant must amount to. For presumably
warrant for judging that P (where the proposition that P is an object of
one of Vicky’s judgements) requires a reliable disposition to judge that P , at
least under appropriate circumstances (at the very least, it should certainly
be compatible with such a disposition, and we can imagine Vicky to be a
being where warrant and disposition do co-exist), and the existence of such
a disposition would seem sufficient for one to conform to one’s warrant. One
only needs to achieve an adequate matching between one’s warrant in judg-
ing that P (a warrant for ith-order judgements) and one’s judgements that
P (ith-order judgements)—one need not achieve an adequate matching be-
tween one’s warrant in judging that P (a warrant for ith-order judgements)
and one’s judgements that one is warranted in judging that P (i+1th-order
judgements). However, I will leave open whether there exists a principled
route to rejection of (MAX), and pursue rather the question of what its
effects would be.
Indeed, even if no flaw should lie in the motivation for rejecting (MAX),
the main trouble would still reside rather in its little effects in saving Vicky
from her predicament. We must first note that matters cannot be left at a
blanket rejection of (MAX), for then (HAPPY) could be satisfied by Vicky by
just answering ‘It is not the case that it is both red and not red’ throughout.
Accepting only trivialities in the face of overwhelming positive or negative
warrant is a parody of inquiry—such a satisfaction of (HAPPY) achieved by
changing the subject would amount to a Pyrrhic victory. Clearly, some norm
enjoining straightforwardly positive or negative judgements for at least some
cases must remain in place even after (MAX) has been discarded. The norm
should probably enjoin a straightforwardly positive judgement for patch #1,
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which implies rejection of (KEEP) along with (MAX) (otherwise the main
line of argument of section 6.4.3 could once again be applied). Again, I will
leave open whether there exists a principled route to rejection of (KEEP)
(this would probably involve a dialectic analogous to the one we have just
broached for rejection of (MAX)), and pursue rather the question of what its
effects would be.
Within the framework of a joint rejection of (MAX) and (KEEP), the
following more satisfactory strategy would then be permissible. Vicky starts
by answering ‘Yes’, and does so for the first few patches, until she reaches
patches which come both decently after patch #1 and comfortably before
the last patch for which ‘Yes’ would be a warranted answer. Let us suppose
without loss of generality that the first patch for which Vicky returns a
verdict different from ‘Yes’ is patch #351. Vicky must of course provide an
alternative answer. Something along the lines of ‘It’s either red or borderline
red’ would do: for Vicky could then switch (in a second violation of (MAX)
and (KEEP)) to ‘It’s either orange or borderline red’ at, say, patch #501
(and then finally switch to ‘No’ at, say, patch #651). Something along
these lines seems indeed to have been the strategy advocated by the Stoics
(see Barnes [1982]; Burnyeat [1982]; Mignucci [1993] for the sources and
Williamson [1994], pp. 8–27 for a more theoretical and highly sympathetic
exposition).
But what must Vicky believe when she switches at patch #351? As
anticipated, she must be complying with a norm N which, in addition to
forbidding assent for patches too close to the last patch for which assent is
warranted, also enjoins assent for patches very close to patch #1. Vicky must
then believe that her switch complies with N . It is actually very natural to
interpretN as enjoining to assent as long as possible (that is, just before one’s
switch would be too close to the last patch for which assent is warranted):
epistemic norms do seem to be maximizing norms which enjoin belief in all
propositions of a certain kind. Such an interpretation of N would however
clearly make impracticable the strategy under consideration, and so, without
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committing ourselves to the ultimate admissibility of a weaker reading of N ,
we will hereafter assume that N only:
• Enjoins assent for patches very far from the last patch for which assent
is warranted;
• Allows for assent and for something different than assent for patches
not very far from but also not too close to the last patch for which
assent is warranted;
• Forbids assent for patches too close to the last patch for which assent
is warranted.
Of course, Vicky should not believe that her switch occurs at the first or last
patch for which a switch would comply with N , for ‘ξ is such that a switch
at it would comply with N ’ (henceforth, ‘ξ is switchable’) is just as vague as
‘ξ is red’ is, so that all the problems we have been reviewing would re-occur
for such a switch.
A similar problem would occur if Vicky were to believe that patch #351
is the best patch to switch at, for ‘ξ is the best patch to switch at’ is similarly
vague (at least in the sense that we and Vicky are now not able to provide
a warranted identification of its cut-off point, which is the relevant sense in
our epistemological setting). It is actually not easy to make sense of how
Vicky can switch at patch #351 without believing it to be the best patch to
switch at: if, say, patch #350 is believed by her to be just as good a patch
to switch at as patch #351, why does she switch at patch #351 rather than
at patch #350?
It is at least unclear that the lack of any epistemic (or practical) rea-
son for such a “choice” could be counterbalanced by the kind of practical
considerations usually appealed to e.g. in the case of Buridan’s ass. What
needs to be rationalized is not any old action, but a change in judgement.
Vicky does have an epistemic (and practical) reason for bringing it about
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that, for some switchable patch x, she switches at x, but for no switchable
patch x does she have an epistemic (or practical) reason to bring it about
that she switches at x. It would seem however that, in such a case where
judgements are concerned, nothing short of an epistemic (or at least prac-
tical) reason for switching at x would warrant Vicky in switching at x, and
so that for no switchable patch x is Vicky warranted in switching at x. Of
course, elaborating on a theme of section 6.4.2, what would be unwarranted
are neither Vicky’s answer for patch #350 nor her answer for patch #351,
but her switching from one to the other (the pattern of her answers), just as,
when presented with two trees of exactly the same height, one’s pattern of
answers ‘That is taller than 20 ft’ (pointing at one tree) and ‘That is between
30 and 10 ft tall’ (pointing at the other tree) would be unwarranted, even
though each single answer may well be warranted.
Be that as it may, the most resilient form of the problem would still
remain. Patches #1 and #1,000 are not only not switchable, but also such
that Vicky is not warranted in believing them to be switchable, and so, by
classical logic, there will be a first patch #i and a last patch #j [1 < i ≤
351, 351 ≤ j < 1, 000] warrantedly believable by Vicky to be switchable.22
Moreover, the strategy we are considering requires Vicky to believe, at least
of the patch (#351) she switches at, that that patch is switchable. For one
has to believe that a patch is switchable in order for one rationally to decide
to switch at it, just as one has to believe that a chair is movable in order for
one rationally to decide to move it. Vicky can thus only start to believe that
a patch #k is switchable if k ≥ i, and only stop to believe that a patch #l is
switchable if l ≤ j. Given (COH), all these beliefs about switchability must
also be warranted. Were Vicky to try to comply with appropriate versions
22Hereafter, for simplicity’s sake, we will assume classical logic also for vague predicates
like ‘ξ is warrantedly believable by Vicky to be switchable’. Such an assumption plays no
essential role in the argument and could be replaced by appeal to vague sets or the like.
For example, instead of talking about patch #i and patch #j, we could have appealed to
the (vague) set of patches warrantedly believable by Vicky to be switchable, set to which
neither patch #1 nor patch #1,000 belongs.
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of (MAX) and (KEEP) concerning switchability, she would of course incur
problems analogous to those we have been reviewing in sections 6.4.2, 6.4.3.
A strategy analogous to the one just exposed must then be deployed,
allowing Vicky to switch to ‘switchable’ (“positive” switch) comfortably
after patch #i (let us call the ordinal number of the first such patch
‘marpos(switch)’) and switch from ‘switchable’ (“negative” switch) comfort-
ably before patch #j (let us call the ordinal number of the first such patch
‘marneg(switch)’).
Definition 6.4.1. A predicate Φ is convex iff, for some m0, m1 [0 < m0 <
m1 < 1, 000], the extension of Φ is {patch #n : m0 ≤ n ≤ m1}.
Definition 6.4.2. For Φ convex:
• marpos(Φ):= the first m such that patch #m comes comfortably after
the first patch warrantedly believable by Vicky to be in the extension
of Φ;
• marneg(Φ):= the last m such that patch #m comes comfortably before
the last patch warrantedly believable by Vicky to be in the extension
of Φ.
Hierarchy starts looming here, and we will call ‘switchable2’ all and
only those patches that lie between patch #marpos(‘switch’) and patch
#marneg(‘switch’). For every i, ‘switchablei’ (and its like, e. g. ‘switchesi’),
as well as positive and negative versions thereof, can be analogously defined
by recursion:
Definition 6.4.3.
• patch #n is switchable1 := patch #n is switchable;
• patch #n is switchablem+1 := marpos(‘switchm’) ≤ n ≤
marneg(‘switchm’).
270 CHAPTER 6. FORCED MARCH IN THE PENUMBRA
Definition 6.4.4.
• patch #n is positively switchable1 := patch #n is patch #1;
• patch #n is positively switchablem+1 := marpos(‘switchm’) ≤ n.
Definition 6.4.5.
• patch #n is negatively switchable1 := patch #n is not too close to the
last patch for which assent to ‘Is this patch red?’ is warranted;
• patch #n is negatively switchablem+1 := n ≤ marneg(‘switchm’).
Theorem 6.4.1. For every m [m : m > 1], n, patch #n is switchablem iff
patch #n is both positively and negatively switchablem.
Proof. Immediate from definitions 6.4.3, 6.4.4, 6.4.5.
Theorem 6.4.2. For every m, {x : x is switchablem+1} ⊆ {x : x is
switchablem}, and, if {x : x is switchablem} 6= ∅, {x : x is switchablem+1} ⊂
{x : x is switchablem}.
Proof. Immediate from definition 6.4.3.
Theorem 6.4.3. For some m, {x : x is switchablem} = ∅.
Proof. Immediate from theorem 6.4.2 and the finitude of {x : x is
switchable}.
Theorem 6.4.4. For every m, patches #1, #1,000 are not switchablem.
Proof. By induction.
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• By construction, patches #1, #1,000 are not switchable1;
• By theorem 6.4.2, for every m, {x : x is switchablem+1} ⊆ {x : x is
switchablem}. Since, by the induction hypothesis, patches #1, #1,000
are not switchablem, they are not switchablem+1 either.
Now, reflect that, generalizing the previous point concerning the require-
ment of Vicky to believe, at least of the patch (#351) she switches at, that
that patch is switchable, we have the belief requirement:
(BEL) It is required of Vicky that:
• If she switches at a certain patch, she believe that patch to be
switchable;
• For everym [m : m > 1], if she positively (negatively) switchesm at
a certain patch, she believe that patch to be positively (negatively)
switchablem.
Adding the monotonicity principle:
(MON) For every m [m : m > 1], n0, if Vicky believes that patch #n0
is positively (negatively) switchablem, she believes, for every n1 [n1 :
n1 ≥ n0] (for every n1 [n1 : n1 ≤ n0]), that patch #n1 is positively
(negatively) switchablem,
we obtain:
Theorem 6.4.5. For every m, n, if Vicky believes patch #n to be
switchablem, she believes it to be switchablem+1.
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Proof. Suppose that Vicky believes patch #n to be switchablem. Then, by
theorem 6.4.4, for some n0, n1 [n0 ≤ n ≤ n1], she must positively switchm+1
at patch #n0 and negatively switch
m+1 at patch #n1. By (BEL), Vicky
believes patch n0 to be positively switchable
m+1 and patch n1 to be negatively
switchablem+1. By (MON), she believes patch #n to be both positively
switchablem+1 and negatively switchablem+1, and so, by her knowledge of
theorem 6.4.1, she believes it to be switchablem+1.
Theorem 6.4.6. For every m, Vicky believes patch #351 to be switchablem.
Proof. By induction.
• By assumption, Vicky believes patch #351 to be switchable1.
• By the induction hypothesis, Vicky believes patch #351 to be
switchablem, and so, by theorem 6.4.5, she believes it to be
switchablem+1.
It then follows in particular from theorems 6.4.3, 6.4.6 that, for some m,
Vicky believes patch #351 to be switchablem without patch #351’s being
switchablem+1, contrary to what the strategy under consideration requires.
Whatever its other merits may be, we can thus conclude that it cannot be
implemented in the general way required to save Vicky from her predicament.
It is important to stress that the crucial use made by the above argument
of (BEL) (with the background assumption of (COH)) by no means amounts
to some transparency requirement which would appear problematic from the
perspective of a rejection of the characteristic S4 axiom for warrant (setting
aside now the question of how much mileage there is in such a rejection for
the issues at hand).
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Firstly, inspection of the definition of ‘ξ is switchablei’ reveals that the
notion need not involve any epistemic feature problematic for transparency:
it is of course stronger than the notion expressed by ‘It can be warrantedly
believed that ξ is switchablei−1’, but it also need not be as weak as any
of the notions expressed by ‘It can be warrantedly believed that it can be
warrantedly believed that it can be warrantedly believed. . . that it can be
warrantedly believed that ξ is switchablei−1’, for any iteration of the ‘It can
be warrantedly believed that’-operator. Hence, (BEL) (with the background
assumption of (COH)) need not require any form of transparency of war-
rant. Moreover, the definition of ‘ξ is switchablei’ only requires a patch to
be within a certain range (to be specified), and the specification of such a
range need only appeal to numerical values which are known to be sufficient
for creating the necessary margins of safety—crucially, they need not be nec-
essary for doing so. Some such values can certainly be specified, and once
‘ξ is switchablei’ is made precise in this way, (BEL) (with the background
assumption of (COH)) should be wholly unproblematic.
Secondly, (BEL) (with the background assumption of (COH)) does not
require in any case that, in general, if a patch is switchablei, Vicky is war-
ranted in believing that it is so: while it does require Vicky to believe that
a patch is positively (negatively) switchablei if she decides positively (nega-
tively) to switchi at that patch, it does not require her to track the full range
of switchabilityi.
Thirdly, even if fault should be found with (BEL) on general grounds,
it is hard to see how it could be dispensed with by the strategy under con-
sideration: for the strategy must certainly allow (indeed—it would seem—
require) that Vicky at least believes to be carrying out the strategy, and
(BEL) amounts to no more than this condition. Saying that, in order to
preserve her intellectual integrity, Vicky should carry out the strategy but
not allowing her at least to believe to be carrying it out would once again
seem to run against any minimal ideals of self-awareness and coherence in
inquiry.
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Fourthly, a weaker version of (BEL) could be formulated as follows:
(BEL−) It is required of Vicky that:
• If she switches at a certain patch, she believe that some patch is
switchable;
• For every m [m : m > 1], if she positively (negatively) switchesm
at a certain patch, she believe that some patch is positively (neg-
atively) switchablem,
requiring only general de dicto beliefs about patches rather than de re beliefs
about specific patches (a version intermediate in strength between (BEL) and
(BEL−) would require de re beliefs about some patches or others). (BEL−)
would seem unnegotiable, and yet a structurally similar argument would still
go through (I leave the details to the reader).
6.4.5 The Enforcement of Classical Logic: Trans-
parency and Inexact Knowledge
It may at this point be objected that all these ruminations crucially rely
on the assumption that there will be a first patch for which Vicky returns
a verdict different from ‘Yes’. As has already been pointed out in section
6.4.2, the assumption follows by classical logic from (CLEAR) and (MAX).
The objection would then consist in pointing out that, given that ‘red’ is
vague, classical logic cannot be legitimately assumed to hold in this context
without further argument. Indeed, if that assumption cannot be made and,
more generally, it cannot be assumed that Vicky adopts different attitudes
with respect to patches which are at a close enough distance from one another
(even if the distance should be larger than 1), it is hard to see how something
like the problem we have been investigating could arise in the first place.
Appealing as it may seem, this train of thought misses one of the ab-
solutely crucial features of the forced march. For the predicate that our
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presentation of the forced march assumed to be subject to classical logic is
not the vague ‘ξ is red’, but simply ‘Vicky returns a ‘Yes’-verdict for ξ’, and
there is no reason to believe this predicate to be vague in the case under
consideration. Of course, generally speaking, the predicate is vague, as we
can conceive of a soritical series such that Vicky indisputably returns a ‘Yes’-
verdict for the first object of the series and indisputably does not return a
‘Yes’-verdict for the last object of the series, with each two adjacent elements
of the series xi and xi+1 being such that Vicky’s act with respect to xi differs
from Vicky’s act with respect to xi+1 only by a nanometrical difference of the
location of one single atom of Vicky’s body. For any such series, we are now
not able to provide a warranted identification of a sharp boundary between
the objects for which Vicky returns a ‘Yes’-verdict and the objects for which
she does not; for any such series, we are now not able to decide for every
object whether Vicky returns a ‘Yes’-verdict for it or not. For any such series,
the predicate indeed appears to be vague over it and, correspondingly, the
claim that there is a sharp boundary appears dubious (indeed false according
to the theory defended in this essay).
However, it is essential to observe that no such vagueness needs to be
present in the series over which Vicky is forced to march. For we can
strengthen (HAPPY) with the following additional condition:
(SHARP) For every patch x, either it is indisputably the case that Vicky
returns a ‘Yes’-verdict for x or it is indisputably the case that Vicky
does not return a ‘Yes’-verdict for x.
There would then presumably be no obstacle to concluding that there will be
a first patch for which Vicky returns a verdict different from ‘Yes’, and the
presentation of the problem could proceed as before. We would only need
to note that the additional imposition of (SHARP) seems unobjectionable:
it would seem hardly satisfactory if one’s intellectual integrity could only be
preserved by burbling.
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Matters are however slightly more complex here. For (SHARP) amounts
in effect to enforcing classical logic on the reactions to what are vague states-
of-affairs. Any reason to think that classical logic does not apply to such
states is thus transformed by the imposition of (SHARP) into a reason to
think that the reactions in question are not both infallible and omniscient
(in a word, that they are not “transparent”).23 To see this, we consider
a suitable soritical series and assume—plausibly enough—that at least one
of the specific reasons to think that classical logic does not apply to vague
states-of-affairs is that we do not want to conclude to the existence of a sharp
boundary between positive and negative cases simply from the existence of
both positive and negative cases. But if there are both positive and nega-
tive cases, there will be (by omniscience) a ‘Yes’-verdict for a positive case
and there will not be (by contraposition on infallibility) a ‘Yes’-verdict for
a negative case. By classical logic, there is a last case x for which there
will be a ‘Yes’-verdict, and so (by infallibility) x is a positive case while (by
contraposition on omniscience) the immediate successor of x is a negative
case. Any reason for rejecting this conclusion is thus a reason for rejecting
the joint assumption of infallibility and omniscience (and their contraposi-
tives) for the reactions in question. (SHARP) cannot thus always hold for
a transparent subject: its imposition is sometimes bound to generate either
error (i.e. failure of infallibility) or ignorance (i.e. failure of omniscience). It
follows that, over suitable soritical series, transparent subjects fail to meet
(SHARP).24
For transparent subjects, failure of (SHARP) is the reflection of a positive
epistemic status (such as the one afforded by transparency) and so justified
by it: the subject fails to meet (SHARP) simply because she is doing so
23A subject’s reaction of Aing to a state-of-affairs that P is infallible iff, if the subject
As that P , then P ; it is omniscient iff, if P , then the subject As that P . I presuppose a
fully analogous definition for ranges of states-of-affairs rather than single states-of-affairs.
24Hawthorne [2005] explores a closely related dialectic, reaching similar conclusions. I’m
especially indebted to Dan Lo´pez de Sa and Sebastiano Moruzzi for challenging conversa-
tions on this topic.
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well epistemically as to be transparent. One of the highest epistemic states,
transparency, enjoins burbling. Such is vagueness. However, for at least some
soritical series, there is no reason to think that Vicky will enjoy transparency
with respect to them (indeed, no reason to think that she will enjoy either
infallibility or omniscience), and so no reason to think that a similar moti-
vation for failure of (SHARP) is available for her: her burbling cannot be
interpreted as the mark of a higher epistemic state, and will thus presumably
be subject to the default criticisms that an inquirer’s burbling rightly elicits.
In particular, this will presumably jeopardize Vicky’s intellectual integrity,
and so we are entitled to assume that, if this is to be preserved, (SHARP)
must be satisfied.
There is another telling reason for thinking that appeal to vagueness for
motivating a rejection of (SHARP) is misplaced in this dialectic (cf Sorensen
[2001], pp. 40–56, whose general treatment of the forced march is quite con-
genial to the solution I will propose in section 6.5.1). That appeal requires a
relevant expression (in our case, ‘red’) to be vague—however, a structurally
identical problem could be created for Vicky by using only precise expres-
sions. Consider a series of 1,000 pairwise indiscriminable trees, going from
25 ft tall to 15 ft tall. The trees are pairwise indiscriminable in the sense
that, given any pair of adjacent trees, no normal human subject could detect,
by unaided vision, any difference in height between the two trees when con-
sidering them in isolation from all other trees (either sequentially or at the
same time). Consider a normal human subject, again Vicky, who, under the
best visual conditions, is forced to give her best judgement sequentially on
all the trees, starting from tree #1. Vicky may know about all this situation,
and so know that at least some of the indiscriminable trees x and y could
differ from one another at least in the sense of there being another tree z in
the series such that z is discriminable from x but not from y (although the
existence of such a tree is not guaranteed in the series). Still, Vicky cannot
detect, by unaided vision, any difference in height between any two adjacent
trees when considering them in isolation from all other trees. The question
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that she will be asked at each step is ‘Is this tree at least 20 ft tall?’. Again,
Vicky’s aim is to give a warranted answer at each step of this new forced
march.
To this effect, she has available any answer whatsoever: ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘I
can’t say’, ‘It’s borderline’, ‘Yes and no’ etc. We can then impose a constraint
analogous to (HAPPY) for the preservation of Vicky’s intellectual integrity
and go through a dialectic analogous to the one we have just been studying.
The final move of rejecting the analogue of (SHARP) on the grounds of the
vagueness of a relevant expression will however not be available, since the
predicate ‘at least 20 ft tall’ is (for all intents and purposes) precise. Inexact
knowledge of a certain property of being F (knowledge afforded by cognitive
processes which unimprovably allow to recognize some case of of being F
without allowing to recognize every case of being F )25 is thus a sufficient
condition for the generation of the problem—vagueness is not a necessary
condition for it. A fairly widespread view in the contemporary debate on
vagueness has it that the forced march represents a paradox of vagueness in-
dependent from the sorites paradox, in the sense that, even though it equally
depends on the vagueness of the relevant expressions, its paradoxicality is
not entailed by (nor entails) the paradoxicality of the sorites reasoning, and
that a theory of vagueness may well fare differently when applied to one
paradox and when applied to the other one (in such a way that the forced
march becomes a new crucial test that a theory of vagueness has to pass).
That view, I hope to have shown, is wrong. The forced march is not in any
interesting sense a paradox of vagueness.26
25Equivalently (under some assumptions), inexact knowledge of an object x is knowledge
afforded by cognitive processes which unimprovably allow to recognize some determinable
of x without allowing to recognize every determinable of x.
26Granted, one might still be exercising vague concepts in the process of evaluating
which judgement one should give with respect to the precise content that a certain tree
x is at least 20 ft tall. One might for example bring to bear considerations concerning
whether x is close enough in height to something which one is independently warranted
in believing to be at least 20 ft tall. It is very unclear however whether even in such a
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This should actually have already been apparent from our presentation
of the original problem using the predicate ‘red’, since that problem simply
arose from the epistemic indiscriminability for Vicky of the patches’ shades,
not from any ignorance on Vicky’s part peculiarly attaching to the predicate
‘red’, and since epistemic indiscriminability of close enough values (such as
specific shades and heights) along a certain dimension of comparison need
not involve any vague categorization of the values of that dimension (such as
categorization into colours or rough sizes). Of course, a different presentation
of the problem could stipulate away the epistemic indiscriminability of close
enough values. The series in question could e. g. be the series of the first
1,000 positive integers presented under their canonical mode of presentation.
Every pair of adjacent numbers would then be discriminable in the sense that
a normal human subject could detect, by unaided reflection, a difference in
cardinality between the two numbers even when considering them in isolation
from all other numbers (either sequentially or at the same time). We could
then consider a normal human subject, again Vicky, who, under the best
conditions for arithmetical reflection, is forced to give her best judgement
sequentially on all the numbers, starting from number 1. The question that
she will be asked at each step is ‘Is this number small?’ (we assume a fixed
context where 1 counts as an indisputable positive case of ‘small’ and 1,000 as
an indisputably negative case of it). Again, Vicky’s aim is to give a warranted
answer at each step of this new forced march.
case vagueness would still be vindicated to be the source of the paradox: after all, the fact
that one is also using numerical concepts does not lend any support to the claim that they
are the source of the paradox. In any event, even if one might so use vague concepts, it
seems plausible that one need not to and might just as well only rely on one’s perception
and one’s understanding of what it is for something to be at least 20 ft tall. A being with
the same perceptual limitations as ours who possesses the concept of being at least 20 ft
tall but no relevant vague concept would be no better off than Vicky in the precise forced
march. I don’t see any clear incoherence in the assumption of the possibility of such a
being. Thanks to Crispin Wright for raising this important issue, which certainly deserves
further exploration.
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To this effect, she has available any answer whatsoever: ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘I
can’t say’, ‘It’s borderline’, ‘Yes and no’ etc. We can then impose a con-
straint analogous to (HAPPY) for the preservation of Vicky’s intellectual
integrity and go through a dialectic analogous to the one we have just been
studying. But the dialectic would now seem to be entirely driven by the
vagueness of ‘small’, for what else could justify our intuitive judgements of
unwarrantability concerning the distinctions Vicky would now be forced to
make? On the strength of these considerations, it could then be conjectured
that vagueness is a necessary condition for the generation of the problem at
least when other natural supplementary assumptions are made (such as the
epistemic discriminability of close enough values along the relevant dimen-
sion of comparison). Plausible as this conjecture may seem, it too is bound to
fail. For even in the case under discussion, a forced march can be constructed
by using a precise predicate such as ‘ξ bricks would break a camel’s back’.
Even if Vicky can now discriminate between any two adjacent numbers, and
can classify differently 1 and 1,000 under the categorization induced by ‘ξ
bricks would break a camel’s back’, she is still in no position warrantedly to
adopt any pair of differential attitudes towards any two adjacent numbers,
in spite of the fact that, in this case, there is no reason to doubt that the
categorization so induced does give rise to a sharp boundary between positive
and negative cases.
Of course, there is a substantial difference between the precise and the
vague case: whereas in the precise forced march there is no problem in think-
ing that the adoption of differential attitudes towards adjacent objects, al-
though unwarranted, may well be lucky enough as to reflect correctly a sharp
distinction in reality,27 in the vague forced march there is a strong (and, at
least according to the theory defended in this essay, correct) intuition that
27At least considering attitudes whose contents remain at the level of positive or negative
predications involving the original precise predicate—vagueness may of course come in as
soon as “reflective” attitudes are adopted which concern e.g. the subject’s epistemic state
(such as the attitude expressed by an utterance of ‘I don’t know’).
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any such adoption is not only unwarranted, but radically misconceived—it
requires a sharp distinction in reality where there could not possibly be one.
It was thus essential to show that a deep problem for (E) arises even in the
absence of this further condition.
Moreover, it is certainly very plausible that the problem is made even
more acute by the presence of this further condition: vague forced marches
impose violations of (E) which, because of their apparent radical misconcep-
tion, are very plausibly even graver than those imposed by precise forced
marches. Note that this circumstance lends however no support to the view
that the forced march represents a self-standing paradox of vagueness: for the
only new feature that vagueness brings in—the apparent radical misconcep-
tion represented by the adoption of differential attitudes towards adjacent
objects—is wholly grounded in the apparent radical misconception repre-
sented by the negation of the major premise of the sorites paradox. The
additional paradoxicality of vague forced marches is thus simply a conse-
quence of the paradoxicality of the corresponding sorites reasoning—we have
not yet found a vagueness-generated paradoxicality independent from that
exhibited by the sorites paradox.
6.4.6 Naive Forced March
This is of course not to deny that, given the eminent plausibility of (E),
the forced march is a paradox (a case where despite the apparent validity
of the argument, the apparently true premises do not appear rationally to
support the conclusion). However, given the previous considerations, we
should neither expect nor require from a theory of vagueness that it offers a
solution (or, more weakly, a diagnosis) to the forced-march paradox flowing
from its solution (or diagnosis) to the sorites paradox. From this perspective,
it should thus be neither a surprise nor a discomfort to find out that the
naive theory of vagueness itself is just as affected by the paradox as any
other theory.
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Prima facie, the naive theory, once supported by a tolerant logic (see
chapter 4) and enriched with the conceptual resources required by the adop-
tion of such a logic (see chapter 5) would seem fit to give a satisfactory
solution not only to the sorites paradox, but also to the forced-march para-
dox. Let us suppose for simplicity’s sake that the margin of tolerance for
‘red’ in our series is exactly 1 (under the natural measure function). Then
Vicky, now a believer in the naive theory, may well accept ‘Patch #400 is
red’ only because she accepts ‘Patch #399 is red’ for non-soritical reasons,28
accepts the tolerance conditional ‘If patch #399 is red, so is patch #400’
for non-soritical reasons and recognizes the validity of modus ponens. Her
reasons for accepting ‘Patch #400 is red’ are thus soritical, and so she is
not committed to accepting ‘Patch #401 is red’, even though she accepts the
tolerance conditional ‘If patch #400 is red, so is patch #401’ for non-soritical
reasons and recognizes the validity of modus ponens (see section 5.4). Not
being committed to accepting ‘Patch #401 is red’ by her antecedent beliefs,
she may well adopt a different attitude towards patch #401 (even if maybe
not that of accepting ‘Patch #401 is not red’, for example if she accepts
(NEC) of section 4.3.3), while still accepting ‘If patch #400 is red, so is
patch #401’, and so while still maintaining that patch #400 and patch #401
do not at all differ in their colour (if one is red, so is the other). Switch at a
certain patch would then seem compatible with recognition that no relevant
difference in colour exists between that patch and its predecessor. Has the
naive theory managed a miraculous squaring of the circle?
Arguably no. Under the previous rules, Vicky must believe that, when
she returns a different verdict for patch #401, she is still complying with
(HAPPY) and all of its sub-conditions. The main line of argument of section
6.4.3 could then once again be applied to obtain the conclusion that she
28For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter, we can take a subject s to accept
ϕ for soritical reasons iff s accepts ϕ because s accepts a tolerance conditional whose
consequent ϕ is and also accepts its antecedent (see section 5.4.3). Note that, contrary
to the usage of chapter 5, here I will use ‘reason’ and its like only to refer to something
which in effect provides some positive epistemic support for a certain belief.
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both believes that [she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red] and
believes that [she is not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red], and so
that she believes that [she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red and
not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red], a belief for which we have
already argued that Vicky has no warrant.
To this it may be replied that, in the novel logical context of tolerant
logics, the last (adjunction) step of the previous argument presupposes that
Vicky’s reasons both for believing that she is warranted in judging patch
#400 to be red and for believing that she is not warranted in judging patch
#401 to be red are non-soritical, for otherwise adjunction may not be guar-
anteed to generate a valid argument from the original premises to the target
conclusion (that is, adjunction may not have the full 1-left-transitivity prop-
erty, see section 4.2.3). The naive strategy under consideration may then
retort that this presupposition is groundless: Vicky may well believe that
she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red only because she both be-
lieves (for non-soritical reasons) that she is warranted in judging patch #399
to be red and believes (for non-soritical reasons) that, if she is warranted in
judging patch #399 to be red, she is also warranted in judging patch #400
to be red. Analogously, Vicky may well believe that she is not warranted in
judging patch #401 to be red only because she both believes (for non-soritical
reasons) that she is not warranted in judging patch #402 to be red and be-
lieves (for non-soritical reasons) that, if she is not warranted in judging patch
#402 to be red, she is also not warranted in judging patch #401 to be red.
In this case, letting T∗ be the naive theorist’s favoured tolerant logic, the
adjunction step would be an application of (Tl) to ϕ0 ⊃ ϕ1, ϕ0 `T∗ ϕ1 and
ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ3, ϕ2 `T∗ ϕ3 to yield ϕ0 ⊃ ϕ1, ϕ0, ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ3, ϕ2 `T∗ ϕ1∧ϕ3, application
which may not be legitimate in T∗.
Let us leave aside the fact that it is actually possible that a suitable
tolerant logic declares that the adjunction step in question is guaranteed to
generate a valid argument from the original premises to the target conclusion
(in fact, even though none of the main systems of chapter 4 does it, this
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could easily be achieved by imposing more structure on the set of tolerated
but not designated values). And let us also leave aside the fact that even if
the pattern of reasoning in question were formally invalid in every tolerant
logic, it would still have to be shown that its current application, despite
its apparent plausibility, is not materially valid. The main problem with
the present reply is rather that, contrary to what it presupposes, Vicky does
have non-soritical reasons both for believing that she is warranted in judging
patch #400 to be red and for believing that she is not warranted in judging
patch #401 to be red: given that she in fact judges patch #400 to be red and
does not judge patch #401 to be red, the main line of argument of section
6.4.3 is available to give her non-soritical reasons for both beliefs.
These are however once again relatively minor niceties. For, as in the case
of the objection to collection of warrant over conjunction of section 6.4.2, the
simple and yet damning point is that Vicky’s pair of attitudes—belief (for
soritical reasons) that she is warranted in judging patch #400 to be red,
belief (for soritical reasons) that she is not warranted in judging patch #401
to be red—draws a sharp distinction between patch #400 and patch #401
(with regard to their being warrantedly judgeable by Vicky to be red) for
which Vicky has no warrant: for all Vicky can tell, an analogous pattern of
attitudes placing the sharp boundary in question rather between, say, patch
#401 and patch #402 would have been just as good (or just as bad).
Having thus disposed of the naive theory of vagueness as a viable strategy
to solve the forced-march paradox, it is important to see how a forced-march-
related objection against the theory in itself fails. The objection is to the
effect that a believer in the naive theory will believe (for non-soritical reasons)
that patch #1,000 is red as soon as she believes for non-soritical reasons that
patch #1 is red, and goes as follows:
ANTI-NAIVE Consider a believer in the naive theory of vagueness, Mon-
sieur Na¨ıf, and consider the predicate ‘ξ is such that Na¨ıf has non-
soritical reasons to believe that ξ is red’ (henceforth, for short, ‘ξ is
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Na¨ıf-non-soritical’). This predicate is just as vague as ‘ξ is red’. As-
suming that Na¨ıf is minimally competent, there will be by assumption
at least one patch (patch #1) believed by him for non-soritical reasons
to be red, and so, very plausibly, at least one patch believed by him
for non-soritical reasons to be Na¨ıf-non-soritical. This last inference is
certainly something the naive theorist should be willing to concede as
correct for patch #1 and for quite a few other patches after it. So take
any such patch #i. Na¨ıf believes for non-soritical reasons that patch
#i is Na¨ıf-non-soritical. Believing in the naive theory of vagueness,
Na¨ıf also believes for non-soritical reasons, given the vagueness of ‘ξ is
Na¨ıf-non-soritical’, that, if patch #i is Na¨ıf-non-soritical, so is patch
#i+1. Therefore, assuming a modicum of rationality, Na¨ıf believes for
soritical reasons that patch #i+ 1 is Na¨ıf-non-soritical.
Now, at least in a highly idealized context where the only information
available is that provided by reflection on the perceptually accessible
colour of the patches, we may well take a reason to be non-soritical
iff it is canonical (that is, yielded by simple reflection on the colour
of the relevant patch considered in isolation from the colour of any
other patch). Moreover, given the idealization in question, it would
seem that the only way for Na¨ıf to gain the information that he has
canonical reasons to believe that patch #i+1 is red is to gain access to
one of these reasons, from which it certainly follows, assuming again a
modicum of rationality, that Na¨ıf believes for non-soritical reasons that
patch #i + 1 is Na¨ıf-non-soritical. It thus follows that Na¨ıf can only
believe for reasons that patch #i+1 is Na¨ıf-non-soritical if he believes
(also) for non-soritical reasons that patch #i+ 1 is Na¨ıf-non-soritical.
We have thus proved that, if Na¨ıf believes for non-soritical reasons
that patch #i is Na¨ıf-non-soritical, he also believes for non-soritical
reasons that patch #i + 1 is Na¨ıf-non-soritical. From this, using a
classical metalanguage (which is legitimate, since ‘Na¨ıf believes for non-
soritical reasons that ξ is Na¨ıf-non-soritical’ can be taken to be precise
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if Na¨ıf is subject to an analogue of (SHARP) for ‘Na¨ıf-non-soritical’, the
soritical/non-soritical distinction is precise and the relevant instances
of the basing relation29 are also precise), the desired result follows from
familiar reasoning.
It should by now be clear where ANTI-NAIVE goes astray. It goes
astray in assuming that the only way for Na¨ıf to gain the information that
he has canonical reasons to believe that patch #i+ 1 is red is to gain access
to one of these reasons. Since Na¨ıf believes in the naive theory of vagueness,
this amounts to overlooking the crucial possibility that Na¨ıf gains that in-
formation by inferring it from the information that he has canonical reasons
to believe that patch #i is red in conjunction with the relevant tolerance
conditional—possibility which was even mentioned in the previous leg of the
argument!
Despite this fallacy, ANTI-NAIVE retains great interest in showing
what is indeed a remarkable consequence of believing in the naive theory
of vagueness. As soon as competent and rational Na¨ıf renounces his trans-
parency by subjecting himself to the relevant analogue of (SHARP) (and the
other assumptions on precision mentioned at the end of ANTI-NAIVE are
in place), he will find himself committed to believing (for soritical reasons),
for some i, that patch #i is Na¨ıf-non-soritical without being able to access
himself any of the relevant non-soritical reasons (and so without being able
to transform his soritical reasons for that belief into non-soritical ones), even
assuming that what appear to be the best possible conditions for a subject to
access these reasons hold. The problematicity of the situation is made even
more acute when we consider predicates for phenomenal properties such as
‘ξ0 looks red to ξ1 at ξ2’: at some time t, Na¨ıf will find himself committed to
believing (for soritical reasons), for some i, that patch #i is such that Na¨ıf
has non-soritical reasons to believe that patch #i looks red to him at t with-
out being able to access himself any of the relevant non-soritical reasons.
29The basing relation is the relation which holds between a belief b of a subject s and
s’s reasons Rs iff s holds b for Rs (see Korcz [1997] for a recent survey).
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But what can prevent Na¨ıf from accessing these reasons relating to patch
#i’s look given that the conditions appear to be the best possible ones for
doing so (patch #i is fully open to view, Na¨ıf’s perceptual system is working
optimally, Na¨ıf is in the clearest possible state of mind for reflecting about
patch #i’s look etc.)?
The presentation of the problem admits of slight variations. Define ‘ξ is
Na¨ıf-non-soritical*’ as ‘ξ is such that Na¨ıf believes for non-soritical reasons
that ξ is red’ (‘ξ is Na¨ıf-non-soritical*’ differs from ‘ξ is Na¨ıf-non-soritical’
in that, given Na¨ıf’s subjection to (SHARP) and the other assumptions on
precision mentioned at the end of ANTI-NAIVE, the former is precise
whereas the latter is vague). Given the precision of this predicate, there will
be a last Na¨ıf-non-soritical* patch #i. Believing in the naive theory, Na¨ıf also
believes for non-soritical reasons, given the vagueness of ‘red’, that, if patch
#i is red, so is patch #i + 1. Therefore, Na¨ıf believes for soritical reasons
that patch #i + 1 is red. Moreover, since, by assumption, patch #i is the
last Na¨ıf-non-soritical* patch, Na¨ıf does not believe for non-soritical reasons
that patch #i + 1 is red, even assuming that what appear to be the best
possible conditions for a subject to access non-soritical reasons hold. And,
again, the problematicity of the situation is made even more acute when we
consider predicates such as ‘ξ0 looks red to ξ1 at ξ2’.
There is no denying that such situations are uncomfortable for the subject
who finds herself in them, but they should by no means be seen as paradox-
ical, or as presenting a challenge to the naive theory. They crucially arise
because Na¨ıf is subjected to (SHARP) itself or to some of its analogues, and
we have already seen in section 6.4.5 that such a subjection is incompatible
with Na¨ıf’s transparency with respect to the relevant states-of-affairs. Since,
on both versions of the problem, this consists in Na¨ıf’s being blind to the
existence of certain non-soritical reasons, we can assume that the failure of
transparency induced by subjection to (SHARP) or its analogues is actually
a failure of omniscience rather than infallibility (see fn 23).
Under this assumption, Na¨ıf’s blindness to the existence of the relevant
288 CHAPTER 6. FORCED MARCH IN THE PENUMBRA
non-soritical reasons can neatly be explained as follows. Na¨ıf’s subjection to
an analogue of (SHARP) for ‘Na¨ıf-non-soritical’ is incompatible with Na¨ıf’s
transparency (i.e. omniscience) with respect to there being non-soritical rea-
sons to believe that a certain patch is red. This, in conjunction with the plau-
sible assumption that, in Na¨ıf’s highly idealized context, any non-soritical
reason to believe that a certain patch is Na¨ıf-non-soritical would be a non-
soritical reason to believe that a certain patch is red, explains why, in the
first version of the problem, Na¨ıf cannot access any non-soritical reason to
believe that patch #i is Na¨ıf-non-soritical. Moreover, Na¨ıf’s subjection to
(SHARP) itself is incompatible with Na¨ıf’s transparency (i.e. omniscience)
with respect to a certain patch’s being red. This, in conjunction with the
plausible assumption that, in Na¨ıf’s highly idealized context, if Na¨ıf has ac-
cess to a certain non-soritical reason, he also has access to every soritical
reason generated by it (so that failure of Na¨ıf’s omniscience with respect to
a certain patch’s being red in effect amounts to failure of Na¨ıf’s omniscience
with respect to there being non-soritical reasons to believe that a certain—
possibly antecedent—patch is red), explains why, in the second version of the
problem, Na¨ıf cannot access any non-soritical reason to believe that patch
#i + 1 is red (to stress, because otherwise Na¨ıf would be omniscient with
respect to patch #i + 2’s being red, which he may well not be). Given this
forced failure of transparency (i. e. omniscience), it is thus just what one
should expect that, for some patches x, y, Na¨ıf is blind to the existence of
non-soritical reasons to believe that x is Na¨ıf-non-soritical, and blind to the
existence of non-soritical reasons to believe that y is red.
What, among other things, the foregoing shows is in effect that, under the
current assumptions concerning Na¨ıf, at least some proposition saying that
a certain patch is red is non-deductively inaccessible for Na¨ıf at the time of
the forced march (see section 5.4.3). Using equivalent assumptions, we could
have derived the same conclusion from the more general result of section 5.4.3
concerning the connection between non-deductively inaccessible propositions
and at least intermediate applications of non-transitivity. What is crucial
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to stress in closing this section is that none of these findings lends support
to the objection that a naive theorist like Na¨ıf is committed to holding that
an object x can be, say, red without there being any canonical reasons to
believe that it is so (because, so the objection goes, even though we cannot
establish by looking that x is red, we can still do so, qua naive theorists, by
inferring that x is red from a relevant tolerance conditional together with its
antecedent). This is so because, for all that has been shown in our discussion
of ANTI-NAIVE, a naive theorist can still hold that [something is red iff
there are canonical reasons to believe that it is so] (from which, together with
the relevant tolerance principle for ‘red’, it plausibly follows that, if there are
canonical reasons to believe that patch #i is red, there are also canonical
reasons to believe that patch #i + 1 is red). This does not contradict any
of the previous findings, as long as we keep in mind that the imposition
of (SHARP) and its analogues on a certain subject s forces a gap between
the existence of canonical reasons to believe a certain proposition and these
reasons’ accessibility to s.30
6.5 The Penumbra
6.5.1 Falling Asleep with an Unhappy Face
Given the failure of even the most promising strategies, we are entitled to
conclude that forced-marched Vicky will not be able to return a warranted
answer for every patch in the series. (E) fails—Vicky cannot possibly preserve
her intellectual integrity while judging every patch in the series. Such is the
forced march. No matter how repugnant this conclusion used to appear to us
before a detailed examination of the forced march, it is the conclusion which
is mandated at the end of such examination, and I will henceforth assume it.
More specifically, let us distinguish between two (related) paradoxes. In
30Thanks to Crispin Wright for illuminating discussions of the cluster of issues surround-
ing ANTI-NAIVE.
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one sense, our paradox was that (E) is apparently true, and nevertheless
consideration of the forced march under apparently true assumptions would
appear to entail that it is false. The straightforward—even though maybe
disappointing—solution to that paradox is that, despite its apparent truth,
(E) is after all false (let us call this the ‘forced-answer paradox ’). But there is
another, arguably deeper sense in which our paradox was that it is apparently
true that one can always preserve one’s intellectual integrity, and nevertheless
consideration of the forced march under apparently true assumptions would
appear to entail that this is false (let us call this the ‘forced-fault paradox ’).
Let us also distinguish between two kinds of solutions to the forced-fault
paradox: on the one hand, “happy-face solutions”, which try to solve the
paradox by respecting (E), and so by devising an overall pattern of answers
which would preserve Vicky’s intellectual integrity while allowing for her to
judge every patch in the series; on the other hand, “unhappy-face solutions”,
which try to solve the paradox by rejecting (E), and so by disallowing Vicky to
judge every patch in the series.31 Given our assumption that (E) is false, we
can thus only hope for an unhappy-face solution to the forced-fault paradox.
What should one do when one is forced-march? After all, given that (E)
is false, there is no strategy one can undertake which would allow one to
preserve one’s intellectual integrity while fully engaging in the forced march.
So, assuming that one’s intellectual integrity is unnegotiable, what should
one do?
That “there is no strategy one can undertake which would allow one to
preserve one’s intellectual integrity while fully engaging in the forced march”
just means that there is nothing one can do or try to do which would effec-
tively preserve one’s intellectual integrity while fully engaging in the forced
march. Any action of this kind would be in vain. This might suggest that
31I’m thus going to use the expressions ‘happy-face/unhappy-face solution’ in a different
semi-technical sense from the semi-technical sense adopted by Stephen Schiffer in his
influential Schiffer [1998]; Schiffer [2000]; Schiffer [2003], pp. 178–237. I’ve decided to stick
to these labels because of their compelling vividness.
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some action of a different kind would be successful. Indeed, it is often in-
timated as an alternative, more effective strategy to the ones we have been
reviewing that at some point in the forced march one should simply opt out
of the game, refusing to keep on answering the malign questions of the in-
terrogator. At some point in the forced march, one should simply shrug
one’s shoulders. This strategy is typically offered in an unhappy-face spirit,
as the only thing which is left to do for Vicky given that all the happy-
face strategies—which try to meet head-on the interrogator’s questions—are
deemed to be bound to fail. Indeed, the arguments in section 6.4 would then
break down at least in their letter, since they assume that there will be a
first patch for which Vicky returns a verdict different from ‘Yes’ immediately
succeeding the last patch for which Vicky returns ‘Yes’ as a verdict, and this
assumption is (classically) justified in the setting of the forced march only if
Vicky does return a verdict of some kind or other for all the patches in the
series.
However, the arguments in section 6.4 would still remain unscathed in
their spirit. For once the deep reasons are appreciated as to why the happy-
face strategies are bound to fail (reasons which I have tried to unearth in
section 6.4), it should be clear that the unhappy-face strategy of shrugging
one’s shoulders is no better off than happy-face strategies are. For Vicky
can be subjected to an analogue of (SHARP) for shrugging her shoulders at
patch x (rather than for returning a ‘Yes’-verdict for x), and so there will be
a first patch #i at which Vicky shrugs her shoulders. But then the question
arises as to why Vicky starts shrugging her shoulders at patch #i rather than
at, say, patch #i − 1 or patch #i + 1, and a dialectic analogous to the one
developed in section 6.4 will occur, with the same negative conclusion. The
dialectic will occur because, even if she decides to shrug her shoulders at the
question as to whether patch #i is red, Vicky can hardly shrug her shoulders
at the question as to why start shrugging one’s shoulders exactly at patch
#i (given that she does so!).32
32True, actions can quite generally be described at such a level of specificity that it
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Of course, one could decide to disengage from the forced march in the
radical sense of not taking part in it in the first place: one would not form
any judgement at all about any patch in the series, not even about patch
#1. But in what sense would such a draconian measure manage to preserve
one’s intellectual integrity? One would not even recognize an indisputable
positive case of red as such, but, as we have already noted in section 6.4.4,
this failure of recognition in the face of overwhelming positive or negative
warrant is a parody of inquiry. Setting thus aside this last suicidal option,
our paradox is now revealed to be even more dramatic: if one cannot even
so much as opt out of the forced march while preserving one’s intellectual
integrity, what should one do?
One shouldn’t do anything. The previous arguments show that, if one
really considers all the questions which naturally arise in the course of a
forced march (or self-consciously dismisses some of them), in one way or
another one is doomed to lose one’s intellectual integrity. Any action would
be in vain. Thus, one can only hope to forget about at least some of these
would make little sense to demand for an action to be justified that the agent be able
to justify, at that level of specificity, her acting in a certain very specific way rather
than in a different but barely distinguishable one. For example, it would make little
sense to demand for your leaving the room to be justified that you be able to justify,
at the level of nanoseconds, your leaving at a certain very specific time t (as, barring
irrelevant vagueness, you unavoidably will) rather than a nanosecond earlier or later than
t. And crucially, in the present context, it becomes irrelevant that mental actions such
as judgements seem to represent a counterexample to the unrestricted validity of the
previous claim (presumably because a mental action—as opposed to a material one—can
remain unspecific in the relevant respects by directing itself towards a suitably unspecific
content), since shrugging one’s shoulders is a material rather than a mental action (I’m
here helping myself to what I hope is an intuitive and non-committal understanding of the
mental/material distinction). Sharpening the way the point is put in the text, I reply that,
as long as shrugging her shoulders is a self-conscious action on Vicky’s part, it will involve
the formation of judgements concerning whether a certain patch is such that it would be
reasonable to shrug her shoulders at it. At least with respect to these judgements (and
under the aegis of (COH)), a dialectic analogous to the one developed in section 6.4 will
occur, with the same negative conclusion. Thanks to Stephen Read for raising this worry.
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questions. This could happen in several ways: by failing to notice that
they do arise, by getting distracted into other activities, by falling asleep
etc. Crucially, these are not actions one undertakes : any such self-conscious
action to the effect of blocking the consideration of the relevant questions
for at least some patch would become involved in the dialectic just exposed.
These and other species of forgetting about a question are rather events that
happen to one, and all one can do is to hope that they will happen.
It is because they are such blind happenings that a human inquirer cannot
be criticized on intellectual grounds for undergoing them, even though she
may be criticized for that on practical grounds (for example, for not taking
a pill which would have kept her awake). Such blind happenings are thus
compatible with the preservation of the inquirer’s intellectual integrity. One
cannot even make preparations for them to happen, as these preparations
would need to involve instructions (like ‘Take a pill that will make you fall
asleep after patch #350’) which, in order to avoid the previous draconian
alternative, would have to make sure that one does not forget to judge at least
in some cases—but the by now all too familiar question would then once again
arise as to how the line can be drawn in a warranted way. . . Uncontrolled
forgetting is the only safe way out of the forced march—or so I must conclude
with an unhappy face.
6.5.2 Doxastic Paradox
It must be recognized that our proposed solution to the forced-fault para-
dox may well have appeared repugnant to us before a detailed examination
of the forced march. Nevertheless, it is the solution which is mandated at
the end of such examination—all better-looking alternatives have revealed
flawed. The argument for our solution has in effect been an unabashed argu-
ment by elimination, in which we gleefully shot down alternative happy-face
and unhappy-face solutions. I think however that, in the presence of the
undeniable initial repugnancy, we can provide additional support for our so-
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lution by showing that a similar solution is the correct one in another area
independent from the forced march. Again, the area we will be looking at
is the same as the one we explored from a different perspective in section
6.3.2 to refute (QS): the area of the paradoxes of self-reference, this time in
particular the doxastic paradoxes.
Consider a modified version of the Believer paradox (re-discovered in
modern times by Burge [1984]), with a sentence β0 provably equivalent with
‘β0 is not believed by John’
33 (where ‘believe’ and its like are short for ‘believe
at some time or other’, with suitable modifications under embeddings).
(i) Suppose that John believes β0. Then, by double-negation introduction,
it is not the case that it is not the case that β0 is believed by John, and
so, since by construction β0 entails ‘It is not the case that β0 is believed
by John’, β0 is not the case. Therefore, by structural contraction, John
believes something that is not the case.
(ii) Suppose that John does not believe β0. Then, since by construction
‘β0 is not believed by John’ entails β0, β0 is the case. Therefore, by
structural contraction, John does not believe something that is the case.
In either case, John would fail to keep track of reality, in particular of
whether or not he believes β0. But, crucially (for our present purposes),
the Believer paradox does not exhaust itself in this already uncomfortable
situation. For reflect that the simple piece of reasoning in (i) is available to
John. John has thus a simple conclusive reason not to believe β0. Given this
reason, if he considers at all the question as to whether or not believe β0,
John should thus come to the conclusion that he should not believe β0. But,
if he considers at all the question as to whether or not believe β0, John can
certainly also come to know that this latter piece of reasoning is available to
33Again, to keep things simple, in making this point I use ‘believe’ and its like as
predicates of sentences. Comments analogous to those made in fn 7 apply.
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John (himself), and so, trusting John’s (his) rationality, come to believe that
John does not believe β0. Ouch!
This situation bears a striking resemblance to the forced-fault paradox.
For here as well there seems to be a serious threat to John’s intellectual
integrity. This should already be apparent from the previous presentation,
as the reasoning exploited there appears to be absolutely compelling (if John
considers at all the question as to whether or not believe β0), and yet commits
John to believing something (β0) that, in the course of the same reasoning, he
has already committed himself not to believing. Since no one can both believe
and fail to believe that something is the case, the preservation of John’s
intellectual integrity is impossible. A slight variation on the reasoning may
make the analogy even more forceful. Either John believes β0 or he doesn’t.
If he does and considers at all the question as to whether or not believe β0,
given a modicum of self-knowledge he can run through (i) to undermine any
warrant he might have had for so believing; if he doesn’t and considers at
all the question as to whether or not believe β0, given a modicum of self-
knowledge he can run through (ii) to undermine any warrant he might have
had for not so believing. Such is the Believer paradox.
The paradox cannot plausibly be blocked by revising the (non-trivial)
logic used in it, because, in contrast to ‘true’ or ‘known (by Thomas)’, ‘be-
lieved (by John)’ is a predicate whose application can be entirely decided on
perfectly ordinary grounds, even if the sentence under consideration is self-
referential in the peculiar way paradoxical sentences are. Of course, it is not
to be denied that there might be cases where the application of ‘believed
(by John)’ is itself indeterminate (consider for example borderline cases for
it), but such cases can be screened off by subjecting John to (SHARP) and
its analogues (an analogous comment would apply to dialetheist proposals of
solution). And there would seem to be no bar to the use of classical logic to
a predicate whose application is so decidable.
Nor can the paradox be blocked by recourse to a hierarchy of belief pred-
icates, so that, setting the ith-order to be the order of the belief predicate
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occurring in β0, John should not believe
i β0 but should believe
i+1 β0. For
the paradoxical reasoning is no less compelling when carried out using the
beliefi predicate instead of the beliefi+1 predicate: if he considers at all the
question as to whether or not believei β0 , John can certainly also come to
know (and hence believei) that the relevant piece of reasoning is available
to John (himself), and so, trusting John’s (his) rationality, come to believei
that John does not believei β0. If belief
i is such as to fail to make this rea-
soning compelling, it must fail to obey some norm which is deeply embedded
in our pre-theoretical concept of belief, and so must all belief properties in
the hierarchy, since, for every j, an analogous paradox can be devised for the
beliefj predicate. Maybe the suggestion is really that, as far as beliefi goes,
John should forget about the question as to whether or not believei β0—if
so, I think the suggestion is on the right track, but the introduction of the
hierarchy does not seem to achieve anything substantial additional to what
the solution to be proposed achieves.
The paradox cannot even be blocked by caution about one’s future ra-
tionality, so that John should not conclude from the availability to John
(himself) of the simple piece of reasoning in (i) (and of the ensuing availabil-
ity to John (himself) of the consequences of the former availability) that John
(he himself) will always do what he has most reason to do, and so will never
believe β0. For, whatever one might think of such a caution, an analogous
paradox can be devised by using a sentence β1 provably equivalent with ‘β1
is not now believed by John’, and it would seem that John cannot but trust
John’s (his) present rationality.
As the presentation of the paradox already suggests, the only way out of
it for John seems to be that of not considering the question as to whether
or not believe β0. It is worth noting that the unhappy-face strategy of not
considering in the sense opting out of the game presents itself here as well,
and that it seems to suffer exactly from the same problem we discussed in
section 6.5.1 for its application to the forced-fault paradox: if John self-
consciously decides not to consider the question as to whether or not believe
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β0, how can he avoid forming the belief that he does not believe β0? A better
unhappy-face solution seems to be that of forgetting about the question as
to whether or not believe β0, in analogy to the forgetfulness solution that
we defended with respect to the forced-fault paradox. Such an unhappy-face
solution would break the spell of the apparent symmetry of the reasonings
in (i) and (ii): forgetting about this question, John will certainly not believe
β0 (and so will not run afoul of the reasoning in (i)), but will also not be
criticizable for not believing what is in fact the case (namely, β0), for, after
all, he has forgotten about that question (and so will not run afoul of the
reasoning in (ii)).
6.5.3 The Source of Borderline Cases
From the standpoint of the traditional approach to the problem of vagueness
adopted in this essay (see section 1.4), our favoured unhappy-face solution
to the forced-fault paradox enjoys a considerable additional advantage. To
recall, that approach takes as basic the phenomenon of sorites susceptibil-
ity, thereby standing in sharp contrast with the dominant approach which
rather takes as basic the phenomenon of borderlineness, interpreting it as
strong borderlineness. Yet, as detailed in section 1.3, there seems to be a
solid intuition that, on each episode of consideration of a soritical series,
some items cannot be decided (i.e. are such that the inquirer is neither in a
position warrantedly to believe that they are positive cases nor in a position
warrantedly to believe that they are negative cases)—in other words, that
no soritical series, even though finite in the classical sense, can be surveyed
all at once. Even though I reject the existence of strong borderline cases (see
again section 1.3), I still accept the content of this borderlineness intuition,
and I would regard it as a serious defect of the theory of vagueness defended
in this essay if it were not able to account for it.
Fortunately, the forgetfulness solution to the forced-fault paradox pro-
vides the materials for accounting for the phenomenon of borderlineness
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without appeal to any distinctive normative status enjoyed by some items
in a soritical series (i.e. without appeal to strong borderline cases). For the
solution requires that, on each episode of consideration of a soritical series,
some items must be left forgotten, and so a fortiori cannot be decided. My
proposal is then to identify the borderline cases in a soritical series S on an
episode of consideration e of S with all and only those items in S that are
forgotten on e in such a way as to make possible the forgetfulness solution
to the forced-fault paradox.
Some caveats. Firstly, the proposal is neutral as to what to understand
“episodes of consideration” more exactly to be: variations can be had both
with respect to whom to count as subject of the consideration (a single
subject, the participants in a context, a whole linguistic community) and with
respect to what to count as an act of consideration (a sequence of explicit
mental judgements, the pattern of beliefs at a certain time, the information
potentially available at a certain time). With regard to the latter, note that
the exact sense of ‘forgotten’ should also be taken to vary according to the
particular choice made for the second parameter (not explicitly mentally
judged, not believed, no information about). There is reason to think that
many of the different notions generated by setting these (and maybe other)
parameters to some of these (and maybe other) values will prove theoretically
interesting—I myself am inclined to think that the notion generated by the
middle values just mentioned will prove especially useful and close to some
aspects of the pre-theoretical notion of a borderline case (see chapter 1, fn
3), and will henceforth assume it as the default notion.
Secondly, as should have emerged from the discussion of the forced march,
by ‘x is forgotten (on an episode of consideration e)’, ‘x is not considered
(on e)’, ‘x lies beyond the horizon of one’s consideration (on e)’ etc. I simply
mean that the question whether x is F or not (where ‘F ’ is the predicate for
which the series is soritical) is forgotten (on e). In particular, I do not mean
that other properties of x are forgotten, let alone that x’s very existence is
forgotten.
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Thirdly, note that the role of the clause ‘in such a way as to make possible
the forgetfulness solution to the forced-fault paradox’ is that of narrowing
down the borderline cases to the largest most central convex set of forgotten
items, thereby approximating a salient feature of the pre-theoretical notion
of a borderline case.
Fourthly, let me stress that my proposal is “reconstructive” rather than
“descriptive”: I do not intend to say what the pre-theoretical notion of a
borderline case (if there is a unique such thing) is (even though I have taken
and shall take inspiration from a couple of features that are displayed in
ordinary thought and talk), let alone what the notion of a strong borderline
case (the notion used by the dominant approach) is. What I intend to do is
rather, having identified on the basis of the phenomenon of borderlineness a
theoretical role to play, to propose a notion which has naturally arisen in the
context of the forced march and which seems fit to play that role. One would
probably get even closer to the pre-theoretical notion of a borderline case by
adding the clause that it must be a hard question to decide whether the item
is a positive or a negative case (in a sense of ‘hard question’ which of course
does not imply that the item is a strong borderline case). I’m inclined to
adopt such a strengthening of the proposal, but nothing of importance here
will hinge on this decision.
Fifthly, one can extend the proposal to definite cases, by saying that x is
definitely F iff x is F and not borderline F (see section 3.3.1). This yields a
well-behaved notion of a definite case—in particular, a notion which is factive
and so allows the explanation of indefiniteness in terms of tolerance offered
in section 1.4. I must leave it to another occasion to explore which properties
of the property of being definite are induced by the proposal (for example,
whether it iterates). Here, it will suffice to note that such an extension
would arguably make mandatory what would already have seemed to be a
desirable broadening of the original proposal: namely, to define the property
of being borderline (and hence the property of being definite) not only for
objects (with respect to properties), but also for propositions—in a familiar
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terminology, to provide not only a de re, but also a de dicto reading for
‘borderline’-phrases (and hence for ‘definitely’-phrases).34 Such a broadening
can be achieved by introducing the notion of a forgotten proposition in the
mould of the notion of a forgotten item. I leave the details to the reader.
Indeed, the extra strength of ‘forgotten’ is welcome, for it seems that the
phenomenon of borderlineness goes as far as to warrant a protest against
any complete classification of a soritical series. ‘Patch #1 is absolutely red;
patch #2 is almost absolutely red; patch #3 is roughly absolutely red. . . patch
#400 is almost neither definitely red nor definitely not red; patch #401 is
just neither definitely red nor definitely not red; patch #402 is little more
than just neither definitely red nor definitely not red. . . patch #600 is almost
not red; patch #601 is just not red; patch #602 is little more than just
not red. . . patch #998 is roughly absolutely not red; patch #999 is almost
absolutely not red; patch #1,000 is absolutely not red’: it is natural to react
to any such classification by saying ‘Look, you can’t do this—you must leave
some borderline cases!’. In this and similar speeches, we can glimpse a feature
of the pre-theoretical notion of a borderline case which has gone unnoticed for
far too long: not something which enjoys a distinctive status, but something
which, on the relevant episode of consideration, is not attributed any such
status—forgotten, lying beyond the horizon of one’s present consideration.
Since I have argued in section 6.4.5 that the forced-fault paradox is not
at all a paradox of vagueness, it should be expected that forgotten items will
be present also on episodes of considerations of non-soritical, precise series
like those considered in section 6.4.5. It should have already been expected
that something very similar to (if not identical with) borderline cases arises
for non-soritical series affected by some sort or other of indeterminacy—
yet, it might be seem doubtful that borderline cases still arise even when
all indeterminacy (be it vagueness-related or not) is absent. However, it
34Ineliminable de dicto occurrences of ‘definitely’ have taken for example centre stage
in chapter 3. I’m grateful to Neil Cooper for making me aware of the importance of this
issue.
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is certainly in the spirit of the theory of vagueness defended in this essay
to allow that something very similar to borderline cases will arise also on
episodes of considerations of precise series, for, on this theory, borderline
cases do not enter at all into the definition of what vagueness is.
Be that as it may, I think that there are some important differences
between forgotten items in a precise series and forgotten items in a soritical
series which justify my prising them apart for theoretical purposes (note
that my official definition of a borderline case applies only to soritical series
and so picks out only the latter kind of forgotten items, but it is clear that
without further substantiation this would be just a point of terminology).
Forgotten items in a soritical series present an opacity to inquiry which is in
some respect stronger and in some respect weaker than the opacity presented
by forgotten items in a precise series.
On the one hand, the opacity is stronger in the sense that it cannot be
eliminated by simply switching to already known, more powerful methods of
inquiry, whereas it can be so eliminated in precise series (e. g. by recourse
to ruler measurements in the case of the series of trees of section 6.4.5).
Indeed, on most views on vagueness, the opacity is so strong in this respect
that it cannot be eliminated at all, holding of necessity for every subject and
method (see Sorensen [2001], pp. 21–39). In this specific respect, such views
have been almost fully vindicated by the present analysis, since, as we have
seen in section 6.4.5, even God himself, if subjected to (SHARP), would have
to forget about some item (of course, given my rejection of the existence of
strong borderline cases, I think that the necessary opacity in question is only,
as it were, de dicto rather than de re: it is the necessity that, on every episode
of consideration, some item or other remain forgotten, and not the necessity
belonging to some particular item to remain forgotten on every episode of
consideration).
On the other hand, the opacity is weaker in the sense that, keeping the
method fixed, for each particular forgotten item in a soritical series, there is
no reason to rule out that subjects belonging to another episode of considera-
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tion do manage to decide the status of the item by that very same method (at
least, this is so if borderline cases are not strong borderline cases), whereas,
for some item in a precise series, there is every reason to rule out that any
subject manages to decide the status of the item by that very same method.
In addition to the divergent answers to the question as to whether or not
borderline cases enjoy a distinctive normative status, there are of course at
least two other quite conspicuous differences between the proposed recon-
struction of the notion of a borderline case and the interpretation given to
it by the dominant approach. The first difference is that the proposed no-
tion will be, in many cases of interest, precise, since, in many such cases,
it will be a precise question which items are forgotten on which episode of
consideration. Granted, sometimes this question will itself be vague (there
can be a soritical series from forgotten items to unforgotten ones). There-
fore, if “higher-order vagueness” is vagueness in one’s favoured notion of a
borderline case (see section 1.3), there will still be on this view a marginal
residue of higher-order vagueness. Nevertheless, in many cases of interest, it
will be legitimate to assume that the borderline cases of a vague predicate
have precise boundaries. In particular, in the context of the paradoxes of
higher-order vagueness (see chapter 3), a new formidable argument needs to
be mounted to the effect that there really is all the higher-order vagueness
that the paradoxes require. The prospects for such an argument are at best
bleak. Moreover, the defender of borderlineness principles can now appeal
to the coherence, for all the paradoxes show, of a position which asserts bor-
derlineness principles while keeping within precise boundaries its pattern of
forgetfulness: if such a position is still coherent, no fatal threat would seem
to be posed on borderlineness principles by the paradoxes of higher-order
vagueness.35,36
35Of course, these are not counters available to a theory adopting the dominant ap-
proach, as they require acceptance of the radically deflationary view of borderline cases
advocated in this chapter. Also, let me stress that, for any naive theory of vagueness, the
last line of resistance against the paradoxes still remains their invalidity in tolerant logics.
36True, on the proposed reconstruction of the notion, even though borderline cases of
6.5. THE PENUMBRA 303
The second difference is that, on the proposed reconstruction, the prop-
erty of being a borderline case is not importantly determined by any intrinsic
feature of the item in question and hence can vastly change from its being ex-
emplified to its not being exemplified and vice versa according to the volatile
vicissitudes of episodes of consideration. In some sense or other, it is rel-
ative to such episodes.37 This is in sharp contrast with the interpretation
given by the dominant approach, according to which the property of being
a borderline case is importantly determined by intrinsic features of the item
in question and hence is relatively invariant across episodes of consideration.
This difference is just what one would have expected given what the source
a vague predicate will in many cases have precise boundaries, it may well be that the
relevant propositions stating where these precise boundaries are on a certain episode of
consideration e are forgotten on at least some episode of consideration. This will often
be plausible especially on e itself: if one forgets about the question whether x is F , one
often also forgets about the question whether x is borderline F . Thus, it may well be
that the premises of the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness are still true on some episode
of consideration. I accept this conclusion, but I am sceptical that anything problematic
for my view follows from it. Firstly, on the present deflationary view of borderline cases,
even if some paradox remained, it would not be a paradox of vagueness at all, but a
paradox of forgetfulness, to be treated in one’s favoured epistemological theory. Secondly,
a straightforward solution to the alleged paradox does seem to be readily available, as
the relevant closure principle for the property of being definite clearly stands no chance
of being correct on the present deflationary view of definite cases. For example, on the
present view, it can be the case that it is definite on an episode of consideration e that
everything in the domain of discourse is F , but also that it is not definite on e that a
certain member x of the domain is F , even though the latter follows from the former.
This is so because it can be the case that, even though the proposition that everything is
F is not forgotten on e, the proposition that x is F is forgotten on e (and so not definite
on e).
37There is by now a huge literature on the different possible semantic and metaphysical
implementations of the intuitive idea that the correctness of the application of a notion
is relative to some specified parameter. Since my proposal is reconstructive rather than
descriptive, I don’t think it’s terribly important to decide here among these implementa-
tions, just as, si parva licet, this wasn’t terribly important for special-relativity theorists
with respect to the notion of simultaneity.
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of borderline cases is on the view I am proposing: borderline cases arise not
because some items have some distinctive property, but because a soritical
series, even though finite in the classical sense, cannot be surveyed all at once
by an inquirer,38 and some item or other in it had better remain forgotten,
lying in the penumbra of the light cast by inquiry. But it does not matter
much which particular item so remains forgotten, and it is just natural that
several items reach and leave the penumbra according to the different foci of
attention of different episodes of consideration. On this view, the notion of
a borderline case is peculiarly anthropomorphic and does not belong to the
side of things as they are in themselves in abstraction from inquiry: the esse
of borderline cases consists in their (non) percipi.
6.6 Conclusion
For the reasons I have already explained, the proposed conception of border-
line cases is particularly hospitable to the theory of vagueness defended in
this essay. From the standpoint of that theory, the overarching dialectic of
this chapter looks as follows. The forced-fault paradox is particularly acute
for a naive theory of vagueness, since, on any such theory, the drawing of
sharp boundaries provoked by the forced march is objectively wrong (run-
ning afoul of tolerance principles) and not just unwarranted. Hence, a theory
accepting tolerance principles is in even more urgent a need than other the-
ories are of a satisfactory solution to the paradox. The forgetfulness solution
is such a solution, being motivated independently of vague forced marches
(as witnessed by precise forced marches) and indeed independently of forced
marches in general (as witnessed by the Believer paradox). Crucially for the
38The idea of totalities which, even though finite in the classical sense, are unsurveyable
is central in the strict-finitist tradition (Hjelmslev [1922]; Esenin-Vol’pin [1970]; Vopeˇnka
[1979] are some of its milestones). As I have warned in section 1.5, the exploration of the
connections between this tradition and the position developed in this essay must wait for
another occasion.
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naive theory, the forgetfulness solution also lets a notion emerge which can
serve as a viable reconstruction of the notion of a borderline case, since it
can account for the phenomenon of borderlineness, which is arguably one of
the few genuine phenomena to be found in this area. Tolerance and border-
lineness are thus finally connected. In the face of the utter inability of the
dominant approach to account for our sense that vague expressions do not
draw sharp boundaries, the tie thus achieved seems to me another point in
favour of the theory defended in this essay.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This essay has offered a new theory of vagueness. The theory falls within
the traditional approach to the problem of vagueness by taking as basic
the phenomenon of sorites susceptibility. The main theoretical tasks of the
theory are thus determined to be the explanation of this phenomenon, an
account of its relation with sorites paradoxes and the explanation of the
other phenomena of vagueness by means of the more basic property of sorites
susceptibility. This essay can be seen as a sustained attempt at accomplishing
these tasks for a specific theory which adopts the traditional approach.
The specific theory developed in this essay is a naive theory of vagueness,
holding that the nature of the vagueness of a predicate consists in its failure
to draw a sharp boundary between its positive and negative cases—that is,
in its tolerance. I have argued in chapter 2 for the claim that tolerance is
indeed a crucial feature that some of our concepts must possess if they are
to serve in the achievement of certain important theoretical and practical
purposes—if certain thoughts about, experiences of and interactions with
the world are to be possible. Together with the very plausible assumption
that the achievement of these purposes, if at all possible, is what vagueness
is for, those arguments can be turned into arguments in favour of the naive
theory itself, since rejecting the theory would then amount to rejecting that
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the achievement of these purposes is at all possible—a sad conclusion indeed.
From the standpoint of the naive theory, such arguments also contribute
to an exhibition of the sources of vagueness. These sources are rooted in
fundamental facts about our cognition and agency in the world. The naive
theory thus gives vagueness a depth which is by far unmatched by all the
other theories.
The truth of tolerance principles, together with the assumption that such
truth is available to vague-concepts users, can also quite straightforwardly
explain most phenomena of vagueness, such as sorites susceptibility, indefi-
niteness, ignorance and higher-order vagueness. At this point, the cumulative
argument in favour of the naive theory may appear impressive: not only does
the naive theory have an undeniable air of self-evidence about it and enjoy an
enviable explanatory power, but it also connects in a desirable way vagueness
with fundamental facts about our cognition, agency and experience in the
world. This concurrence of positive features plausibly makes it the theory
which must be defeated if it is not to be accepted.
Alas, there is indeed a defeater: the sorites paradox. As no other serious
defeaters are in view, a satisfactory solution to the paradox becomes in effect
the Grail of the naive theory of vagueness: if such a solution can be found,
it will be hard to see, in view of its other positive features, how the theory
could fail to be the right theory of vagueness. By way of a preliminary to
the real treatment of the paradox, I have shown in chapter 3 that it will be
in any event vain to retreat from the naive theory (and from its tolerance
principles) to some weaker theory adopting the dominant approach (and to
its borderlineness principles). For, once the full extent that higher-order
vagueness must take under the dominant approach is recognized, it can at
last be seen that the same kind of logic which, via a standard sorites paradox,
dooms tolerance to inconsistency is also sufficient, via a higher-order sorites
paradox, to doom borderlineness to inconsistency.
Coming to my own solution to the sorites paradox, I have identified in
chapter 4 an unobvious usually hidden presupposition of the reasoning in-
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volved in the paradox (the transitivity of the consequence relation) and de-
veloped a natural weakening of the logic which puts principled restrictions on
it, thereby making the naive theory consistent. Some of the many philosoph-
ical issues arising from this non-transitivist solution to the sorites paradox
have been addressed in chapter 5. There, I have argued that non-transitive
conceptions of logical consequence quite generally find their roots in the idea
that consequence should be faithful to certain local connections and that at
least some of these conceptions can (even if they need not) be made sense
of as representing a different understanding of the normative import of con-
sequence rather than as contesting some traditional law linking consequence
with truth.
Although the claim has not been adequately defended in this essay, I
don’t think that vagueness gives us any reason to believe in the existence of
strong borderline cases. Yet, I do acknowledge the phenomenon of border-
lineness, and so my theory had better say something about what it is to be a
(non-strong) borderline case and why there are (non-strong) borderline cases.
Indeed, there arguably is a general challenge for theories adopting the tra-
ditional approach to connect in a satisfactory way sorites susceptibility with
borderlineness. I have tackled this issue in chapter 6, starting from a more
general problem concerning the possibility and limits of the preservation of
one’s intellectual integrity in inquiry, and addressing from that—I hope—
illuminating perspective the forced-march paradox. I have argued that the
paradox is not really a paradox of vagueness at all and that no happy-face
solution to it will succeed. I have proposed my own unhappy-face solution,
which requires that one forget about some items in the forced-march series.
Finally, exploiting the concept of a forgotten item crucially employed by this
solution, I have suggested that, in a reconstructive spirit, we identify border-
line cases on an episode of consideration with the relevant items which are
forgotten on that episode of consideration and have argued that the recon-
structed notion actually suffices to explain the phenomenon of borderlineness
and other features of the pre-theoretical notion of a borderline case.
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The riddle of vagueness has been a major cause of intellectual embarrass-
ment for a few ancient philosophical schools and has occupied many of the
sharpest minds in modern analytic philosophy. It lies at the crossroad of
some of the deepest and hardest issues in the philosophy of logic, language
and epistemology. I have really enjoyed thinking about it for the last few
years and I must actually confess that I’m fairly confident that the theory
presented in this essay is right in its main contentions. Yet, I think that, as is
often the case for many of the perennial problems in philosophy, to manage
to hit the truth is actually much less important for the intellectual value of
our inquiry than to improve our understanding of what the problem really is,
to assess merits and disadvantages of extant positions and to develop origi-
nal ways of thinking about it. I don’t think there can be any doubt that, on
these latter dimensions, the contemporary debate on vagueness has been a
success story of modern analytical philosophy. I hope that the present essay
will fruitfully contribute to this ongoing dialogue.
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